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"Each nation has a unique tone to sound in the symphony of human culture; each nation is 
an indispensable and irreplaceable player in the orchestra of humanity" 
I L Claude Jf., National Minorities An International Problem 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1955, 85. 
"No man is an island, entire to itself; every man is a piece of the main ..... Any man's death 
diminishes me because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for 
whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee". 
John Donne cited in M C Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in 
International Criminal Law (Dordrecht: M.Nijhofl) 1992, Preface. 
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PART I 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
1.1 THE PROBLEM OF PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The concern for the plight of the minorities and an attempt to safeguard their 
interests has been an ideal which has contributed towards the growth and expansion of 
international law. 1 Although international law primarily operates through the medium of 
States, and minorities generally have no locus standi, the treatment which the minorities 
receive from their States has occasionally become a matter of international concern.2 
International law, however, has historically found it difficult to deal with the issue of 
minorities. Like the poor, the weak and the inarticulate, they have, since time immemorial 
been the natural victims of persecution and genocide.~ In an age when wars were "just", 
religious repression legitimate, and cultural or political dissidence unacceptable, minorities 
remained the prime target ofrepression.4 
1 
3 
4 
Infra chapter 4~ "The protection of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities is one of the oldest 
concerns of international law" Thornberry. 1. 
This concern has sometimes been translated in to an armed intervention to protect members of these 
communities although the humanitarian motives have been open to suspicion. Infra chapter 4. 
Kuper Genocide, 11-18. Potter; Kuper, International Action against Genocide, (London: 
MRG),1984~ Kuper, Prevention of Genocide. 
B Whitaker, Report on the Question of the Preservation and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub.2/1985/6 "Through out recorded human history, War has been the predominant 
cause or pretext for massacres of nationals. ethnic, racial or religious groups. Wars in ancient and 
classical era's frequently aimed to exterminate if not enslave other peoples. Religious intolerance 
could also be a predisposing factor: in religious wars of middle ages as well as in places in the old 
testament, some genocide was sanctioned by the Holy Writ" ibid. 6-7. For an exposition of the 
concept of "just war" see I Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force. (Oxford: OUP) 1963, 
3-18. According to Brownlie "The examination of materials of ancient civilisations for nascent 
concepts of international law proves to be a somewhat barren pursuit, and even societies which had 
achieved a high degree of civilisation were ready to resort to war against other societies and groups 
for re.:'lsons which were often slight. Lack of close contact between groups, contrast in levels of 
culture and ways of thought, and rivalry over access to resources or trade led to conflicts which were 
frequent and vicious, and which commonly resulted in slavery or death of the vanquished" (footnotes 
omitted) Brownlie ibid. 3; a)so see 0 Schacter, "Just War and Human Rights" 1 PYIL (1989), 1-19; J 
Elbe, "The Evolution of the concept of Just Wars in International Law" 33 AJIL (1939), 66S"'()88~ J 
Kunz, "Bellum Justum and Bellum Legale" 45 AJIL (1951), S28-534~ I Claude Jr, "Just Wars: 
Doctrine and institutions" 95 PSQ (1980), 83-96. 
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Even in this contemporary period of relative tolerance and rationality, minorities 
are often subjected to persecution, discrimination and genocide.s The stance of 
international law remains tentative and extremely cautious, for minorities pose questions 
of a serious nature, existing in myriad forms with their own social, political, cultural and 
religious peculiarities.6 Often transcending national frontiers minorities are extremely 
capable of appealing to the sensitivities of their international sympathisers. Most national 
boundaries are arbitrarily drawn, and a number of States contain turbulent factions 
artificially placed within their borders, often cutting across frontiers.' Many regions 
continue to witness a perpetual and infinite struggle between the minority groups on the 
one hand and the State on the other, sometimes to a point where the very fabric of the 
institution of the State comes under threat. 
A consideration of many of the contemporary disputes including those involving 
the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey and Iran,s the Kashmiris of Pakistan and India,9 the Sikhs of 
Indian Punjab,1O the Tamils of Sri Lanka,1I the Biharis of Bangladesh, 12 the Tibetans of 
China,13 the Catholics of Northern Ireland,14 the non-Arab indigenous Africans of Southern 
s Op.cit note 3~ Whitaker op.cit note 4, 7-10; Mckean; Van Dyke; Benito. 
6 J Robinson, "International Protection of Minorities A Global view" 1 lYHR (1971), 61-91, 61. 
, For an excellent survey see Gurr ct al. 
B Smaller Kurdish communities could also be found in Syria, Lebanon and states of fonner Soviet 
Union; D McDowall, The Kurds, (London: MRG), 1991; Hannum, 178-202. 
9 A Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books), 1991; S Ganguly, 
"Avoiding war in Kashmir" 69(5) FAffs, (1990),57-73; A Azmi, Kashmir An Unparalleled Curfew, 
(Karachi: Panfwain), 1990; A Varshney, "India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism" 
31 AS, (1991), 997-1019; R Wrising, "Kashmir Contlict" in C Kennedy (ed.) Pakistan 1992 
(Karachi: OUP), 1993, 133-165; A Khan, "The Kashmir Dispute A plan for regional co-operation" 
31 Col.JTL (1994) 495-550. 
10 Y Malik, "Democracy, the Akali Party and the Sikhs in Indian Politics" in D Vajpcyi and Y Malik, 
19-49~ C Shakle, The Sikhs (London: MRG) 1986~ Hannum, 151-177; also see AI "An Unnatural 
fate" A.s:4 20/42/93. 
II W Schwarz, The Tamils of Sri Lanka, (London: MRG) 1988~ Hannum, 280-307~ P Hyndman. "The 
1951 Convention Definition of a Refugee: An Appraisal with particular reference to the case of Sri 
Lankan Tamil Applicants" 9 HRQ (1987), 49-73; R Oberst, "Tamil Militancy and Youth insurgency 
in Sri Lanka" in Vajpeyi and Malik, 175-198~ AI, Sri Lanka, A.s:4 37/1/93,1993. 
12 B Whitaker et ai, The Biharis of Bangladesh, (London: MRG) 1977~ for a background analysis of the 
issues see J Rehman, "State-building, self-determination and Mohajirs" 3(2) C.s:4 (1994), 111-129. 
13 S Subedi, "The Right of self-determination and the Tibetan People" in Kritsitotis, 1-16; ICoJ, The 
Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law (Geneva), 1959~ C Mullin and P Wangyal, The Tibetans Two 
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Sudan,ls and protagonists in civil wars of the fonner Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 
reveals the widespread nature of the conflict. While a number of governments attempt to 
hide behind Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter and take refuge in the "citadel" of 
State sovereignty and sovereign equality, the minorities may take to heart the 
revolutionary indoctrination of secession in the name of self-determination. A significant 
number of States that emerged from the rubble of decolonisation have, in particular, faced 
serious challenges from their minorities. The emphasis on the principle of Uti Possidetis, 
though redolent of the colonial past, meant arbitrary divisions of peoples belonging to the 
same tribe, race, or religion. In the face of these challenges a number of States attempted 
to introduce constitutional devices including integration and pluralism,16 while others, 
insensitive to minority aspirations and unwilling to compromise, concentrated on the 
building of a nation-state with one dominant culture, language, politics and religion. I? 
Consequences of some of these policies have been severe, resulting in enduring and painful 
conflict. 
The issue of minority rights has and continues to occupy a sensitive position in 
inter-State relations. Historical as well as current events show that the subject is also 
capable of engulfing the international community as a whole. The ending of the "Cold-
war" has brought with it a need for urgent revision of many areas of international law and 
Perspectives on Tibet-Chinese Relations (London: MRG), 1983, AI Peoples' Republic of China 
Repression of Tibet 1987-1992, AS4 17/19/92, 1993. 
14 Hannum, 226-246. H Jackson and A McHardy, The Two Irelands: the Problem of a Double 
Minority, (London: MRG), 1972~ T Hadden, "Northern Ireland" in MiaU, 22-45. 
IS C EpriJe, Sudan :The Long War, (London: Institute for the study of conflicts) 1972; G Morrison, The 
Southern Sudan and Eritrea: Aspects of wider African problem (London: MRG), 1973; Hannum 308-
327; see also AI, Sudan, AFR 54129/93, 1993; D Kritsiotis, "Uti Possidetis in the Sudan: An Mrican 
crisis in perspective" in Kritsiotis, 71-81. 
16 See United Nations, Special study on Racial Discrimination in the Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Sphere, (New York: United Nations) 1971, 103-105; paras 373-379; P Thornberry, 
Minorities and Human Rights Law, 1987, (London: MRG); PaHey, 6. 
17 Palley, ibid.; also sce R Emerson, "The Fate of Human Rights in the Third World" 27 WP (1975), 
201-226; for the position in Africa see 0 Oja and A Sesay "The OAU and Human Rights: Prospects 
for the 1980's and Beyond" 8 HRQ (1989), 89-103; R Howard "Evaluating Human Rights in Africa: 
Some problems of implicit comparison" 6 HRQ (1987), 160-179. 
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international relations. The subject of the rights of minorities in international law, it is 
submitted, is worthy of an extremely thorough reconsideration. 
1.2 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
Contemporary international law provides limited rights to minorities, and there 
remains a strong perception that it affords recognition only to those rights that are capable 
of being accommodated within the general framework of individual human rights.18 While 
the right to "existence" and to "equality and non-discrimination" may be seen as being 
accorded to members of minority groups qua individuals,19 international law remains 
inadequate in preserving the cultural, linguistic and religious identity of these groups.20 
Members of a minority group often feel that in the clash of cultures, religions or 
languages it is their will and aspirations which are marginalized, and in this respect the 
18 See the discussion on the United Nations General Assembly Dec/aration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities UN Doc. AIRes. 47/135 and 
Article 27 of ICCPR, infra chapter 7~ N Rodley, "Conceptual problems in the protection of 
Minorities: International Legal Analysis" 17 HRQ (1995), 48-71, 64; "In a general way, the 
assumption lying behind the classical formulations of standards of human rights ... has been that group 
rights would be taken care of automatically as the result of the protection of the rights of individuals" 
I Brownlie, "Rights of Peoples in International law" (ed.) J Crawford, Rights of Peoples. (Oxford: 
OUP) 1988, 1-16, 2~ "Is the almost exclusive emphasis on individual human rights in international 
law since 1945 enough?." J Crawford, "The Rights of Peoples some conclusions" ibid. 159-175, 159; 
"Under the League of Nations, human rights and minority rights, though limited in their application, 
formed a coherent package. Human beings were dealt atomistically and as members of particular 
communities held together by a common consciousness or cultural, religious or linguistic tradition. 
The new human rights has been advancing to universal status, while virtually abandoning community 
rights. This is a great loss and oversight" P Thornberry, "Is there a phoenix in the Ashes 
International Law and Minority Rights" 15 Tex.JJL (1980), 421-458, 453-454; J Kunz "The Present 
Status of International Law for the Protection of Minorities" 48 AJIL (1954) 282-287, 282. 
19 "The purpose of the Genocide Convention is to affirm the rights of minorities to live, but not to give 
them the right to live as members of minority" Laponce, 34~ "In practice ... the [Genocide) Convention 
has been interpreted as guaranteeing members of minorities the right to exist, and not necessarily as 
assuring the existence of the group itself' K Kelly, "National minorities in international law" 3 JILP 
(1973), 253-273, 269~ infra chapter 5~ On the subject of non-discrimination see references op.cit note 
5; infra chapter 6. 
20 ThornbcrI)'~ F Ermacora "The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations" 182 Rec. des 
Cours (1983), 251-366; " ... existing norms on the rights of minorities are limited, and inadequate to 
the task of ensuring that minorities do not have assimilation or integration forced upon them as a 
threat to their existence and identity" Thornberry "Self-determination", 888. 
5 
individualistic and universalistic tone of international law of human rights is deficient. 
International laws which could be related to minorities are not only seen as being 
attenuated and indirect in nature but there is considerable evidence to suggest that they are 
largely ineffective in safeguarding whatever rights that are granted to minorities. 
The contention of the present study is that international law is in itself a difficult 
medium for providing adequate rights for minorities and for effectively safeguarding those 
rights. In conducting the analysis, the study identifies and examines the existing 
international legal norms relating to the rights of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, 
and in so doing highlights both the weaknesses in substance of these rights and the 
problems associated with their effective implementation. State practice has varied 
considerably in relation to minority rights, with a wide variety of factors influencing and 
determining their behaviour, and it is submitted that a general survey may not be adequate. 
Hence, in order to analyse properly the inherent difficulties and weaknesses associated 
with the issue of minority rights in international law, the case of Pakistan is used as an 
example. 
1.3 STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK OF TilE STUDY 
The study is divided into five parts consisting of twelve Chapters in total. The 
present part, Part I, in introducing the subject has provided the scope and objectives of the 
present work. Part II is entitled: "The Conceptual Analysis of the Rights of Ethnic, 
Linguistic and Religious Minorities". As its rubric indicates, this Part attempts to deal 
with a number of conceptual difficulties relating to the meaning of "rights of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious minorities". The term "rights" has often been used in a wide and 
indiscriminate manner, and such usage has sometimes resulted in confusion and 
6 
ambiguity?1 The meaning of "rights" of minorities in international law can generate a 
number of complexities, a subject we shall be considering in chapter two. Apart from the 
term "rights", the concept of "minority" itself remains controversial and complex and our 
analysis in this chapter attempts to highlight a number of these complexities. 
The next Chapter, Chapter three, compares the concept of "minority" with the 
other analogous collectivities of "peoples" and "indigenous peoples or populations" in 
international law. The subject of "the right all peoples to self-determination" particularly 
in the post-colonial context has generated considerable controversy. Self-determination, 
as a legal right under international law is accorded to "peoples", although as our 
discussion would reveal, in many instances the distinction between "peoples", "minorities" 
and "indigenous peoples" is not necessarily a straightforward exercise. 
Part III analyses the substantive rights of minorities under international law. A 
natural and convenient starting point for this exercise is a brief overview of the historical 
evolution of the concept of protection of minorities, a subject which is dealt with in 
Chapter four. The remaining chapters of Part III focus on the contemporary position. In 
view of the submission that neither the substantive rights to which minorities could lay 
claim to, nor their implementation mechanisms are monolithic, the remainder of Part III 
itself has been divided into Sections A and B. 
Section A consists of Chapters five and six and considers what have been termed 
as "established" rights of minority groups. Section B deals with what is called "emerging" 
rights. Under the established rights of minorities, Chapter five analyses the "right to 
21 W Hohfeld, "Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning" (ed.) W Cook, 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning Essays by Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld, (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1919, 23-64; F Von Prondzynski, Freedom of 
Association and Industrial Relations A Comparative Study, (London: Mansell Publishing Limited), 
1987, 10-15; J Shestask, "The Jurisprudence of Human Rights" in T Meron, (ed.) Human Rights and 
International Law, (Oxford: OUP), 1984, 69-113; F Barker, Private Property, Public Access: A 
Critique of the Legal Framework Governing the Enforcement and Exercise of Public Rights of Access 
to land, 1994, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Hull, 20-28. 
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physical existence" as accorded to minority groups under intemationallaw.21 Chapter six 
considers the "right to equality and non-discrimination". This right, although granted to 
individuals, nonetheless benefits members of minority groups as well as the majority in 
their capacity as individuals; its examination remains indispensable in the contemporary 
paradigm of individual human rights law.23 Chapter seven provides a consideration of 
what is called the "emerging right of autonomy" for minorities in internationallaw. 
In order to validate an analysis of the possible rights of minorities, article 38(l} of 
the Statute of the International Court ofJustice24 has been relied upon since it provides the 
most authoritative interpretation of the sources of internationallaw. 25 The analysis of the 
provision of the article in so far as it is relevant to our research is conducted in the 
substantive parts of the study. The article provides: 
(a) 
(b) 
~~ 
The Court whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such 
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognised by the contesting States; 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations 
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules 
oflaw.26 
22 Y Dinstein, "Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities" 25 ICLQ (1976), 102-120, 118; 
Thornberry treats the substance ofthe right as "right to existence" 57. Also see "a tentative minimal 
catalogue of rights of the group" of Lerner, N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in 
International Law, (Dordrecht: M.NijhofI), 1991,34-36. 
23 Hence while the focus of the prescnt work is on the rights of minorities as collectivities or groups, it 
is submitted that the undoubtedly significant impact which human rights norms have on members of 
minorities and the majority also deserve our attention. See also Thornberry, 10. 
24 (1945) UKTS 67 (1946) Cmnd 7015. 
25 Brownlie, 3; Brierly, The Law o/Nations (cd.) H Waldock 6th edn. (Oxford: OUP), 1963,56. 
26 In municipal law, it is possible to maint.1in a distinction between formal and material sourees with 
relative ease, as is the identification of hierarchy of various sources of law. The same can not be said 
with equal certainty in the case of international law. While discussing the provisions of Article 38 
Brownlie opines "They are not stated to represent a hierarchy, but draftsmen intended to give an order 
and in one draft the word 'successively' appeared. In practice the Court may be expected to observe 
the order in which they appear: (a) and (b) are obviously the important sources, and the priority of (a) 
is explicable by the fact that this refers to a source of mutual obligations of the parties. Source (a) is 
thus not primarily a source of rules of general application, although treaties may provide evidence of 
the formation of custom. Source (b) and, pcrhaps (c) are formal sources, at least for those who care 
for such classifications. Source (d), with its reference 'as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law' relates to material sources. Yet some jurists regard (d), as a reference to formal sources, 
8 
The substantive weaknesses and problems of implementation of the rights 
belonging to minorities under international law that have been identified in Part III, are 
exemplified in Part IV through the case of Pakistan. The exercise is based on the 
submission that a global overview of the inherent complexities relating to the issue of 
minority rights may be inadequate and merely vacuous; hence this Part while focusing on 
the case of Pakistan, highlights the difficulties and weaknesses in international law in 
providing adequate rights for minorities and effectively safeguarding those rights. Chapter 
eight analyses the historical considerations in the evolution of minority rights in the 
context of the Indian Sub-Continent. Chapter nine considers the substantive weaknesses 
in the current laws relating to physical existence and the difficulties in safeguarding this 
right, particularly in the context of events during the civil war in East Pakistan. Chapter 
ten provides an analysis of the issues that are generated in the application of the norms 
relating to equality and non-discrimination, and its application to the various ethnic and 
religious groups of Pakistan. Chapter eleven considers the problems generated when 
confronted with the issue of autonomy for minorities. The final part, Part V which 
consists of the concluding chapter, presents the conclusions drawn from this study. 
and Fitzmaurice has criticised the classification of Judicial decision as "subsidiary means" ....... "In 
general Article 38 does not rest upon a distinction bctween formal and material sources, and a system 
of priority of application depends simply on thc order (a) to (d), and the reference to subsidiary 
!lleans. Moreover, it is probably unwise to think in terms of hierarchy dictated by the order (a) to (d) 
l~ all ca~es." (Footnotes omitted) Brownlie ibid., 3-4; on the subject of formal sources see G 
Fltzmaunce, Some Problems regarding the Formal Sources of International Law Symbolae Verzijl. 
1958, 153-176. ' 
PART II 
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF 
THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC, 
LINGUISTIC AND 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
INTRODUCTION TO PART II 
A consideration of the conceptual analysis of "the rights of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious minorities" is required as an essential pre-requisite for analysing the present 
subject for a number of reasons. The substantive debate on the issue of "rights of 
minorities" may not prove extremely helpful without a clarification on the meaning and 
scope of the concept of "rights". The term "rights", as we shall shortly consider in 
Chapter two, has often been used indiscriminately so as to engender considerable 
confusion; its application in intemationallaw poses particular complexities. 
Similarly, the debate on substantive rights of minorities may not be meaningful 
without an identification as to what constitutes a "minority" for the purposes of according 
international legal protection. Minorities can and do exist in all forms and sizes; there are 
many complexities involved in arriving at a consensus definition, and it is not surprising to 
note that such definition has not been forthcoming. I In the absence of a universally 
endorsed definition of "minority", Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti's definition 
which he presented in his Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Linguistic 
and ReligiOUS Minorities is generally regarded as an authoritative expression.2 Chapter 
two, while recognising its authoritative position, reveals a number of possible 
shortcomings in the definition. 
2 
"The definition of minority has also prc-occupied many scholars and leading experts in international 
law, despite the fact that there have been countless attempts to formulate a widely acceptable 
definition of minorities they all lack success", 0 Andrysek, Report on the Definition of Minorities, 
(Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights: Studie-en-Informatiecentium) 1993, 13; "Despite 
recent interest in the rights of minorities, there is still no agreed definition of a minority" H Cullen, 
"A Response to William Lawton" in Kritsiotis, 34-39, 35; "There is no generally accepted definition 
of minorities in intemationallaw" P Thornberry in Miall, 14-21, 20. 
Capotorti, 96. 
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Chapter three attempts to disentangle the complex web of "minorities", 
"indigenous peoples" and "peoples". Indigenous peoples in general parlance and in most 
ways epitomise characteristically the minority syndrome; the annals of history testify to 
their systematic persecution, discrimination, extermination and genocide. Indigenous 
peoples deserve all that international law has to offer in protecting the weaker elements of 
the State. On the other hand their is an insistent desire on the part of the indigenous 
peoples themselves to be accorded a status distinct from other minorities. International 
law is increasingly distinguishing them from ordinary minorities and has to some to extent 
recognised the collective nature of their existence. 
A greater test is presented to international lawyers in ascertaining the meaning of 
the concept of "the right of Peoples to self-determination". It is not proposed to provide a 
detailed examination of the subject, for such an exercise, it is submitted, is not called for 
when analysing in lex lata, the rights of minorities. The subject itself has generated 
considerable and often inconclusive debates. Precision is not the primary attribute of 
international law; repletion of ambiguity characterises a number of areas. As our analysis 
in chapter three would reveal, the issue of "the rights of Peoples to self-determination", 
particularly in the post-colonial context cannot exactly be treated as a model of clarity.3 
3 Professor Frecstonc's views are instructive as well as indicative of the inherent complexities when he 
writes "There can be few areas, ... where the search for common values presents more difficulties than 
the doctrine of self-determination, a poignant political slogan as well as a loudly acclaimed principle 
of international law ....... self-determination is indeed an unruly horse. Shaped by the processes of 
dccolonisation rather than the UN Charter it has been harnessed by, amongst others, national 
liberation movements, secessionists and irredentists and driven forward for all manner of reasons 
including race, tribe, religion and language as well as simple geography. Its headlong course takes in 
issues of minority rights, human rights, collective verses individual rights, as well as justice, 
democracy and even the concept of governance with in the international legal order" D Freestone, 
Forward in Kritsiotis, vi. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE CONCEPT OF "RIGHTS" AND 
"MINORITIES" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
11 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
An attempt to analyse the substance of rights of minorities in international law 
is immediately confronted with a number of issues of fundamental importance. A 
question of prime significance that arises, relates to the meaning of the term "rights", 
that "chameleon-hued" expression, against the arbitrary and indiscriminate usage of 
which Professor Wesley Newcomb Rohfeld warned us so strenuously.! 
The complexities and confusion that the term could generate is exacerbated 
when the meaning of "rights of minorities in international law" is debated. 
Furthermore, if international law is to provide rights for minorities, the issue of their 
identification becomes a matter of international concern. The elements of human nature 
are infinite; each individual is different from others and in this respect, each one of us 
could be regarded as a minority. Such an exercise may however blur the vision; the 
conception of "minority" may become far too elastic for international law to bear a 
proper focus. 
As noted in the introduction to the present Part, Special Rapporteur's definition 
which he presented in pursuance to Article 27 ofICCPR, although generally treated as 
authoritative, is not completely immune from criticism. The present chapter makes an 
attempt to analyse the various facets of this definition. The definition also reflects a 
noticeable weakness of international law in failing to provide any preCise meaning to 
the concepts of "ethnicity", "religion" and "language". Certain States revel in this 
"One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive statement, and the true 
solution of legal problems frequently arise from the express or tacit assumption that all legal 
relations may be reduced to 'rights' and 'duties', and that these latter categories are therefore 
adequate for the purpose of analyzing even the most complex legal interests ... Even if the 
difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of terminology, its seriousness would 
nevertheless be worthy of definite recognition and persistent etTort towards improvement~ for in 
any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both 
to clear though and to lucid expression. As a matter of fact, however, the above mentioned 
inadequacy and ambiguity of tenns unfortunately reflect, all too often, corresponding, paucity and 
confusion as regards actual legal conceptions" W Rohfeld "Some fundamental Legal Conceptions 
as Applied in Judicial Reasoning", (ed.)., W Cook, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied 
in Judicial Reasoning Essays by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, (New Haven: Yale University Press) 
1919,23-64,35-36. 
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ambiguity, denying the existence or the numerical strength of minorities within their 
boundaries. 
2.2 MEANING AND NATURE OF RIGHTS 
The term "rights" is used in a wide variety of circumstances~ an often arbitrary 
usage of the term creates confusion as to the form of the relationship that is sought to 
be established. This arbitrariness has been a constant source of irritation to a number 
of lawyers, though a detailed analysis in the exposure of the weaknesses in the general 
usage of the term is attributed to Professor Wesley Hohfeld? It is not intended in the 
present work to examine in detail and critically analyse Hohfeld's theory of the 
distinctions between different types of rights~ neither would such an exercise, it is 
submitted, be extremely helpful, since our primary focus of interest is in international 
law as opposed to the various facets of municipal law. On the other hand, Hohfeld's 
views could be deployed to highlight the complexities which the term "rights" could 
generate in its application to international law. 
According to his view, the term "right" has been used to identify the existence 
of a number of varied relationships. It has sometimes been used in its strict sense, 
reflecting that the right-holder is entitled to something with a co-relative duty on an 
other person. Equally, the term "right" has been used to refer to an immunity from 
having a legal status altered, or to indicate a privilege to do something, or a power to 
create and alter legal relationships. 
In his essay, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning J, Professor Hohfeld presented eight fundamental conceptions which in his 
view, while serving as the "lowest common denominators" could be used to analyse all 
2 Ibid.; F Von Prondzynski, Freedom of Associations and Industrial Relations A Comparative 
Study, (London: Mansell Publishing Limited), 1987, 10; J Shestack "The Jurisprudence of Human 
Rights" in Meron (ed.) Human Rights and International Law, (Oxford: OUP)1984, 69·113; N 
Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence, Law and Rights (London: Sweet and Maxwell), 
1986, 129·130; F Barker, Private Property, Public Access: A Critique of the Legal Framework 
Governing the Enforcement and Exercise of Public Rights of Access to land, 1994, Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Hull, 20·28. 
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legal problems; his answer to the confusion generated by the rather indiscriminate 
usage of term "rights" lay primarily in the application of a scheme of correlatives and 
opposites. In this scheme, the Jural Correlatives of rights, privilege, power and 
immunity were duty, no-right, liability and disability respectively and their Jural 
opposites were no-rights, duty, disability and liability? 
A major concern of Rohfeld was that of maintaining a distinction between 
rights in the strict sense and privileges. In this regard, he proposed that while the 
existence of a right in the strict sense could be identified through the presence of a duty 
owed to the right-holder, the identification of a privilege (or a "liberty" or "freedom") 
was possible through the absence of rights of others to prevent the exercise of the 
privilege.4 Similarly in Rohfeld's terminology any person, who by his acts could 
produce a change in the legal relations of another, had a legal power, and the person 
whose legal relations would be altered if the power to be exercised was under a 
"liability". Hohfeld used the term "immunity" to describe the case where one person's 
legal relations could not be changed by acts of another. In this situation, the former 
could be said to be enjoying an immunity, much in the sense where a person could not 
be deprived of his liberty or property without due process of law by the government in 
power.S 
"[Summarising the analysis] a power bears the same general 
contrast to an immunity that a right does to a privilege. A right is one's 
affirmative claim against another, and a privilege is one's freedom, from 
the right or claim of another. Similarly, a power is one's affirmative 
'control' over a given legal relation as against another, whereas an 
immunity is one's freedom from the legal power or 'control' of another 
as regards some legal relation". 6 
As indicated earlier, the main question which attracts our attention is the 
possible application of the Hohfeldian paradigm of "rights" in international law of 
3 
4 
S 
6 
Op.clt note I, 36. 
Ibid. 39~ Von Prondzynski op.cit. note 2, 10-11. 
W Cook, "Introduction, Hohfeld's contribution to the Science of Law", op.cit note I, 8-9. 
Hohfeld, op.cit note I. 60. 
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human rights with its contemporary focus on rights of the individual. As Shestack 
correctly points out 
"the question is not trivial. Particularly in the international 
sphere, where diverse cultures are involved, where positivist 
underpinnings are shaky, and where implementation mechanisms are 
non-existent or fragile, the issue of definition can be crucial". 7 
His highly pertinent comments provide more food for thought: 
"some of the civil and political rights [as provided in the 
International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights] are in the nature 
of immunities meaning that governments cannot derogate from them. 
But are there any absolute rights? Surely the right to life guaranteed by 
article 6(1) of that Covenant would seem to be so basic as to be 
considered absolute. Yet, article 6(1) only offers protection against 
'arbitrary' deprivation of life. What is the effect of this qualification on 
the nature of the right involved? 
When we speak of inalienable rights, what do we mean? Do we 
mean a right to which no exceptions or limitations are valid? or do we 
mean a 'prima-facie' right with a special burden on the proponent of any 
defeasance? Or do we mean a principle which must be followed unless 
some other principle weighty enough to allow abridgement arises? Must 
considerations which justify an exception be of the same moral category 
as those that underlie the right?,,8 
If there is uncertainty as to the nature of the more fundamental rights, what are 
we to make of the rights which may be derogable in certain circumstances? Are they in 
the Hohfeldian scheme, rights in the strict sense, immunities or privileges? In other 
7 
8 
Shestack op.cit note 2, 70. 
Ibid .• 71; see the Second Optional Protocol to ICCPR Aiming at the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, 1989, 29 ILM, 1464. Also see Human Rights Committee's first General Comment on 
Article 6 Human Rights Committee Report GAOR, 37th Session Supp 40, 93, 1982. Naldi's 
views are instructive when commenting on the abolishment of death penalty he says "Article 3 of 
the Universal Declaration has not been interpreted as proscribing the death penalty. Article 6 of 
the International Covenant clearly envisages its continued use, although it does limit its 
imposition, and the United Nations Human Rights committee has declared that the death penalty 
per se does not breach the International Covenant, but para 6 there of does suggest the 
desirability of its abolition. In that sense the protocol may be seen as the fruition of the hope 
expressed in Article 6 of the International Covenant" .... "It would seem that it can not be 
postulated that a norm of customary international law exists precluding death penalty. This is 
evident by the retention of death penalty by a large number of States and also by considerable 
opposition to the adoption of the United Nations second protocol" G Naldi "United Nations seeks 
to abolish the Death Penalty" 40 ICLQ (1991), 948-952, 949, 951. also see Article 4 ACHR; see 
the Advisory Opinion with regard to questions relating to the interpretation of provisions in the 
American Convention on Human Rights concerning death penalty 231 ILM, 1984, 320; 6th 
Protocol to the ECHR 1983; Also see Soering v UK ECHR Ser.A. No 161. 1989, para 103. 
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words, if there exists a power of derogation on the part of the State from the rights as 
provided in an international covenant, could we not legitimately question the precise 
nature of the "rights" that have been granted9? 
In a number of States, constitutional rights that have been accorded to 
individuals are more in the nature of privileges rather than immunities. This certainly 
has been the case of the former Soviet Union and other socialist States. Even in the 
case of Britain, since there remains the possibility of abridgement by Parliament at any 
time, many of the "freedoms" - such as the freedom of speech can be regarded more in 
the nature ofHohfeldian liberty and not as an immunity.1O 
Further confusion arises in relation to the position of economic, social and 
cultural rights which carry no obligations of immediate implementation and are more in 
the nature of aspirations or goals. I I Considering their attenuated nature, could they at 
all be regarded as "claim-rights" and if so on whom is the co-relative duty? Still 
greater confusion would ensue if we were to bracket the so called "third generation 
9 T Burgenthal "To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations" in 
Henkin. 72-91. 
10 Simmonds. op.cit note 2. 132. 
11 This aspirational approach is reflected by the terms of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. According to Trubek "The Economic Covenant is oriented around 
the principle of 'progressive realisation'. The principle has several elements. First, the rights 
which are exclusively dealt with in the Economic Covenant are said to be 'recognised' rather than 
'declared' or 'ensured'. This implies that a party's obligations in the areas of work. education, 
health etc. differ from its obligations in areas like the right to form trade unions, which right is 
'ensured'. Further, article 2(1) of the Economic Covenant, which states the principal obligation 
undertaken by parties in the social area, commits them 'to take steps' toward the realization of the 
rights that are 'recognised in the present covenant'. Trubeck "Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in the Third World" in (ed.) Meron, op.cit note 2, 205-271, 213. In his treatment of the 
nature of the obligations imposed by the Convention Mckean considers that a distinction could be 
drawn between "promotional" conventions which did not impose on the ratifying States 
obligations of an immediate applic.:1tion but seek to promote defined objectives and policies and to 
set out standards to achieved (includes inter alia Economic Covenant 1966) "immediately 
binding" conventions and others "mixed with some obligations taking effect immediately. but 
with others to be introduced gradually to avoid the dimculties and dislocations with an immediate 
obligation might cause (includes Racial Discrimination Convention- 1965 and the Civil and 
Political Rights Covenant-I966) Mckean, 103-104. Commenting upon the ICESCR, Robertson 
and Merrills have this to say "It is thus quite clear that this is what is known as a promotional 
convention. that is to say that it does not set out rights which the parties are required to 
implement immediately, but rather lists standards which they undertake to promote and which 
they pledge themselves to secure progressively. to the greatest extent possible, having regard to 
their resources ..... this difference in the obligations results from the very nature of the rights 
recognised in the Covenant." Robertson and Merrills, Human Rights in the World, An 
Introduction to the Study of International Protection of Human Rights, 3rd edn., (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press), 1989,230. 
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rights" such as the right to development,12 the right to a healthy environment, and 
human rights to share in the "common heritage of mankind" in the category of rights. 
Robertson and Merrills properly query the nature of these rights saying "Economic 
development, the protection of Environment, the common heritage of mankind and 
peace: are these concepts 'rights' in any meaningful sense? They can, and should be 
objectives of social policy. They may be items in a political programme. However, 
they are certainly not legally enforceable claims". 13 
Perhaps one of the most fundamental issues that attracts our attention as 
international lawyers is the complications arising out of the enforcement of legal rights. 
It remains clear that enforcement mechanisms in international law and in particular 
those related to enforcement of individual human rights are inadequate and ineffective 
and at best rudimentary. Indeed, even the astute and calculating human rights 
enthusiast may find it difficult to quarrel with the view which questions the existence of 
rights for which it is not possible to seek a remedy or if it were possible, would depend 
on the consent of the State.14 
Intractably related to this issue of enforcement is the procedural capacity of 
bringing an action. International law provides limited procedural capacity to 
individuals to bring actions before international tribunals, and although some recent 
instruments have adopted a group oriented approach, IS minorities generally are devoid 
12 S Chowdhury, E Denters and P de Waart, The Right to Development in International Law, 
(Dordrecht: M. Nijhofi) 1992~ P Alston "The Right to Development at the International level" 
(cds.) S Snyder and S Sathirathe, Third World attitudes towards International Law, 
(DordrechtM. Nijhofi) 1987, 811-824; R Rich, "The Right to Development A Right of peoples" 
(ed.) J Crawford, The Rights o/Peoples, (Oxford: OUP), 1988,39-54. 
13 Robertson and Merrills op.cit note 11, 258. 
14 Speaking in the context of a Labour dispute Lord Denning's views seem highly instructive when 
he states that a right which depended on its enforcement upon the consent of another person, 
could hardly be regarded as a right Gouriet V Union of Post Office Workers (1977) 1 QB 729, 
761; also see R Higgins "Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in International Law" 24 
NYLSLR (1978), 11-29. 
IS See e.g. article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, 60 UNTS 195; UKTS 77 (1969); Article 25 European Convention of Human 
Rights 1950.; also see Protocol 11 to this Convention, signed 11 May, 1994, 33 ILM 943. R 
Bernhardt "Reform of the Control Machinery under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Protocol No 11" 89 AJIL (1995), 145-154. 
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of a procedural capacity. Lying "upon the fault line of international personality"16 the 
best hope for bringing actions with the ultimate objective of the realisation of whatever 
rights international law provides them, minorities rely upon the medium of the 
individua1. The "implementation" of rights of minorities ought to be seen in the 
background of the present discussion. 
2.3 THE DEFINITION OF "MINORITY" IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
"Minority" is an ambiguous term, potentially definable through an endless 
combination of interacting variables, like religion, language, ethnicity, race, culture, 
physical characteristics and a variety of other traits. Minorities come in all forms and 
sizes and indeed each and every individual in one form or another belongs to a 
minority. Bearing in mind the ambiguities inherent in the concept of "minority", 
international law has historically found it difficult to provide any firm guide-lines in 
relation to defining the concept. It is not surprising to note that despite the setting up 
of a regime on minorities treaties after the establishment of the League of Nations, no 
standard definition of minorities was forthcoming. 
While refraining from elaborating on the meaning of minority, the Permanent 
Court oflnternational Justice in the Greco-Bulgarian communities casel7 stated 
"By tradition ... .'the community' is a group of persons living in a 
given country or locality having a race, religion, language and traditions 
in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, 
maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and 
upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and tradition 
of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other".ls 
More recently in the United Nations regime, although considerable efforts 
principally in the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
16 M Shaw "The Definition of Minorities in intemationallaw" (ed.) Y Dinstein and M Tabory, The 
Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, (Dordrecht: M.Nijhom, 1993, 1-31,2. :~ 1930PCU., SerB., No 17,17. 
Ibid. 21. 
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of Minorities (Sub-Commission) have been made, a consensus definition of minorities 
has proved elusive. This failure has been due mainly to a feeling that the concept is 
inherently vague and imprecise, and that no proposed definition would ever be able to 
provide for the innumerable minority groups that could possibly exist. Indeed, as the 
memorandum prepared by the United Nations Secretary-General stated 
"It follows ... that 'minority' cannot for practical purposes be 
defined simply by interpreting the word in its literal sense. If this were 
the case, nearly all communities existing within a state would be styled 
minorities, including families, social classes, cultural groups, speakers of 
dialects, etc. Such a definition would be useless. As a matter of fact, 
the term minority is frequently used at present in a more restricted 
sense; it has come to refer to mainly a particular kind of community, 
which differs from the predominant group in the state 
Such a minority may have originated in any of the following ways 
(a) It may formerly have constituted an independent nation with its own 
state (or more or less independent tribal organisation); 
(b) It may formerly have been part of a nation living under its own 
state, which was later segregated from this jurisdiction and annexed to 
another state; or 
(c) It may have been, or may still be, a regional or scattered group 
which although bound to the pre-dominant group by certain feelings of 
solidarity, has not reached even a minimum degree of assimilation with 
the predominant group".19 
Explaining the difficulties the Special Rapporteur Capotorti has written 
"Despite the many references to minorities to be found in 
international legal instruments of all kinds (multi-lateral conventions, bi-
lateral treaties and resolutions of international organisations) there is no 
generally accepted definition of the term 'minority'. The preparation of 
a definition capable of being universally accepted has always proved a 
task of such difficulty and complexity that neither the experts in this 
field nor the organs of the international agencies have been able to 
accomplish it to date. The reason for this is the number of different 
aspects considered. Should the concept of a minority be based on 
numerical ratio of the' minority' group to the popUlation as a whole or 
is this quantitative aspect secondary or even unimportant? Is it 
necessary to limit this concept by introducing the idea of minimum size? 
Should only objective criteria be taken into account or should it be 
assumed that 'subjective' factors also have a part to play? Does the 
origin of minorities matter for the purposes of a definition? Should we 
19 Definition and Classification of Minorities, UN Publications Sales No 1950JaV.3. paras 37-38. 
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understand by minorities groups of nationals only, excluding groups of 
foreigners" .20 
2.3.1 Definition Proposed by the Special Rapporteur Francesco Capotorti 
Despite the continuous hesitancy in defining the term minority,21 the issue was 
provided urgency by the inclusion of an article relating to "persons belonging to 
minorities" in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Subsequently, Special Rapporteur Capotorti who was assigned to the task of preparing 
a study pursuant to article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights 
formulated a definition specific to this article. According to his definition a "minority" 
is a 
"group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a 
non-dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the State-possess 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the 
population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards 
preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language".22 
2.3.1.1 Complications Arising from Capotorti's Definition 
Although it does not seem possible to provide an aU-embracing and acceptable 
definition, critics have raised a number of issues in relation to Capotorti's description. 
The primary feature of the definition seems to be a combination of both objective and 
20 Capotorti, S. 
21 In a number of occasions the Sub-Commissions recommended, albeit unsuccessfully to adopt a 
preliminary definition of minorities (E/CN.4 Sub 2/119, para 32~ E/CN.4/Sub.2/140, annex 1, 
draft resolution II~ E/CN.4/Sub.21149, para 26). In its 5th session, the Sub-Commission put 
forward a recommendation for the Human Rights Commission, that the latter adopt a draft 
resolution on the definition of "minority" bearing a number off actors in mind which were (i) the 
term minority includes only those non-dominant groups in a population which possess and wish 
to preserve stable ethnic. religious or linguistic traditions or characteristics markedly different 
from the rest of the population~ (ii) such minorities should properly include a number of persons 
sufficient by themselves to preserve such traditions or characteristics (iii) such minorities must be 
loyal to the state of which they are nationals. Further consideration of the issue was however 
halted due to a number of disagreements in the concept of minority, see proceedings of the 9th 
session ElCN.4/40S, para 438. 
22 Capotorti,96. 
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subjective elements in ascertaining a minority group. Objective criteria would involve 
a factual analysis of a group as a distinct entity within the State "possessing stable 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics that differ sharply from those of the rest of 
the population"23. The subjective criteria would be found on the basis that there exists 
"a common will in the group; a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving the 
distinctive characteristics of the group"24. It may well be that in view of these rather 
onerous considerations of evaluating both the objective and subjective criterion, 
identification of a minority group might prove to be a difficult task. 
The second proposition that needs to be dealt with is that of numerical strength 
of the group in question. Capotorti's insistence on numerical inferiority to the rest of 
the population would generate difficulties in multi-minority situations where no single 
group forms an ascertainable majority.2s Whereas it seems acceptable that the 
numerical inferiority must at least account for "a sufficient number of persons to 
preserve their traditional characteristics"26, further complications are engendered when 
we consider the situations where the "non-dominant position" is in fact held by a 
numerical majority, a situation akin to contemporary Rwanda, or formerly that of 
South Africa, or to that of East Pakistan prior to 1971.27 
Arguably these latter examples are cases of a "reversed minority", 28 requiring 
more a consideration of the principles of self-determination, although it may well be 
23 L Sohn "The Rights of Minorities" , in Henkin 270-289, 278-279. 
24 Ibid. 
2S Ibid. 
26 UN Doc. ElCN.41703 (1953), para 200. 
27 "In fact, one has to consider the protection of collective human rights not merely of minorities, 
but ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in general. For a State may be under the sway of a 
minority, in which case the collective human rights of the majority may call for protection. South 
Africa today, and Pakistan before the creation of Bangladesh, may be instance to demonstrate the 
point. If we continue to use the familiar term' minorities', it is worthwhile bearing in mind that 
the test for the existence of a minority entitled to protection under international law is not always 
numerical. Perhaps we can think of a minority in the sense that such a group plays a minor role 
in the a1Tairs of the country" Y Dinstein, "Collective rights of minorities and peoples" 2S ICLQ 
(1976), 102-120, 112~ cr. however, Tomuschat's view who treats Dinstein as "an isolated voice" 
in this matter C Tomuschat "Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights" Volkerrecht als Rechtsordnung Internationale Gerichtbarkeit Menschernrechte 
Festschnjt Fur Herman Mosler, (1983),949.979,957. 
2S P Ermacora, "The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations" 182 Rec. des Cours 
(1983),251-366,284. 
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that a definition similar in nature to that of the one provided by Professor PaHey, with 
its focus on power-politics of a group may be more appropriate in these circumstances. 
According to her, a minority is "any racial, tribal, linguistic, religious caste or 
nationality group within a nation state and which is not control of the political 
machinery of the state".29 This view has been endorsed by UNESCO when it stated 
that it is doubtful that "groups numerically smaller than the rest of the population' is an 
adequate definition. In some cases, the majority population is in fact a sociological 
minority, and it may be useful to take into account the power distribution and who can 
dispense what in deciding on 'minority rights",.30 
The third issue that arises out of the Capotorti definition is that of the position 
of non-nationals within the State.31 Non-nationals could form a significant proportion 
of a State's population, and although the main thrust of the development of 
international law of human rights has devoted itself to a consideration of the plight of 
nationals within the State, the rights of the non-nationals, as individuals, is also 
becoming a concern of human rights law. Indeed, as Lillich correctly points out "the 
question of rights of aliens is inextricably linked to the contemporary international 
human rights law movement because it poses a clear test of relevance and 
enforceability of international human rights norms which have developed since World 
War 11".32 
29 PaUey 3; also see J Fawcett. International Protection of Minorities, (London: MRG), 1979. 4; 
Laponce, 8·9; "the distinction .... between nations and minorities is one of power. The elements of 
power or powerlessness is distinguishing characteristic of national and minority discourses" H 
30 Cullen, 3 Law and Critique, 1992, 219·240, 219-220. 
Cited in Capotorti, 9, para 43. 
31 There is considerable amount of slipperiness in the concept of nationality in internationallaw and 
lacks concise definition. In Nottembhom case the ICJ stated "According to the practice of states, 
arbitral and judicial decisions and to the opinions of writers, nationality is a legal bond having as 
its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties". Nottembham case (Liechtenstein v 
Guatemala) Second phase IeJ, 1955, 4, 23; On the concept of Nationality see P Weiss, 
Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, (Alhenann de Rijn: Sijthof and Nooordhoft) 
2nd edn, 1979 cJ., however the usage of this concept by T Modeen, International Protection of 
National Minorities in Europe, (Abo: Abo Akandmi), 15-20. 
32 R Lillich, The Human Rights of Aliens in Contemporary International Law, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press). 1984, 2~ 44-48; " .. the whole human rights movement may be seen 
as an attempt to extend the minimum international standards from aliens to nationals" M 
Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Law, (London: George Alen and Unwin), 
1986, 91 ~ H Rosting. "Protection of minorities by the League of Nations" 17 AJIL (1923), 641-
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Non-nationals consist of a number of categories including migrant workers, 
refugees and stateless persons and the phenomenal increase in their numbers in recent 
years has brought considerable attention to their position in international human rights 
law.33 The travaux pre para to ires of the International Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights are not extremely helpful on the matter, though whatever guidance that could 
be obtained points more in the direction of exclusion of non-nationals from the 
category of minorities as envisaged in article 27.34 On the other hand, it needs to be 
noted that article 27 of the ICCPR, unlike article 25, refers to persons,35 and the 
working group of the Human Rights Committee in its preparation of a general 
comment on article 27 hinted at the possibility of the inclusion of non-citizens within 
the ambit of the article.36 
660~ L Sohn and T Burgenthal, International Protection of Human Rights, (Indianapolis: The 
Bob-Merrill Co), 1973. 
33 See Wiess op.cit note 31, G Goodwin Gill, The Refugee in International Law, (Oxford: OUP), 
2nd ed. 1991, Fsouza et ai, The Refugee Dilemma (London: MRG), 1984~ A Ghosal and T 
Crowly "Refugees and Immigrants: A Human Rights dilemma" 3 HRQ (1983), 327-347, D Grieg, 
"The Protection of Refugees and Customary International Law" 8 AYBIL (1978-80), 108-141~ P 
Hyndman "TIle 1951 Convention Definition of refugees: An Appraisal with particular reference 
to the case of Sri Lankan Tamil Applicants" 9 lIRQ (1987), 49-73~ J-P Fonteyne, "Burden 
Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature and Function of International Solidarity in cases of Mass 
Influx of Refugees" ibid. 162-188~ D Kennedy, "International Refugee Protection" 811RQ (1986), 
1-69~ ] Hathaway, The Law of Refugee Status, (Toronto: Butterworths) 1991~ T Rogers, "Two 
Dimensions of a National Crises Population Growth and Refugees in Pakistan" 26 MAS (1992), 
735-76l. On the position of Migrant workers see R Owen, Migrant Workers in the Gulf, 
(London: Minority Rights Group) 1985; I Muyuki, International Protection of Human Rights of 
Migrant Workers: With Special Reference to the Role of the ILO, Unpublished LL.M dissertation, 
University of Hull, 1992. 
34 See the additional draft clause to [Article 27) that was proposed by Yugoslavia limiting the article 
to "citizens", UN Doc AlC.3/SR.1I03 para 54~ the Indian delegate Mr Kaslival "wondered 
whether the committee would not prefer to replace the word 'persons' by ·citizens.... According 
to Mrs Afnan the Iraqi delegation "understood .... the obligation of a state within its own territory 
could only be towards its own citizens. It was in that sense that she understood the word 'person' 
used in the article" UN Doc NC.3/SR.1I04, para 7; also note the Pakistani position UN Doc 
NC.3/SR. 1104, para 17~ cf. the position of the representative from Equador ibid. para 45. 
35 Attempts to replace in Article 2(1) the term individuals with "nationals" or "citizens" could not 
succeed. UN Doc A.C.3/SR. 1103, para 38~ The exclusive focus of Capotorti has come under 
considerable academic criticism. According to Tomuschat "One can not fail to observe that the 
word employed [in Article 27] is 'person', not nationals" op.cit note 27, 960; similarly Dinstein is 
critical of this view of the special Rapporteur "This interpretation can not be endorsed" "Freedom 
of Religion and the Protection of Religious minorities" (cd.) Dinstein and Tabory op.cit note 16, 
145-169, 157. 
36 "the quality of a community as a minority under article 27 does not necessarily depend on a 
formed bond of citizenship of its members with the host states" UN Doc. CCPRlC/23/CPR.l 
(1984) para 4. Also note the similar views of Bhandare in the UN Sub-Commission, UN 
Doc.ElCN.4/Sub.2/1985 SR.14, at 2; for a similar position adopted in relation to the definition of 
minorities see A Eide, Protection of Minorities, Possible ways and means of facilitating the 
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Another area on which Capotorti's definition could be challenged is its 
restrictiveness by concentrating almost exclusively on its reliance upon what has been 
termed as "minorities by will" and overlooking the position of "minorities by force". 
"Minorities by will" and "Minorities by force" are terms engineered by Laponce.37 • 
Explaining the distinctions between the two kinds of minorities, he comments: 
"two fundamentally different attitudes are possible for a 
minority in its relationship with the majority: it may wish to be 
assimilated or it may refuse to be assimilated. The minority that desires 
assimilation but is barred is a minority by force. The minority that 
refuses assimilation is a minority by will". 38 
It would appear that Capotorti's definition while focusing on the position of 
these "Minorities by will" would tend to ignore "Minorities by force". As we shall see 
in Part III and IV a number of minorities, which although anxious to integrate with the 
community have been forcibly segregated by usage of hideous phenomenons as 
Apartheid, and segregation based on race and religion. 
2.3.1.2 Alternative Definition Proposed by Jules Deschenes 
A more recent exposition of the concept has been conducted by Mr Jules 
Deschenes, a Canadian member of the United Nations Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.39 For Deschenes, a 
"minority" is 
"A group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical 
minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with 
ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those 
of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with 
one .another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to 
survIve and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in 
fact and in law". 
Peaceful and Constructive solution of Problems involving Minorities, Second progress report 
ElCN.4/Sub.2/1992137, 13-14, paras 59-65. 
37 Laponce, 12-13. 
38 Ibid. 12 
39 UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, 30, para 181. 
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The abundance of similarities between the definitions put forward by Capotorti 
and Deschenes are so pronounced that the latter could in fact be regarded as merely a 
refined version of the former: the term "citizen" is used instead of "nationals"; the 
expression "inferior" is replaced to avoid connotations of cultural-value judgement 
without altering the meaning.40 Deschenes, nonetheless treats minorities as numerically 
fewer, being citizens of the State, bearing distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious 
characteristics. It probably is the case that most definitions of "minority" which are 
formulated would not differ radically from Capotorti's definition. Besides that, his 
definition, despite some weaknesses, has endured the test of time and still carries 
considerable following, and general reliance will be placed on it in the present work. 
2.4 RATIONALE FOR THE FOCUS ON "ETHNIC, LINGUISTIC AND 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES" IN THE PRESENT STUDY 
As noted earlier the ambiguity in the concept of "minority" results from the 
possibility of having included in it innumerable sections of the community; it is clearly 
not possible to discuss all the minorities that may exist and the abundance of varied 
terminology in the modern jurisprudence of human rights makes the selection of an 
appropriate category of minorities a rather cumbersome task. The United Nations 
Charter relies upon the terms race, sex, language or religion in the employment of 
human rights.41 The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights uses the terms 
"race, colour, sex, language religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status."42 1948 The Genocide Convention focuses on 
the protection of national, ethnical, racial or religious groups.43 The 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in its article 27 accords protection on the basis 
40 Thornberry, 7. 
41 Article 1(3) op.cit 
42 Article 2. Adopted December 10, 1948, GA Resolution 217, UN Doc Al81O, 71. 
43 Article 2 Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of Genocide 78 UNTS 277, 
1948; Cmnd.2904. 
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of ethnicity, religion or language. However, in its article relating to non-
discrimination, the Covenant uses identical provisions of the Universal Declaration but 
without any elaboration of the terms.44 The 1966 International Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination when defining "racial discrimination" 
relies on the features of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin.45 The 1992 
United Nations General Assembly Declaration focuses upon the Rights of Persons 
belonging to "national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities."46 
2.4.1 Article 27 of ICCPR 
In view of this profusion of wide ranging terminology, the selection of "ethnic, 
linguistic and religious" minorities calls for an explanation. The rationale for the 
employment of these terms is rather simplistic; "ethnic, linguistic and religious" 
minorities are terms borrowed from article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights. 47 
Article 27 provides 
"In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language" . 
Since Article 27 carries the burden of being the main treaty provisions in 
contemporary international law which aims to provide a direct protection to persons 
44 Article 2(1) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Annex to UN Gen Ass Res 2200 
(XXI), GAOR, 21st session, supp 16.49; 6 UKTS 1977. 
4S Article 1. Racial Discrimination is defined as "any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference 
based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exclusion or an equal footing of human 
tights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of 
public life". The Convention on the Elimination on all forms of Racial Discrimination 60 UNTS 
195; UKTS 77 (1969). 
46 UN Doc.NRes/47/135 adopted December 1992. 
47 ICCPR adopted 16 December, 1966, entered in to force 23 March 76, GA Res 2200 (XXI), 21 
UN GAOR supp. No. 16 at 52, UN Doc. N6316 (1966). 
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belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities,48 it would be appropriate, in a 
study on minority rights, to incorporate and acknowledge the terminology of the 
primary international provision on minorities. The present study, while not completely 
ignoring other minorities will concentrate on the position of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious minorities. 
2.4.2 Meaning of "Ethnicity", "Language" and "Religion" in the Context of 
Minority Rights 
In addition to the uncertainty as to the definition of a "minority" international 
law has also failed to provide appropriate guide-lines as to the meaning of "ethnicity", 
"language" or "religion". The term "ethnicity" presents particular complications, for in 
the absence of any precise or adequate definition in international law, reliance has to be 
placed on secondary sources. According to one scholar "ethnic groups may be defined 
as peoples who conceive of themselves as one kind by virtue of their common ancestry 
(real or imagined). who are united by emotional bonds, a common culture and by 
concern with preservation of their groupS".49 Another author, focusing on ethnic 
groups within Thailand, has viewed ethnic groups as" ... categories of the population ... 
who distinguish themselves or are distinguished by the majority groups as differing 
from each other and the latter in acquired behavioural characteristics or culture, 
regardless of whether or not they differ in inherited or racial characteristics".so 
Despite uncertainty as to the scope of the term as noted above. it has frequently 
been used in binding legal instruments. Although, until 1950 ethnicity does not feature 
significantly as ground for discrimination in international instruments, its subsequent 
48 Thornberry "Self-determination" 877. 
49 R Burkey, Discrimination and Racial Relations, Report on the International Research Conference 
on Race Relations, (Aspen: Colorado), 1970,62. 
so F Moore, Thailand, lIs People, Its Society, lIs Culture .. (New Haven: Yale University Press), 
1974, 64~ According to the Oxford English Dictionary the term is derived from the Greek word 
"ethnikos" which refers to (a) nations not converted to Christianity~ heathens, pagans~ (b) race or 
large group of people having common traits and customs~ or (e) groups in an exotic primitive 
culture Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed. (Prepared by J Simpson and E Weiner) Vol. v, 
(Oxford: OUP), 1989,423-424. 
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use has been justified on the basis of its apparent comprehensiveness. 51 Nonetheless, 
the differences and the preferences particularly between the usage of ethnicity and race 
often remains unclear, and it has been suggested that a better "practical approach" 
would be "to deal with the two [ concepts] together to prevent unfortunate gaps 
appearing". 52 
The problems that arise from a debate in relation to the meaning of "religion" 
are of a serious nature, for the issue of religion in itself is highly sensitive and capable 
of being extremely controversial. 53 Comparative lesser international consensus has 
emerged in relation to the issues involving religion and international instruments fail to 
provide any definition as to what constitutes a religion. 54 
A survey of the international instruments as well as the constitutional 
provisions relating to religious freedom and non-discrimination, presents a rather 
unhelpful exercise if the objective is to ascertain the meaning and scope of religion. 
Although the travaux preparatoires of the Declaration on the Elimination of All forms 
of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief reflects a broad 
consensus that religion or belief includes "theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs" 
and excludes political or aesthetic philosophies from this category, no actual definition 
of the term "religion" could be incorporated in the text. 55 
51 Capotorti, 34; E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.48; E/CN.4/Sub.2/119, Para 31. "Although in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and other instruments prior to 1950 the term 'racial minorities' was 
generally used, this gradually fell out of favour as being unscientific'. 'Ethnic group' was 
preferred since this was a wider term including groups which saw themselves or were seen by 
others as possessing different characteristics or culture regardless of whether they differed in 
inherited, racial or national characteristics" Mckean, 144. 
52 Shaw op.cit note 16, 17. 
53 For an interesting analysis of the influence of religion upon internationa11aw see M Janis (ed.) 
The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law, (DordrcchtM. Nijhofl), 
1991; A Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices, 
UN Publication Sales E60.X.lV2; 1960; T Van Boven, "Advances and Obstacles in building 
understanding between People of diverse Religions and Beliefs" 13 HRQ (1991), 437-452; 
Benito. 
54 R Clark, "The United Nations and Religious Freedom" 11 NYUJILP (1978-9) 197-225; S Neff, 
"An Evolving International Norms of Religious Freedom: Problem and Prospects" 7 CalWIU 
1973, 543-590. 
55 G A Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp (No 4) at 171 UN Doc N36/51 1981; see Article l(a) ofthe 
Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intolerance, 1967 YBUN 1967, 
488-90; I Brownlie, BaSic Documents on Human Rights, (Oxford: OUP), 2 edn. 1981, Ill-lIS; D 
Sullvian, "Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of Religious Intolerance and Discrimination" 82 AJIL (1988), 487-502, 491. It had 
28 
Some elaboration has been conducted by Courts though without any definitive 
formulations. In a United States Case the Court stated 
"the term' religion' has reference to one's views of his relation to 
his creator and the obligations they impose of reverence for His Being 
and Character and of obedience to His Will. It is often confounded 
with cults of form of worship of a particular sect, but is distinguishable 
from the latter"56 
A judgment of the Indian Supreme Court found that 
"Religion is a matter of faith with individuals or communities 
and not necessarily theistic. There are well known religions in India like 
Buddhism and lainism which do not believe in God. A Religion 
undoubtedly has its basis in the system of beliefs or doctrines which are 
regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their 
spiritual well being, but it will not be correct to say that religion is 
nothing else but a doctrine of belief. A Religion may not only lay down 
a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it may prescribe 
rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are 
regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances 
might even extend to matters of food and dress". 57 
Benito 
In her recent study the United Nations special Rapporteur Elizabeth Odio 
"refrained from attempting to define 'religion', since the 
meaning of the word is generally well understood by all ... nevertheless, 
it is perhaps useful to point out that 'religion' can be described as an 
explanation of the meaning of life and how to live accordingly. Every 
religion has at least a creed, a code of action and a cult". 58 
Another prominent authority sees religion as "in contra-distinction to any other 
form of belief-relates to faith in God as a Supreme Being, or in multiple deities, or at 
been contended at the drafting stages that the phrase' religion on belief to include such values as, 
inter alia, free thought be understood and animistic beliefs, monotheism, polytheism, agnosticism, 
UN Doc.El3925, Annex at 1, 3-4~ 1978 ESCOR Supp (No 4) 62, UN Doc E/1978/34. It was also 
contended that certain philosophies should be specifically eXCluded from the definition e.g., 
racism. Nazism. Apartheid. UN Doc A/C/C.3/L.2033. 1973, alongside theories on subjects in the 
nature of philosophy. history, politics. art and scicncc. 
56 Per Mr Justice Fields Davies v. Beason 1890, 133, US SCt.Reports. 333. 
57 Per Mukherjea. l, The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra 
Thiratha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt AiR 1954 Sc. 282~ also see Ratilad Panchad Gandhi and 
Others v. State of Bombay and Others A1R 1954 Sc. 388; Ramanasramam by its Secretary-
general Sambasiva Roa and Others v. The Commi ...... ioner of Hindu Religious and Charitable 
EndowmentsMadrasAiR 1961 Madras 265. 
58 Benito. 4. 
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least in some supernatural powers or spirits capable of influencing human affairs". S9 In 
view of the undoubtedly differing opinions on the definition of religion and belief, it 
may be wiser to leave the matter open, in the hope that a wider constituency could 
benefit from whatever international legal norms have to offer to religious minorities. 
On the other hand, the lack of consensus in issues of definition also reflects the 
complexity which international law may face in providing recognition to certain groups 
as a minority; certain States have not hesitated in exploiting this weakness to the 
fullest advantage in denying recognition.60 The constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, for instance, provides recognition to Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians as 
minorities, denying the same status to approximately 300,000 Baha'is,61 and in Turkey, 
only those Kurds who do not speak Turkish are officially recognised as Kurd, 
producing a much lower figure of Kurdish population.62 However, it is equally 
possible to confront a situation where a majority is forcibly imposing upon a particular 
section of the community the status of a religious minority. 63 
The meaning of "language" in international legal discourse, similarly remains 
imprecise. According to McDougal, Laswell and Chen "language" "is broadly 
S9 Y Dinstein, "Freedom of Religion and the protection of Religious Minorities" (eds.) Dinstein and 
Tabory op.cit note 16,145-159, 146. 
60 In this regard the view of the so-called "countries of immigration", in particular the Latin 
American States have been very pronounced. see AlC.3/SR.1l03~ for the position of Brazil (para 
12)~ Chile (paras 19, 23)~ Ecuador (paras 43,44). 
61 According to Article 13 of the Iranian Constitution "Zoroastrian, Jewish and Christian Iranians 
are the only recognised religious minorities. who within the limits of law, are free to perform 
their religious rites and ceremonies and to act according to their own canons in matters of 
personal affair and religious education" Constitution oj the IslamiC Republic oj Iran oj 24th 
October 1979, as amended to 28 July 1989, A Blaustein and G Flanz, Constitutions of the 
Countries oj the World, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications) Vol. viii, 1992. The Constitution 
doesn't mention religion as a ground for non-discrimination see Article 19~ A An-Na-im 
"Religious Minorities under Islamic Law and the limits of cultural relativism" 9 HRQ (1987), 1-
18, 1,13~ BaM'i International Community, The Bahn 'Is oj Iran, A Report on the Persecution oj a 
Religious Minority, (June 1981), 1 ~ K Bigelow "A campaign to deter genocide: The BaM'i 
experience" (ed.) Fien Genocide Watch (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), 1992, 
189-196~ ''The BaM'i faith is not recognised by the Iranian authorities as an official religion, as a 
result, members of that faith wishing to register themselves as BaM'is are refused identification 
cards, passports and other official documents, arc dismissed from jobs are refused admittance to 
universities" cited in Benito, 10. 
62 See The Turkish Constitution inter alia Article 3, 42 A Blaustein and G Flanz, Constitutions oj 
the Countries oJthe World, (Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications) vol. xx, 1982~ D McDowall, The 
Kurds, (London: MRG), 1991,9. 
63 See infra Part IV, the case of Ahmadis in Pakistan. 
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understood to include all the means (signs and symbols), phonetic and phonemic, by 
which people communicate with each other" .64 It is arguable that to a large extent 
ethnicity subsumes linguistic and cultural identities. However, as the case of a number 
of tribes in the Mrican continent exemplifies, there remains the possibility of 
linguistically distinctive groups though having the same ethnic or racial origin. In a 
number of instances, there is a fine dividing line between a dialect of an existing 
language or the presence of a different language altogether. 
The recently adopted European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages6' 
while not providing a clarification on the meaning of "language" as such, defines the 
term "regional or minority language" as 
(i) traditionally used within a given territory of a State by 
nationals of that State who form a group numerically smaller than the 
rest of the population, and 
(ii) different from the officiallanguage(s) of that State~ 
it does not include dialects of the officiallanguage(s) ofthe State 
or the Language of migrants.66 
As far as the identification of linguistic minorities is concerned, it has to be 
conceded that academic opinion also reflects the characteristic difficulties. Nowak, for 
instance writes 
"Linguistic minorities refer to those groups of the population 
that use a language, both among themselves and in public, that clearly 
differs from that used by the majority as well as from the state language. 
This need not be a written language. However, mere dialects that 
deviate slightly (in pronunciation) from the majority language do not 
establish the status ofa minority".67 
64 M McDougal, H Lasswell and L-C Chen, "Freedom of discrimination in choice of Language and 
International human rights" 1 SIULJ (1976), 151-174, 151~ also see M Tabory, "Language rights 
as Human Rights" 10lYHR (1980), 167-223, 187-188. 
6S Adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, opened for signature 2 October, 
1992. 
66 Ibid., Article l. 
67 M Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, CCPR Commentary (Keh1 am 
Rhein: Strasbourg), 1993, 491. 
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The Characterisation of individuals on the basis of "race", "ethnicity", 
"language" or "religion" is not infrequently premised on objective criterion and it may 
well be that in a number of instances there is a strong inter-relationship between these 
identities.68 
2.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of "rights" and "minorities", presents particular difficulties, 
especially in the sphere of international law where the quest for consensus can be an 
enduring exercise. However, an inability to define concepts with precision is not 
necessarily synonymous to a questionable legal existence, though it may affect their 
viabi1ity~ many international legal institutions have survived in the absence of 
specification and meticulousness. 
As we have noted, the definition of "minority" has and continues to provide 
difficulties; views on the entire subject vary significantly depending on the cultural, 
sociological, political and legalistic values of the proponent. It must be emphasised 
however, that not everything is in conflict and contention~ there is a solid core in the 
definition of the conception of minority. The dissensions that do exist are not 
necessarily of an elementary nature or central to the entire subject, though the present 
work, as we shall see in due course, does recommend that a full and precise exposition 
is required to facilitate further progress to protect the rights of minorities. 
Although there is room for further improvement, Special Rapporteur 
Capotorti's definition could be taken to reflect the aforementioned core; a definition 
which he proposed in his study pursuant to article 27 of the ICCPR. The definition, as 
well as article 27, singles out "ethnicity", "language" and "religion" as distinctive 
features of minority identity. Ethnicity, language and religion, as we have seen are 
68 See the United States Supreme Court Decision in Saint Francis College v AL-Khazraju 107 S.Ct 
2022 (1987), Shaare Tefila Congregation v Cobb 1075 S.Ct. 2019 (1987). 
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difficult conceptions and, without a uniform basis under international law are quite 
capable of engendering confusion. However, in practical terms, it must be conceded 
that the identification of a particular identity may not be so complex as it might first 
appear. A greater challenge, and from the Statist point of view a more sinister 
scenano tends to develop, when the rather mundane and manageable subject of 
minority rights is allied to such conceptions as "Right of aU Peoples to self-
determination" a subject to which we now turn. 
CHAPTER THREE 
MINORITIES AND COMPARABLE ENTITIES 
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
"PEOPLES" AND "INDIGENOUS PEOPLES" 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
To distil "peoples" and "indigenous peoples" from the volumes of minorities 
can be an onerous and perplexing exercise. The task, can by no means be regarded as 
a fairly straight forward one; while academic opinion differs radically, international law 
itself could be regarded as faltering at crucial instances. The difficulties become 
obvious if we consider the position of such groups as the Kurds of Iraq, Turkey and 
Iran, the Tamils of Sri Lanka, the indigenous Indians of the Americas, the aborigines of 
Australia and the Toureque people from Mali, Ogonis from Nigeria, and the Twa Du 
people from Rwanda.' The guidelines that are provided, as we shall consider shortly in 
greater detail, tend to make matters no less ambiguous. 
Regardless of the complexity of the debate, the aforementioned exercise is 
necessitated by the fact that, the rights of "peoples" and "indigenous peoples" may 
differ significantly from those that are accorded to members of minority groups. The 
issue is given added impetus when the debate centres around self-determination, a 
phrase aptly described as one "simply loaded with dynamite".2 International legal 
instruments associate the concept of self-determination to "peoples", minorities are not 
per se beneficiaries,' making the issue of identification and distinctions crucial. 
2 
3 
See T Estamotopoulou, "Indigenous Peoples and the United Nations: Human Rights as a 
Developing Dynamic" 16 HRQ (1994), 58-81, 71~ J Corntassel and T Primeau "Indigenous 
. Sovereignty' and International Law: Revised Strategies for Pursuing 'Self-determination'" 17 
HRQ (1995), 343-365, 345-348; W Roxana, What to celebrate in the United Nations Year of 
Indigenous Peoples? (Singapore: Department of Sociology National University of Singapore), 
1993. 
R Lansing, The Peace Negotiations, A Personal Narrative, 1921, 97, cited in M Promerance Self-
Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations, (The Hague: 
M.Nijhofi), 1982, 74. Also cited by L Brilmayer, "Secession and Self-Determination A 
Territorial Interpretation" 16 YaleJlL (1991),177-202, 177. 
"Self-determination is not a right of minorities. They must look instead to human rights: those 
which are not the rights of . peoples'" P Thornberry, Minorities and Human Rights Law, (London: 
MRG) Report No 73, 1987, 5~ "".minorities as such do not have a right to self-determination" R 
Higgins "General Course in Public International Law" (1991) Rec. des cours, 170. 
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3.2 "PEOPLES" 
3.2.1 THE DEFINITIONAL DEBATE 
The identification of an entity as "Peoples" in international law, particularly in 
the post-colonial period, has proved to be controversial~ the primary cause for 
altercation being differences in rights accorded to "Peoples" and "minorities". There 
are differing views as to the substance and content of the rights which are enjoyed by 
"Peoples", although it is well established that the "right to self-determination", belongs 
to "Peoples", regardless of the complications in their identification. As Professor 
Shaw succinctly points out "the issue of what in law constitutes a 'People' has proved 
to be one of great controversies of the Post-World War II era. The reason for this has 
been the development of the concept of self-determination". 4 
The definitional debate as to the precise meaning of "Peoples" has waged ever 
since the term was used in the United Nations Charter. The Charter attaches the 
"Right of self-determination to Peoples".s The UN Secretariat commenting upon the 
term "Peoples" in the Charter stated "Peoples refers to a group of human beings, who 
mayor may not comprise States or Nations",6 leading to the view, albeit a minority 
one, that the provisions of the Charter allowed secession for minorities.7 Incidentally it 
also needs to be borne in mind that the United Nations, although using the term 
"Nations" is itself an organisation representing the States of the World. 
Since the coming into operation of the Charter, the term "Peoples" has become 
an indelible fixture of many international and national instruments though there has 
often been an inconclusive debate as to its meaning and scope. It is not the intention of 
the present study, nor it is submitted, is it possible, to define a concept such as the 
"Right of All Peoples to self-determination" with any precision. As Hannum comments 
4 
S 
6 
7 
M Shaw, "The Definition of Minorities in international law" in Y Dinstein and Mala Tabory, 
(cds.), The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoffl, 1993, 1-31,2. 
See infra. 
UNCIO Docs, XVIII, 657-658. 
UNCIO Docs, XVII, 142. 
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" .. no contemporary norm of international law has been so vigorously promoted or 
widely accepted .... as the rights of all peoples to self-determination. Yet the meaning of 
that right remains as vague and imprecise as when it was enunciated by President 
Wilson and others at Versailles".8 
It is submitted that a simple elaboration of the varied contexts in which the 
term has been used may not be very helpful. On the other hand, a brief consideration 
of the "Right of All Peoples to self-determination" seems to be necessary for a study of 
this nature. Not only is the issue of self-determination, at least that of "internal self-
determination" in the form of inter alia autonomy, self-government and establishment 
of representative institutions capable of affecting the position of minorities but a wider 
interpretation of the right (as is currently taking place in Central and Eastern Europe 
and in many other parts), could have a phenomenal impact on the future political 
geography of the world. 
3.2.2 THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
Self-determination in its modern form could be related to the experiences of 
American, French and Bolshevik Revolutions with their emphasis on popular 
sovereignty.9 Though used widely by politicians and nationalists, in international law 
the concept remained in embryonic form until the events of the First World War when 
President Wilson, the leading exponent of this ideal attempted to assert his wishes in 
8 
9 
H Hannum, "Rethinking Self-Determination" 34 Va.JIL (1993), 1-69,2. 
"There had been waves of nationalism in Europe since the Lutheran and Calvinist revolutions, 
but self-determination was not a revolt of princes and theologians but that of the popular will, its 
imagination inflamed by the American and French Revolutions and notions of the inherent 
. rights of man' as adumbrated by the Scottish Enlightenment and Immanel Kant" T Franck, 
"Post-modem Tribalism and the Right to secession" (ed.) C Brolmann, R Lefeber, M Zieck, 
Peoples and Minorities in International law, (Dordrecht: M. NijhofI), 1993, 6-7~ I Brownlie, 
"Rights of Peoples in International law" (ed.) J Crawford, Rights of Peoples (Oxford: OUP), 
1988, 1-16, 4~ see also J Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law. (Oxford: OUP) 
1979, 85-89; A Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination. (Leaden: Sijthoft), 
1973, 17. 
36 
various forms.lo However, President Wilson was soon to discover, presenting utopian 
ideals was one thing, yet their practice quite another. As Claude Jr accurately states 
"Wilson's preachments concerning national self-determination 
were characterised by more evangelical fire than clarity of definition or 
analysis. Not only was the concept vague, but its consistent application 
as the absolute criterion for the settlement of all boundary questions 
would have involved more drastic consequences for the map of Europe 
than Wilson realised when he began to function as its prophet or was 
willing to support when he was confronted with political realities".11 
Perhaps the fundamental difficulty with an otherwise attractive, and even 
sensible proposition was the identification of its potential beneficiaries. Jennings 
comments provide a fruitful analysis of this problem 
"Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who 
was also the President of the United States, President Wilson, 
enunciated a doctrine which was ridiculous, but which was widely 
accepted as a sensible proposition, the doctrine of Self-determination. 
On the surface it seemed reasonable: Let the people decide. It was in 
fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody 
decides who are the people". 12 
Hence, beset by the inherent contradictions of different though competing and 
equally worthy "selves", the uncertainty in ascertaining the proper mode of 
"determination" and its content and the conflict of self-determination with the cardinal 
principles of sovereign equality, duty of non-intervention, maintenance of status quo, 
preservation of peace and security and the sanctity of international treaties, the 
10 In a statement before the Congress in 1916 he said "Every people has a right to choose the 
sovereignty under which they shall live" and in 1918 he was firmly of the belief that "all well 
defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost satisfaction that can be accorded them 
with out introducing new or perpetuating old demands of discord and antagonism" cited in M 
Shaw, Title to Territory in A/rica, (Oxford: OUP), 1986, 60-61~ Of his famous 14 points, 
Wilson's fifth point was as follows "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of 
all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such 
questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with 
the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined" cited in M Nawaz, "The 
Meaning and Range of the principle of self-determination" 82 Duke LJ (1965),82-101,82-83. 
\I I Claude Jr, National Minorities An International Problem, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press), 1955, 11. 
12 I Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 1956, 
56. 
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Wilsonian ideal failed to flourish. 13 On a universal level, its application could not be 
taken seriously, it was generally ignored in the Paris Peace Conference 1919, and was 
not even mentioned in the final draft of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
Though the final territorial settlements proved disappointing, self-determination left 
some of its mark in the form of the mandate system,14 minority rights treatieslS and was 
sometimes reflected in the judgements of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice.16 
Despite repeated references to it, both by politicians and lawyers during the 
inter-war years, self-determination failed to be recognised as part of positive 
Internationallaw.17 Although the events in Europe in the 1930's and during the course 
of the Second World War forced the allied powers to focus on the issue of human 
rights, references to self-determination remained ambivalent, only rarely making its 
appearance. The Atlantic Charter of August 1941 makes reference to it, but the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals do not. 18 
The United Nations Charter makes express reference to self-determination on 
two occasions. According to Article 1, one of the purposes of the UN is to "develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for equal rights and self-
determination of all peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen 
universal peace".19 The other reference is made in Article 55, according to which 
"With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are 
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
13 Promerance op.cit note 2. 1-9~ see also T Franck, "Legitimacy in international system" 82 AJIL 
(1988), 705.759, 744. 
14 See Article 22 of the Covenant of League ofNations~ 225 CTS 195~ 112 BFSP 13, 316~ 13 AJIL 
Supp 128, 36l. 
IS Infra chapter 4: P Thornberry, "Is there a phoenix in the Ashes? International law and Minority 
Rights" IS Tex.IU (1980),421-458,453-4. 
16 Minority Schools in Albania (1935) PCIJ Ser AlB no 64, 17. 
17 "The self-determination idea ..... did not emerge as a principle of positive international law until 
the Soviet Union insisted on it at the 1945 San Francisco on the United Nations" F Kirgis Ir "The 
Degrees of Self-Determination in the United Nations Era" 88 AJJL (1994) 304-310, 304. 
Thornberry "Self·Determination" 871~ see also the Aaland Island Case LON Official J Special 
Supp No. 1. Aug. 19203,5. 
18 For the text of the Atlantic Charter see 35 AJIL. Supp., 191. Adherence by USSR and other states 
was done through a declaration of 1 January 1942; 36AJIL (1942) Supp, 191. 
19 Article 1(2). 
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principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall 
promote" followed by a number of objectives. Chapter XI, which was subsequently to 
form the basis of decolonisation, also implicitly recognises the principle of self-
determination, although the term itself is not used.20 
There seems to be some debate as to whether it was, in fact, the intention of 
the drafters of the UN Charter to provide for a legally binding right of self-
determination,21 although the view may seem persuasive that Charter provisions in 
relation to self-determination did create binding legal obligations, albeit in a rather 
vague and imprecise manner.22 In any event, as Professor Higgins points out, the self-
determination principle-as enunciated in the Charter-was inherently conservative and 
radically different from how it came to be subsequently understood?3 
Whatever the legal position as regards self-determination may have been at the 
time of the coming into operation of the Charter, the rapid changes in the UN have 
ensured its conspicuous existence as a legal right though its primary focus has been 
directed towards decolonisation. Although a number of States have adopted a 
negative stance on the issue it seems certain that the right to self-determination is 
20 According to Professor Bowett "It is [) permissible to regard the entirety of Chapters XI and XII 
of the U.N. Charter as reflection of the basis idea of self-determination" Problems of Self-
Determination and Political Rights in the Developing Countries, Pros ASIL. (1966), 129-135, 
134. 
21 "There is probably a consensus among scholars that, whatever its political significance, the 
principle of self-determination did not rise to the level of rule international at the time the United 
Nations Charter was drafted" Hannum, 33~ "Self determination, in contrast to sovereignty and all 
that flows from it, was not originally perceived as an operative principle of UN Charter, .. .it was 
one of the desiderata of the Charter rather than a legal right that could be invoked" Y Blum, 
"Reflections on the changing concept of self-determination" 10 Israel L.R. (1975). 509-514, 511; 
see also the views of Gross as discussed by Emerson, "Self-Determination" 65 AJIL (1971), 359-
377, 361. "Many jurists and governments were prepared to interpret these references as merely 
hortatory effect, but the practice of United Nations organs has established the principle as part of 
the United Nations" Brownlie, 596; 
22 "Not withstanding initial equivocation, it can now be seen that real obligations were created, if 
imperfectly expressed in the Charter" Thornberry, 871. 
23 "The concept of self-determination did not then, originally, seem to refer to a right of dependant 
peoples to be independent, or indeed, even to vote". After a discussion of Chapter XI and XII she 
concludes "It can now be seen that self-determination is not provided for the text of the United 
Nations Charter-at least in the sense that it is generally used". R Higgins, "General Course on 
Public International Law" (1991) Ree. des Cours. 155, 156~ also see R Emerson "Colonialism, 
Political development and the United Nations" 10 (1965),484-503. 
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applicable even in the post-colonial world.24 The most forceful assertion of this view is 
propounded in the common article of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
According to the common article 
"All peoples have a right to self-determination. By virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their 
economic, social and cultural development". 
Amongst regional conventions, the right to self-determination is enshrined in 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights. 25 The recently revised ILO 
Convention on Indigenous population and Tribal people,26 while distancing itself from 
the "ordinary" minorities. also provides for the right to self-determination, though 
again without defining the concept.27 
Customary international law affirms the vIew that self-determination is a 
binding legal right. General Assembly Resolutions are not per se binding,28 though 
24 Note Article 1(3) of ICCPR which provides "The state parties to the present covenant, including 
those having responsibility for ... Non-self-governing and Trust territories, shall promote the 
realisation of the right of self-determination". On the practice of Human Rights Committee see R 
Higgins op.cit, note 22, 161; According to Crawford "The Charter mentions self-determination 
only twice, and in both cases it seems to mean something different from the usual understanding 
of self-determination" J Crawford, op.cit note 9, 90. Although the limits of the meaning of what 
Kimminch terms as "self-determination of races" are not clear his overall view seems pertinent 
when he says "Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that with the present situation in the evolution 
of international Jaw self-determination of races is now not merely a principle but a genuine right" 
o Kimminich, "The Function of the Law of Ethnic Groups in International Systems" 23 Law and 
State (1981),37-51-46. 
2S OAU Doc CABILEG/67/3 Rev 5; 27 Rev ICJ; 21 ILM 59. 
26 72 ILO Bulletin S9 (1989). 
27 See infra text accompanying notes 34-47; See N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination and 
International Law. (Dordrecht: M. Nijhofl) 1991, 29. The Helsinki Final Act of the Conference 
on the Security of Europe (CSCE) 1975 is not an international treaty and only a set of political 
commitments. It nonetheless has carried substantial influence in the subsequent development of 
legal norms. Article VIII of the document provides for the right to self-determination as a 
continuing right; see M Koskeniemi "National Self-determination Today: Problems of legal 
theory and practice" 43 ICLQ (1994), 241-269, 242; E Eddison, The Protection of Minorities at 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (Essex: Human Rights Centre Papers in 
the theory and practice of human rights No, 5) 1994; R Brett and E Eddison, Minorities A Report 
on the CSCE Human Dimension seminar on case studies on National Minority issues: Positive 
Results Warsaw 24-28 May 1993 (Essex: Human Rights Centre Papers in the theory and practice 
of human rights No, 6) 1994. 
28 Save for those which deal with internal matters of the Organisation e.g. Article 17 of the United 
Nations Charter; Sec Higgins 4-5. S Davidson, Human Rights. (Buckingham: Open University) 
1993. 
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they can be instrumental in providing evidence of State practice,29 and can in certain 
circumstances be regarded as interpreting the provisions of the Charter.3o In this 
context it is important to note the highly authoritative UN General Assembly 
Resolutions which have been treated as authoritative interpretations of the Charter, and 
generally regarded as reflective of customary law, for example Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial territories and Peoples G.A.Res 1514 (XJ-?31 
and the Declaration of the Principles of International law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN 
GAR 2625 (X¥V), 1970;32 there are many others which reaffirm this normative value. 
Judicial discussion and the views of publicists and international lawyers tend to validate 
this assertion.33 A detailed exposition of the matter of jus cogens will be conducted 
29 On the Customary value of General Assembly Resolutions see B Slaon, "General Assembly 
Resolutions Revisited" 58 BYIL (1987), 39-150~ Higgins, 1-10, B Cheng, "United Nations 
Resolutions on Outer space: Instant Customary International Law" 5 IJIL (1965), 23-48; Judge 
Tanaka, South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) ICJ Reports 1966, 16, 291-293; for a stricter 
interpretation see Judge Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion, Namibia Case ICJ Rep 1971, 6, 280-
30 
281. 
"In some cases a resolution may have a direct legal eiTect as an authoritative interpretation and 
application of the Charter" Brownlie 15; he then goes on to mention as an example in the 
footnote the Declaration on the Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations, 
1970. 
31 According to Bleicher "The language and the circumstance of the passage of Res 1514 (XV) 
... .indicate that the resolution was intended to set out a binding interpretation of the Charter, and 
the continual re-citation and other actions of the General Assembly in support of the resolution 
display seriousness of the belief'S Bleicher, "The Legal Significance of Re-citation of General 
Assembly Resolutions" 63 AJIL (1969), 444-477, 474; The Declaration has been treated "as a 
document only slightly less sacred then the Charter" see R Rosenstock "The Declaration of 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey" 65 AJIL, 713-735, 
730. Note also the evolutionary G.A. Res. 1541 (XV) 1960, which attempts to provide guidelines 
to United Nations and its members in determining as to whether a territory has achieved a full 
measure of Self-Government. 
32 According to Professor Brownlie "Most important is the Declaration on the Granting of 
Independence to Colonial countries and peoples adopted by the General Assembly in 1960 and 
referred to in a series of Resolutions concerning specific territories since then. The Declaration 
regards the principle of self-determination as a part of the obligations stemming from the Charter. 
The principle has been incorporated in a number of international instruments. The United States 
and many other governments support the principle, which appears in the Declaration of Principle 
of International Law concerning Friendly Relations adopted without vote by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1970" Brownlie 596-7. 
33 See the Namibia case "the subsequent developments of international law in regard to non-self 
governing, as enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-
determination applicable to all of them ... " IC} Reports 1971, 6, 31; Western Sahara Cases IC} 
Reports, 1975, 12, 31-33 and Judge Dillard's celebrated opinion especially at 122. For a succinct 
discussion see Shaw, op.cit note 10; 1986~ Higgins, 90-106. 
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shortly,34 though it needs to be noted that in the absence of any precise specification, it 
has been contended that self-determination forms part of the norms of jus cogens.3S 
3.3 INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
3.3.1 THE DEFINITIONAL DEBATE 
A consideration of the position of minorities in international law could not 
afford to ignore the case of the indigenous peoples. Indigenous peoples, in a number 
of States occupy the position of minorities and being weak and inarticulate many of 
their demands coincide with those of other minority groupS.36 As their name reflects, 
being indigenous to the land, many of them were killed-off, while the survivors were 
conquered or subjugated.31 Having been relentlessly victimised in the contemporary 
34 See Infra chapter 5. 
3S H Gros Espell, Special Rapporteur, Implementation of United Nations Resolutions relating to the 
Right of Peoples under Colonial and Alien Domination to Self-Determination, Study for the Sub-
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, UN 
Doc.ElCN.4/Sub.2/390, 1977, 17-19, paras 61-71; H Gros Espiell's Report UN Doc 
ElCNA/Sub.2/40S, 1978, 31-37, paras 67-81; "The writer shares ... with full conviction and in 
dull awareness of all its consequences, the idea today, the rights of peoples to self-determination 
in one of the case of Jus Cogens" G Espiell, "Self-Determination and Ius Cogens" in A Cassesse, 
(cd.) UN Law/Fundamental Rights Two Topics in International Law, (Alpen aan den Rijn: Sijthof 
and Noordhom, 1979; ILC, Draft Articles on State Responsibility, Part I, Article 19 3(b); Special 
Rapporteur T Van Boven, Study Concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation and 
Rehabilitation for victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
ElCN.4/Sub.21l993/8, 16. 
36 The documentation produced by organisations such as "Survival" include those which could be 
equally conveniently indexed in the category of minorities; see e.g. the Newsletter of Survival 
International 38, 1994. Conversely a key focus of Minority Rights Group has been the plight of 
indigenous groups; see e.g. H O'Shaugnnessy and S Corry, What future for the Armindians of 
South America, (London: MRG) 1987; I Wilson, Canada's Indians, 1982; I Creery, The Inuit 
(Eskimo) of Canada, (London: MRG) 1983; I Wilson, The Original Americans: US Indians, 
(London: MRG) 1980; 0 Stephen and P Wearne, Central America's Indians, (London: MRG) 
1984. 
31 "Genocide has been committed against indigenous, Indian or tribal peoples in every regime in the 
World ... " Hannum, 74; W Heinz Indigenous PopUlations, Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights, 
(Berlin: Quorum verlag) 1988; I Clinebell and I Thomson "Sovereignty and self-determination: 
The rights of native Americans under international law" 27 Buff L.R. (1978), 669-714. Many 
like the AchC(Guayaki) Indians have reached a point of physical extinction; see R Ames ''The 
Ache of Paraguay" in Potter, 218-237; Kuper, International Action against Genocide, (London: 
MRG) 1984, S~ G Alfredson, "International Law, International Organisations and Indigenous 
peoples" JIAffs (1982), 113-124. 
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age, they remain in conditions which governments of modern States regard as less 
developed. Efforts to retain their aboriginal and autochthonous life has cost a number 
of them dearly, stretching from forced assimilation to genocide. Unfortunately, 
persecution and discrimination against indigenous peoples, is still existent in many 
societies, and the continuation of a number of discriminatory laws provide a sad 
commentary on their state of affairs.38 A United Nations document eloquently 
summarises their contemporary position 
"Often uprooted from their traditional lands and way of life and 
forced into prevailing national societies, indigenous peoples face 
discrimination, marginalisation and alienation. Despite growing 
political mobilization in pursuit of their rights, they continue to lose 
their cultural identity along with their natural resources. Some are in 
imminent danger of extinction" ?9 
As we shall see in due course, 10 a number of instances the limited 
jurisprudence that exists on the position of minorities relates itself closely to the 
position of indigenous peoples.40 Indeed, having been the primary targets of genocide, 
persecution and discrimination, indigenous peoples deserve to be the chief beneficiaries 
of whatever the modern norms relating to minorities has to offer. 
On the other hand, while similar concerns are shared as regards both 
indigenous peoples and other minorities, there remains a pronounced view that the 
indigenous peoples belong to a distinct category.41 This, in fact, is the established view 
of the indigenous peoples themselves-an aspiration which was succinctly reflected by a 
representative of the Indian Treaty Council when he stated that "the ultimate goal of 
38 See International Labour Conference, Report o/the Committee o/Experts on the Application 0/ 
Conventions and Recommendations, 64th session, 1978. 
39 United Nations, Indigenous Peoples International Year 1993, (United Nations), 1992. 
40 See the jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee Lovelace v Canada, HR Committee, 
Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (2nd to 16th session); UN Doc CCPR/CIOP/1, 
1985, 10 (admissibility), 37 (interlocutory decisions), 83 (view of Human Rights Committee); 
Kitok v. Sweden Doc N43/40, 221; infra chapter 7. 
41 See the proceedings of the 11 th meeting of the United Nations working group on indigenous 
rights 18 UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.211992/33, 1992, 19; Shaw, op.cit note 3, 13-16; Lerner, "The 
Evolution of Minority Rights in International Law" in (eds.)., C Brolmann, R Lefeber, M Zieck 
op.cit note 9, 77-101, 81. 
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their colonizers would be achieved by referring to them as minorities".42 According to 
the Special Rapporteur Deschenes of Canada "we should not attempt to deal with 
questions of indigenous populations while discussing the rights of minorities". 43 
Indeed in many ways demands made by indigenous peoples are more forceful 
with a higher threshold, claiming "to be more than minorities" and asking for an 
entitlement of "two set of rights, one as indigenous group and the other as minority".44 
Equally, there remains an uneasiness that the claims of indigenous peoples, if applied 
generally to minorities may threaten the established world order. Hence, it is not 
surprising to note the identification and definition of the indigenous peoples has proved 
to be a controversial and politically sensitive issue, even more so than in the case of 
other minority groups. State practice, like that of the issues relating to the definition of 
minorities, remains equivocal. However, a number of States-detennined not to accept 
the existence of indigenous peoples within their frontiers-have denied any association 
of indigenous peoples with any other minority. Barsh mentions Bangladesh, Indonesia, 
the former USSR, India and China which have maintained that there are no 
"indigenous" peoples in Asia only minorities epitomising former Soviet Ambassador 
Sofinsky's view before the Sub-Commission in 1985 that "indigenous situations only 
arise in the Americas and Australasia where there are imported 'populations' of 
Europeans".4s 
Equally, while several States have proved extremely sensitive, particularly 
States from the Latin American region on this definitional issue-many of the indigenous 
groups themselves have asserted a prerogative to define their "nations".46 In the midst 
of these conflicts, it is not surprising to perceive tensions as to whatever definition is 
accorded to the indigenous peoples or communities.47 
According to the Special Rapporteur Jose R Martinez Cobo: 
42 Cited in Thornberry, 331. 
43 UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, paras 32-38. 
44 Thornberry 342. 
4S R Barsh, "Indigenous People An Emerging Object of International Law", 80 AJIL (1986), 369-
385,375. 
46 Ibid. 376. 
47 Hannum 88-90. 
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"Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed 
on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of 
the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They 
form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to 
preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued 
existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, 
social institutions and legal systems. 
The historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an external 
period reaching into present, of one or more of the following factors: 
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or at least of part of them 
(b) common ancestry with the original occupants of the lands~ 
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestation (such as religion, living 
under a tribal system, membership of international community, dress, 
means of livelihood, life-style etc.) 
(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the 
habitual means of communication at home or in the family, or as the 
main preferred, habitual general or normal language ). 
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country, or in certain regions of the 
World~ 
(f) other relevant factors" .48 
According to Article 1(1) of the ILO Convention 109, adopted in 1989, the 
Convention applies to 
(a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural 
and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of 
natural community, and whose status is regulated wholly or 
partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or 
regulations~ 
(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as 
indigenous on account of their descent from the populations 
which inhabited the country belongs at the time of conquest or 
colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries 
and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of 
their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. 
Article 1(2) goes on to provide 
48 Special Rapporteur, Jose R Martinez-Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against 
Indigenous Populations. UN Doc.ElCN.4/Sub.2/198617/Add.4, 1986,29, paras 378-80. 
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Self-identification as individual or tribal shall be regarded as a 
fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the 
provisions of this convention apply. 
This discussion reveals the tensions and divisive nature of the probable 
definition of "indigenous" peoples in international law. It is also the case that 
indigenous peoples, themselves, like other groups or communities, are capable of 
differing radically from each other. Certainly, an observation into the myriad existence 
of some of these "savage and inaccessible people,,49 or "people within contact with 
civilization" provides fascinating and cherishable distinctions. 50 It may well be that the 
threat to the institution of the indigenous peoples might not come so much from the 
absence of a consensus definition, but from the extent of the rights that they have 
under international law. 
3.3.2 THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
Many of the claims made by the indigenous peoples coincide with those of 
other minorities. The desire for autonomy and recognition as collective entities forms 
part of the vocabulary of the indigenous peoples as well as other minority groups, 
although the thrust and vibrancy of these made may differ significantly. Historical 
association with land and environment dispenses a distinct flavour to the demands 
made by the indigenous peoples. Their claims include, inter alia, that of collective 
property rights of land and natural resources, the special nature and form of 
relationship between individual members and tribes and the right to impose obligations 
on individual members which may not necessarily be aspired by other minorities. 51 
Indeed international instruments have, of late, attempted to consider in depth 
the position of indigenous people and a number of specialist instruments have been 
<49 F Van Langenhove, The Question of Aborigines Before the United Nations, The Belgian ThesiS, 
(Brussels: Royal Colonial Institute) 1954, 10. 
50 Ibid. 16. 
51 G Neithem "'Peoples" and "Populations" Indigenous Peoples and the Rights of Peoples", J 
Crawford, Rights of Peoples, (Oxford: OUP), 1988. 
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adopted which aim to concentrate solely on the position of indigenous populations. 52 
This rather sudden resurgence of interest may be taken as an acknowledgement, at 
least in part, that the cause of Indigenous peoples raises specific issues of concern 
which ought to be focused on more specifically. 
The organisation which has shown a significant interest in the plight of 
indigenous peoples and more generally in its efforts to "establish universal and lasting 
peace" through means of social justice is the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO).53 The organisation, ever since its inception in 1919, made evident its interest by 
establishing a Committee of Experts on Native Labour in 1926.54 A natural projection 
of this agenda was reflected in the adaptation of various conventions and 
recommendations including the Forced Labour Convention 1930 (ILO Convention 
29),55 the Recruiting of Indigenous Workers Convention 1936, (ILO Convention 50),56 
the Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention 1939 (ILO 
Convention 64),57 the Penal Sanctions (Indigenous Workers) Convention 1940 (ILO 
65)58 and the Contracts of Employment (Indigenous Workers) Convention (ILO 86).59 
A significant work in the cause of protecting indigenous peoples was 
conducted under the auspices of the organisation, Indigenous Peoples Living and 
Working Conditions of Aboriginal Population in Independent Countries. 6O The study 
published in 1953, bears its mark in the two texts adopted at the fortieth session of the 
organisation, manifesting in the ILO Convention 107 Concerning the Protection and 
52 See e.g. Barsh op.cit note 45 .• Barsh "Revision of the ILO Convention no. 107",81 AJIL (1987) 
756-762; Barsh "United Nations seminar on indigenous peoples and States" 83 AJIL (1989), 599-
756-762. 
53 Preamble to the Constitution of the ILO 62 Stat. 3485; TIAS No 1868; I Brownlie (ed.) Basic 
Documents on Human Rights 2nd edition. (Oxford: OUP), 1981, 171; F Wolf, "Human Rights 
and the International Labour Organisation" T MeTOn (ed.) Human Rights in International Law, 
(Oxford: OUP), 1984, 273-305. 
54 H Hannum (ed.), Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, (Dordrecht: M.Nijhofi), 1993,8. 
S5 39 UNTS 55; Cmd 3693; 134 BFSP 449. 
56 40 UNTS 109; Cmd 5305; 21 ILO Bull III. 
S7 40 UNTS 281; Cmd 6141; 8 Hudson 359. 
58 40 UNTS 311; Cmd 6141; 8 Hudson 377. 
S9 161 UNTS 113; Cmd 7437; 148 BFSP 664. 
60 Studies and Reports, New Series No, 35 (Geneva: International Labour Office), 1953. 
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Integration of Indigenous and other tribal and Semi-tribal Populations in Independent 
Countries61 and Recommendations No 104. 
The adoption of the 1957 Convention was a significant step forward in 
projecting the views and aspirations of the indigenous peoples. The Convention, 
however has been a product of its time with a considerable imprint of an assimilationist 
ideology. By its own admission, it applies, inter alia, to those populations "whose 
social and economic conditions are at a less advanced stage than the stage reached by 
other sections of the national community". 
The Convention has remained an object of ridicule and objection on the part of 
indigenous groups themselves. The India Council complained: 
"[The Convention] does not consider in its articles the right to 
self-determination. It seeks integration and assimilation, with total lack 
of respect for the dignity of every people and its right to freedom. Its 
aim is the destruction of our culture, of our traditions, of our 
language ... .It seeks to promote the individual, which is contrary to the 
communal spirit of our peoples". 62 
No doubt a prominent theme of the Convention is the emphasis on integration 
of indigenous peoples with other sections of the community, even at the cost of 
abandoning their heritage. This bears the appearance of less "respect for indigenous 
culture" and more in the nature of a "simple recognition that it exists and is 
undesirable".63 The Convention has remained limited and ineffectual both in terms of 
the meagre participation as well as the inadequacy of its provisions. 
This overwhelming feeling of discontentment provided the impetus to the 
adoption of a revised ILO Convention 169, Convention concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal peoples in Independent Countries, 1989.64 The 1989 Convention is certainly a 
reflection of a more liberal attitude and biased against hitherto prevalent integrationist 
61 328 UNTS 247. 
62 Cited in Van Dyke, 83. 
63 Thornberry, 350 
64 72 ILO Bull S9 (1989); 28 ILM 1382. 
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and assimilation orientations~ its moderating effect on what according to its preamble 
were "the assimilationist orientations of earlier standards" is worthy of appreciation. 
On the substantive front, a number of features reflect a degree of promise. 
Article 2, for instance, while improving upon the 1957 convention, reinforces the issue 
stating that governments shall have the responsibility to develop the participation of 
the peoples concerned, and acts to protect their rights. It stresses upon the 
participation of the peoples concerned, actions to protect their rights with the emphasis 
upon the need to respect for social and cultural identity, their customs and traditions 
and their institutions. These acts shall ensure equality of rights and opportunities, full 
realization of the social, economic and cultural rights of the indigenous peoples, and 
would eliminate the socio-economic gaps. 
While article 3 prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, article 4 enjoins special measures for safeguarding the 
institutions, property, labour, culture and environment of indigenous peoples in a 
manner which is not inconsistent with their freely expressed wishes. Article S, 
reaffirms the fundamental principle of recognising, respecting and promoting the social, 
cultural and religious values. 
The significance of article 6 lies primarily in the fact that it reqUires 
governments to consult indigenous peoples in matters affecting them, allowing and 
establishing means for free participation and establishing means for development of 
their institutions. Article 7, reflects the cherished ideals of autonomy by stating that 
peoples concerned shall have their right to decide their own priorities for the process 
of development as it affects their lives, beliefs, institutions and spiritual well being and 
the lands they occupy or otherwise use, and to exercise control, to the extent possible, 
over their own economic, social and cultural development. In addition, they shall 
participate in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes 
for national and regional development which may affect them directly. 
The advance of the 1989 Convention is considerable over its predecessor, and 
deserves our attention in so far as it relates specifically to the position of indigenous 
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peoples and their rights. It is also important for our overall consideration of minority 
rights. As we shall see in chapter seven, many of the rights recognised and provided in 
the 1989 Convention for indigenous peoples, may come to provide an appropriate 
substance to what has been termed as the "emerging right to autonomy". 
Having said this, the 1989 Convention, in many ways, falls short of providing 
an adequate expression to the claims of indigenous peoples. There are a number of 
issues where their is very little international consensus. These relate, inter alia, to land 
rights, the right of self-determination and international personality. Although, Chapter 
II of the Convention deals in considerable detail with the subject ofland, in its drafting 
stages there emerged considerable disagreement with more than 100 amendments 
being presented, and in the final resort only reflecting a compromise amongst divergent 
interests.65 
The right to self-determination has proved to be particularly contentious and it 
needs to be borne in mind that while the Convention does apply to "peoples" a number 
of State representatives were unhappy with the usage of the term "peoples" with all its 
paraphernalia, and wanted it replaced with "populations". 66 The Convention itself has 
grudgingly granted indigenous peoples a limited recognition to this right, although the 
adoption of this text was only possible through the addition of an extra paragraph 
curtailing the effect of whatever the right has to offer. This occurs in the form of 
article 1(3) which provides: 
The use of the term "peoples" in this convention shall not be 
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may 
attach to the term under international law 
Efforts on the part of other international organisations have of late begun to 
match those of the ILO.67 The issue of indigenous peoples has been elevated in certain 
65 See views of Latin American and Asian representatives in International Labour Conference, 
Provisional Records, 76th session, 1989, No 25, 2511, 25 June~ N Lerner, Group Rights and 
Discrimination in International Law, (Dordrecht: M.Nijhofl), 1991, 109. 
66 Ibid .. 
67 The United Nations General Assembly declared 1993 as the International Year of the World's 
indigenous Peoples-GA Res 46/128; UN GAOR 46th session, UN Doc AlResl461l28, 1992~ See 
generally Estamatopoulou op.cit note 1. 
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quarters-notably the Inter-American Institute, an agency ofOAS.68 In 1981 the United 
Nations created a pre-sessional working group on Indigenous population of the United 
Nations Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities.69 The fruitful work of the individual experts, along with the impact of the 
completion of a major study conducted by the United Nations Special Rapporteur in 
1983,70 has projected the issue in the United Nations to significant proportiQns, and a 
Declaration on Indigenous peoples is on the agenda of the United Nations General 
Assembly.7' 
It is submitted that while indigenous peoples cannot be divorced from other 
minorities, there appears to be an increasing recognition of indigenous peoples as a 
distinct category of international legal subjects, leading to a number of specialist 
instruments dealing specifically with their position. The present work, while 
considering the position of indigenous populations in so far as it comes within the 
overall bracket of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, would not in view of the 
present limitations focus in any great depth on matters which deal exclusively with 
indigenous peoples. 
68 See the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Inter-American Year Book on Human 
Rights /969-70 (Washington DC: OAS), 1976, 73-83~ also see Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Report on the work accomplished by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights during its 29th session (October 16-27), 1972 OAS Doc. OAS/Ser UVIII.29 Doc.40 rev.l 
1973, 63-65~ ibid., Ten years Activity /971-198/ (Washington D.C: OAS), 1982,328-29. 
69 See Sub-Commission Res 2 (XXIV) Sept. 8, 198t Commission on Human Rights Res 1982/19, 
Mar 10~ ECOSOC Res 1982/34, May 7. 
70 Special Rapporteur, Jose R Martinez-Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against 
Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. ElCN.4/Sub/198617 and Add 1-4, 1986. 
7. See the Draft Declaration on the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples as adopted by the Working 
Group on Indigenous Population of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2, 1992/33, Annex 1, 1992; Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples Revised working paper submitted by the Chairperson-Rapporteur Ms. Erica-Irene Daes, 
pursuant to Sub-Commission Res 1992/331, E/CN.4/Sub. 211 993126, 1993; The Draft United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the Sub-Commission in 
August 1994 UN Doc ElCN.4/199512; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56. This draft was submitted before 
the Human Rights Commission which decided to establish an inter-governmental working group 
UN Doc ElCN.4/1995/L.lll Add.2 March 1995; reprinted 34ILM 1995, 535. 
51 
3.4 PEOPLES, MINORITIES AND SELF-DETERMINATION 
Academic opinion clearly points to links between minorities, peoples and self-
determination. According to Professor Brownlie: 
"The issue of self-determination, the treatment of minorities and 
the status of indigenous population are the same and the segregation of 
topics is an impediment of fruitful work. The rights and claims of 
groups with their own cultural histories and identities are in principle 
the same-they must be. It is problem of implementation of principles 
and standards which vary, simply because the facts will vary. The point 
can be expressed by saying that the problems of Lapps, the Inuit, 
Australian Aboriginal, the Welsh, the Quebecois, the Armenians, the 
Palestinians, and so forth, are the same in principle but different in 
practice. This association of categories is one reason for the hesitant 
approach to the definition of 'peoples' or 'minorities' or 'indigenous 
peoples"'.72 
Equally in Dr Thornberry's vIew "Self-determination and the rights of 
minorities are two sides of the same coin".73 In contrast to these views, international 
legal instruments attempt to draw distinction between "Peoples", "minorities" and 
"indigenous peoples", and avoid almost religiously associating minorities with notions 
of self-determination.74 In practical terms as well, ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minority groups without a territorial base may have had little in the way of self-
determination~ the burst of decolonisation did not significantly further the cause of self-
determination for many of those groups. A number of them felt that after the 
72 I Brownlie, "The Rights of Peoples in Modem International Law" (cd.) J Crawford op.cit note 9, 
1-16, 16; also cited by K Partsh "Recent developments in the field of Peoples Rights" 7 HRU 
(1986), 177-182, 182. 
73 Thornberry "Self-determination" 867. 
74 The practice of States and their views on the subject can also be ascertained from their reports to 
the Human Rights Committee. For the position of Iraq in relation to the Kurds see UN Doc 
A/42/40 paras 352, 353, 385, 386. The jurisprudence of the Human Rights Committee itself 
endorses a distinction between persons to belonging to minorities under article 27, and the 
peoples under 1. Article 27 provides an appropriate basis of redress for individuals belonging to 
minorities; article 1 has no application in their situation see A.D. v. Canada UN Doc A/39/40, 
1984,200; Human Rights Committee: Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol vol. ii, 23; 
also see McIntyre v. Canada 14 HRLJ, 1993. 171 discussed by H Cullen, "A Response to William 
Lawton" in Kritsiotis, 34-39, 34-45. 
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colonisers left, they were subjected to another form of colonialism, and have remained 
under "alien and colonial subjugation". 
3.4.1 The Belgian Thesis 
The early attempts that were made to espouse the cause of self-determination 
of these groups did not meet with much success. According to the Belgian 
representative the primary focus under the provisions of Charter needed to be on 
"territories whose peoples have not yet attained a fun measures of self-government", 
whatever their political status may be.7s The substance of the argument, which later 
came to be known as the Belgian thesis, attempted to open up the possibility of 
expanding the ambit of self-determination to "indigenous peoples" and "minorities" by 
expanding the scope of Chapter XI further than colonies and protectorates.76 Kunz 
presents the gist of the argument when he says: 
"The interpretation that Chapter XI applies only to colonies and 
protectorates is strongly attacked as discriminatory and arbitrary. The 
word 'colony' is nowhere used in Chapter XI. It is also not true that 
Chapter XI applies only to 'overseas territories'; there is a colonization 
by seaward and by Landward expansion. Neither is the existence of 
such territories excluded by the fact that they are integrated into the 
metropolitan area. There are many peoples-the Belgian thesis gives 
detailed explanation as to many concrete examples-of inferior 
civitzations in Africa, Asia and Latin America which do not merely form 
minorities, but form quite separate ethnic groups, different in race, 
language or religion, or have hardly anything in common with the 
peoples of higher civilizations on whom the government of the country 
in question is based. Colonization is no less colonization, if it is made 
by territorial contiguity. than by overseas expansion. The primitive 
Indians of Latin America were in colonial times governed from 
overseas. The fact that their countries became independent by 
7S Van Langenhove op.cit note 49~ Thornberry "Self-determination" 873. 
76 "The generality of the Belgian concern was expressed in the delegate's remark that 'similar 
problems (to colonialism] existed wherever there were underdeveloped groups' The thesis 
radicalises self-determination by insisting that it can apply to indigenous groups and minorities" 
Thornberry ibid, 873. "(the] 'Belgian thesis' was unavailingly launched to seek to broaden out 
the application of Chapter XI to bring under its protection not only the colonial peoples but all 
others who were substantively not self-governing" R Emerson "Colonialism, Political 
development and the United Nations" 10 (1965),484-503,489. 
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revolutions by Criollos-revolutions in which the native inhabitants had 
no part-often did not change their status; only now an independent 
government sitting in the same country controls them. Even in the new 
Asian states, where independence was won by autochthonous peoples, 
many primitive peoples of these states are not fully self-governing". 77 
This argument failed to muster any support from the international community 
because most States were keen not to enlarge the scope of the principle of self-
determination. Any other course would not only be too disruptive for international 
stability but there would also be a conflict with the cherished ideals of State 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. The world community had recognised the rights 
of "peoples" to self-determination and, while emphasising on this right to self-
determination of "peoples" under colonial domination,18 expressed serious doubts as to 
its legitimacy outside the colonial or neo-colonial context. Hence "the United Nations 
rejected [the Belgian thesis] and adopted in its place a 'salt water' theory of 
colonialism. Inclusion of unwilling nationalities was illegal only if the state and its 
colony were geographically separated" .79 
3.4.2 The Colonial Declaration 
The restrictive view of the non-applicability of the concept of self-
determination to minorities generally can be reiterated by a consideration of the 
Declaration on the granting of independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the 
General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV).80 As its title makes clear, the Declaration is 
primarily concerned with colonialism, and not aimed in any manner or form at affecting 
the status quo of the post-colonial world. In radically reinterpreting the "self-
determination" provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Declaration calls for 
"immediate steps .... [to] be taken, in trust and non-self governing territories or all other 
77 J Kunz, "Chapter XI of the United Nations Charter in Action" 48 AJIL 1954, 103-111, 109 
78 (emphasis added); also see Whiteman 13 Digest 697-698; Crawford op.cit note 9, 359. 
79 W Reisman "The struggle for the Falklands" 93 Yale U (1983) 28-58, 46. 
Brilamayer, op.cit note 2. 182. 
80 UN GA Res 1514 (XV) adopted on 14 December 1960; Thornberry 17. 
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territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the 
peoples of those territories ... in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence 
and freedom". 
Peoples is a territorial concept; territorial integrity is to be maintained beyond 
independence.81 Article 6 of the Declaration in affirming this position states 
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the 
national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with 
the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. 
While the forces of conservatism have been strong, international law has 
remained disinclined to look piercingly through the impermeable veil of State 
sovereignty. A general view seems to have been accepted that self-determination is a 
right pertaining only to peoples under "alien subjugation, domination and 
exploitation"S2 or peoples under "colonial and alien domination", 83 or "peoples subject 
to colonial exploitation". 84 
3.4.3 The Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States 
The hypothesis of either restricting cases of self-determination to colonial and 
neo-colonial situations8S or alternatively treating self-determination as a continuing 
right in the post-colonial era but only limited to the whole peoples of a State has 
generally meant that self-determination is not associated in any manner with minority 
groups. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
81 P Thornberry, op.cit note 3. 5. 
82 See paragraph 1 of the Declaration. 
83 G.A.Res 2649 (XXV), 30 Nov. 1970~ 2708 (XXV) 14 December 1970~ 2878 (XXVI) 20 
December 1971. 
84 G.A.Res 2787 (XXVI), 6 December 1971. 
85 Note the position of India which has entered a reservation to Article 1 of the ICCPR~ also see 
India's second periodic report before the Human Rights Committee CCPRlC/Add.13. 
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Relations and Co-operation among States, G.A.Res. 2625 (XXf? does provide some 
opportunity to link self-detennination to minorities.86 
Considerable attention has been given to the principle of sovereign equality in 
of the Declaration with this object in mind.87 The paragraph on self-detennination 
which is followed by an obligatory territorial clause provides 
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or 
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance 
with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as 
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour. 
According to White 
" .... to be immune from claims of self-determination which in 
certain cases may result in the fragmentation of an existing State, that 
State must be acting in compliance with the right of self-determination. 
The test of legitimacy is the possession of a government which is 
representative of the people and does not practice discrimination. The 
final paragraph ... requires that States do not act in such a way as to 
imperil the territorial integrity of any other State. There was no express 
proscription on the ability of peoples to struggle for self-determination 
either by seeking to replace an unrepresentative government with one 
that secures self-detennination" .88 
The issue of representative government has also attracted Rosenstock's 
attention.89 He says 
"a close examination of the its text will reward to the reader 
with an affinnation of the applicability of the principle to peoples within 
existing States and the necessity for governments to represent the 
governed" .90 
Similarly Erica-Irene Deas notes 
86 Thornberry "Self-Determination" 875. 
87 Ibid. 
88 R White, "Self-Determination: Time for a Re-assessment?" 28 NILR (1981) 140-170 159. ~ , , 
Rosenstock, op.cit note 3l. 
90 Ibid. 732. 
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"The meaning ... .is plain. Once an independent State has been 
established and recognised, its constituent peoples must try to express 
their aspirations through national political system, and not through the 
creation of new states. This requirement continues unless the national 
political system becomes so exclusive and non-democratic that it cannot 
be said to be 'representing the whole people'. At that point, and if all 
international and diplomatic measures fail to protect the peoples 
concerned from the State, they may perhaps be justified in creating a 
new state for their safety. Indeed, in such a state of affairs, legal 
arguments cease to have any real significance since peoples will defend 
themselves by whatever means they can. Continued government 
representivity and accountability is therefore a condition for enduring 
enjoyment of the right to self-determination and for continued 
application of the territorial integrity and national unity principles".91 
Thus, for these authorities the implication from the aforementioned principle of 
the Declaration, as well as from general principles of international law is that if people 
within existing States are treated in a discriminatory manner by a government, or that 
the government is unrepresentative, then the probable claim for self-determination may 
not be defeated by arguments of territorial integrity. 
Having said that, whatever the emerging trend might be in academic opinion, 
this academic voice would only form a very subsidiary portion of the sources of 
international law. It can perhaps be surmised with relative certainty that in the 
contemporary State-centred international law, "Peoples" is still very much a territorial 
concept; territorial integrity and State sovereignty act as the twin pillars of the post-
colonial world order. On this hypothesis, it would be difficult to sustain a view that 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities within modern nation-States are synonymous 
to "Peoples". Thornberry's contention is more appealing that "if Peoples' applies 
within States it is majorities~ there is little in this definition for minorities".9'2 
91 E A Daes E/CN.4/Suh.21l993/26 Add 1, 4, para 21. According to the Vienna Declaration 
adopted on 25 June 1993, "In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations among States in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and 
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people 
belonging to the territory with out distinction of any kind". UN World Conference on Human 
Rights, (United Nations: New York) 1993,29, pt 1, para 2. 
92 Thornberry op.cit note 3, 5. 
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3.5 CONCLUSIONS 
While the debate on the substance of the right to self-determination is likely to 
continue to be volatile and probably inconclusive, the conceptual difficulties inherent in 
this debate must not be overlooked. Rohfeld's paradigm of rights has been considered 
earlier along with the difficulty in fitting the so-called "third-generation" rights as 
"claim-rights". Attempts to treat "the right of all peoples to self-determination" as a 
"claim-right" would engender particular difficulties. Who would be the holder of the 
"right" and upon whom lies the "co-relative duty"? Can the "peoples" of a State, in 
fact be treated as synonymous to the State itself, meaning thereby that the holder of 
"rights" and bearer of "duties" is the identical identity of the State?93 
In so far as the relevance of the debate as regards the definition of "peoples" 
and "indigenous peoples", there remains the possibility of considerable overlap 
between the concepts of "minority" "peoples" and "indigenous peoples", though they 
cannot be regarded as being identical; certainly the constraints within which 
international law operates would not permit it to take such a stance. Minorities, like 
many of the weaker and poorer elements of any society have an uncanny faculty for 
survival and resilience; they cannot be simply wished away nor could they easily be 
coerced into submission. Despite the reluctance of international law to allow 
minorities the status of "peoples" many of them have nonetheless attempted to 
appropriate the concept of self-determination to their dictionary,94 with a number of 
their claims being synonymous to those of "peoples". 
On the other hand, it must however be conceded that the nervousness exhibited 
by international instruments is not wholly without any rationale. As the present work 
93 The debate would appear to reach confusing proportions. According to Crawford "If the phrase 
'rights of peoples' has any independent meaning, it must confer rights on peoples against their 
own government. In other words, if the only rights of peoples are right against other States, and 
if there is no change to the established position that the government of the State represents 'the 
State' (i.e. the people of the State) for all international purposes irrespective of its 
representativeness, than what is the point of referring to the rights in question as the rights of 
peoples? why not refer to them as the rights of States in the familiar, well understood though 
some what elliptical way?" J Crawford op.cit note 9, 55-67, 56. 
94 P Thornberry "Self-determination" 868. 
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would attempt to exemplify through the case of Pakistan, the lacuna between the right 
to self-determination and what has been termed as the emerging right of autonomy may 
not be very wide~ notions of autonomy could easily extend to those of self-
determination and threaten the existence of the State structure. 
It is probably the case that if self-determination has any relevance to minorities, 
it is of an indirect nature. The concept of "internal self-determination" would benefit 
the whole peoples including minorities. It could also be argued that self-determination 
is a continuum of collective rights, and there is a linkage between the rights of 
individual members of any community, minorities, indigenous peoples or the entire 
peoples of the State~ in essence minorities and other collectivities profit from the 
contemporary norms of human rights or conversely as Sieghart has put it " .... all human 
rights exist for the protection ofminorities .. ".9s 
95 P Seighart, The Lawful Rights of Mankind. (Oxford: OUP), 1986, 168. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART III 
The present part comprises of four chapters and although the primary objective 
is to analyse the contemporary rights of minorities, a historical survey has been 
included for a number of reasons. Firstly, as we shall shortly see in the next chapter, 
protection of minorities is indeed "one of the oldest concerns ofinternationallaw".l A 
historical analysis, while confirming this latter point would also, it is hoped, provide us 
with some reasons for the shift away from minority protection to individual human 
rights after the Second world war. 
A second basis for not overlooking the past position derives from the caveat 
that in international law there remains the possibility of renaissance and revival of 
previous values and norms. It is important to bear in mind Professor Kunz's remarks 
relating to "fashions" in international law".2 In a similar vein Krishnaswami, in his 
seminal work on The Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and 
Practices, reminds us of trends and the changes of attitudes. 3 
As a logical corollary of what has been said as regards the non-immutable 
nature of international law, the remaining Chapters of Part III, have themselves been 
divided into two main sections, section A and B. Section A considers, what are 
termed as "established rights" of minorities in international law. Under this section, 
chapter five analyses "the right to physical existence of minorities" and chapter six 
goes on to consider "the right to equality and non-discrimination". Section B, consists 
of what has been called "emerging rights". It consists of a single chapter, chapter 
seven and analyses the view, possibility and difficulties in recognising "autonomy" as a 
right of minorities under international law. 
2 
3 
Thornberry, 1; also cited supra chapter 1. 
J Kunz, "The Present Status of the International Law for the Protection of Minorities" 48 AJIL 
(1954) 282-287,282. 
A Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the matter of Religious Rights and Practices, UN 
Publication Sales E.60.XIV.2. 1960, 55. 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The constitution of modern political geography has seen the rise and fall of 
great empires~ the birth and demise of many glorious civilisations and cultures, and the 
growth and extinction of multifarious religions and languages. The heterogeneity in 
the composition of modern nation-States which, although a legacy of the past, evinces 
more pronounced and varied manners than words could describe. The tapestry of 
human diversity exhibits itself in a million different ways in infinite variations of 
taxonomy. Religions splinter into denominations of creeds and sects, languages branch 
out into dialects and the ethnic equation is imbalanced by peoples of aU colours and 
shades living side by side.' While a consciousness of this diversity is reflected in the 
natural and metaphysical sensitivities of man, history also reveals a general 
unwillingness to accept differences. Religious intolerance has been, and unfortunately 
continues to provide, a lacerative and tormenting concern to the possibility of 
congenial human relationships.2 Indeed from a historical point of view, while questions 
of religious minorities are as old as history itself,3 corresponding efforts to protect 
them were amongst the first ones to generate tensions at the international level. 
Subsequent developments with the emergence of nation-States led to wide variety of 
issues over which the then existing international society showed its concern. 
In order to conduct a proper analysis of the rights of minorities in 
contemporary international law and to assess the limitations that exist in their 
2 
3 
Thornberry, 2. 
A Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the matter of Religious Rights and Practices, UN 
Publication Sales E.60.x.IV.2 1960; S NeIT"An Evolving International Legal norm of Religious 
Freedom: Problems and Prospects" 7 Cal. W1U (1973) 543-590; Benito; Report submitted by 
Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribeiro Special Rapporteur appOinted in accordance with Resolution 
1986120 of the Commission on Human Rights E/CN.4/1988/45 6 January, 1988; T Van Boven, 
"Religious Freedom in International Perspective: Existing and Future Standards" (eds.) J 
Lekwwitz et ai, Des Menschen Recht Zwischen Freicheit und Verantwortung, Festschrift fu Karl 
Joesf Partsch ZUni 75 Geburstag, (Berlin: Dunker and Humblot) 1989, 103-113; On the topical 
issue of blasphemy laws see AI, Pakistan Use and Abuse of blasphemy laws, 1994 ASA 33/08/94; 
The Times, "Boy escapes hanging in Pakistan" 24-2-95; Independent, "Boy 14 escapes death 
sentence"; see Part IV infra. 
H Rosting, "Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations" 17 AJ1L (1923), 641-660, 642. 
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protection, it seems necessary to provide a historical overview. The present chapter, 
therefore, aims to analyse briefly the evolution of minority rights in international law, 
and to draw out some of the difficulties that have been inherent in the protection of 
minority groups. 
4.2 EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT OF PROTECTION OF 
MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the evolution of international law, the treatment that was accorded to 
religious minorities in a number of States in Europe was the first to attract international 
attention.4 There were discernible international efforts in the direction of protecting 
religious minorities against persecution as early as the thirteenth century.s Since the 
Reformation, however, the surge of intolerance amongst sects of the Christian religion 
amplified the debate on minorities, elevating the subject so that it was expressly 
incorporated in international agreements when territories were ceded. 
During the seventeenth and eighteenth century, a number of treaties embodying 
clauses relating to religious minorities were concluded between various European 
countries. These treaties included the Treaty of Vienna signed in 1607 by the King of 
Hungary and Prince of Transylvannia, which accorded to the Protestant minority in 
Transylvannia the free exercise of their religion.6 For the development of international 
law the Peace of Westphalia 1648, between France and Holy Roman Empire and their 
respective allies, is not an event of insignificance.7 The Peace marked the end of the 
4 
S 
6 
7 
"In earlier times it was religious minorities above all which were the focus of attention" T 
Modeen, The International Protection of Minorities in Europe, (Abo: Abo Akandmi), 1969, 35; 
"The international protection of minorities originated in the attempt to safeguard the position of 
dissident religious groups" I Claude Jr, National Minorities An International Problem, 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press), 1955,6; H Heinz, Indigenous Populations, Ethnic 
Minorities and Human Rights, (Berlin: Quorum Verlag), 1988, 22; For the struggles within the 
national orders ofa number of European States see Krishnaswami, op.cit note 2,4-8. 
Claude, ibid., 6. 
Thornberry, 28; Heinz, op.cit note 4,22. 
"The origins of the international community in its present structure and configuration is usually 
traced back to the peace of Westphalia (1648) which concluded the ferocious and sanguinary 
thirty years war". A Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, (Oxford: OUP), 1986, 34; 
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Thirty Years War, which had seen unprecedented suffering and pain. While having had 
"its origins, at least partially, in a religious conflict, or one might say, in religious 
intolerance" 8 the Peace "consecrated the principle of toleration by establishing the 
equality between Protestants and Catholic states and by providing safeguards for 
religious minorities".9 
The Treaty of Osnabruck, in particular, could be regarded as a landmark, since 
it provided that 
"subjects who in 1627 had been debarred from the free exercise 
of their ruler, were by the Peace granted the right of conducting private 
worship and of educating their children, at home or abroad, in 
conformity with their own faith, they were not to suffer in any civil 
capacity nor to be denied religious burial, but were to be at liberty to 
emigrate, selling their estate or leaving them to be managed by 
others" .10 
Subsequently, the 1660 Treaty of Olivia, between Sweden and Poland provided 
for the free exercise of their religion by the Roman Catholics in the territory of Livonia 
ceded by Poland to Sweden: Article 2(3) provided that "cities of Royal Prussia, which 
as a consequence of this war, have become property of ..... (Sweden), will maintain all 
the rights, liberties and privileges which they have enjoyed ... in the ecclesiastical or lay 
domain". Other examples of treaties providing for freedom of religion and worship 
include the treaties between France and Holland at Nijmegen11 concluded in 1678 and 
the Treaty ofRyswick of 169712 together with the Treaty of Paris of 176313 concluded 
between France, Spain and Great Britain under which Great Britain accorded freedom 
of worship to Roman Catholics in the Canadian territory ceded by France.14 
also see C Pany. Preface to The Consolidated Treaty Series, (Dobbs Ferry, New York: Oceana, 
1969-81), 1969, Vol. I, 1648-1649, 1969~ for text see ibid., 119,271. 
8 L Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia" 42 AJIL (1948), 20-41, 21; see also Neff op.cit note 2, 550; 
Krishnaswami, op.cit note 2, 11; M Nowak, United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. (Strasbourg: Kehl am Rhein) 1993,480; B Dickson, "The United Nations and Freedom of 
Religion" 44 ICLQ (1995), 327-357, 330. 
9 Gross Ibid. 22. 
10 Gross, ibid, 22. 
1\ 14 Panys treaty series, 441. 
12 22 Panys treaty series, 5. 
13 42 Parrys treaty series, 320. 
14 Neff, op.cit note 2, 11. 
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4.2.1 Protection of Minorities and the Concept of Humanitarian 
Intervention 
The nineteenth century saw a shift in the approach of the developments relating 
to minority protection; the bi-Iateral stance was remodelled and a number of multi-
lateral treaties emerged. Similarly, a change was also evidenced in so far as the 
protection of ethnic and national minorities was concerned with the Final Act of the 
Congress of Vienna. ls This was the first international instrument to contain clauses for 
the protection of national as well as religious minorities. Indeed, while the French 
Revolution had sent waves of an emancipating ideology of religious freedom across the 
frontiers of Western Europe,16 concern had begun to concretise not only as to the 
position of religious minorities in certain parts of the world but also as to the problems 
of national and ethnic minorities. 
The inchoate structures of international laws, in which the system of protection 
of minorities operated, also had its hazards and nurtured germs of abuse. The potential 
for exploitation and intervention in the absence of any regulations regarding the use of 
force,17 leading to, for example, acquisition of new territory was a source of suspicion 
and controversy. The system itself was abused, and while heavy traces of interventions 
based upon these ulterior motives could be found in some earlier incidents, further 
degeneration was to take place in territories held by the Ottoman rulers. 
A contemporaneous development to the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the increasing focus of attention of the 
position of minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. Amongst the many factors 
leading to the final demise of the Empire, an important one was the increasing 
IS 64 Parrys treaty series 453. 
16 "It is the history of religious tolerance and of mankind's struggle to obtain liberty of thought 
which reaches its culminating point in the Declaration of the Rights of Man at the time of the 
French Revolution" Rosting. op.cit note 3,642-3. 
17 For subsequent developments see General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 29 UKTS 1929, 94 
LNTS 57; Article 2(4) United Nations Charter; see generally I Brownlie, International Law and 
the Use afForce by States, (Oxford: OUP), 1963. 
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intolerance and repression of minorities. Historically the minorities, with the Millet 
system in place under the Ottoman's had enjoyed a considerable measure of autonomy, 
in social, civil and religious affairs;18 as Van Dyke comments "it was an application of 
the right of Self-Determination in advance of Woodrow Wilson".\9 
A generally retrogressive move towards intolerance ultimately resulted in the 
disintegration of the Millet system. In the wake of this repression, although a 
considerable Western movement gathered towards the protection of Christian 
minorities, there remained serious reservations as to the true motives of the Western 
European powers in the affairs of the rapidly degenerating Ottoman Empire. While it 
might be possible to discern, during this era, some evidence of the doctrine of 
"humanitarian intervention", a closer analysis of the concept may also provide a 
disastrous prognosis for post-Charter world order were a right of such a nature 
recognised.20 
There were intermittent threats of interventions in the affairs of the Ottoman 
Empire, some of which were ultimately carried out, though with justifications which 
were frequently untenable. In 1827, Great Britain, Russia and France-ostensibly 
concerned at the plight of the Christian minorities in Greece-used military force. On 
18 Laponce, 84-5. 
19 Van Dyke, 74. 
20 For a survey of the literature on the subject see I Brownlie, op.cit note 17. 338-342~ R Lillich, 
"Intervention to Protect Human Rights" 15 McGill LR (1965), 205-219~ L Sohn and T 
Burgenthal, International Law and Human Rights, (Indianapolis: The Bob-Merrill Co) 1973, 
137-211~ T Frank and N Rodley, "After Bangladesh The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by 
Military Force" 67 AJIL (1973), 275-305~ R Lillich, (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention and the 
United Nations. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia) 1973; J Fawcett, "Intervention to 
Protect Minorities" in B Whitaker (ed.) Minorities A Question of Human Rights (London: 
Pergomon Press) 1984, 69-77~ E Behanuik, "The Law of Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention by 
Armed Force: A Legal Survey" 79 Military Law Review (1978) IS7-191~ J-P Fonteyne, "The 
Customary International Law doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its current validity under 
United Nations Charter" 4 CalWIU (1974) 203-270~ M Nawaz, "What Limits on the Use of 
Force? Can force be used to depose an Oppressive Government" 24 IJIL (1984), 406-410; C 
Greenwood, "Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention" World Today February (1993), 34-
40~ K Pease and D Forsythe "Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and World Politics" 15 
HRQ, (1993), 290-314; P Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use 
of Force, Inaugura11ecture at the University of Amsterdam 22 January 1993 (Amsterdam: Het 
Spinhuis) 1993~ N White, "Humanitarian Intervention" 1 International law and Armed Conflict 
Commentary, 1994, 13-27; L Kuper, "Theoretical issues relating to Genocide: Use and Abuses" 
(ed.) G Andreopoulous, (ed.) Genocide: Conceptual and Historical DimenSions, (philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press) 1994, 31-46. 
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the other hand, as Franck and Rodley point out, there were a number of practical 
considerations and the action cannot unequivocally be described as having been taken 
for purely humanitarian reasons.21 
The Greek intervention was undertaken as a collective effort for fear of one 
power establishing an undue influence in the Balkans. Indeed, the issue of the balance 
of power was seen to be of such a paramount nature that it led Great Britain and 
France alongside Turkey, to fight the Russians in 18S7, when the latter tried to 
intervene unilaterally in order to protect the Christians of the Ottoman Empire. A 
further series of intervention could also be attributed to the Ottoman Empire, taking 
place between 1840-1861.22 
In 1842, an intervention also took place to protect the Marinate Christians of 
Lebanon, although it was conducted with the consent of the government of Turkey. In 
1860, foreign troops, primarily 6000 French troops were employed to protect 
Marinates after widespread news of the massacres of thousands of Marinates. 
Although Professor Brownlie terms the incident as an exceptional case of genuine 
humanitarian intervention,23 there was considerable suspicion at Napoleon Ill's true 
intentions. The expedition itself was only authorised after guarantees of the removal of 
the French troops within a fixed period, initially that of six months. A consideration of 
the overall circumstances-in particular an analysis of the "fault" element in the civil war 
and the desire of the European intervenors-has led commentators to regard even this 
incident as suspicious.24 Later, interventions both in the Ottoman Empire as well as in 
Latin America have been cast aside as doubtful. Indeed, with the benefit of hindsight 
and bearing in mind the often selfish motives of interventions, it might be taxing to 
21 "The episode, may, but need not be seen as part of general pattern of protecting Christian 
minorities against Mohammedan infidels~ it may also be classified as a chapter in the epic of the 
European love-hate [relationship] towards the Turk, governed by the desire to bring the Ottoman 
Empire under European surveillance as a necessary concomitant of Europe's civilizing mission, 
its trade superiority, the imperatives of the balance of power, and the Western powers fear in 
Russia" (footnotes omitted) Franck and Rodley, op.cit note 20, 280. 
22 Malanczuk, op.cit note 20, 13-14~ Modeen, op.cit note 4,33. 
23 I Brownlie, op.cit note 17, 340. 
24 I Pogany "Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French Intervention in Syria Re-
examined" 35 ICLQ (19&6), 1&2-190; Franck and Rodley, op.cit note 20,282. Lillich op.cit note 
20~ Behauniak~ Kuper, Genocide 1981, 165. 
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agree with Lillich's view that "the doctrine appears to have been so clearly established 
under customary internationallaw that only its limits and not its existence is subject to 
debate" .25 
4.2.2 The Conceptual and Substantive Difficulties with the Concept of 
Humanitarian Intervention 
While, the list could be appended with incidents of interventions both prior to 
the inception of the United Nations Charter and subsequent to it-as could be the 
directory of jurists who at some point in history have shown an inclination for some 
form of humanitarian intervention-the conceptual and substantive problems associated 
with the doctrine are unlikely to be resolved. Historically, a coercive weapon in the 
hands of stronger States, its advocacy has been opposed by less powerful States,z6 A 
chronicled analysis of the circumstances in which these interventions took place, and of 
those episodes when, despite gross violations of human rights no effective action was 
undertaken could perhaps lead us to affirm the view held by Franck and Rodley, that 
States have only acted when it has suited their interests to act and notions of human 
rights have been only secondary and generally peripheral. 
In the contemporary post-Charter era, criticism of the doctrine of humanitarian 
intervention has emanated from its largely ambiguous and its potentially exploitative 
nature. It is difficult to arrive at any objective and universally acceptable criterion 
under which unilateral (or multilateral) intervention could be legitimated-in particular, 
the nature, circumstances and scale of violations of human rights which could trigger 
such interventions,27 and perhaps more significantly the difficulty in practice of 
25 Lillich ibid. 
26 Franck and Rodley op.cit note 20, 290. 
27 Franck and Rodley pose the question "Does the scope of humanitarian intervention encompass all 
'human rights' or only political and economic rights, or only the right to life? Is the right to 
intervene to be limited to situations of actual large-scale losses of life or does it also extend to the 
imminence or apprehension of such losses? what do such terms mean and how are the facts or 
probabilities to be established? How large scale must the loss of life be? If Self-Determination is 
a protected right, how large a majority must desire it, how strongly held must their belief be". 
ibid 
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protecting human right on a permanent basis through any such use of force. 28 There 
would also remain the issue of examining and dissociating the possible vested interest 
of the intervening power(s). Equally significant would be the question as to whether 
there should be specific limitations imposed on such interventions, along with the 
necessity of particular safeguards against threats of possible exploitation by the 
intervening State(s). 
It remains clear that without effective protection, individual as well as 
collective rights would remain a dead letter,29 and it has been argued vigorously that in 
the absence of any concerted international effort, humanitarian intervention ought to be 
recognised. However, it is submitted that although the idea of unilateral or collective 
interventions, in situations of gross violations might seem attractive, recognition of a 
right of intervention on humanitarian grounds would open floodgates of military 
intervention on genuine as well as not-so-genuine grounds of violations of human 
rights. This would destabilise the delicately poised international order and provide a 
recipe for the destruction of modern rules relating to the prohibition of use of force. It 
is wiser to assert that pleading for a general recognition of humanitarian intervention is 
not a step forward and that 
"any attempt to devise a general justification for humanitarian 
intervention, even if such a doctrine were to limit intervention to very 
extreme circumstances, would run into difficulty. A blind 
humanitarianism, which fails to perceive the basic truth that different 
States perceive social and international problems very differently can 
only lead into a blind alley". 30 
Invocation of the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII, which can 
authorise military actions in respect of threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and 
28 See I Brownlie "Humanitarian Intervention" J Moore (ed.), Law and Civil War in the Modern 
World. (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), 1974,217-228,222-223. 
29 ILA Rapporteur "human rights without effective implementation are shadows without substance" 
cited in R Lillich op.cit note 20, 206. 
30 A Roberts "Humanitarian War: Military Intervention and Human Rights", 69 IAJJs. 429-449, 
(1991),448. 
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acts of aggression,31 would probably seem to be a more rational and practical 
approach. It is fortunate that with the ending of the Cold War, there is optimism that 
the Security Council would be able to undertake some positive measures in the 
direction of protection of human rights. Changes of circumstance in world affairs since 
1989 has borne some of this optimism out in practice. On the other hand the recent 
cases of the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan, Somalia, Mghanistan and Iraq 
seem to reaffirm the view of sceptics that while nations of the world act in their own 
interests, international law would remain a difficult medium to promote and protect 
rights of minorities. 32 
4.3 THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AFTER THE FIRST WORLD 
WAR 
As a consequence of the appalling atrocities and abuses of individual and group 
rights during the Great War, the end of the war generated a number of efforts to 
project the issue of minorities and self-determination at the international level. More 
importantly, the territorial readjustments that were brought about, made it imperative 
that the issue of the position of minorities was to be resolved in order to lay a firm 
foundation for a lasting peace. 
The debate relating to the position of minorities was raised when the Covenant 
of the League of Nations was being drafted with attempts being made to incorporate 
minorities provisions in the Covenant of the League.33 President Wilson spearheaded 
31 Article 39 of the UN Charter provides "The Security Council shall detennine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security". 
32 Franck and Rodley op.cit note 20, 294~ see P Alston "The Security Council and Human Rights 
Lessons to be learned from the Iraq-Kuwait crises and its aftermath" 13 AYBIL (1990-91) 107-
176~ H Adelman "Humanitarian Intervention: The case of the Kurds" 4 URL (1992) 4-38~ P 
Malanczuk "The Kurdish crises and Allied intervention in the aftermath of the second Gulf War" 
2 ElIL (1991), 114-132. 
33 0 Miller, The Drafting of the Covenants, (New York: G B Putman and Sons) 1928, vol. ii, 9l. 
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the attempts to provide ideals of self-determination and minority rights with concrete 
forms. The second draft covenant prepared by him included a clause in accordance 
with which the new States would bind themselves to guarantee equality of treatment of 
their "racial and national minorities".34 In a third draft submitted, Wilson elaborated on 
his previous proposals by adding a stipulation under which all States seeking admission 
to the League would bind themselves to accord equal treatment to their minorities. 
The draft article stated 
"The League of Nations shall require all States to bind 
themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent 
or autonomous States, and the executive council shall exact of all states 
seeking admission to the League of Nations the promise to accord to all 
racial or national minorities within their several jurisdictions exactly the 
same treatment and security, both in law and in fact, that is accorded to 
the racial or national majority of the people".3s 
Similarly, as far as the position of religious minorities was concerned, President 
Wilson's third draft contained the following provision 
"Recognising religious persecution and intolerance as fertile 
sources of war, the powers signatory hereto agree, and the League of 
Nations shall exact from all new States and all States seeking admission 
to it the promise, that they wilt make no law prohibiting or interfering 
with the free exercise of religion, and that they will in no way 
discriminate, either in law or in fact, against those who practice any 
particular creed, religion or belief whose practices are not inconsistent 
with public order or public morals" .36 
The final version that subsequently emerged, however, failed to contain 
any provisions relating to the position of minorities, largely as a result of the fears of 
the impact it might have on the issue of sovereignty. It might also have questioned the 
post-war order, including the colonial possessions of the Great Powers. It was also 
surprising to note that when at last there had arrived an opportunity to incorporate a 
34 Ibid. 
3S Ibid. 
36 Ibid. vol. ii, lOS. 
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provision of such a nature in the Covenant, President Wilson himself changed his view-
point in favour of "quiet diplomacy" and avoiding "embarrassments".37 
4.3.1 The Minorities Treaties 
Despite the non-inclusion of any clauses pertaining to minorities, the Peace 
Conference that set about the task of re-establishing the legal order and in the process 
re-drawing the map, was aware that changes in the political geography of the 
European continent would inevitably exacerbate the minority question. The 
conference placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations a system for the 
protection of minorities. 
The minorities regime took four different forms38 
1) The five minorities treaties concluded between 1919-20 
Poland: 
The treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Poland 28 June 1919 
Chzecho-Slovakia: 
The treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Chzecho-Slovakia, St-Germain-en-Iaye, 16 September 1919 
The Serbo-Croat-Slovene State: 
The treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
The Serbo-Croat-Slovene State, St Germain-en-Iaye, 
10 September 1919 
Romania: 
Treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Romania, Paris 9 December 1919 
Greece: 
Treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Greece, Severs 10 August 1920 
37 Robinson et ai, Were the Minorities treaties a failure?, (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs) 
1943, 15. 
38 For a list of instruments See United Nations, Special Protective Measure of an International 
Character for Ethnic, ReligiOUS or Linguistic Minorities UN Doc/CN.4/Sub.2/214/rev 1; UN Doc 
ElCN.4/Sub.2/221IRev 1; UN Sales No 67.xIV3; for texts until 1927 see Protection of Linguistic, 
Racial and Religious Minorities by the League of Nations, Provisions contained in the various 
international instruments at present in force, (Geneva) August 1927, League of Nations 
publications IB Minorite 1927 IB2. 
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2) Four special chapters of the Peace treaties of 1919-1923 imposed on 
the vanquished States 
Austria: 
Treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Austria, St Germain-en-Laye, 10 September 1919, Arts 62-69. 
Bulgaria: 
Treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Bulgaria, Neuilly-sur-seine, 27 November 1919, Arts 49-57. 
Hungary: 
Treaty between Principal Allied and Associated Powers and 
Hungary, Trianon, 4 June 1921, Arts 54-60. 
Turkey: 
Treaty of Peace between Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, 
Romania, the Serbo-Croat-Slovene State and Turkey Lausanne, 
24 July 1923, Arts 37-45. 
3) Four subsequent treaties 
The Polish Danzig convention of9 November 1920 
Agreement between Sweden and Finland concerning the 
population of the Aaland Islands placed on record and approved 
by resolution of the Council of League of Nations on June 27 
1921 
German-Polish Convention relating to Upper Silesia of ISMay 
1922 
Convention of 8th May 1924 concerning the territory of Me mel, 
between Allied and Associated powers and Lithuania 
4) Five unilateral declarations signed by various States signed between 
1921-1932 upon their admission to the League of Nations, of which the 
Council of the League of the Nations took note in ad hoc resolutions. 
The States that made such a declaration were 
Albania 2 October 1921, 
Lithuania 12 May 1922 (extended to Memel district 
29 September, 1924) 
Latvia 7 july 1923, 
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Estonia 17 September 1923, 
Iraq 30 May 1932. 
Although there were some variations in the substance of the treaties, the Polish 
treaty essentially served as a model. In general, the minorities treaties provided for 
rules on nationality, a guarantee to all inhabitants for the protection of life and liberty, 
equality of treatment regardless of religious denomination and equal enjoyment of civil 
and political rights. Furthermore, the provisions for special protection for members of 
racial, linguistic and religious minorities were built-in to the treaty system. In addition 
to providing for equality of treatment in law and in fact, these special provisions 
included access to public offices and educational, cultural, linguistic and religious 
autonomy. This autonomy provided for the establishment of institutions and 
associated facilities under their own control. Minorities were also to be authorised to 
have an equitable proportion of funds in order to exercise these rights satisfactorily.39 
Guarantees were introduced for the expression of religious beliefs, freedom of 
receiving education in mother tongue as well as the usage of native language in private 
life and certain spheres of public life.40 
Specific rights were also introduced for a number of minorities including the 
Jewish minority of Greece, Rumania, and Lithuania; the Vlachs of Pindus of Greece; 
the non-Greek minority communities of Mount Athos; the Moslem minority of 
Albania, Greece, Serbo-Croat-Slovene state; the non-Muslim minority in Turkey and 
the non-Muslim minority in Iraq.41 
The framework upon which the League system was established carried internal 
as well as international obligations. Internally, the States agreed to irrevocably 
entrench the provisions relating to minorities in their constitutional set-up. The 
external obligations manifested themselves in guarantees in so far as they related to 
39 Robinson, Op.cit note 37. 
40 F Ermacora, "The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations" 182 Rec. des Cours 1983, 
251-366. 259~ I Claude Jr op.cit note 4. 19. 
<II J Robinson. "International Protection of Minorities A Global View", IIYBHR (1971) 61-91. 
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members of racial, religious and linguistic minorities and were designated as 
"obligations of international concern" .42 This guarantee meant that while no 
modifications to the relevant treaty provisions were possible without the consent of the 
majority of the League Council, the Council undertook the responsibility of 
enforcement. 
The main procedure through which the League system operated was as 
follows. The Secretariat of the League examined the petition to determine whether it 
was receivable. It is to be noted that although minorities had been given the right to 
make petitions, these petitions were more in the nature of providing information rather 
than being a party to any probable proceedings. Once declared to be receivable, the 
petition was transmitted by the Committee of the Council to the State concerned for 
comments. If the conditions laid down by the Council were fulfilled it was then passed 
to the members of the League of Nations. 
In the Council, the examination of the petitions was carried out by a committee 
of the Council comprising of three members, known as the "Minorities Committee". A 
Committee was set up to deal with each petition. At the conclusion of its examination, 
the committee could either reject the petition, attempt to find a solution through a 
negotiation with the government, or request that the question be placed on the agenda 
of the Council. Any member of the Council had the right to bring the matter before the 
council, whatever the decision by the Committee. The Council could therefore take 
such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and effective in the 
circumstances, including invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. 
The instruments for the protection of minorities provided for the intervention 
of the Court in cases where differences of opinion arose between the Government 
concerned and any of the allied or associated powers or any other power which was a 
member of the Council. The States which had assumed obligations with regard to 
minorities were obliged to refer the dispute to the Court if the other parties requested 
it. Furthermore the decision of the Court was final. The Court also was empowered 
42 Polish Treaty, Article 12. 
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to provide advisory opinions. The authority for delivering advisory opinion as well as 
the competence "to hear and determine any disputes of an international character" was 
granted by Article 14 of the Covenant. The Court did use its jurisdiction and on 
occasions expressed itself with such felicity that despite the overall failure of the 
system, many of its pronouncements have left a lasting impression.4) 
4.3.2 Evaluation of the League System 
The League Minority Treaty System worked well for some years, for some 
minorities and on some issues, though it failed to achieve an overall success. The 
absence of any rational lay-out of the system, with its rather arbitrary confinement to 
smaller States of Eastern and Central Europe, was probably the biggest drawback in 
the system of the protection of minorities. The States which had assumed obligations 
often found them embarrassing and unacceptable and felt, with some justification that 
the Great Powers were unduly interfering in their sovereign rights and domestic 
jurisdiction.44 
The reason for the collapse of the system of protection of minorities similarly 
lay in the discriminatory and inequitable set-up. Taking the then prevailing orthodox 
43 The Court's Advisory Opinion in Minority Schools in Albania of 6th April 1935 has become a 
major precedent, guidance and source of inspiration on issues relating to equality of treatment. 
According to the Court "The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to 
secure for certain elements incorporated in a state, the population of which differs from them in 
race, language or religion, the possibility of living peacefully alongside that population and co-
operating amicably with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which 
distinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special needs .. Jn order to attain 
this objcct, two things were regarded as particularly necessary, and have formed the subject of 
provisions in these treaties. The first is to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or 
linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on a footing of perfect equality with other 
nationals of the state. The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable means for the 
preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics. These 
two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, for there would be no true equality between a 
majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions, and were consequently 
compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of it being a minority"; Advisory 
Opinion in Minority Schools in Albania 1935 PCIJ Ser AlB, 17; also see the adviSOry opinion in 
Settlers of German Origin in territory ceded by Germany to Poland 1923 PCJJ. Ser B. No 6; 
Acquisition o/Polish Nationality 1933 PCJJ Ser B. No.7; Access to German Minority Schools in 
Upper Silesia 1931 PCIJ Ser AlB. No 40; Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of 
Polish Origin or speech in Danzig 1932 PCIJ Ser AlB No 44. 
44 Heinz, op.cit note 4, 30. 
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view of State sovereignty, these States felt humiliated and indignated at being placed 
under the scrutiny of an external body. Had the system been impartially applied to all 
and sundry, this would perhaps have eased some of the pain felt by minority States. 
Robinson and his collaborators sum up this sentiment in the fol1owing manner 
"it was in the interests of preservation of this status that the 
minorities provision in the special treaties and the in the peace treaties 
were imposed upon reluctant states (Coactus tamen Voluit). [But] 
these considerations stopped short of applying them to big powers too. 
Neither the defeated (and territorial1y amputated) Germany nor the 
victorious (and territorially aggrandized) Italy were forced to assume 
responsibilities appropriate for medium-sized states. The rational 
behind this exceptional treatment was apparently the conviction that the 
Big powers, by their very essence are responsible and would not 
indulge in such acts as might offend public opinion. As for others, it 
was thought that they had to be protected from themselves: left alone, 
they might indulge in repression of minorities". 45 
A number of minorities initially felt disillusioned at being denied any expression 
of self-determination, and then being placed under a system which, although prima 
facie was set up for their benefit, neither promised them adequate and satisfying 
recompense nor did it allow them to play any significant role in their own defence. On 
the other hand, attempts were made to abuse the system by particular "disloyal" and 
"privileged" minorities who could act in concert with their allied kin-States. Indeed, 
some States-particularly Germany-exploited the minority issue to satisfy their own 
expansionist ambitions.46 
Whatever the indiscretions on the part of minorities, the kin-States, or the 
minority States, it would perhaps be naive to rest the entire blame for the ultimate 
failure on one party. Claude's view seems rational and sober when he suggests 
" ... the system was not executed in good faith, it was never given 
a fair trail, since none of the interested parties-neither minority states, 
nor minorities nor Kin-states nor neutral powers-entered into the great 
4S Robinson, op.cit. note 37,65. 
46 J Kelly, "National Minorities in International Law" 3 JILP (1973),253-273,258. 
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experiment with the spirit and attitude which were essential to its 
success" .41 
Despite all its shortcomings and inherent contradictions, the league system was 
nonetheless a remarkable attempt at ensuring certain minimal rights to certain minority 
groups. The ultimate outcome needs to be judged in the context of the prevailing 
world order with all its inequities and injustices. The legacy of the system in fact, 
remains in many ways a positive moment in the painful history of group rights. At 
least an attempt, be it limited in vision and ultimately unsuccessful, was made to 
elevate the issue of minority protection in the international arena. The merits in the 
system continue to provide strength to those commentators who believe in a more 
rational and just society. Hinting at some of these merits, Lerner says 
"minority schools were established in several countries, 
neglected groups were rehabilitated, forced assimilation was resisted 
and representatives could playa role in the political affairs of countries 
such as Czechoslovakia and Latvia. Moreover, the methods of 
mediation and conciliation produced some results, and the Permanent 
Court ofInternational Justice contributed to the protection of minorities 
with important decisions, of great value even today". 48 
4.3.3 Postscript to the League System 
The setting up of the wide network of treaties could be compared with the anti-
climax of its subsequent demise. The manner and form which the ultimate breakdown 
of the League system took was only to reconfirm the views of its critics. During the 
long and painful years of the Second world war the minority issue consistently 
remained at the forefront. While the role which turbulent minorities had played as part 
47 Claude Jr, op.cit note 4, 48. 
48 N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International/aw, (Oordrecht: M.Nijhofl) 1991, 
11. 
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of their contribution to the war aroused scepticism, the treatment which certain 
minorities received-in particular the Jews-at the hands of their host States incensed the 
world at large. 
Unhappy with the League expenence, and perhaps more fearful of the 
instability and insecurity which "disloyal" minorities could generate, the statesmen who 
were to build the new world order aimed to give priority to peace, order and stability. 
There was a discernible switch from advocacy of the rights of minorities, to the less 
threatening rhetoric of individual human rights, leading to a suggestion that problem of 
minorities would cease in the era of human rights and "hence in a confused world of 
minority protection bliss was found in the rhetoric of individual human rights as 
eloquently envisioned by President [Roosevelt]'s four freedoms".49 The issue of 
minority rights, on the whole was seen as damaging; its potential for abuse more pre-
eminent than its constructive faculties. This emotion is embodied in Brugel's view that 
"[a]fter the Second world war the slogan was no longer 
'protection of minorities' but 'protection from minorities' and it seemed 
that the cunning exploitation of justified or spurious complaints for the 
aims of aggressive regimes was quite welcome to some of their 
protagonists as a motive [so to speak] for 'abolishing' a problem, for 
whose constructive solution their existed neither the readiness nor the 
necessary ability" .50 
Indeed, a number of minorities were to suffer heavily in the aftermath of the 
war; the transfer of population treaties between various States of Eastern Europe and 
more prominently the expulsion of nearly fourteen million Germans from various 
regions of Europe and its sanctification is a painful example of the realpolitik. 51 The 
manner and form that these expulsions took, with two million German perishing in the 
process, defies both reason and legal principles, though it nonetheless goes some way 
in substantiating a view of the difficulty in the operation of international law as an 
49 Claude, op.cit note 4, 73. 
so W Brugel, "A Neglected field, the Protection of Minorities" 4 RDH, (1971), 413-442, 413. 
51 Ibid., A de Zayas "The International Judicial Protection of Peoples and Minorities" in C 
Brolmann, R Lefeber and M Zieck, Peoples and Minorities in International Law, (Dordrecht: 
M.Nijhofl) 1993,223-287. 
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objective and impartial mechanism. Justifications for such transfers based on post-war 
legal principles would not be able to withstand the charge of application of double 
standards; at Nuremberg the Nazis expulsion had been condemned as a crime against 
humanity. 52 According to Professor de Zayas 
"some fourteen million Germans were' transferred' from Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, partly on the basis of Article XIII of the 
1945 Postdam Protocol, mostly under inhuman conditions and complete 
dispossession of the property. Over two million Germans perished in 
the process, precisely at the same time when the Allies were 
prosecuting the Nazis at Nuremberg on the specific charge of forcibly 
deporting Frenchmen and Poles out of ostensibly annexed territories. 
The Nuremberg judgment held that Nazi expUlsions constituted crimes 
against humanity .... By contrast the Allied policy of expelling peoples 
and minorities suddenly seemed acceptable, as long as it was carried 
with the approval of victorious powers". 53 
International law cannot be so easily disassociated, either from its State-
centred constitution or from its enduring historical and political impressions. The 
human injustices which became a contributing factor in provoking the Second 
world war and the unfathomable atrocities during the course of the war led to a 
detennined attempt to bring to justice those involved in committing these 
atrocities. In the final analysis, it may be argued, that those who had lost the war, 
and those who could be associated with the vanquished were the ones to suffer the 
consequences of their misdeeds. S4 The justice that was dispensed at Nuremberg, 
Tokyo and in subsequent proceedings, could be considered more in the nature 
"victor's vengeance". Although not treating this so-called "one-sided justice", as 
"without merits" ,S5 Professor Bassiouni laments the fact that 
"one sided justice reveals the unfairness of the legal international 
system. Germany, during world war I and world war II, had records of 
52 Thornberry, 115. 
53 Op.cit note, 51,258-9. 
54 See generally A de Zayas, Nemesis at PostDam: the Anglo-Americans and the expulsions o/the 
Germans: Background, Execution, Consequences (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul) 1977~ A 
de Zayas "International Law and Mass Population Transfers" 16 Harvard ILl (1975), 207-58~ I 
Claude Jr, op.cit note 4, 114-125. 
55 C Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in International Criminal Law, Dordrecht: M.Nijhofi), 
1992,231. 
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Allied violations of the very laws and rules which the Allies charged 
Germany of violating. The German documentation of world war I Allies 
violations against Germany even escaped public attention and no 
significant trace of world war II Allied violations against Germany and 
against Germans and others appears in the recollection of world public 
opinion. Some exceptions, however, exist, such as the dreadful fire 
bombing of Dresden during world war II that remains in the world's 
conscience as a symbol of the terrible sufferance that befell the civilian 
German population between 1943-1945. It is shocking that the 
wholesale violations of conventional and customary rules of war against 
German prisoners of war by the USSR, has escaped international public 
attention. The same inattention applies to the Allies violations against 
the Japanese, the worst example of which the world community's 
approval of the use of two atomic bombs in 1945 against the cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing and injuring hundreds of thousands of 
civilians. Had Japan and Germany so bombed an Allied power, there is 
no doubt that its perpetrators, from the decision-makers to the crews of 
the planes, would have been tried and convicted of war crimes". S6 
Historically speaking, instances of physical extermination of weaker elements, 
genocide and persecution, are too many and too painful~ political constraints have 
often prevailed over humanitarian and legalistic concerns in preventing or in punishing 
those involved. For many, disillusionment has been grave, bordering upon 
misanthropy. The worst international criminals may have escaped the wrath of 
international community; even in the case of Hitler and Nazi Germany, Hannum's 
cynicism bears elements of the unfortunate realpolitik when he comments that had 
"Nazi Germany not been so thoroughly defeated, [] reasoning [of 
political inconvenience] also would have permitted Hitler to remain in 
power-so long as whatever post-war coalition that emerged in Germany 
was politically acceptable to the Allied powers". 57 
56 ibid., 231-232. 
57 H Hannum "International Law and the Cambodian Genocide Sounds of Silence" 11 HRQ (1989), 
83-138, 137. 
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4.3.4 Issue of the Subsequent Legal Validity of Minorities Treatise 
The final question in this historical debate and one which is of a practical 
nature, relates to the contemporary value of the Minority treaty system. There remains 
some controversy as to the extent to which treaty obligations survived the demise of 
the League. If they had indeed been extinguished what were the causes? A fairly 
detailed study was conducted by the UN Secretariat under the title of The Study of the 
Legal Validity of the Undertaking concerning Minorities. s8 The study, however, is not 
exactly a model of clarity and the matter has not been completely resolved. The study 
in its conclusion states 
"Reviewing the situation as a whole ... one is led to conclude that 
between 1939 and 1947 circumstances as a whole changed to such an 
extent that generally speaking, the system should be considered as 
having ceased to exist"S9 
While drawing strength from clausula rebus sic stantibus,60 it is possible to 
argue that all minorities treaties have been extinguished. There nonetheless remains a 
strong view that some obligations-in particular those regarding Turkey and Greece,61 
Finland (in relation to Aaland Island) remain intact,62 and Austria relating to the 
provisions of 8t Germain-are still in force due to constitutional provision of 1920.63 
58 UN Doc.ElCN.4/367, 7 April 1950. 
59 Ibid., 70-71. 
60 N Fienburg "The Legal Validity of the undertakings concerning Minorities and the Clausula 
Rebus Sic Stantibus" in B Azkin (cd.) Scripta Hiersoiyminitana V Studies in Law, (Jerusalem: 
Magness Press) 1958, 99-131; For a reflection of this doctrine in modern international law see 
Article 62 VCLT 1969; Brownlie, 619-62l. 
61 see UN Doc ElCN.4/367/Add.l 27 March 1951,2; According to the secretariat "Only in regard to 
the special regime established bilaterally between Greece and Turkey does the secretariat take the 
position that Greece (and also Turkey) may still be bound". 
62 T Modeen, op.cit note 4, 69-73. "The machinery established by the League of Nations to deal 
with the minorities problem ceased to exist altogether with the League, in 1946. The obligations 
created by the minorities treaties and clauses, except for Aaland Islands agreement lost their force 
after World War II, either because of desuetude or by the traditional clausula rebus sic stantibus, 
a substantial change of circumstances which makes a pre-existing obligation inapplicable" Lerner 
op.cit note 48, 14. 
63 Ermacora, op.cit note 40, 268. 
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
A chronicle of man's endeavour of being accorded a right to be different in 
terms of his ethnic, linguistic and religious identity has passed through changes in 
attitudes; from inchoate protection of religious minorities of Northern and Central 
Europe to interventionist attempts to protect minorities-largely those in Eastern 
Europe-under the rubric of humanitarian intervention, to a system of limited protection 
under the aegis of the League of Nations, to a more generalised model of human rights 
focusing upon the individual. 
As indicated in the introductory section to the present part changes in trends 
may be more in the nature of their replacement with different models; their 
abandonment may only be transitory and cannot generally be treated as synonymous 
with their permanent exhaustion. Historical surveys are beneficial not merely for their 
general enlightenment, but also for predicting revivals and renaissance of trends and 
fashions. 
As in other societies, in international society, fashions and trends are not 
immutable. Krishnaswami points to a positive progression in the direction of a regime 
of religious non-discrimination though with the caveat that "a prediction of trends is in 
the nature of prophecy, and it is quite possible that any estimate ..... may be reversed, by 
the course of human affairs". 64 This reflection on the historical debate of the position 
of minorities, we hope, in addition to providing an appropriate prelude to a discussion 
of the contemporary phase of minority rights, would also result in more rational and 
realistic conclusions-both in terms of predictions as post-scripts to the end of the 
"cold-war" as well as to de lege Ferenda of the rights of minorities. 
64 Krishnaswami, op.cit note 2, 55. 
SECTION A 
ESTABLISHED RIGHTS 
CHAPTER FIVE 
MINORITIES AND THE RIGHT TO 
PHYSICAL EXISTENCE 
82 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The development of human rights jurisprudence has been based on the premise 
that all human beings, regardless of whether they are seen singularly as individuals or in 
the form of such collectivities as minorities, have a basic right to physical existence. 
The right to existence is paramount to all other rights, for it is only the living who 
could lay a claim to other human rights. t Existence, however is a term of myriad 
connotations reflecting differences in the case of individuals and minorities. Whereas 
for individuals, physical existence is the essence of life, minorities relish on their 
collective sense of identity.2 For minorities, any right to existence is not exclusive to 
their physical existence but would also include inter alia a cultural, religious, linguistic 
existence, without which the group in question would lose its distinctiveness.3 
2 
3 
4 
"Existence is a notion which has a special sense for a 
collectivity. An individual 'exists' or he does not~ his non-existence is 
individual death. A collectivity such as a minority group exists in the 
individual lives of its members; the physical death of some members 
does not destroy the \ existence' of the group, though it may impair its 
health. There is, however, another existence for a minority through 
language, culture, or religion, a shared sense of history, a common 
destiny. Without this \ existence' it is possible to say that individuals live 
but the group does not: it has been replaced by something other than 
itself, perhaps a new group, larger or smaller".4 
Y Dinstein, "The Right to Life, Physical integrity and Liberty" in Henkin, 114-137. P Sieghart, 
The Lawful Rights of Mankind, (Oxford: OUP) 1986, 107. "Amongst all human rights, the 
primacy of the right to life is unanimously agreed to be pre-eminent and essential: it is the sine 
qua non, for all other human rights depend for their potential existence on the preservation of 
human life" B Whit.1ker The Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, (Revised and Updated) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6. "There must surely 
be unanimity among members of the United Nations on the primacy of the right to life. The 
emphasis on human rights would be quite meaningless without the survival of living subjects to 
be the carriers of these rights. And the circumstances of the founding of the United Nations, as 
well as its charter, declarations, and covenants, seem to establish without doubt that in the midst 
of the sharpest conflict of ideologies, of values, and of national interest there is unanimity among 
the member states on the primacy of the right to life". Kuper Prevention of Genocide, 3~ "who 
can doubt that right to life in a literal sense is the most basic rights of all" I Claude Jr, National 
MinoritiesAn international Problem, (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) 1955, 156. 
Thornberry, 57. 
Infra, Chapter 7. 
Thornberry, 57. 
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In its fundamental sense, however, the right to existence is seen in terms of 
physical existence, a right which, in the case of individuals, is adequately 
acknowledged and protected in contemporary international human rights instruments.s 
The subject of the destruction of the physical existence of minorities, on the other 
hand, comes within the ambit of international criminal law.6 The development of 
international criminal law has matched the progress made in the field of the 
international standard-setting of human rights. International criminal law has not only 
come to concern itself with many issues like piracy, terrorism and drug trafficking, but 
has also more recently engaged itself with crimes which directly offend international 
human rights norms.7 
This inter-action is reflected vividly by the Genocide Convention,8 the 
Convention on the non-applicability of statutory limitations to war crimes and crimes 
against humanity,9 the draft code of crimes against peace and security of Mankind 
prepared by the International Law Commission, \0 and the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of Apartheid.1I Although the right to 
physical existence remains paramount and pre-eminent, it can stretch the developing 
norms of international law of human rights to their limits; the right is generally 
S See the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Article 3, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, GA Res 
217, UN Doc A 1810 at 71. Article 2 ECHR (1950) Article 2, and the Sixth Protocol (1983), The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) Article 6, annex to the UN Gen Ass 
Res 2200 (XXI), GAOR 21st session, supp 49; UKTS 6 (1977). ACHR (1969), 9 ILM; 1969 
YBHR 390. Protocol to ACHR to abolish the Death Penalty (1990); The Mrican Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights (1981) 21 ILM 59; 27 Rev IC] 64. 
6 Thornberry, 57; L Grecn "International Criminal Law and the protection of Human rights" in B 
Cheng and E Brown, (cds.) Contemporary Problems of International law: Essays in honour of 
Schwanzenberger on his Eightieth Birthday, (London: Stevens and Sons Limited) 1988, 116-137. 
7 M Bassiouni and V Nanda (eds.), A Treaties on International Criminal Law, (IIinios: Charles C 
Thomas) 1973. 
8 78 UNTS 277; 58 UKTS, 1970; Cmnd 4421. 
9 754 UNTS 73; 8 ILM 68; 1968 YBHR 459; 9 IJIL 317; R Miller, "The Convention on the non-
applicability of statutory limitation to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity" 65 AJIL 
(1971) 476-501. 
10 Draft Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 43rd session UN 
Doc.NCN.4IL.464 Add.4, 1991~ also appended in L Sunga, Individual Responsibility in 
International Law for Serious Human Rights violations, (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoff) 1992, 169. 
1\ GAR 3068 (XXVIII) Annex, GAOR. 28th session, Supp 30~ I Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents 
on Human Rights, (Oxford: OUP) 2nd ed., 1981, 164; see Multilateral Treaties in respect of 
which the Secretary-General performs Depository functions, 1978, 120.121. 
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violated, or at least its violation is tolerated by sovereign States,12 who are the main 
subjects of international law. 
The main purpose of the present chapter is to analyse the development of 
international legal norms in relation to the physical existence of minorities, and to 
consider the difficulties and complications that confront international law in adequately 
protecting the right to physical existence. 
5.2 MINORITIES AND THE RIGHT TO PHYSICAL EXISTENCE IN 
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
A historical legal analysis depicts a melancholy picture of the antiquity of the 
acts of the physical extermination of minorities. 13 This phenomenon, unfortunately, is 
as old as the human history itself; every leaf of the chronicle of human endeavours 
unfolds sad tales where the weak and the inarticulate became victims, and were 
sacrificed at the alter of the strong, the powerful and the reckless. Leo Kuper, while 
analysing the history of physical extermination of minority groups, provides several 
revealing and tragic instances. These include a mention of the horrifying massacres 
resulting from the Assyrian warfare during the seventh and eighth centuries B.C; 
Roman obliteration of the city of Carthage and all its inhabitants;14 religious wars of 
medieval and indeed modern history as a source of extermination. ls 
More recently, the rise of nationalism, totalitarian ideologies like that of 
Nazism, Stalinism and the upsurge of racial, religious and linguistic consciousness, 
have generated wholesale extermination of groups. Equally, there remains substantial 
12 "".it is almost impossible for this ( genocide) to be committed other than at the connivance or 
toleration of state authorities" Green op.cit note 6,35. 
13 Kuper GenOCide, 11-18; Potter; Kuper Prevention o/Genocide ~ L Kuper, International Action 
against Genocide, (London: MRG) 1982; H Fien, Genocide Watch, (New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press) 1992. 
14 Kuper, GenOcide, 11-12. 
IS Kuper, ibid., 12-14; B Whitaker, op.cit note 1, 6-7; also see I Brownlie, International Law and 
the Use 0/ Force, (Oxford: OUP) 1963. 
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evidence to support the conviction that large scale massacres-extending even to the 
wiping out of entire indigenous communities-has been conducted in several parts of 
the world.16 If the phenomenon of colonisation of indigenous peoples and minorities 
reflects a sad and shameful comment on the annals of history, the progression towards 
decolonisation and the destruction wrecked upon many groups in the newly 
independent States is more painful to digest.17 
Ironically, however, it was the continent of Europe-the root and foundation of 
principles which were to give birth to human rights ideology-where the worst crimes of 
physical extermination of minorities took place. It was to be the atrocities committed 
by the Nazis and their accomplices towards weaker groups like the Jews that led to the 
wholesale acceptance of the crime of the physical extermination of groups into the 
realm of international criminallaw.18 
5.2.1 Emergence of the Term "Genocide" 
In contemporary terms, this activity of physical extermination of groups is 
labelled as genocide.19 Ralph Lemkin, a Polish jurist of Jewish origin is accredited with 
developing the modem principles relating to the crime of genocide and indeed for 
coining the term itself. 20 In 1933, he presented his ideas based on the protection of 
groups in a special report to the Fifth International Conference for the Unification of 
Penal Law.21 He later elaborated these perceptions in his work, Axis Rule in Occupied 
16 Potter, 16~ Kuper, International Action against Genocide, op.cit note 13, 15. 
17 For the position of Algeria see L Kuper, Pity of it All Polarisation of Racial and Ethnic 
Relations, (London: Duckworth) 1977, 245-275~ As to the case ofIndia see Part IV infra. 
18 "It was the devastation of peoples by the Nazis which provided the impetus for the formal 
recognition of genocide as a crime in international law, thus laying the basis of intervention by 
judicial process" Kuper Genocide, 20. 
19 Whitaker aptly describes this activity as "the ultimate crime and gravest violation of human rights 
it is possible to commit" supra op.cit note I, 5. 
20 R Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, (Washington: Carneige Endowment for International 
Peace) 1944, 79~ J Potter, "What is Genocide? Notes towards a definition" in Potter,S. 
21 R Lemkin, 'Genocide as a crime in international law' 43 AJIL (1949) 145-151. R Lemkin 
'Terrorisme' Actes de la Ve Conference Internationale pour l'Unification du Droit Penal, Paris, 
1935,48-56. His formulation at that time were that certain elements whose aim was to destroy 
racial or ethnic groups should be declared dec/ita juris gentum. These acts of destruction of 
groups were to be divided in to two principal crimes 'barbarity' and 'vandalism'. Whereas the 
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Europe, to develop the term genocide which was derived partly from the Greek word 
"genos" meaning race, tribe or nation, and partly from the Latin verb "caedere" which 
denotes the act ofkilling.22 In his view 
"By' genocide' we mean destruction of a nation or of an ethnic 
group ... Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the 
immediate destruction of a nation, or except when accompanied by 
mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a 
co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of life of national groups ... The objectives of such 
a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions 
of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economical 
existence of national groups, and the destruction of personal security, 
liberty, health, dignity, and even lives of the individual belonging to 
such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an 
entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in 
their individual capacity, but as members of the national group".23 
Crimes in the nature of genocide, which strain and exhaust contemporary 
archives, could interest international lawyers in their capacity as individuals and as 
fragments and elements of the human race~ the spirit of John Donne may transcend all 
of us when he comments" ... every man is a piece of continent, a part of the main ... Any 
man's death diminishes me because I am involved in mankind ... " .24 For international 
lawyers and jurists the appeal for a challenge against genocide lies on a higher plane; 
the term has passed into international legal vocabulary; its prohibition has become an 
indelible part of the minority directory~ it stands out as the first principle in 
internationallaw. 
fonner was denoted to oppressive and destructive actions against individuals as members of 
national, racial or religious groups, the latter included acts of malicious destruction of artistic and 
cultural heritage. Kuper Genocide, 22. Thornberry, 60-61. 
22 "New conceptions require new terms. By'" genocide' we mean the destruction of a nation or of 
an ethnic group. This new word. coined by the author to denote an old practice in its modem 
development. is made from the ancient Greek word genos (race, tribe) and the Latin, cide 
(Killing), thus corresponding in its formation to such words as tyrannicide, homicide, infanticide 
etc." Lemkin op.cit, note 20, 79. 
23 Lernkin ibid., 79. 
24 Cited in M Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal law. (Netherlands: 
Sijthofl) 1992, Preface. 
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5.2.2 International Legal Vocabulary and the Term "Genocide" 
In international legal discourse the usage of the term "genocide" is a relatively new 
one, and appeared for the first time during the Nuremberg trials in a separate category. 
Its recognition as a crime in international law was a direct consequence of the 
atrocities committed during the Second World War. The term "genocide" itself was 
used for the first time in the indictment of 8th October which charged major German 
war criminals of having committed "deliberate and systematic genocide, viz. the 
extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain 
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and 
national racial and religious groups".2S The concept re-emerges in various trials of the 
Nazi war criminal conducted in the National courts by the Allies.26 
Although genocide has now emerged as an independent concept, it bears a 
relationship to war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal does not specifically mention the term genocide, 
nonetheless, Article 6(c) of the Charter provided the necessary lineage between war 
crimes and crimes against humanity on which the concept could be developed as a 
separate category.27 
Article 6 of the Charter of International Military Tribunal annexed to an 
agreement signed by the Four-Powers in 1945 provided for the establishment of a 
tribunal to prosecute and punish war criminals, who were involved in the commission 
of any of the following offences: 
(a) crimes against peace~ 
namely planning preparation, initiation or waging of a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) war crimes; 
2S Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, 1947, vol. i, 43-44. 
26 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, 1947-49, vol. vi, 48~ vol. vii 7, 24~ vol. xiii, 2, 3,6, 112, 
114 and vol. xv, 123. 
27 Text of the agreement for the establishment of IMT and Annexed Charter, UNTS, 5, 251 ~ AJIL, 
39 (1945), Supplement 257. 
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namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall 
include, but not be limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in 
occupation of or in occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of 
prisoners of War or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of 
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity; 
(c) crimes against humanity; 
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war, 
or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or 
in connection with any crime with in the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated 
The last of these categories-crimes against humanity-was at that time only 
establishing itself as a rather controversial principle as it divided academic opinion into 
two schools of thought. One school regarded it as revolutionary with great potential, 
whereas the other considered it as being inconsistent with international legal norms.28 
Indeed, international legal history reveals that crimes against humanity have occupied a 
subsidiary position to war crimes, and did not emerge as a separate concept in 
international law until at least 1923,29 meaning thereby that offences committed by 
governments against their own nationals was not within any of the recognised 
categories of international crime.30 
However, the position was considerably different at the end of the Second 
world war. The atrocities committed by the Nazis had produced a united front 
regarding the punishment of those who had been involved in crimes against humanity 
during the currency of the war and more specifically at condemning and criminalizing 
28 E Schwelb, "Crimes Against Humanity" 23 BYIL (1946), 178-226, 178; J Brand, "Crimes against 
Humanity and Nuremberg trials" 28 OLR (1949), 93-119; Bassiouni op.cit note 24, Bassiouni, 
"Crimes against Humanity" 31 Col.JTL (1992), 457-494; Kuper GenOcide, 21; On War Crimes 
see H Lauterpacht, "The Law of Nations and the punishment of War Crimes" 21 BYIL (1948) 58-
59. 
29 C Bassiouni, "International law and the Holocaust" 9 Cal. WIU, (1978), 202-305, 21l. In the 
peace treaties of Versailles (Art 228-230) Saint-Germain-en-Iaye (Art 173-76), Trianon (Art 157-
159), NeuiIIy-sur-seine (Art 118-120), the term Crimes against humanity does not appear. 
Although in the Treaty of Sevres (1920) the substance of the concept does make an appearance, 
the treaty itself remained unratified and was replaced by another treaty, the treaty of Lausanne 
which allowed for a general amnesty. Schwelb op.cit note 28, 182. 
30 Thornberry, 88. 
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genocide in times of war and peace alike. Hence, it was not surprising that in its very 
first session, the United Nations General Assembly included in its agenda a resolution 
entitled "Resolution on the crime of Genocide" and adopted it as Resolution 96(1) on 
11 December 1946.31 Although, a General Assembly Resolution and prima facie 
deprived of the status of binding legal obligation,32 the unanimity of the Assembly in 
declaring "Genocide as a Crime under international law which the civilised world 
condemns" and the substance and form of the Resolution leads to a conviction that it 
was, in fact, declaratory of customary international law. 33 
The Resolution played a major role in the recognition of genocide as a crime in 
international law, for not only did it form the basis of the Genocide Convention of 
1948, but several of its themes were taken up in various other international 
instruments. There was essentially a recognition of the emergence of this concept of 
genocide, quite independent to that of "crimes against humanity". 34 To concretise and 
provide a legal recognition to this independent concept, the establishment of a 
convention on genocide was deemed necessary and a convention was in fact adopted 
within the space of two years. 
31 YBUN, 1946-7,255. 
32 H Kunz, "The United Nations Convention on Genocide" 43 AJIL (1949), 738-746, 738. 
33 "such Resolutions ... are authority for the content of customary law only if they claim to be 
declaration of existing law. A clear example is Resolution 96(1) of 11 December 1946". M 
Akehurst, "Custom as a source of international law" 47 BYIL (1974-5), 1-53, 6~ see infra chapter 
9. 
34 Note the views of the various delegates during the preparatory stages of the Genocide Convention. 
According to the Brazilian representative Mr Amado " ... while it was true that article 6 (c) of the 
Nuremberg Charter enunciated acts which, by their nature, constituted genocide, such acts were 
covered by the article only in so far as they had been committed either during or in connection 
with the preparation for war. Genocide, however, was an international crime which could also be 
committed in time of peace, and the Assembly had been careful to make that important 
distinction". GAOR, 3rd session, Part 1, Sixth committee, 63 meeting, 30 September 1948, 6, 
para 7. 
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5.3 THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RIGHT OF PHYSICAL 
EXISTENCE FOR MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
5.3.1 International Conventions 
5.3.1.1 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948 
The main thrust of the crystallisation of a right to physical protection of 
minorities has been provided by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide, 194835 (here-in-after the Convention). Indeed, after the 
coming into operation of the United Nations Charter it was the first convention to have 
dealt directly with the issue of the physical protection of groups, and it still remains as 
the primary conventional obligation in this respect. 36 There is no mention of minorities 
in the text of the treaty itself; an unfortunate reflection of the lack of the then existing 
enthusiasm for minorities. It is directed more at the offenders, an ordinance against 
offenders rather than a proclamation of the rights of groupS.37 On the other hand, it 
remains clear that the dynamics of the State structure makes minorities its natural 
beneficiaries and hence it is meaningful to consider the Convention as an indelible part 
of their Charter ofRights.38 
The origins of the Convention adequately reflect the abhorrence with which the 
world community regarded genocide. The unanimity with which the Convention was 
35 78 UNTS 277; 58 UKTS 1970. 
36 Thornberry, 59. 
37 J Crawford "Peoples or Governments" in J Crawford (cd.), Rights of Peoples, (Oxford: OUP) 
1988,55-67,59. 
38 "The Convention on Genocide may be characterised as a means of protecting minorities since in 
reality it is most nearly concerned with affording protection for population groups in minority 
positions" T Modeen, The International Protection of Minorities in Europe, (Abo: Abo Akandmi) 
1969, Ill. 
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adopted has several important consequences. Firstly, the terminology of the 
Convention makes it clear that the substantive principles enunciated therein are 
recognised and binding on all States, regardless of their treaty obligations. Secondly, it 
manifests the view that there is a legal obligation on all States to take action not only 
to prevent its occurrence, but also to punish those involved in committing genocide. 
The preamble of the Convention, while noting the General Assembly 
Resolution 96(1) of 11 December 1946 which condemns genocide as a crime under 
internationallaw, calls for international co-operation to rid mankind of what it terms as 
an "odious scourge". According to article 1, "the contracting parties confirm that 
genocide whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under 
international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish". Although, article 1, 
seemingly merely confirms the prohibition of genocide, nonetheless it remains of 
considerable significance. Not only is it an attempt to provide a universal recognition 
of the crime of genocide, but also its application both in times of peace and war is a 
considerable expansion of the scope of the Charter of the International Military 
Tribuna1.39 The issues relating to prevention and punishment have raised considerable 
controversy and will be dealt with separately. 
(i) Acts Constituting Genocide 
According to Article II of the Convention genocide consists of 
"any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or part a 
national, ethical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
39 This sentiment was echoed by the Egyptian Representative, Mr Raffat, when he said that article 1 
"expressed three fundamental concepts, namely, that genocide was a crime under international law, 
and it was a crime in time of Peace as well as in time of war. That was no doubt a repetition of the 
terms of the General Assembly Resolution, but the latter was only a recommendation whereas the 
Convention would be binding on the parties" GAOR, 3rd Session, Part I, Sixth Committee, 67th 
mtg., 5 October 1948,39. For debates on the value and need of the retention of Article 1 see the 67th 
and 68th mtg., 6 October 1948 ibid. 29-36, 36-47. 
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(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part~ 
Imposing measures intended to prevent births with in the group; 
Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group." 
It would appear that the definition of the acts which constitute genocide is 
exhaustive in nature, which contrasts vividly with the wider expression of the General 
Assembly Resolution 96(1). Though the provision of an exhaustive definition results 
in the disadvantage of inflexibility, the main benefit of such a provision is to provide set 
guide-lines for States and to adopt consistency in their approach to follow and not to 
provide a loophole for them to set their own standards in relation to its rneaning.40 It is 
important to note that genocide, according to Article II, is not only aimed at the total 
destruction of a group, but also covers the partial destruction. On the other hand, it is 
also to be noted that none of the characteristics, as we have already considered, i.e. 
national, ethical, racial or religious, are defined. 
(ii) Exclusion of "Cultural" Genocide 
From the definition as preserved in the Convention, it would appear that 
whereas categories (a) to (c) can be described as classic cases of "physical genocide", 
and category (d) as "biological genocide", category ( e) is more controversially aimed 
at reflecting elements of "cultural genocide",41 the legal validity of which is subject to 
debate. 
Indeed as the travaux preparatoires suggest, the issue of inclusion of "cultural 
genocide" had proved highly controversial, with several member States arguing 
vigorously over the risk of political interference in the domestic affairs of States.42 The 
Ad hoc Committee, following the view adopted in the General Assembly Resolution, 
40 See T Franck, "Legitimacy in international system" 82 AlIL (1988) 705-759, 714. 
41 See the Secretariat Draft Convention, the Secretary-generals preliminary draft as supplemented 
by the comments of the three experts consulted, UN Doc E/447. The draft, and comments on it 
by states, is reproduced as UN Doe N362, GOAR, 2nd Session, 6th Committee, Summary 
Records, 16 September-26 November 1947, Annex 3, and Annex 3a (comments); Thornberry 71. 
42 The Secretariat Draft Convention, the Secretary General's preliminary draft as supplemented by 
the comments of the three experts consulted, UN Doc. El447. 
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not only decided to keep it within the Convention, but also devoted a full article 
elaborating its meaning. 
Article III of the draft convention provided: 
In this convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the 
intent to destroy the language, religion or culture of a national, racial or religious 
group on grounds of the national or racial origin or religious belief of its members such 
as: 
(1) prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools or 
the printing or circulation of publications in the language of the group, 
(2) Destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical 
introductions and objects of the group. 
The extensive debates on the subject that were conducted reflect that those in 
favour of retaining "cultural genocide" within the definition pointed out to the 
imperative nature of preserving the group identity without which it would seem 
meaningless to talk about the existence of groups. It was argued that there was an 
obvious and natural relationship between physical and cultural extermination making it 
vital to protect both the physical and cultural existence of groups. "Cultural 
genocide", however, was ultimately excluded from the definition. There were fears on 
the part of the majority of States of converting the legally binding instrument into a 
mere formula of political rhetoric; of providing a pretext for unnecessary intervention 
and establishing a grave hurdle in the State-building process on the part of the newly 
emerging States.43 
The practicality of incorporating such an offence was also brought into 
question: international and national tribunals would be unable to gauge the accuracy 
and extent of the allegations brought forth and the governments would not be in a 
position to adequately safeguard themselves from such charges. The prevailing 
opinion was that there was a difference between mass murder and closing libraries and 
that the later issue of "cultural genocide" should be left to human rights treaties and 
43 GAOR, 3rd session, Part 1, Sixth Committee (83 mtg.) at 193-207, 25th October 1948~ GAOR 
Plenary (178 meeting) 9th December 1948~ Note the views ofMr Amado (Brazil) ibid. 83rd mtg., 
at 197-8; Mr Federspiel (Denmark); Mr Lapointe (Canada) 199-200; Mr Goyhsolo (peru) 202; 
Mr Gross (USA) 203; Mr Keckenbeeck (Belgium) 204; Also see chapter 9 infra. 
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minority rights treaties.44 Despite its exclusion from the text of the treaty, "cultural 
genocide" has left its mark. A special reference is made to the forcible transfer of 
children from one group to another, and the word "ethical" was added to the groups 
covered there by creating the impression of extending protection to groups with 
distinctive culture and language.4s 
As part IV will illustrate, through the case of Pakistan, wanton destruction of 
groups may also take the form of deportation, mass displacement and plantation of an 
alien population. There have been innumerable contemporary instances where States 
have employed some or all of the aforesaid means to destroy the existence of the 
groups.46 Concern over the omissions of these activities has attracted the attention of 
many commentators. According to Drost, "The five acts of genocide enumerated in 
article II do not cover all possible ways and means of intentionally destroying a human 
group as such. Deliberate destruction of a human group may well take the form of 
deportation or mass displacement of internment and enslavement with forced labour, of 
denationalisation by systematic terrorism, inhumane treatment and physical intimidation 
measures" .41 
A further reflection of a serious gap, and closely related to the issue of "cultural 
genocide", is the absence of a prohibition on demographic changes which could 
transform the proportion of a population. Indeed, Professor Ermacora's point is a valid 
one when he observes that " ... another form of genocide can be the demographic 
change in a given area. This demographic change does not fall under the acts 
enumerated .. .in the Convention.". 48 There has also been growing concern that modern 
day developments have created newer threats to the survival of certain groups. 
44 GAOR, 3rd session, Part 1, Sixth Committee (83 mtg.) at 193-207, 25th October 1948~ the views 
of the Brazilian, Canadian, US and Belgium representative. N Robinson, The Genocide 
Convention A Commentary. (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs) 1960 65 
45 ' • Kuper, GenOCide, 31. 
46 See A OeZayas, "International law and Mass popUlation transfers" 16 Harvard IV (1975) 207· 
258~ J Claydon, "Internationally uprooted people and the transnational protection of minority 
culture" 24 NYLSLR (1978), 125-151~ V Iyer, "Mass expulsion as violations of human rights" 13 
IJIL (1973), 169-175. 
41 P Drost, Crimes o/State Book II. (Leiden: Sijthofl) 1959, 124. 
48 F Ermacora, "The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations" 182 Rec. des cours, (1983) 
251-366, 314. 
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Activities such as the use of nuclear and chemical explosions, toxic environmental 
pollution, acid rain or the destruction of rain forests threaten the existence of peoples 
in several parts of the world.49 
A particular concern of the General Assembly Resolution of 11 December 1946 
was the "cultural contributions lost as a result of genocide". The omission of this 
sentiment was unfortunate; minorities shorn of their cultural identity would be little 
more than a collection of individuals going through the motions of a physical existence. 
In the words of one commentator, the deletion of an article relating to cultural 
genocide "destroyed the very letter and spirit of the Resolution of December 1946 
because it effectively deprived the world of cultural contributions of small groups of 
people".50 
(iii) Issue of Intent 
The commission of the crime of genocide requires two necessary ingredients: 
actus reus, which is the physical action of destruction, in whole or in part, of a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group and mens rea, which is the mental element 
or the intent to commit such a crime. The crime of genocide would not be committed, 
regardless of the ruthlessness of the act and the barbarity of its consequences, without 
a specific intent of committing genocide being involved. 51 On the other hand acts, 
which do not succeed in achieving the intended result of extermination of groups 
notwithstanding the presence of intent are punishable. 52 
Attempts were made to have an objective criterion to assess the commission of 
the crime. 53 It was argued that the requirement could provide a pretext in suggesting 
49 Whitaker op.cit note 1, 17. 
50 S Ikramullah, Pakistan Horizon December 1948 234. 
SI· ' Also see Robmson op.cit note 44,58.59. 
S2 See Article III. 
S3 GAOR, 3rd Session, Part 1, Sixth Committee (73 mtg.) 12 October, 1948, 81.98; See the views 
of USSR representative Mr Morozov, ibid. 96 and the views ofMr Chaumont (France) ibid. 96-
97. 
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denial of the crime for absence of any intent involved. 54 According to an amendment 
proposed by the Soviet Union the phrase "committed with the intent to destroy" in the 
draft Convention should be replaced by the phrase "aimed at the physical 
destruction".55 
Attempts to discard the requirement of intent failed to attract the required 
consensus; the Soviet proposed amendment was rejected by 36 votes to 11, with 4 
abstentions. Whereas the Secretariat draft Convention provides a wider view, 
subsequent drafts reflect a continually narrowing view on this issue of intent. An 
equally significant deficiency in the present definition, it is contended relates to the 
relationship between the requirement of mens rea and actus reas. From a simple 
construction of the article, it appears that intent alongside positive actus reas is 
necessary to constitute the crime. It is equally conceivable that actus reas might be 
committed through omissions which may be intentional or negligent. 
Since the coming into operation of the Genocide Convention, charges have 
been levelled against a number of States, and the defence-not surprisingly has been an 
absence of intent. Indeed, the French delegate was to make the prophetic statement 
when he pleaded that substitution of the term was necessary as it would "guard against 
the possibility that the presence in the definition of the word 'intent' might be used as a 
pretext in the future for pleading not guilty on the ground of absence of intent". 56 
(iv) Protected Groups 
The protected groups in the Convention are "national, ethnical, racial or 
religious ... ".51 Some of the features and the inherent problems in the list are 
immediately prominent. In a given situation, it may well be possible to earmark a 
group as fitting within a certain category. However, since none of these terms are 
54 Ibid. 
55 AJC.6/223. 
56 GAOR, 3rd Session, Part 1, Sixth Committee (73 mtg.) 12 October, 1948,97. 
51 Article II. 
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defined in the Convention or indeed in any other international legal instrument, there 
remains considerable ambiguity as to the possible meaning of "national" or "ethnical" 
"racial" or "religious" group.58 
Though unlike Resolution 96(1) national and ethnic groups are mentioned, 
there is no reference to the political and "other" groups as stated in the Resolution, or 
"linguistic" groups as mentioned in the Secretariat draft. The draft prepared by the 
Secretariat had mentioned racial, national, linguistic, religious and political groups but 
not ethnic groups, which were first mentioned in the text prepared by the Ad hoc 
Committee. 
(v) Exclusion of Political Groups 
The most contentious debate as to the potential scope of protection related to 
political groups. The debates of the Sixth Committee probably reveal the dawning of 
the Cold-war politics~ the US delegates were keen to include political groups while 
their Soviet counter-parts wanted the exclusion of such groups from the realm of 
protection under the Convention. 59 The advocates of such a provision cited the case of 
Nazis who had found it easier to identify political opponents for example, the 
communists for persecution.60 The whole point of the discussion being that it was 
relatively straightforward to recognise groups associated to opposition, and to be made 
subsequent objects of genocide. The exclusion of "political groups" proved a 
disappointment for those who pleaded that political dissidents were as much a target of 
genocide as national, ethnical, racial or religious groupS.6\ Opponents of the motion 
countenanced their argument on grounds of rationality and practicality~ they projected 
a view that the constitution of political groups was too vague and would provide an 
58 See the discussion Supra chapter 2. 
59 GAOR, 3rd Session, Part I, Sixth Committee, 74th mtg., 14th October, 1948; 75th mtg. 15 
October 1948; and 128th mtg., 7 December 1948. See in particular views of Mr Gross (USA) 
101-103; and Mr Morzov (USSR) 103-106. 
60 Ibid Gross 101; Mr De Beus (Netherlands) 100; Mr Medeiros (Bolivia) 98; Mr Correa (Ecuador) 
100-1. 
61 Ibid. 
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opportunity for external interference. In addition to these objections was the genuine 
fear of losing the unanimity amongst States and consequent lack of enthusiasm in 
drafting and ratification of the treaty. Concern was expressed at the prospects of 
instability and the provision of a vague terminology in a legally binding instrument. 62 
The international society works on the basis of State sovereignty; a majority of 
States considered that the inclusion of such a provision might provide a pretext for 
other States to interfere or intervention on the part of United Nation's contrary to 
Article 2(7) of the Charter.63 Added to that there was also the fear of the loss of 
sovereignty of a State in quelling unrest and civil war for fear of external scrutiny. 
The Venezuelan representative summed up the argument succinctly in the Sixth 
Committee when he said: 
"The inclusion of political groups might endanger the future of 
the convention because many States would be unwilling to ratify it, 
fearing the possibility of being called before an international tribunal to 
answer charges made against them, even if those charges were without 
foundation. Subversive elements might make use of the convention to 
weaken the attempts of their governments to suppress them ..... [while] 
certain countries where civic spirit was highly developed and the 
political struggle fought through electoral laws would favour the 
inclusion of political groups, .... there were countries where the 
population was still developing and where political struggles were 
violent. These countries would obviously not favour the inclusion of 
political groups in the convention". 64 
Considerable faith was placed in the emerging trends of human rights. The 
issues relating to the position of political groups alongside other individuals could 
merge into the wider and more encapsulating human rights values rather than being 
62 Ibid. See views of Mr Morzov (USSR); Mr Abdoh (Iran) 99; and Mr Messina (Dominican 
Republic) 99. 
63 Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter provides "Nothing contained in the present Charter 
shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially with in the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to 
settlement under the present chapter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of 
enforcement measures under chapter VII". 
64 GAOR. 3rd Session, Part 1, Sixth Committee, 69 mtg., 7 October 1948,58. 
99 
based on narrow and difficult conceptions of genocide.65 It is contended that the 
exclusion of political groups has, however, proved to be a great oversight~ incidents 
that have taken place since the coming into operation of the Convention, in several 
parts of the world, particularly in the newly emerged States of Asia and Mrica, remain 
witness to the phenomenon of "political genocide". As the French representative stated 
in the General Assembly "Whereas in the past crimes of genocide had been committed 
on racial or religious grounds it was clear that in the future they would be committed 
mainly on political grounds".66 
Subsequent history and contemporary events prove that political groups 
continue to remain a major target of genocide. States have felt comfortable to conduct 
genocide in the pretext of public order or suppressing political opposition. The issue 
relating to the exclusion of political groups also has wider repercussions, for not only 
has made it possible for such groups like the communists to be victimised but it has 
also been possible for States to conduct genocide of certain racial, national, ethnical or 
religious groups, for these group are likely to form part of the political opposition.67 
Political groups are not the only ones whose omission can' be subjected to 
criticism. Linguistic groups claim to have the same sanctuary as ethnical, national, 
racial or religious groups; the slip·periness in the terms ethnicity and race arguably 
subsumes linguistic erements, though the heterogeneity and incongruity in the peculiar 
6S Ibid., S4-62~ cf. views of Drost "The argument that inclusion of political groups or of economic, 
social and cultural groups under the scope of the convention would involve problems of the 
protection of minorities and the promotion of a respect for human rights any more than the four 
groups actually protected under the present article II, serves merely as a pretext against the 
principle of international penal safeguards in general" ... "By leaving political and other groups 
beyond the purported protection the authors of the Convention also left a wide and dangerous 
loophole for any government to escape the human duties under the convention by putting 
genocide into practice under the cover of executive measures against political or other groups for 
reasons of security, public order or any other reason of state. If perhaps political reasons cannot 
be adduced as proper excuse for the genocidal measures against a group protected under Article 
II, then very likely such genocidal policy will be defended on economic, social or cultural 
grounds" P Drost, Crimes of State volume i, 1956, 122.123. 
66 See ECOSOCOR. 7th Session, 26th August 1948, 723~ M Shaw, "Genocide and International 
Law" in Y Dinstein and M Tabory (eds.), International Law at a time of Perplexity, Essays in 
honour o/Shabtai Rosenne, (Dordrecht: M.NiJ·hofl) 1989 797·820 808. 
67 • • ' , 
This pomt had been made by the representative of Ecuador, when he stated that the governments 
might "usc the pretext of political opinions of a racial or religious group to persecute or destroy it, 
without becoming liable to international sanctions" GAOR. 3rd session, Part 1, Sixth Committee, 
74th mtg., 14th October 1948, 102. 
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taxonomies of State may demand an independent identification.68 If ethnicity and race 
could embody linguistic identities, there remain other sections of a community which 
require a similar form of protection. These includes the old, the disabled or retarded, 
women, children, sexual minorities such as homosexuals, and many others; certainly 
the record of the Nazis and their predecessors who had perpetrated crimes of genocide 
had targeted many groups which were most vulnerable and need the greatest amount 
of protection. 
On the other hand, it is important to appreciate that in the context of our 
present debate, certain omission were inevitable for reasons of practicality as well as 
for the purposes of concluding a convention of this nature. The primary objective was 
to provide a basic guarantee to certain groups, and the overall selection of the 
categories it would appear, did succeed in matching the overall objectives. 
(vi) Issue of Individual Criminal Responsibility 
Article IV of the Convention lays down the principle of individual criminal 
Responsibility. According to the Article 
"Persons committing genocide or any of the acts enumerated in 
Article III shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals". 
Attempts were made at the Sixth Committee stage to incorporate liability of 
States in order to cover firstly the preventive aspects of the Convention, and secondly 
to ensure that liability was accepted by the States.69 The General Assembly, however, 
following the International Military Tribunal and the generally held view, declined to 
accept the principle of State Responsibility for genocide. This was partly because of 
fear of individuals evading responsibility and partly due to the fear of implicating States 
where the question of punishment did not exist. 
: See M Tabory "Languag~ Rights as Human Rights" 10lYHR (1980), 167-223, 174-175. 
UN Doc A/c/6th Committee, Annexes, 24. 93 and 92 and 96 meeting. 
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The Genocide Convention follows the established view since the Second World 
War, a view eloquently presented by the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg: 
"Crimes against International law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced". 70 
According to article 8 of the Nuremberg Charter 
"The fact that the defendant had acted pursuant to orders of his 
government or of a superior shall not free him from the responsibility, 
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal 
determines that justice so requires". 71 
The preparatory work following this intention reinforces the view that the 
prime objective had been to exclude pleas of "acts of State" or "supreme orders". 
There remain however, a number of intriguing issues such as the probable meaning of 
public officials, and the position of those members of the government who have 
opposed, through their actions, any commission of acts which constitute genocide. 
The Convention fails to provide for any rules relating to superior orders, 
although attempts were made by the Soviet Union in the Sixth committee-albeit 
unsuccessfully-to explicitly deny "superior orders" any justification for committing 
genocide.72 It is worth noting that the Ad hoc Committee had excluded from its draft, 
references to non-admissibility of the plea of superior orders, primarily because it 
might, in certain circumstances be unfair, for a person not to rely on such a plea. 
While appreciating this inherent concern, it is submitted that a plea of non-admissibility 
of such a defence ought to have been retained, for invariably this defence would be 
relied upon whether justified or not.73 
70 Trail of major War Criminals bel"ore the JAn'. proceedings. Nuremberg 1947 234. 71 './' ,. , 
39 AJIL 3 (Supp. 1945, Official Documents)~ also see H McCoubrey, International Humanitarian 
Law The Regulation of Armed Conflicts (Aldershot: Dartmouth) 1990, 220. 
72 The proposed amendment read "Command of law or Superior order shall not justify genocide" 
UN Doc NC.6/21S/Rev.1. 
73 L Green "Superior Orders and Command Responsibility" 27 CYIL, (1989) 167-202. 
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5.3.2 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
5.3.2.1 Customary Law and the Scope of the Prohibition 
(i) Groups Protected 
There exists a unanimity as to the criminalization of genocide in municipal and 
intemationallaw, though the precise scope of the concepts beg a number of questions. 
In international law, as we have already noted, a number of international instruments 
testify to the validity of this prohibition. A primary focus of our attention has been the 
conventional rules on the matter~ an analysis of the scope and substance of the 
provisions of the Convention has been conducted. However, conventional rules, can 
and certainly in the present case, do work in conjunction with customary rules though 
the scope and substance may vary. A treaty provision could possess the customary 
force if it fulfils the basic criterion of the establishment of custom; it could reflect 
customary law if its text declares or its travaux preparatoires state, with the requisite 
opinio juris, that its substance is declaratory of existing law.74 
In the present context, it is contended that despite the absolute prohibition of 
the crime of genocide in both customary and conventional law, customary law varies in 
its scope. The declaratory nature of General Assembly Resolution 96(1) has already 
been referred to. The Resolution, it would appear, is more expansive, based on a more 
ambitious agenda. It has a wider constituency and appeals to humanity in general. 
Genocide is considered in general terms as "a denial of the right of existence of entire 
human groups". The Genocide Convention, by contrast, reflects a cautious approach: 
74 M Akehurst, A Modern Introduction to International Lmv, (London: George Allen and Unwin) 
6th edn. 1987, 26-27~ C Baxter, "Multilateral treaties as evidence of customary law" 41 BYIL 
(1967-66), 275-300~ M Akehurst, "Custom as a source of international law" 47 BYIL (1974·5), 1-
53, 42-52~ for a detailed discussion see infra chapter 7. 
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after providing an affirmation of the crime of genocide in Article I, Article II goes on 
to provide a definition explicit to the Convention. 
This wider perspective, as present in the General Assembly Resolution is a 
reflection of the abhorrence with which international community viewed the crime. 
The Nazi atrocities, fresh in the minds of international politicians and the public alike, 
had demonstrated the various forms in which genocide could be committed; the 
Resolution reflecting a general revulsion, aimed to provide a general prohibition. The 
constraints which we have seen characterise the Convention are not present in this 
idealistic expression; political or other groups are placed in the same bracket as racial 
or religious groups; culture is deemed as an integral part of the existence of human 
groups. Reinforcement of the wider vision of genocide could also be sought from a 
number of proceedings by national tribunals of the Allies.7s 
In Ulrich Greifelt et al,76 for instance, the prosecution case rested on the 
broader scope of genocide as envisioned in the General Assembly Resolution The 
second count in the indictment made reference to a "systematic programme of 
genocide, aimed at the destruction of foreign nationals and ethnic groups, in part by 
murderous extermination, and in part by the elimination and suppression of national 
characteristics" and that "the object of this programme was to strengthen the German 
nation and the so-called' Aryan' race at the expense of.. .. other nations and groups by 
imposing Nazi and German characteristics upon individuals selected therefrom (such 
imposition being hereinafter called 'Germanization') and by the extermination of 
'undesirable' racial elements". The indictment went on to provide specific instances of 
this programme of genocide. 
(a) Kidnapping the children of foreign nationals in order to select for Germanization 
those who were considered of' racial value'; 
(b) Encouraging and compelling abortions on Eastern workers for the purpose of 
preserving their working capacity as slave labour and weakening Eastern nations; 
75 Law Reports of Trials of war criminals (London: HMSQ, 1947-9), vol. vi, 48; vol vii, 7-9; and 
24-26; vol xiii, 2,3, 6, 112 and 114; vol xiv, 122-123. 
76 Ib'd I'" 1 I "VO Xlll, ' 
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(c) Taking away, for the purpose of exterminating or Germanization, infants born to 
Eastern W orkers~ 
(d) Executing, imprisoning in concentration camps, or Germanizing Eastern workers 
and prisoners of war who had had sexual intercourse with Germans, and imprisoning 
those involved~ 
(e) preventing marriages and hampering reproduction of enemy nationals~ 
(t) Evacuating enemy populations from their native lands by force and resettling so-
called' ethnic-Germans' (Volksdeutsche) on such lands; 
(g) compelling nationals of other countries to perform work in Germany, to become 
members of the German community, to accept German citizenship and to join the 
German armed forces ... ~ 
(h) Plundering public and private property in Germany and in the incorporated and 
occupied territories, e.g., taking church property in Germany, real estate .. etc.~ 
(1) Participating in the persecution and extermination of Jews." 
Similarly, in awarding its judgment in the trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser,78 the 
Supreme National Tribunal of Poland included, inter alia, in the list of crimes 
committed against the Polish population: 
(b) Repression, genocidal in character, of the religion of the local population~ by 
restriction of religious practices to the minimum~ and by destruction of churches, 
cemeteries and the property of the church 
(c) Equally genocidal attacks on Polish culture.79 
It is necessary, however, to note that the nature of binding customary norms 
require a higher form of allegiance~ the declaratory nature of the prohibition of 
genocide as enunciated in Resolution 96(1) does not mean that all and everything that 
is expressed in it carries an equal value.so As we have noted briefly through the 
proceedings of the war crimes trials, genocide could and probably did mean a number 
of things to a number of people, a point which can also be confirmed through an 
analysis of the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Convention. Thus, for instance, 
77 Jbid., 2.3. 
78 Law Reports of Trials of war criminals, XIII 70 
79 ' . Ibid., 112. 
80 Sec the position of the Polish Representative; GAOR, 3rd session Part I, Sixth Committee 64th 
mtg., 1st October 1948, 19. 
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on the issue of "political genocide", political groups, as we have noted earlier, featured 
in the text of the Resolution, although during the preparatory stages of the Convention 
a number of disagreements resurfaced in relation to the possible nonnative value of the 
subject. According to the representative of Poland, the operative part of the 
Resolution did not deal with political groups, but related only to the grounds on which 
genocide could be committed.8I Similarly, according to the representative of 
Venezuela,82 and Belgium8) the terms of reference in the Resolution were only to be 
measured as guidelines and not interpreted literally for the purpose of deciding its 
customary value. The travaux preparatoires also reflect disagreements on the issue of 
"cultural" genocide. Several representatives presented the view that although cultural 
genocide was an evil in its own right, it was more appropriately dealt within the ambit 
of international law of human rights rather than a convention of this nature.84 
(ii) The issues of Criminal Responsibility of States and the SUbject of 
Jurisdiction 
If the disagreements on such issues as the subject of "cultural" genocide and its 
subsequent exclusion leads to a view that such a prohibition does not exist in 
customary law, there are a number of other issues whose inchoate recognition may 
pose questions as to their contemporary validity. Individual responsibility for crimes 
against international law, including genocide is firmly established~ State responsibility is 
not. The debate on the subject of criminal responsibility of States has been lively 
though probably not conclusive.8s The 1980 International Law Commission Draft 
Articles on State responsibility in article 19, include acts of genocide carrying State 
81 Ibid., 175 mtg. 110.111. 
82 Ibid., 112.113. 
83 Ibid., 74th mtg. 
84 See e.g. the views of the Indian delegate ibid., 64th mtg. 15.16. 
8S According to Professor Shaw "The question as to whether States may indeed be criminally 
responsible is highly controversial" op.cit note 66, 814; also see Professor Weil views in 
"Towards Relative Normativity in International Law" 77 AJIL (1983), 413-442. 
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responsibility.86 According to probably the leading authority on internationallaw, Ian 
Brownlie 
"the concept [of criminal responsibility of States] cannot be 
justified in principle, and is contradicted by the majority of 
developments which have appeared in international law. Its only 
sphere is that of morals and propaganda. Some supporters of the 
theory of the criminal responsibility of the state in fact only prescribe 
punishment for the individuals comprising the government, in which 
case the only difference between their position and that of those who 
say that there can only be criminal responsibility of individuals is 
terminological. The' sanctions' which are referred to as providing 
the penal responsibility of states have an artificiallook".87 
Professor Brownlie continues to remain "unconvinced of the practical utility of 
the concept of criminal responsibility of States".88 Similarly as regards the 
aforementioned article 19 Sinclair's view is that it does not establish the criminal 
responsibility of States; it simply posits an aggravated degree of responsibility for 
internationally wrongful acts designated for want of a better term, as 'international 
crimes' .89 
Brief consideration also needs to be provided to another rather controversial 
principle. The principle enunciated in article VI of the Genocide Convention as 
regards jurisdiction seem to be established in customary law, though the expansion of 
jurisdiction on universal grounds, is an issue which, it is submitted is not resolved 
completely. The matter was a subject of considerable debate and disagreement in the 
preparatory stages of the Convention. The view of a number of States was 
summarised by the Soviet representative when in the Sixth Committee he said "the 
principle of universal punishment was even more incompatible with the sovereignty of 
86 18 11M, 1979, 1568, Article 19(3)(c); also see Special Rapporteur Theo Van Boven, Study 
concerning the rights to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms ElCN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 16. 
87 Brownlie, op.cit note 15. 152-3. 
88 I Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility. (Oxford: OUP). 1983,33. 
89 I Sinclair, "Lex Ferenda and Crimes of State" in J Weiler, A Cassese and M Spinedi, (eds.) 
international Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the lLC's Draft Article 19 on State 
Responsibility, (Berlin: Walter de Gryter) 1989, 242. 
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States than international punishment".90 Others, however, have viewed the provision 
of universal jurisdiction established in customary internationallaw.91 This certainly was 
the approach taken by the District Court in Attorney-General of the Government of 
Israel v Adolf Eichmann92 envisaging article VI of the convention as "a compulsory 
minimum".93 The Court's pronouncement on the crime of genocide, its recognition as 
of the crime as one of "utmost gravity under international law" tends to draw parallels 
with other crimes for which universal jurisdiction exists. Taking strength from the 
Eichmann's case, a number of jurists have claimed the existence of universal 
jurisdiction. According to Shaw "Article VI is a treaty rule and it may be strongly 
argued that State practice has defined genocide as a crime of universal jurisdiction, 
apart from the narrow provision of that article".94 
5.3.3 JUS COGENS 
The repeated references to the prohibition of genocide has led to a general 
consensus that it now forms part of jus cogens.9S The elaboration of the doctrine is 
provided by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties.96 According to 
article 53 of the Convention 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with 
a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of 
present convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a 
norm accepted and recognised by international community of States as 
a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which 
90 GAOR, 3rd session, Part I, Sixth committee, 100 mtg., 403. 
91 Bassiouni, op.cit note 24, 520. In a recent case, US Circuit Court of Appeal allowed the 
extradition of an alleged Nazi concentration camp guard to Israel on grounds of universal 
jurisdiction, Demjanuk v Petrovs"-y 776 F 2d 57 J (6th Cir. J 985). 
92 Judgement of the District Court 36 ILR 18; Supreme Court ofIsrae1277. 
93 Ibid., para 25. 
94 Shaw op.cit note 66, 816. 
9S For a consideration of the meaning of Jus Cogens see Article 53 & 64 of the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, 1969. YBILC 1966, vol., 247-8. See E Schewelb "Some Aspect of 
International Jus Cogens as Formulated by International Law Commission" 61 AJIL (1967) 946-
975. M Whiteman, "Jus Cogens in International Law with a Projected List" 7 GA.JIL (1977), 
607-626. 
96 See J Crawford, The Creation o/States in International Law, (Oxford: OUP) 1979,80. 
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can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law 
having the same character. 
Although there is no specification as to what constitutes such a norm, the 
commentary of International Law Commission puts forward the example of a treaty 
attempting to implement genocide as violating the principles of jus cogens.97 While 
customary as well as conventional law affirms the permanent position of prohibition of 
genocide, the International Court, has reiterated this point on a number of occasions. 
Unanimous support is also forthcoming from jurists and publicists. For Professor 
Brownlie "The least controversial examples of the class [of Jus Cogens] are the 
prohibition of the use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial non-
discrimination, crimes against humanity and the rules prohibiting trades in slaves and 
piracy".98 Similarly, in discussing the Genocide Convention, Schwelb says "the case 
for attributing to its provisions (Whether it restates pre-existing law or creates new 
law) the character of Peremptory norms is particularly strong".99 
Genocide has come to be regarded as a crime under international and municipal 
laws. The confident and authoritative terminology of the General Assembly Resolution 
96(1) followed by the confirmation in the Genocide Convention provides clear 
evidence of this. The view that genocide is unconditionally prohibited in international 
law has been affirmed on various occasions both by national and by international 
courtslOO• According to the ICJ 
"The origins of the convention show that it was the intention of 
the United Nations to condemn and punish genocide as 'a crime under 
international law' involving a denial which shocks the conscience of 
97 According to the Commission's analysis of' obvious and best settled' rules of Jus Cogens include 
(a) a treaty contemplating an unlawful use of force contrary to the principles ofthe Charter 
(b) a treaty contemplating the performance of any other act criminal under international law, and 
(c) a treaty contemplating or conniving at the commission of acts, such as trade in Slaves, piracy 
or genocide in the suppression of which every state is called upon to co-operate. YBILe, 1966, II, 
248. 
98 Brownlie, 513. 
99 Schwelb, op.cit note 95, 954~ "Genocide and slavery are favourite examples of practices which 
are generally accepted to be contrary tOfuS cogens" Mckean 281. 
100 For the international perspective see the judgement the International Court of Justice in 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of GenOCide, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1951, IS. 
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mankind, etc. (Resolution 96(1) of the General Assembly, December 11 
1946). The first consequence arising from this conception is that the 
principles which are recognised by civilized nations as binding on 
States, even with out any conventional obligation. A second 
consequence is the universal character both of condemnation of 
genocide and of the co-operation required 'in order to liberate mankind 
from such odious scourge' ... The Genocide Convention was therefore 
intended by the Contracting Parties to be definitely universal in 
scope" .101 
In the later case of Barcelona Traction, Light and Power CoI°2 the Court, 
while providing a distinction between the obligations erga omnes and obligations of 
States towards each other in diplomatic protection, described the former in the 
following manner 
"in contemporary international law, from the outlawing of acts 
of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and rules 
concerning the basic rights of human person, including protection from 
slavery and racial discrimination. Some of the corresponding rights of 
protection have entered into the body of general international law 
(Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide); others are conferred by international 
instruments of a universal or quasi-universal character" .103 
As far as the municipal laws are concerned, practically every State has declared 
that it regards genocide as a criminal offence and the judgment in Eichmann's case 
provide the best precedent. 104 According to the District Court of Jerusalem 
(considering the repeated pronouncements by General Assembly in Resolution 96(1), 
the Genocide Convention and the Reservations Case) 
"There is no doubt that genocide has been recognised as a crime 
under international law in the fun meaning of this term ex tunc, that is 
to say the crime of genocide committed against the Jewish people and 
other peoples during the period of Hitler regime were crimes under 
international law" .105 
101 Ibid., 23. 
102 Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Case (Belgium v Spain), IeJ Reports 1970,3. 
103 See ibid., 3 paras 33-34. 
104 Attorney-General of the Government of israel v Eichmann (1961) ILR 36, 5~ J Fawcett, "The 
Eichmann Case", 38 BYiL (1962) 181-215. 
lOS 36 ILR (1961) 34. 
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5.4 WEAKNESSES IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO 
PHYSICAL EXISTENCE 
As noted in the earlier sections, the right to physical existence of members 
belonging to groups has been transformed into a peremptory norm of international law 
and no derogation is permissible from it. Despite this, unfortunate though it sounds, 
genocide of minorities has taken place in a number of States. These States include 
both those which are parties to the Convention and those which have not ratified the 
Convention. 
A number of genocidal conflicts have taken place in the States which have 
emerged from the rubble of colonialism. Indeed, in several States of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America minorities have frequently become victims of genocidal conflict. It 
would perhaps not be inaccurate to suggest that the minorities in the post-colonial 
States of Africa have suffered the most adverse consequences. The historical and 
contemporary position of many groups, including the Tutsis and Hutus in Rwanda and 
Burundi, Ibos in Nigeria and the indigenous Africans of Southern Sudan provide an 
unfortunate commentary. 
In December 1963, soon after Rwanda won her independence, there was large 
scale genocide of the Tutsi minority resulting in the massacre of approximately 20,000 
Tutsi men, women and children. 106 In the neighbouring Burundi, the genocidal conflict 
between Tutsis and Hutus went on for several years resulting in the massacre of 
hundreds of thousands. Immediately after 1962, when Burundi gained her political 
independence, relations began to turn sour between the minority Tutsis and majority 
Hutus. In 1965, with the failure of a Hutu backed coup attempt, several thousand 
Hutus were massacred. This triggered a bloody genocidal conflict resulting in the 
massacre of thousands of Tutsis, but more significantly of at least 100,000 HutuS.107 
106 Kuper Genocide, 62. 
107 b d 1 j .,63. 
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This conflict between the Hutus and Tutsis in both Rwanda and Burundi has gone on, 
and seems almost unending. In Rwanda, since last year the orgy of "ethnic cleansing" 
has resurfaced with an unprecedented vigour and threatens to engulf Burundi as 
well. lOS 
Ever since the creation of independent Sudan in 1956, the peoples of southern 
regions have suffered from a form of "colonial or alien domination" and the resulting 
conflict between the relatively prosperous and dominant north and the poor and 
underdeveloped south has caused the virtual extermination and liquidation of 
thousands of Southerners:09 The rigour and upsurge of religious fundamentalismllo 
which has been characterised in many parts of the Islamic world, is typically reflected 
in the mood of the Khartoum government; religious, racial minorities and political 
opponents becoming unfortunate victims of a policy of discrimination, persecution, 
physical extermination and genocide. The case of Southern Sudan epitomises a tragic 
tale of attempts at forced cultural, linguistic and religious assimilation, of Arabization 
and of "starvation deployed as a weapon against civilians" .111 The agreements that 
have been made-most notably, the Southern Provinces self-government Act 1972, and 
the Koka Dam agreement of 1986-unfortunately became a causality of intolerance of 
successive Khartoum governments and the political immaturity of rebels factions of the 
south. 112 
A potentially clearer example of genocide seems to be reflected in the case of 
Ibos of Nigeria at the hands of the Northern Nigerians. Typically, the political 
structures left over by the colonial powers sew the seeds of distinctions and divisions 
108 Medccins sans Frontieres, Genocide in Rwanda, July 1994. 
109 Hannum, 308-327. Kuper says that during 1955-1972 nearly 500,000 southern Sudanese were 
killed, victims of civil war, famine and disease. Nearly 100,0000 became refugees Kuper 
Genocide, 69. 
110 See M P Moya, Rapporteur, The Rise of Islamic Radicalism and the future of Democracy in 
North Africa, Sub-committee on the Mediterranean BaSin, Draft Interim Report, May, 1994. 
III L Kuper "Theoretical issues relating to Genocide" (cd.) Andrcopoulos op. cit, 31-46, 42. 
112 See generally D Kritsiotis "Uti Possidetis in the Sudan: An African crises in perspective" (ed.), D 
Kritsiotis, 7l-83~ C Eprile "Sudan: The Long War" (ed.), B Croziers, Conflict Studies 1972~ G 
Morrison, The Southern Sudan and Eriteria: Aspects of wider African Problem (London: MRG)~ 
for extracts of the 1972 and 1986 agreements see H Hannum, Documents on Autonomy and 
Minority Rights, (Dordrecht: M. NijhofI) 1993, 688-701. 
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between the various indigenous communities. Nigeria could be divided into three main 
structures. In the north, the Hausa-Fulani were dominant with the east inhabited by 
Ibos and the west Yoruba. There were many linguistic, cultural and religious 
differences between the north and east. The January 1966 coups (the first of a series 
of military coups) was taken by a majority of northerners as an attempt on the part of 
the Ibos to dominate Nigeria. Using this as a reasonable scapegoat, the northerners 
started to wreak their vengeance on those Ibos who had migrated upwards. 
Thousands of Ibos were killed hundreds of thousands were forced to flee. The 
intensity of the massacres resulted in producing a reaction on the part of the minority 
group in the form of a secessionist movement and civil war, resulting in the massacre 
of nearly 1 millions Ibos.1I3 
Large scale genocide of minority groups has taken place in the Middle East and 
Asia. 114 It is not possible to provide a detailed analysis of the position in every State, 
although a reference to prime instance of genocide seems necessary. The Kurds, as a 
MRG Report comments "are the fourth most numerous people in the Middle East. 
They constitute one of the largest races, indeed nations, in the world today to have 
been denied an independent State. Whatever the yardstick for national identity the 
Kurds measure up to it".1IS However, the atrocities that have been committed to the 
now fragmented Kurdish people, and the inadequate international response towards the 
plight of the Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria remains one of the most unfortunate 
stories of human history. There is evidence to suggest that the Kurds have been made 
victims of genocide, have been and continue to be persecuted and discriminated in each 
of the States they inhabit. 116 
113 Sec the views of various commentators, "Biafra, Bengal and Beyond: International Responsibility 
and genocidal conflicts" Proc.ASIL (1972), 89-108~ R Lillich, (ed.) Humanitarian Intervention 
and the United Nations, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia) 1973. 
114 Th 
ere are many painful instances, which though grave in magnitude would require volumes-for 
the case of Cambodia sec H Hannum, "International Law and Cambodian Genocide: The Sounds 
of Silence" 11 HRQ (1989), 82-138~ D Hawk and R Coomaraswamy, "Minorities in Cambodia" 
(London: MRG), 1995: Keesings Contemporary Archives "Cambodia" November 1992,39195. 
liS D McDowall, The Kurds (London: MRG). 1985,5. 
116 For the diSCriminatory position of Kurds in Turkey see article 3, 42 of the Constitution of Turkish 
Republic reprinted in A Blaustein and G Flanz" Constitution of the Countries of the world 
(Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1973) 1984, vol. xxi~ AI, Escalation in human rights abuses 
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In the case of Iraq, memories of recent repression, persecution and genocide 
have attracted more international attention. These atrocities have resulted in the 
extermination and displacement of hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women and 
children. During the "reign of terror" as perpetuated by President Saddam Hussain, 
the Kurds, alongside other minorities such as the Shiites and the Marsh Arabs have 
become victims of a genocidal campaign. 
During the presidency of Sad dam Hussain, there have been constant attacks 
made on Kurdish villages. The Kurds received the treatment of belonging to the fifth 
column during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1987, the Kurds became the victims of chemical 
attacks by the Iraqi forces. During the month of April, a number of villages in the 
Sulamani province and in the Balisan valley were attacked by mustard gas, leaving 
hundreds of innocent people dead or permanently disabled.1I7 Unfortunately, as the 
MRG report goes on to state "[a]1though news of these chemical attacks disseminated 
internationally, no steps were taken to restrain Iraq. Furthermore, although a United 
Nations Commission investigated and confirmed the alleged use of chemical weapons 
by Iraq against Iran, it did not investigate allegations of this use against Iraqi Kurds, 
since it was not authorised to do SO":18 
On 17th of March 1988, the Iraqis used poisonous gas in Halabja killing at least 
5000 people with several thousand blinded, wounded and injuredl19 and there are 
reports that similar attacks continued thereafter particularly in the immediate aftermath 
of the cease-fire with Iran. Some international attention in recent years has been 
focused on the position of the Kurds in Iraq, which may in itself be due to political 
reasons. 
The limited protection that had been provided to the Kurds in the immediate 
aftermath of the Gulf crisis, through the creation of "safe-havens", fell far short of 
against Kurdish villages July 1993 Al Index EUR 44/64/93; AI, A Timefor action AI Index EUR 
44/13/94 February 1994; AI. Turkey, More people "disappear" following detention AI Index: 
EUR 44/15/94; AI Turkey, Selahattin Sinsek: 12 years in prison after unfair trial AI Index: EUR 
44IEUR 44/09/93; AI Turkey, Student Soner Onder still held July 1993 AI Index EUR 44/66/93. 
117 D McDowall. The Kurds, (London: MRG) 1985.38. 
118 Ibid. 
119 Ibid. 38. 
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adequate and permanent protection to the Kurdish people. The legal basis under which 
the limited enforcement action was undertaken is open to question; certainly it was 
difficult to accept the view that the Security Council Resolution 688, as such, was 
sufficient to provide the firm legal basis.'20 It has to be accepted that the threat to 
Kurds remains so long as President Saddam's regime stays intact. Besides that Kurds 
are being victimised in Iran and Turkey.121 The recent initiative on the part of the 
Turkish government to wipe out the PKK rebels, and the allegations of brutality and 
violations of human rights of the Kurdish population endorses this point.122 
There is also substantial evidence to support the view that genocide of religious 
groups (regardless of whether their minority status is recognised or not) in several 
countries-primarily those of Middle East and Asia-has taken place. The plight of 
Baha'is in Iran is a chilling reminder as to what fundamentalist States can do to 
dissident religious and ideological groups. Politicians and statesmen are generally 
extremely careful as not to accept responsibility for genocide, though the example of 
Iran has shown that when fundamentalism takes over other faculties, this may not 
necessarily be the case. In this context the statement of Hujjab'I-Islam Qazi, President 
of the Revolutionary Court in Shiraz is revealing 
"The Iranian nation has determined to establish the government 
of God on earth. Therefore it cannot tolerate the perverted Baha'is 
who were instruments of Satan and the followers of devil and of the 
super powers and their agents ... .It is absolutely certain that in the 
Islamic Republic of Iran there is no place for the Baha'is and Baha'ism 
... Before it is too late the Baha'is should recant Baha'ism, which is 
condemned by reason and logic. Otherwise the day will soon come 
120 See P Alston "The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons from the Iraq-Kuwait crises and 
its aftermath" 13 AYBIL (1990-91) 107-176~ F Hampson, "Liability for war crimes" in P Rowe, 
(ed.), The Gulf War 1990-91 in International and English Law, (London: Routledge) 1991,241-
260~ T Farer, "Human Rights and foreign policy: what the Kurds learnt (A Drama in one Act)" 
14 HRQ (1992), 62-77; L Freedman and E Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-91, (princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press) 1993; H Adelman "Humanitarian Intervention: The case of Kurds" 4 
IJRL (1992), 4-38. 
121 For a general consideration of human rights in Turkey with some analysis of the position of 
Kurds see C Rumpf "The Protection of Human Rights in Turkey and the significance of 
International Human Rights instruments" 14 HRU (1993),394-407,401. 
122 Times, "Fear of civilians grows as Turks advance in to Iraq", 23 March 1995; Independent, 
''Turks ignore EU and harry Kurds" 24 March 1995. 
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when the Islamic nation will deal with them in accordance with its 
religious obligations, as it has dealt with other hypocrites .... The Muslim 
nation will, God willing, fulfil the prayer of Noah [from the Koran]: 
'And Noah said, Lord, leave not a single family of Infidels on the Earth: 
For if thou leave them, they will beguile thy servants and will beget only 
sinners, infidels'" 123 
Genocidal conflicts have also arisen in most other parts of the world. Although 
religious cleavages, as in the case of India, Lebanon, Northern Ireland, Cyprus and the 
former Yugoslavia, have some times been the key element in starting such conflicts, as 
the situation in Pakistan illustrates, ethnic and linguistic dissonance124 could be equally 
destructive. Indeed, as the cases of Tibet, Sri Lanka and more recently that of the 
former Yugoslavia and the former USSR reflect it is quite possible that a combination 
of several factors lead to such genocidal conflicts.12s 
Although atrocities have occurred in virtually every republic of the former 
Yugoslavia, it would appear that the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been the 
prime targets of genocide, victims of the Serbian aggression. Exact figures are hard to 
obtain and probably are not of extreme significance~ the fact of the matter is that while 
several millions have become displaced or have become refugees, uncountable numbers 
have perished, been tortured, gang raped or become victims of the "systematic policies 
of ethnic cleansing".126 The rather insignificant role which the United Nations has 
played in as far as the actual physical protection of the minorities of the former 
123 Cited in B Frelick "Rcfugecs: Witnesses to Genocide" in H Fien (cd.) op.c;t note 13, 47-48; also 
see various newsletters produced by Bha'ia International Community. see also the Report 
submitted by Special Rapporteur. Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Riberio complied in accordance with 
Resolution 1986120 o/the Commission on Human Rights E/CN.411988/45, 5. An'-Na'im's paper 
also contains a catalogue of alleged measures taken against the Bahais in Iran, see A An'-Na'im 
"Religious Minorities under Islamic laws and the limits of cultural relativism" 9 HRQ (1987), 1-
18. 1. 13. 
124 See supra chapter 4. 
12.5 J Rehman "Accomplices or Gloho-Cop? Genocide Alive in Bosnia" paper presented at the 
Conference on The Law and Politics o/Yugoslavia 7 May. 1993. 
126 Guardian Education "Nation States Recipe for International disasters" The Guardian, 23 
February, 1993. See symposium. "The Yugoslav crisis New Intemationallaw issues"~ C Chinkin, 
"Rape and sexual abuse of women in international law" 5 FJIL (1994) 326-341' D Petrovic 
"Ethnic Cleansing-An attempt at methodology" ibid., 342-359. ' , 
116 
Yugoslavia is concerned creates disillusionment of any hope that a "New World Order" 
has generated.127 
In the case of States who are parties to the Convention, the binding legal 
obligations of the treaty have not proved sufficient to prevent genocide.l28 The 
Convention has not been able to overcome the hurdle of State sovereignty and provide 
for a satisfactory mechanism for the trial and punishment of those involved in 
committing genocide. 
The real test of the efficacy of any human rights instrument is its effective 
implementation. Human Rights instruments generally suffer from the absence of an 
adequate implementation machinery which in the face of principles of State sovereignty 
remains seriously ineffective. The Genocide Convention provides no exceptions as the 
mechanisms provided within the Convention have not come into operation or have 
proved fundamentally flawed. 129 According to Article V 
"all contracting parties undertake to enact in accordance with their 
respective constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the present convention and, in particular, to provide 
effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any other acts 
enumerated in article III" 
The provision implies that each State party would introduce legislation which 
would meet the requirements of Article V. States are given considerable latitude as to 
the application of this provision within their constitutional framework. This has also 
meant a difference in interpretation of the various provisions nationally, both by 
legislatures and judiciary. A number of States have not adopted any specific measures 
implying that they regarded the treaty as self-executing. Finland and Poland are two 
121 M IgnatrefT. "Ugly face ofa new world order" Sunday Times, 7 Nov. 1993~ Z Pajic, Violations of 
Fundamental Human Rights in the Former Yugoslavia, The Conflict of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
(London: Institute ofInternational Studies) Occasional Paper No 2, February 1993. 
128 The former Yugoslavia provides a prime example of this situation. 
129 See for International Instruments H Hannum, Guide to International Human Rights Practice, 
(London: Macmillan) 1984~ Sohnt "Human Rights: Their Implementation and Supervision by the 
United Nations" in Meron (ed.), lluman Rights in International law, (Oxford: OUP) 1984, 369-
401. 
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key examples of States which have treated the Convention as directly applicable in 
their domestic laws. 130 
Most States have claimed that their existing legislation satisfies the 
requirements of the Convention. The Special Rapporteur M. Ruhashyankiko in his 
report provides a number of examples where States have responded in this manner.13l 
Egypt, for instance, stated: 
"In application of these constitutional principles, Egyptian penal 
law contains provisions guaranteeing the individual's right to the 
physical and psychological safety of his person and the protection of his 
freedom. The penal code devotes a special chapter to the crimes of 
homicide and assault (articles 230 to 251) and prescribes the death 
penalty for any person who leads such a band or holds a position of 
command therein. Any person who has joined such a band without 
taking part in its organisation or with holding a position of command 
therein is liable to a penalty of a term of hard labour or hard labour for 
life (article 89)."132 
Similarly the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republic replied stating that its 
constitutional arrangements satisfied the requirements of the Convention. Her 
government stated, inter alia: 
"That action [of ratification of Genocide Convention] did not require 
any changes in or addition to Soviet Legislation, since a system of 
guarantees designed to ensure the free development of national, ethnic, 
and religious groups existed in law long before the adoption by United 
Nations of the Genocide Convention. Article 123 of the Constitution of 
the USSR states: Equality of Rights of the Citizens of the USSR, 
irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, 
government, cultural, political and other public activity, is an 
indefeasible law .... " 
The Soviet report concluded that: 
"Thus the Soviet Legislation provides all the necessary guarantees for 
fully implementing the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide". 
130 M Ruhashyankiko, The Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
GenOCide, UN DocJCN.4/Sub.2/416, 141. 
131 Ibid. 
m Ibid. 142. 
118 
Ruhashyankiko's report similarly reveals that the domestic legislation 
introduced by a number of States is based on the provisions of the Convention. 
Indeed, in a some cases the legislation uses terminology of Article II verbatim.133 The 
legislation, though incorporated by a few States, however, raises questions as to 
whether it complies with the provisions of Article II of the Convention. The case of 
Israel, is the classic example, as its legislation, although similar to the Convention, is 
deemed only to apply to crimes committed "against the Jewish people" with the 
implication that other groups are not covered by the Law. 
In his report, the Special Rapporteur provides a detailed analysis of efforts 
made by a number of States to incorporate legislative measures to adopt the 
Convention in their domestic laws; this includes those States who have had a 
satisfactory record of protection of minority rights. However there are also a number 
of those States which, although claiming to have incorporated the Genocide 
Convention have failed to respect its provisions. 134 Although a number of East 
European States could be mentioned in this respect, the main focus lies on the States 
of Africa. One prime example is Rwanda. Despite its pitiful record on physical 
protection of minorities, Rwanda has maintained that its domestic legislation contains 
adequate protection against acts of genocide. I 35 
As far as the implementation of the Convention is concerned, according to 
Article VI of the convention 
"Persons Charged with genocide ... shall be tried by a competent tribunal 
of the State in the territory of which the act was committed or by such 
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to 
those Contracting Parties which shall have its jurisdiction" 
133 See the Legislation introduced by UK (Genocide Act 1969, Ch 12, 40 Halsbury's Statutes of 
England 387-90, 3rd cdn; also see the War Crimes Act 1991; A Richardson "War Crimes Act 
1991" S5 MLR (1992), 73-87; G Ganz "The War Crimes Act 1991 Why no constitutional crisis" 
ibid., 87-95; for Canada see Can. Rev. STAT. Supp I, 171-181,1970. 
134 Pakistan would be the main focus of attention in Part IV infra. 
13S Ruhashyankiko op.cit note 130, ISO-IS 1. 
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The Convention in its final draft presents two alternatives; firstly that of a trial 
on the basis of Lex Loci delicti commissi, and secondly on providing jurisdiction to an 
international penal tribunal. In relation to the first alternative i.e., of providing 
jurisdiction at the place of commission of the wrongful act in question, it follows the 
rules of general international law, although there are practical problems attached to the 
trial ofindividuals in the territory where the alleged acts were committed. 
The primary problem confronting this area is the fact that genocide in most 
instances is committed by the governments in power, and as long as those government 
remain in power, it is almost impossible to rely on this territorial principle. The case of 
Germany after the Second World War, as the defeated power, was an exceptional one 
in providing the allied powers a forum-probably a manifestation of a prerogative of the 
victors against the losers. 
However, in most cases of genocide, it is the governments within the States 
that are involved, and unless and until they are removed, the difficulty remains of trying 
those who have been involved in committing genocide. It is quite possible for a 
genocidal regime to stay in power for a long time and defy international law and 
municipal laws. It is equally possible that the stance of successive governments might 
be based on the policy of genocide and forced assimilation of certain minority groups. 
The cases of Eichmann and many others show, that the apprehension of the accused 
could cause serious problems. Although, by Article VII, States parties to the 
Convention pledge to grant extradition wherever appropriate, political interests and 
subjective opinion seriously hamper a smooth operation of the provision. 
It is quite possible for the accused to flee a State which is not a contracting 
party to the Convention. Since international law does not impose any specific 
obligations on States to comply with each other to extradite individuals, the last and 
perhaps the only course of action would be to resort to illegality to assume 
jurisdiction.136 Even if the accused is captured and tried in the State in which the 
136 J Bridge, "The Case of an International Court of Criminal Justice and the formulation of 
International Criminal Law" 131CLQ. (1964), 1255-1281, 1258. 
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offences were committed, the sensitivity of the issue of genocide might make the 
possibility of fair trail very remote. 
If the option of lex loci delicti commissi seems impractical, the second 
alternative to date is not available, due largely to lack of consensus on the part of 
sovereign States. The recent atrocities, including genocide and crimes of international 
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, have however, once again 
given impetus to the efforts for the creation of international criminal court. Indeed, the 
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, in its 
Resolution 827 and 955 determined that the breaches to humanitarian law constituted 
"a threat to international peace and security" and that prosecuting the alleged offenders 
would constitute towards restoring international peace. Notwithstanding, the setting 
up of these tribunals, there appear to be "mighty tasks" confronted by the 
Prosecutors. 137 There are serious difficulties involving procedural, substantive and 
more importantly the funding and availability of resources. 138 
Having regard to these complexities, commentators have expressed surprise 
that some proceedings have at all been commenced. 139 Sceptics would argue that there 
may well be some "show-case" trials, but in so far as the punishment of real 
perpetrators of the international crimes are concerned political constraints would 
prevent them being brought to justice. 
There has also been a renewed interest in the effort to establish an International 
Criminal Court. A draft statute has been submitted to the General Assembly, and 
consideration was given to its provisions by the Sixth Committee during 1993.140 The 
International Law Commission provided a revised draft statute to the General 
Assembly in December 1994. However, the work of the ILC is still in draft form~ the 
geographical and temporal limitations which contributed in generating a consensus in 
137 D McGoldrick and C Warbrick "International Criminal Law" 44 ICLQ (1995),466-479.478. 
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid. 471. 
140 Ibid. 473~ J Crawford. "The ILC's Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court" 88AJJL 
(1994), 130-152. 140; J Crawford. "The ILC adopts a Statute for an International Criminal 
Court" 89AJIL (1995) 404-416. 
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the Security Council to establish ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda may not be present in the case of establishing an International Court. 
In so far as the Genocide Convention itself is concerned the provisions of 
article IX seem to have been of primary importance, not simply because they attempt 
to provide ICI with the jurisdiction to try cases, but, perhaps more significantly 
because it challenges the vital issue of State sovereignty. Article IX provides 
Disputes between the contracting parties relating to the 
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, 
including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or 
for any other acts enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the 
International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the 
dispute. 
The revolutionary nature of the article is reflected through its provisions of 
compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in contrast to article 36 of 
the Statute of International Court. The article has a considerably wide scope, including 
not only the interpretation of the provisions of the convention but also its application 
and fulfilment of obligations undertaken by the States parties. The article is not self-
explanatory in a number of ways and there remain several unanswered questions for 
instance whether responsibility incurred is to be civil or criminal and whether a State 
could be held liable in international law to its own citizens for the genocide 
perpetuated. 141 
Unfortunately, although genocidal activity has taken place on a number of 
occasions, the article has been nearly redundant as far as its practical utility is 
concerned and the jurisdiction of the court has rarely been invoked with nearly a 
quarter of the ratifying States entering reservations to the article. 142 The provisional 
court order in relation to the Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro143 
141 GAOR 3rd session, Part 1,6 Committee, 103rd meeting, 428-440 and l09th meeting, 442. 
142 UN Doc. STILEG/SEREl8, 98 et scq.~ Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 4th 
cdn. (London: Sweet and Maxwell) 1991~ on Reservations see J Gamble Jr "Reservations to 
Multi-Lateral treaties: A Macroscopic view of State Practice" 74 AJIL (1980), 372-394. 
\41 C 
ase concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime 
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina) v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) Request for the 
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would not appear to be helpful, either for the resolution of the dispute or for the 
development of norms relating to the prohibition of genocide.144 
The effect of a reservation made by a State party to a Convention is to exclude 
or to modify the effects of a treaty provision in its application to that State.14S The 
States presenting reservations to the article in the Convention have attempted to 
exclude the jurisdiction of the Court. Indeed, the question of reservations to the 
Convention, while reflecting the reluctance of States to submit to the jurisdiction of the 
International Court provided a starting point in the area of reservations to treaties in 
international law. 
The issue of reservations to the Convention became a subject of intense debate, 
even prior to the Convention coming into force. Certain States, in particular-Australia 
and Ecuador-objected to the reservations entered into by members of the Soviet bloc 
and this dispute led the General Assembly to seek an advisory opinion of the 
International Court.146 According to the traditional practice, reservations to multi-
lateral treaties were only accepted as valid if the treaty allowed such a reservation and 
all the parties consented to it. 147 While the League secretariat and subsequently the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations followed this principle of "absolute 
integrity",148 simultaneously a more flexible approach had been developing amongst 
members of Pan-American Union (subsequently the Organisation of American 
States).149 
indication of Provisional Measures, IC] 8 April, 1993, and Further Requestfor the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, Order of 12 September 1993, IC] Rep 1993, 325. 
144 Sec C Gray, "Application of the Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) orders of provisional 
Measures of8 April 1993 and 13 September 1993" 43 ICLQ (1994) 704-714. 
145 According to Article 2(1 )(d) of VCLT (1969), Reservation means "a unilateral statement, 
however phrased or named by a state, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding 
to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effects of certain provisions of 
the treaty in their application to that sL:'lte". 
146 the ICI op.cit note 100, 15. 
147 See C RcdgweU, "Universality or integrity: Some reflections on reservations to General 
Multilateral Treaties" 64 BYIL (1993) 245-383, 346. 
148 Brownlie, 609. 
149 Redgwell op.Cil note 147,247-8. 
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This evolving approach reflected a desire to allow States to become parties to a 
treaty as against those States which did not object to the reservation. The inquiry 
before the Court essentially related as to the extent, if at all, to which a State ratifying 
the Convention with a reservation became party if reservations were objected to by one 
or more parties. If such a State could be regarded as party, what would be the effect 
of a reservation both as against States accepting the reservation and those objecting to 
it? 
When the issue of reservations was confronted by the International Court, the 
Court pointed to the importance of bearing in mind the special characteristics of the 
Convention, with its universal Character and humanitarian purpose. According to the 
Court, in essence "the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are 
recognised by civlized nations as binding on States even without any conventional 
obligation",15o and it was determined not to risk providing loopholes in the absolute 
condemnation of genocide through a limited participation in the Convention. lSI The 
Court, relying upon the "Object and Purposes" test, stated that it was "the 
compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Convention that must 
furnish the criterion"lsl for States that present a reservation as well as for States 
objecting to it. This indication of the element of subjective judgement means 
disagreement as to the compatibility of a reservation, and consequently the status of a 
State as a party to the Convention. 
ISO ICJ op.cit note 100, 24. 
lSI N Rodley, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention The Case Law of the World Court" 38 
ICLQ 321-333,322. 
152 ICJ Op.cit note 100, 124. 
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5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Since the Second World War, a number of developments have featured 
prominently in relation to the right to existence. Although the focus of attention has 
been on the individual and not minorities as such, international and municipal laws have 
progressed sufficiently to provide minority groups the fundamental right of physical 
existence. In this respect the role of the General Assembly Resolution 96(1) and the 
Genocide Convention is of primary importance; the Genocide Convention is the first 
post world-war II treaty with any bearing on minorities which has provided the 
inspiration for most States to provide-at least in theoretical terms-to criminalize 
genocide and accord the guarantee of right to existence to minority groups. 
Hypothesising on the crucial ifs and buts of history may be a dangerous 
exercise for building legal arguments, though it may be contended that even on a 
practical plane, minorities in general have benefited from this prohibition of physical 
extermination. The world may not be a safe place for the weaker and vulnerable 
elements but it does provide a fundamental legal right to physical existence for all 
individuals. State practice, in a number of cases and the role of the United Nations 
itself has, however, left much to be desired for the physical protection of minorities. 
This problem has featured more prominently in a number of post-colonial States of 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, who, in the process of building up, States have relied 
too heavily on an assimilationist policy. The nexus between minorities and their 
collective identity does beg the issue of impact of these assimilationist policies, and 
potential repercussions on the existence of minorities. 
There also remains a considerable body of academics which has remained 
pessimistic about the practical impact of the rules emerging out of the Convention. 
According to Schwarzenberger 
" .. the whole convention is based on the assumption of virtuous 
governments and criminal individuals, a reversion of the truth in 
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proportion to the degree of totalitarianism and nationalism practised in 
any country. Thus the convention is unnecessary where it can be 
applied and inapplicable where it may be necessary. It is an insult to the 
intelligence and dangerous, because it may be argued a COlltrario by 
brazen upholders of an unlimited rasiol1 d'Etat that acts enumerated in 
the Convention, but not committed with the intent of destroying groups 
of a people' as such' are legal" 153 
It may not be wise to unconditionally condemn the provisions of the 
Convention. There are certain inherent virtues embedded in its text, the value of it 
which must be appreciated and preserved. As Gabriela Mistral said 
"[the] success of the Genocide Convention today and its greater 
success tomorrow can be traced to the fact that it responds to 
necessities and desires of a universal nature: The word genocide carries 
in itself a moral judgement over an evil in which every feeling man and 
woman concurs".1 54 
153 Schwarzenberger, "The Problem ofInternational Criminal Court" 3 CLP, (1950), 263-296, 292-
293. 
154 G Mistral "An Appeal to World Conscience-The Genocide Convention" UN Review, June 1956, 
14-15 
CHAPTER SIX 
MINORITIES AND THE RIGHT TO 
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The principles of equality and non-discrimination can be regarded as the twin 
pillars on which the whole edifice of modern international law of human rights is 
established. A refined and eloquent expression of the same sentiment is provided by 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht when he writes that the claim to equality "is in a substantial 
sense the most fundamental of the rights of man. It occupies the first place in most 
written constitutions. It is the starting point of all liberties".1 While the ultimate 
objective of all versions of equality and non-discrimination is perceived to create a just 
and equitable order, "justice", "equality" and "non-discrimination" are in themselves 
controversial terms with immense uncertainty as to their precise scope and 
ingredients.2 
Subjective principles of equality have been practised by every society, 
civilisation and religion3 and have been the inspiring force behind the great revolutions 
in England, France, America and Russia. The historical phenomenon of unfathomably 
discriminatory treatment of individuals on the basis of their religion, sex, language and 
race is well documented. Discrimination, unfortunately, is not only a historical 
phenomenon but is rampant in many contemporary societies. Minority groups as the 
weaker sections of the community are most vulnerable to discrimination; in societies 
where the majority will dictates the expression and route of behaviour, minorities may 
2 
3 
H Lauterpacht, An International Bill of the Rights of Man. (New York: Columbia University 
Press) 1945, 115. 
"Equality is a notion exposed to different philosophical interpretations~ its meaning in the various 
legal systems is not always the same" N Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in 
International/aw. (Oordrecht: M. Nijhofl) 1991, 25~ also see Judge Tanaka's dissenting opinion 
in South West Africa Cases (Second Phase) 1966 IeJ Report 6~ also J Verzijl,lnternational Law 
in Historical Perspective, (Leydon: Sijthofl) 1968 vol. ii, 6. 
According to Judaism and Christianity, "the common human ancestor in God's image described 
in Genesis and the fatherhood of God to all men imply the essential quality of all men, supporting 
the idea of rights which all enjoy by virtue of their common humanity" (Malachi), "thou shalt 
love thy neighbour". According to Islamic ideology "he who believes in God, let him act kindly 
towards his neighbour". Hadih of Prophet Mohammed (PBUH). quoted in Ramcharan "Equality 
and non-discrimination" in Henkin 246-269,248 .. 
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have little, if any opportunity to manifest let alone adopt an independent stance. 
Minorities frequently suffer at the hands of majorities as the will of the latter 
predominates, and indeed the prime reason of the initial development of minority 
perceptions has often been a result of deprivation. persecution and maltreatment by the 
callous and unkind majority groUp.4 
As the present chapter will attempt to illustrate, international law has gone a 
long way to ensure the practice of principles of equality and non-discrimination. It has 
increasingly become a convincing argument that prohibition of discriminatio~ at least 
of racial non-discrimination now bears the value of customary international law which 
partakes of the nonn of jus cogens. The matter of religious intolerance remains 
conspicuous for a relatively attenuated consensus as regards the formulation of specific 
binding international instruments. 
Members of minority groups clearly would be beneficiaries of a regime based 
upon equality of treatment and non-discrimination. Claims made by members of these 
groups may however prove to be more complex and taxing for States to digest. As 
Lerner comments "equality does not mean only formal equality before the Law. 
Equality for all may well be proclaimed in the texts, the law may grant equal protection 
to all, and still de facto, there may be a real, material inequality, and as a consequence 
of social, economic or cultural conditions, sometimes even when there is no intention 
to discriminate";' de jure equality may not be adequate, legal values and social 
behaviour may need to be stretched to limits in attempts to ensure genuine equality and 
non-discrimination. 
4 
S 
See N Lerner. op.cit note 2. 1991. 27. 
Ibid. 
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6.2 THE RIGHT TO EQUAL TREATMENT AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
IN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
As we have already noted, the perception of the quest for equality and non-
discrimination, in its modern form, was manifested in the move initiated by President 
Wilson of the United States at the end of the first world war. He attempted, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to incorporate in the Covenant of the League of Nations provisions 
relating to self-determination and equality of treatment for racial and religious 
minorities.6 Subsequently, when efforts were made to incorporate a clause relating to 
racial equality at the Peace Conference, it proved unacceptable to the major Western 
Powers, "in the end [leading] only to ruined hopes, fierce hostility and accentuated 
prejudices".7 
The final arrangements after the First World War did not provide much cause 
for optimism for a global regime based upon the notions of equality and non-
discrimination save for the occasional and inchoate reflection in the form of the 
mandate system,8 minority treaties and were sometimes referred to in the judgement of 
the PCU.9 These measures were not adequate to make the principles of equality and 
6 
1 
8 
9 
According to Article VI of his draft Covenant "The League of Nations shall require all new States 
to bind themselves as a condition precedent to their recognition as independent or autonomous 
States, to accord to all racial or national minorities within their jurisdiction exactly the same 
treatment and security, both in law and in fact that is accorded to the racial and national majority 
of their people". 
P Lauren "First Principles of Racial Equality" 3 HRQ (1983) 1-26,2. 
Article 22 of the Covenant stated that the well-being and development of the peoples in the 
mandated territories should form a "sacred trust of civilisation" and that the mandatory powers 
should administer the territories under conditions which "will guarantee freedom of conscience 
and religion .... and the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade". 
[to secure equality for minorities] "two things were regarded as particularly necessary ... the first is 
to ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religions or linguistic minorities shall be placed in 
every respect on a footing of perfect equality with other nationals of the State. The second is to 
ensure for the minority .. suitable means for the preservation of their traditions and their national 
characteristics" Minority Schools in Albania (1935) PCB Ser AlB no 64, 17. 
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non-discrimination part of positive international law, though there was a nascent 
recognition of such a possibility.IO 
The inter-war years and perhaps more prominently the period during the 
Second World War perceived that the new international organisation that was to 
replace the League of Nations could not limit itself to a few minorities. The principle 
of Universal human rights had to replace the limited rights which were formerly 
accorded to a number of groupS.ll 
The United Nations Charter, like the Covenant of the League of Nations 
contains no explicit provisions for the protection of minorities. However, unlike the 
Covenant there are a number of references to the principle of Universal respect of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, equality and non-discrimination. Since the 
adoption of the United Nations Charter, the principles of equality and non-
discrimination have proved to be the linchpins of the human rights regimes. These 
principles are enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,12 the Charter of 
the Organisation of American States, \3 the American Declaration on Rights and Duties 
of Man,14 the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, IS 
the European Economic Community Treaty, I 6 the ILO Convention and 
Recommendation concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment of 
Occupation,l? the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education,18 the ILO 
Convention 169,19 the International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
10 Even so, prior to the United Nations Charter the notion of non-discrimination as a general 
principle of international law remained a remote prospect see W Mckean "The meaning of 
discrimination in international and municipal law" 44 BYlL (1970) 177-192, 177. 
Jl See supra chapter 4~ Mckean. 52. 
12 Adopted December 10, 1948, GA Resolution 217, UN Doc Al81O, 71. 
\3 4 UNTS 119~ 152 BFSP 51; 2 UST 239~. 
14 Text in Brownlie, Basic Documents on Human Rights 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP), 1981,381. 
IS Adopted November 4, 1950. UNTS 232, see in particular Article 14. 
16 261 UNTS 140~ Cmnd 7461~ See the "Social Policy" articles, article 117-122; also see F Von 
Prondzynski, "The Development of EEC Social and Employment law", in L Heffemam and J 
Kingston (cds.) I/uman Rights A European Perspective, (Blackrock Co Dublin: Round Hall 
Press) 1994,249-257. 
17 Adopted June 25, 1958 UNTS 34 (lLO General Conference) entered into force June 5, 1960. 
18 429 UNTS 93; 44 UKTS 1962. 
19 Supra, Chapter 4. 
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Racial Discrimination,20 the International Covenants on Human Rights,21 and the 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice.22 
The foundations of the modem international legal jurisprudence relating to the 
issue of equality and non-discrimination can be traced from the provisions of the 
United Nations Charter. There are several references to the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination. The preamble points to the determination of the peoples of the 
United Nations to cere-affirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women ... ".23 Article 1 (3) 
states that one of the purposes of the UN is the promotion and encouragement of 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all "without distinction as to 
race, sex, language or religion". According to Article 8, the UN shall place no 
restrictions on eligibility of men and women to participate in any capacity in its 
principal and subsidiary organs. 
The Charter also devolves authority to the General Assembly to initiate studies 
and making recommendations "for the purpose of ..... assisting in the realization of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion"?4 The United Nations is obliged to "promote ... Universal 
respect for and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all with out 
distinction as to race, sex, language or religion" .25 According to Article 62 (2) the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) may "make recommendations for the 
purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all". The trusteeship system that was incorporated in the UN also carried 
with it the notion of equality for all.26 
20 60 UNTS 19S~ UKTS 77 (1969). 
21 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights UN Oen Ass Res 2200 (XXI), GAOR, 
21st session, supp 16,49; UKTS (1977). The International Covenant on Social, Economic and 
Cultural Rights (1966) 993 UNTS 3. 
22 Text in United Nations. A Compilation of International Instruments. (New York: United Nations) 
1988, 135-142. 
23 United Nations Charter UNTS XVI; UKTS 67 (1946); Cmnd 7015. 
24 Jbid. Article 13 (1) (b) ibid. 
25 Ibid. Article 55 (c)ibid. 
26 Article 76 (d). It is noteworthy that there was a radical change in the provisions relating to non-
discrimination and human rights from the Dumbarton Oaks to San Francisco. At Dumbarton 
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The Universal Declaration on Human Rights is based on the principles of 
equality and non-discrimination, with a number of its articles relating themselves to this 
concept. 27 The Declaration, although a General Assembly Resolution and as such not 
binding on States, nonetheless stands out as probably the most authoritative instrument 
in the armoury of international human rights law. Indeed, as has been eloquently 
summed up 
"Since 1945, the Universal Declaration has acquired a greatly 
re-inforced status, not only as a 'common standard of achievement for 
all peoples and all nations' but also as a statement of principles which all 
states should observe. It has been reaffirmed by the General Assembly 
on a number of occasions, of which the most striking were perhaps the 
adoption of the Declaration on colonialism in 1960, which provided' All 
states shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter 
of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and the present Declaration .... ' and the unanimous adoption in 1963 of 
the Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which 
contained similar provision. 
In the World outside the United Nations the influence of the 
Universal Declaration has been no less profound. It has inspired more 
than forty state constitutions, together with regional human rights 
treaties of Europe, Africa and the Americas, and examples of legislation 
quoting or reproducing provisions of the Declaration can be found in all 
continents. Thus the impact of the Universal Declaration has probably 
exceeded it's authors most sanguine expectations while its constant and 
widespread recognition means that many of its principles can now be 
regarded as part of customary law."28 
The adoption of the Universal Declaration also set the stage for a number of 
multilateral treaties.29 The Genocide Convention, as we have already noted, was the 
first of a series of international conventions which related themselves to the non-
Oaks there were few proposals relating to the protection of human rights and the international 
organisation that was to be ultimately formed had its main functions in establishing international 
peace and security. A number of factors brought the human rights issues to the front see 
generally A Robertson and J Merrills, Human Rights in the World An Introduction to the Study of 
International Protection o/Human Rights, (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 1989. 
27 Article 2 of the Declaration provides "Everyone is entitled to the rights and freedoms set forth in 
the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status. Furthermore no 
distinctions shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or other international status 
of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-
28 governing or under ~ny other limitation of sovereignty". 
Robertson and Mernlls, op.cit note 26, 27. 
29 Mckean, 10.t 
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discriminatory jurisprudence of human rights. The Convention, as noted above 
attempts to prevent the worst form of discriminatory behaviour- physical extermination 
on grounds that a group has a particular national, ethnic or religious origin.30 There 
have also been other notable developments for instance in respect of the attempts to 
abolish Apartheid,31 Slaveri2 and forced labour.33 Discrimination based on race, 
religion or country of origin is rendered impermissible in both the Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees (1951)34 and to the Status of Stateless Persons (1954).3s A 
number of instruments have been adopted in such areas as employment and education 
where discrimination at least in subtle manifestations is fairly rampant~ Convention on 
Discrimination in Education 1960 provides a key examples. Similarly, the work of the 
ILO, and its particular focus in eliminating discrimination against indigenous peoples is 
worthy of appreciation and has been dealt with already.36 
Equality and non-discrimination are prominent features of both the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a subject to which we shall return to in the next 
section. As has been noted, a considerable overlap exists between the principle of 
protection of minorities and the provision of non-discrimination so much so that a 
regime of non-discrimination is sometimes regarded as sufficient. Not only has this 
been the traditional approach, in the current political environment States find the issue 
of non-discrimination more appealing, a premises which has often reflected in the 
activities of the Commission on Human Rights. Although an over-emphasis on non-
30 According to Mckean the Genocide convention "seeks to prevent the rnost severe form of 
discrirnination-the physical destruction of persons on the grounds that they belong to certain 
national, ethnic, racial or religious groups" ibid., 105; " .. genocide is not only the ultirnate denial 
of human rights, it is, in the deepest sense, the sociological outcome of discrirnination" W M 
Reisman "Responses to crirnes of Discrirnination and Genocide An Appraisal of the Convention 
on the Elirnination of All forrns of Racial Discrimination" 1 Den JILP (1971) 29-64, 41. 
31 Convention on the Abolition of Apartheid UN Gen Ass Res 3068 (XXVIII), Annex, GAOR, 28th 
session, supp 30; 13 ILM 50. 
32 The Slavery Convention 1926, as arnended by the Protocol of 1953. Supplernentary Convention 
on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery 
1956. 
33 The Forced Labour Convention, 1930 and the abolition afforced labour convention 1957. 
34 189 UNTS 150; UKTS 39 (1954); Cmnd 9171; 158 BFSP 499. 
3S 360 UNTS 117; UKTS 41 (1960); Cmnd 1098; 161 BFSP 372. 
36 Supra Chapter 3. 
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discrimination at the expense of positive duties in relation to protection and promotion 
of the interests of minorities, can be a dangerous exercise, the existence of non-
discriminatory regime is nonetheless fundamental to both individual and collective 
rights and in this respect the role of the various United Nations organs is 
commendable. 
6.2.1 Religious Non-Discrimination in International Instruments 
One of the key issues of concern has been the relatively weak nature of the 
prohibition of the norm of religious non-discrimination when compared to the 
condemnation of racial discrimination. The drafting history of instruments based on 
religious intolerance and discrimination provide a living testimony to this. Whereas the 
idea of the prohibition of racial discrimination was readily concretised and given legal 
recognition in the form of a Convention, it was not until 1981 that a rather attenuated 
General Assembly Resolution was adopted in the matter of religious intolerance and 
discrimination.37 The prospects of adoption of a Convention on the prohibition of 
discrimination based on Religion and its subsequent large-scale ratification seem, at 
best remote. Lerner's comments reflect the dichotomy of the situation 
"After World War II, discrimination on the religious grounds 
received the same treatment as other forms of discrimination in general 
human rights instruments. When it was decided to prepare specific 
instruments in that area, progress was very slow, particularly compared 
with the field of racial discrimination and incitement. The consequence 
was that until now there is no obligatory treaty encompassing religious 
intolerance and discrimination in particular. Moreover, there is no 
general agreement as to the advisability of launching a struggle in favor 
of such a document under the present circumstances, and its observers 
foresee great difficulties if a new attempt is made to adopt a 
convention" .38 
37 Lerner, op.cit note 2, 89. 
38 Ibid.7S. 
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As far as the stance of the United Nations is concerned in its attempts to 
combat discrimination, there seems a certain amount of fallacy. In contrast to the 
considerable success in adopting international instruments relating to the elimination of 
racial discrimination, a similar consensus has been absent in issues relating to religious 
discrimination. In its Resolution 1510(XV) of 12 December 1960, the General 
Assembly condemned all manifestations and practices of racial, religious and national 
hatred in the political, economic, social, educational and cultural spheres of the life of 
society as violations of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.39 
However, when it came to the undertaking of practical steps, it was not found 
possible to have a consensus on all issues relating to the prohibition of discrimination. 
At the end as a compromise it was decided to create separate instruments each dealing 
with race40 and religion.41 In 1962, the General Assembly requested the Economic and 
Social Council for the preparation of a draft declaration and Convention on the 
Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination and the General Assembly in its 
Resolution 1904 (XVIII) adopted on 20 November 1963, proclaimed the Declaration 
on the Elimination of All forms of racial discrimination. 
On the other hand the frequent impasse in the drafting of specific instruments 
on prohibition of discrimination based on religion can be treated as "shameful"42 and 
comparable to "a tale punctuated by hypocrisy, procedural jockeying and false 
starts".43 Mckean considers the issue as being one of "neglected"44 discrimination 
pointing out that "no other subject has been so shunned and neglected" in the United 
Nations as one of religious rights and beliefs. Similarly, when providing a commentary 
39 A number of similar resolutions were adopted by the Sub-Commission in January 1960 
(ElCN.4/800, para 163), the Commission on Human Rights in March 1960 (Res 6 (XVI) and 
ECOSOC in July 1961 (Resolution 826B (XXXII). 
40 Sec GAR 1780 (XVII), 7 December 196217 UN GAOR (No 17) 33. 
41 See GAR 1781 (XVII), 7 Dec. 1962 17 UN GAOR (No 17) 33. 
42 B Dickson "The United Nations and Freedom of Religion" 44 ICLQ (1995) 327-357, 342~ P 
Alston "The Commission on Human Rights" in P Alston, (cd.) The United Nations and Human 
Rights: A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: OUP), 1992, 134. 
43 R Clark "The United Nations and Religious freedom" NYUJILP (1978), 197-220~ also cited in 
Mckean, 121. 
44 Mckean ibid. 121. 
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on the Declaration on religious intolerance, Sullvian says "There is no consensus on 
whether the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion or belief already 
constitutes a norm of customary law" .45 Mckean's analysis is correct when he writes 
"It is regrettable that, at the end of the twentieth century, 
religious intolerance and bigotry should remain, as they have over 
centuries, a prime cause of division between States and communities 
inhabiting those States; no topic, it may be contended, had divided 
mankind more and it is unlikely that the United Nations will find 
acceptable solutions quickly". 46 
It probably is the case that the constitutional provisions and legislation 
overwhelmingly satisfies the broad and generalised requirements of non-discriminatory 
stance on the basis of religion. However, freedom of religion or belief itself is a 
conglomeration of various rights and values. It can be a regarded as a complete code 
of life, determining every pattern of social behaviour. Its pronouncements affect every 
aspect of life, including matrimonial and family affairs, public order, freedom of 
expression, association, freedom to preach and manifest one's religion as matter of 
conscience and faith. 47 Domestic and international tribunals have often been 
confronted with faithfuls belonging to different religious and sects and raising 
questions of a serious nature. 48 
4S Sullvian "Advancing the Freedom of Religion or Belief through the United Nations Declaration 
on the Elimination of All forms of Religious intolerance and Discrimination" 82 AJIL (1988) 
487- 502, 488-489. Her footnote comments includes this view "Although generalised reference to 
the freedom of religion or belief appear in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights article 18, 
the ICCPR article 18, regional instruments, the Declaration is the only instrument that deals with 
the subject in specific terms". ibid. 
46 Mckean, 123. 
47 On the subject of ritual sacrifices of animals see the US Supreme Court in Church of Lukim; 
Babali Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah (1993) 12 4 LE.d 472~ and Indian Supreme Court in 
Mohammed Han if Qureshi v. Bihar 1959 SCR 629; on the subject of proselytism see Kokkinnass 
v. Greece EClIR, 17 EHRR (1993),397. 
48 An analysis of Pakistani and Indian case law provides an interesting view of the difficulties 
involved. See Navendra v. State of Gujrat AIR 1974 SC 2098; Jagdishwar Anand v. P.c., 
Calcutta (1984) S.C Sl~ Ratilal Panch ad Ghandhi and Others v. State of Bombay and Others AIR 
(SC.) (1954), 388; Ramj; 101 Modi v. State of UP, 1957 AIR; Rev. Stainsislans AIR 1975 MP 
163~ Saifuddin Saheb AIR 1962 SC 853~ Commissioner of Hindu ReligiOUS endowments Madras 
\I. Sri Lakshmandra AIR (1954) SC 388~ Sarwar Hussain AIR (1983) A1l252~ State of Bombay v. 
Narasu Appa Mali AIR 1952 Bombay 1984~ Mohammed Ahed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 1985 
AIR SC 945. For the position of Pakistan see infra Part IV 
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Therefore although the plethora of international treaties since 1945 clearly 
reflects the view that the fundamental principle of international law of human rights is 
that all individuals are to be treated equally-and ought not to be discriminated against 
merely on the basis of their belonging to a certain ethnic, religious or linguistic group-it 
is argued that the strength of the prohibition in each case differs. This argument is 
endorsed by Professor Van Boven in his scholarly article, where he states "It is clear 
that the degree of consensus and sense of urgency are more prevalent when it comes to 
the elimination of racial discrimination than when elimination of religious intolerance is 
envisaged".49 Hence while the legal norms in relation to the prohibition of racial 
discrimination are regarded as fairly uncontroversial example of jus cogens,50 the same 
cannot be said with an equal conviction in relation to the prohibition of discrimination 
based on religion. 
6.3 THE CRYSTALLISATION OF THE RIGHT TO RACIAL EQUALITY 
AND NON-DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
6.3.1 International Conventions 
6.3.1.1 The International Covenants 
Inherent in the nature of the International Bill of Rights is the concept of 
equality and non-discrimination, and the International Covenants of 1966, provide an 
accurate reflection of this. There is considerable strength in Ramcharan's view that 
"equality and non-discrimination constitutes the most dominant single theme of the 
[ICCPR] Covenant".sl 
According to Article 2(1) of ICCPR States Parties undertake to 
49 T Van Boven, "Religious Freedom in International Perspective Existing and Future Standards", 
in 1 leweitz et al., (eds.) Des Menschen Recht Zwischen Freicht und Verantwortung, (Berlin: 
Dunker and Humblot), 1989, 103-113, 105. 
so Brownlie, 513. 
SI Ramcharan in Henkin, 246-269, 246. 
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"respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subj,:ct to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the covenant without distinction of any kind, such 
as race, colour, sex, language and religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status ... " 
Article 3, while providing for equality for men and women states 
"The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure the equal right 
of men and women to the enjoyment of aU civil and political rights set forth in the 
present covenant" 
Article 25 provides 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the 
distinctions mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely 
chosen representatives~ 
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of the will of the electors; 
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his 
country. 
Perhaps the primary article52 on equality and non-discrimination in the 
Covenant is contained in article 26 according to which 
"All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against any 
one on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status". 
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides 
"The States parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the 
rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of 
any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status".53 
From a closer reading of the provisions of article 2(1) and 26 of ICCPR, the 
key articles in the present context-use the terms "distinction" and "discrimination" 
respectively. Article 2(2) of the ICESCR relies upon the term "discrimination". The 
ambiguity generated by the differential use of the terms "distinction" and 
"discrimination" is exacerbated by the fact that there is no definite attempt to define 
52 Also see Article 27 of the International Covenant discussed at length in chapter 7 infra. 
53 GA Res 2200 A. 21 UN GAOR. (Supp.No 16) 49-50. 
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either of these terms,54 though it probably is the case that the terms have been used 
interchangeably with each other. A stronger challenge against the International 
Covenants, in particular, ICCPR is its focus on the individual. It is the individual, 
whose equal treatment and non-discrimination is the primary concern; the group 
dimension is not so well appreciated. The focus of article 27, as we shall see in the 
next chapter, is individualistic in nature, though minorities as groups are intended to be 
the ultimate beneficiaries. The absence of any explicit provisions relating to policies of 
affirmative action tends to reinforce the anti-collective stance; the Race Convention in 
these respects is an improvement for certainly there is a stronger recognition of group 
rights, in terms of affirmative action as well as locus standi. 
6.3.1.2 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination 
The adoption and entry into force of the Covenant on the Elimination of All 
forms of Racial Discrimination provides a significant step towards the attempts to 
combat racial discrimination at the global level. 55 It has accurately been regarded as 
"the international community's only tool for combating racial discrimination which is 
54 "This review of the covenants demonstrates that although they are largely concerned with the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination, much confusion and uncertainty still existed at the 
time of drafting as to their nature and content. It is unfortunate that a greater attempt was not 
made to compare the work of other UN organs in the field and to investigate the experience of 
domestic courts in interpreting equality clauses under municipal constitutions. One major reason 
for the lack of proper analysis was the speed with which the drafting committees changed their 
composition. There was often little continuity between sessions and it was regrettable that an 
effort was not made to ensure that representatives who had begun the drafting of a particular 
instrument were not permitted to make use of their experience and complete the tasks assigned to 
them". Mckean. 152. 
55 The Convention is "more than a statement of lofty ideals. It provides machinery for 
implementation which goes well beyond any previous human rights instruments negotiated in the 
UN" per the American representative at the time of the adoption of the Convention. NPv. 1406, 
53-55, cited in T Meron, "The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination" 79 AJIL (1985) 283-318,283. 
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one and at the same time universal in reach, comprehensive in scope, legally binding in 
character, and equipped with built-in measures ofimplementation".56 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
discrimination was adopted on 21 December 196557 and entered into force on 4 
January 1969. The strength of the international consensus is reflected by a number of 
features. Firstly, the Convention was adopted by 106 votes to none. Although, 
Mexico abstained initially, it later declared an affirmative vote in support of the 
provisions of the Convention.58 Secondly, the speed and number of State ratification 
speaks much for itself as to the general consensus on the issues relating to prohibition 
of Racial Discrimination. The importance of the Convention lies in, the fact that it has 
been ratified by a vast majority of States to the extent where it is only second in 
number after the Geneva Conventions of 1949.59 
While the Declaration on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination provided the 
driving force for the incorporation of both substantive and normative articles of the 
Convention, it would be fair to suggest that the adoption of the Convention within two 
years after the Declaration has its roots in the political support of the newly emerging 
States of Mrica and Asia who have been particularly strong in condemning racial 
discrimination and Apartheid. The Provisions of the Convention, although undeniably a 
major advance in the cause of eliminating racial discrimination, nonetheless raise a 
number of complex questions reflecting in some ways the weaknesses that still exist in 
international law relating to the prohibition of discrimination. 
56 Statement by Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination at World Conference to 
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination 33 GAOR, Supp (No IS) at 10S-9 UN Doc. Al33/18 
(1978). 
51 UN GA Res. 2106A (XX). The Convention was adopted by 106 votes to none. 
S8 Thornberry. 259. 
59 T Meron, Human Rights Law Making in the UN. Legal and Policy Issues, (Oxford: OUP) 1986, 
s. 
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(i) Complications in the Definition of "Discrimination" and the Scope of the 
Convention 
The preamble of the Convention while introducing the matters of consideration, 
emphasises on equality and upon the imperative nature of removing racial barriers. 
Unlike the Declaration, the Convention however does contain a definition of 
"discrimination" which means 
"any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, 
on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the 
political, economic, social cultural or any other field of public life"60 
The importance of the contents of the definition necessitates a close scrutiny. 
"Racial discrimination" is given a broad meaning which according to the terms of the 
Convention could be based on a variety of factors like race, colour, descent,61 
national62 or ethnic origin. According to the definition, four kinds of acts could be 
regarded as discriminatory: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference. For 
any of these acts to constitute discrimination they must be based on (a) race; (b) 
colour~ (c) descent~ (d) national origin or (e) ethnic origin and should have the purpose 
or effect of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise on an equal 
60 Op.cit Article 1(1). 
61 This term is unique only to be used in the present convention. It was adopted on the suggestion 
ofIndia in the third Committee UN Doc NC.31L1216, & L.1238; UN Doc N6181 paras 33,37, 
41(a), although the first impression that one gets is that it is no different from national or ethnic 
origin. However as Mckean remarks descent may add something else as "it is not easily 
subsumed under the concept of national or ethnic origin" Mckean, 156. 
62 The meaning of national origin provoked considerable controversy, as according to Lerner the 
Iravaux preparatoires of the Convention reveal that "the confusion regarding the terms national 
origin and nationality, widely used as relating not only to persons who were citizens of, or held 
passports issued by a given State, but also ethnic groups or nations having a distinct culture, 
language and traditional way of life but living together with other similar groups in the same 
state" Lerner op.cit note 2,49. 
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footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life.63 
In comparison to the ICCPR, it appears that the Race Convention seems to 
have a broader perspective for, unlike the ICCPR, which is limited to rights addressed 
in that particular instrument, article 1(1) applies to racial discrimination "which has the 
purpose or effect of nUllifying or impairing, recognition, enforcement or exercise ... of 
[all] human rights and fundamental freedoms".64 However, in another respect the 
scope of the Race Convention is far limited as it only deals with racial discrimination 
and any discrimination based on grounds of religion, sex or political opinion are prima 
facie out side its scope.65 The definition of racial discrimination raises a number of 
intriguing though controversial issues.66 There is a constant debate over the nature of 
equality that is aspired for; how far is the separation of different groups on the basis of 
ensuring equality compatible to the provisions of the Covenant? How far the 
Convention imposes obligations or extends itself in prohibiting discrimination in private 
life as opposed to public life?67 Indeed the meaning as to what constitutes public life is 
itself subject of controversy. 
It is equally important to note the situations where the Convention is not 
applicable as provided in other paragraphs of Article 1. The Convention is not 
applicable in cases of "distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences" made by a 
63 Ibid.28. 
64 T Meron "The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination" 79AJIL (1985) 283-308,286. 
65 Note however the provisions of Article 5. 
66 W Vierdag, Concept of Discrimination in International Law-With Special Reference to Human 
Rights. (The Hague: M. NijhoIT) 1973. 
67 At first sight the usage of the terminology may restrict the activities contained therein to Public 
Life (see Article 1(1». However a number of other provisions indicate a broader approach e.g. 
see article 2(1)(d). Similarly article 5 provides for a number of rights not necessarily coming 
within the ambit of public life. To reconcile these apparently conflicting approaches it has been 
suggested that the term public life is used in the wider sense encompassing all sectors of 
organised life of community, an interpretation presented in support of the rejection of draft 
proposal of the limiting of the scope of Article 1(1) of the Convention M Mcdougal S Lasswell 
and L Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order. (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press) 1980, 593~ also see M Ford "Non-Governmental Interference with Human Rights" BYIL 
(1986) 253-280, 261-262; D Harris, Cases and Material in International Law, 4th edn. (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell), 1991,654 cf. Brooks v. Netherlands 2 Selected Decisions lIRe 196, 1987, 
and the comments by Harris. 
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State party between citizens and non-citizens and cannot be interpreted as affecting the 
laws regulating nationality, citizenship68 or naturalisation, "provided that such 
provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality" .69 Hence, while 
distinctions made solely on the basis of race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin 
are impermissible,70 a number of international lawyers severely criticised these 
provisions as permitting de facto discrimination. According to Reisman, for example 
"The language of Article 1(2) opens the way for discrimination against 
non-citizens, which in some context may constitute de facto racial 
discrimination. If the non citizens are stateless and without hope of 
diplomatic protection, they are the most helpless creatures in 
international law. Much of East African racial discrimination against 
Indians is probably not covered by Article 1(3), which excludes from 
the Convention domestic provisions of nationality, citizenship or 
naturalization as long as they do not discriminate against a particular 
nationality, may be formulated too broadly. A significant number of 
ethnic states practice preferential immigration and naturalization as a 
means of maintaining their existence and it is not clear whether the 
intention of para 3 was to challenge the lawfulness of this practice". 71 
Article 2 sets out States obligations in detail with the aim to "pursue by all 
appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all 
its forms and promoting understanding among all races". A close analysis of the article 
reveals the objectives of its incorporation. The parties not only undertake to refrain 
from permitting discriminatory acts, but promise to take positive steps through 
legislative and administrative policies to prohibit and condemn racial discrimination. 
Article 2(1) reads as follows: 
~tates parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all 
~ppropnate means a~d without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all 
Its forms and promotmg understandmg among all races, and to this end: 
68 Op.clt Article 1 para 2. 
69 Ibid. para 3. 
70 Article 1(3). 
71 R' . 3 elsman Op.Clt note 0, 47~ M Iyoda, International Protection of Human Rights of Migrant 
workers with Special Reference to the Role of ILO, unpub LL.M Dissertation, Hull University, 
1992. 
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(a) Each State Party undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination 
against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public 
authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act in conformity with 
this obligation~ 
(b) Each State Party undertakes not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination 
by any person or organisations~ 
( c) Each State Party shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and 
local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have 
the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists~ 
(d) Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, 
including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any 
person, group or organisation~ 
(e) Each State Party undertakes to encourage, where appropriate, inte~rationist multi-
racial organisations and movements and other means of elimmating barriers 
between races, and to discourage any thing which tends to strengthen racial 
division. 
Article 2(1), it would appear, imposes a twofold obligation on Parties, one 
positive and the other negative. The negative obligations prevent Parties or their 
agents from undertaking acts or practices of racial discrimination against persons or 
institutions. The second, positive obligation is conducted thorough effective, concrete 
measures to bring to an end any form of racial discrimination. Hence, while article 
2(1) (a) prevents a State party from sponsoring, defending or supporting racial 
discrimination by any persons or organisations, article 2(1)(c) and (d) impose on State 
parties positive obligations to take effective measures to eradicate the possibility of 
racial discrimination by any person, group of persons or organisation. Article 2( 1)( e) 
perhaps reveals the essence of the whole section stating that the aim of each State 
party is to encourage integration of racial groups in the nation-State. 
(ii) Issues of Affirmative Action 
One of the most significant features of the Convention is the exception to the 
general rule of equality for all individuals~ the provisions relating to affirmative action 
finds expression in article 1(4) and 2(2).72 According to article 1(4) 
72 For similar provisions see Article 2(3) of the Declaration, Article 5 of the ILO Convention 328 
UNTS 247~ Cmnd 328. According to UNESCO Convention provision of separate schools by 
States parties will not be deemed discriminatory. Also see the 1978 UNESCO Declaration on 
Race and Racial Prejudice Article 9(2). 
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"special measures taken for the sale purpose of securing adequate 
advancement of certain ethnic groups or individuals requiring such 
protection as may be necessary in order to ensure to such groups or 
individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, 
provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead 
to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that 
they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were 
taken have been achieved" 
This is complemented by Article 2(2) which represents a detail of the 
obligations undertaken by the States parties who: 
"shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in the social, 
economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to 
ensure adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or 
individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the 
full and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the 
maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups 
after the objective for which they were taken have been achieved" 
The two provisions are not without their complications and may offer States 
too much of a discretion in decisions relating to the constitution of "racial", "ethnic" 
groups and the form and content of the relief that is to be provided. Having noted this, 
it is also clear that the provisions are of potentially considerable significance for 
minorities and lesser advantaged groups. The unique feature of these provisions is that 
unlike article 27 of ICCPR Covenant (which on a literal reading of the text does not 
provide for affirmative action), article 2(2) attempts to provide protection to groups of 
persons or individuals qua members of a group.73 The essence of both these articles of 
the Race Convention is that, although permitting for special measures they are, 
designed to be of a temporary nature. Their essential purpose is to generate equality in 
real terms. Mckean's view is that Art 1(4) and 2(2) provide a synthesis 
"which incorporates the notion of special temporary measures, 
not as an exception to the principle but as a corollary to it, 
demonstrates the fruition of the work of the sub-commission and the 
method by which the twin concepts of discrimination and minority 
protection can be fused in to the principle of equality,,14 
73 Meron op.cit note SS, 306. 
74 Mckean, IS9. 
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This view, it is submitted, should be received with caution for it might lead to a 
suggestion that minorities could be adequately protected merely with the institution of 
non-discriminatory laws. The induction of the concept of temporary measures to 
produce equality and non-discrimination may not be the ultimate cherished ideal for 
minorities to preserve their identity. As the position in the Commission has clearly 
reflected, a number of States are keen on the issue of non-discrimination, which 
necessarily implies the flattening of differences between linguistic, cultural and 
religious groups and promoting assimilation, invariably going to the credit of the 
dominant majorities.75 
(iii) The Broad Scope of the Convention and Attempts to Prohibit Racial 
Discrimination 
A number of provisions of the Convention have a very broad scope, and in 
practice may seem rather over-ambitious. Article 4, for instance and primarily for this 
reason has been regarded as one of the most controversial of articles within the 
Convention.76 According to it, State parties: 
condemn all propaganda and all organisations which are based on ideas or 
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, 
or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, 
and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate aU 
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and to this end with due regard to the 
principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the rights 
expressly set forth in Article 5 of this convention, inter alia; 
(a) shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial 
superiority or hatred, incitement or racial discrimination, as well as acts of violence 
or incitement of such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour 
or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, 
including the financing thereof; 
75 "Depending upon the legal regime in a State 'prevention of discrimination' alone may be seen as 
flattening out differences between cultural and religious groups and promoting assimilation, no 
doubt in the interest of the dominant culture". Thornberry, 128. 
76 Mckean,160; also see M Korengold "Lessons in Confronting Racist Speech: Good Intentions. Bad 
Results and Article 4 (a) of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
Discrimination" 77 Minn LR (1993). 719·737. 
t 
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(b) shall declare illegal and prohibit organisations, and also organised and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, an~ shall 
recognise participation in such organisations or activities as an offence pUnishable 
by law~ 'bl' h' , bl' , " 'I I I t (c) shall not permIt pu IC aut onttes or pu IC InstItutIOns, natlOna or oca, 0 
promote or incite racial discrimination. 
The provisions of article 4 carry far-reaching implications. State parties not 
only take upon themselves to prohibit discriminatory acts, but also undertake to 
declare illegal and prohibit organisations and activities which attempt to disseminate 
opinions of racial superiority inciting racial discrimination.77 The scope of the 
obligations imposed are also far wider than other international instruments, e.g. ICCPR 
20(2). Article 4 uses a very wide and strong terminology, and the question arises as to 
the resolution of any conflict of rights which is inherent in the provisions of the 
article,78 
According to article 5, States undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone without distinction 
as to race, colour or national or ethnic origin to equality before the law, The article 
then goes on to enumerate a number of rights, including both civil and political rights 
as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Article 6 provides remedies against 
those who have been involved in racial discrimination, be it in their official or unofficial 
capacity. It provides: 
State parties shall assure to everyone with in their jurisdiction effective 
protection and remedies through the competent national tribunals and other states 
institutions against any acts of racial discrimination which violates his human rights and 
fundamental freedoms contrary to this convention as well as the right to seek from 
such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as a 
result of such discrimination 
It has been suggested that a liberal interpretation of the provisions of the 
article, particularly bearing in mind the phrase "just and adequate reparation or 
satisfaction" for any damage suffered as a consequence of racial discrimination would 
be a considerable advance over previous instruments over such instruments as Article 8 
77 Meron op.cit note 59, 24. 
78 which right is to be given priority freedom of expression as against non-discrimination UN Docs 
EleN.4/837, paras 73-83; El3873, paras.l44-188; N6181, paras 60-74. 
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of the Universal Declaration, Article 2 of ICCPR, and Article 7(2) of the Declaration 
on the Elimination of All forms of Racial discrimination which have dealt with the 
subject previously.79 In accordance with Article 7, States parties undertake to adopt 
immediate and effective measures particularly in the field of teaching, education, 
culture and information with a view to combat prejudices which lead to racial 
discrimination and to promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations 
and racial or ethnic groups. 
6.3.2 INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW 
6.3.2.1 Development of Customary Norms Relating to Racial Equality and 
Non-Discrimination 
There seems to be a general consensus that the international legal principles 
relating, at least to racial equality and non-discrimination, now form part of 
international customary law. States are thus bound by these principles regardless of 
their treaty obligations. There is considerable evidence in that direction through State 
practice accompanied by the relevant opinio juris. Substantiation of this principle, as 
we shall consider shortly, is also forthcoming through an analysis of a number of 
subsidiary sources such as pronouncements of the International Court of Justice80 and 
the view of the publicists. 
The emergence of the principles of equality and non-discrimination since 1945 
may in contemporary terms seem relatively non-controversial, with a common 
consensus on the part of the international community. However the evolution of these 
fundamental precepts has incurred considerable hesitancy. Indeed, despite the 
atrocities committed during the second world war, the essence of which had been 
discrimination based on race, sex, language, religion and political affiliations, there is 
79 Lerner, op.cit note 2. 57-58. 
80 South West Africa Cases ICJ Reports 1962, 318 (1st Phase) and leI Reports, 6 (2nd Phase). see 
infra. 
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evidence to suggest that, at least initially, the great colonial powers, in particular the 
UK were not keen on discussing the matter if it were in any way to affect their policies 
in relation to colonies.BI 
The proposals relating to equality and non-discrimination at Dumbarton Oaks 
were not forthcoming with only one reference to human rights and fundamental 
freedoms81 primarily because of the fear that this might lead to intervention into the 
domestic affairs of sovereign States. A proposal by China that "the principle of 
equality of all states and races shall be upheld"83 proved unacceptable to the United 
States, Britain and Soviet delegates at Dumbarton Oaks and hence was eliminated. 
At San Francisco, the climate was however different with increasing 
recognition being given to human rights as a major purpose of the United Nations. 
The pressure of smaller States, the role and influence of Non-Governmental 
Organisation's, and the sentiment of the States with experience of racial discrimination 
during colonialism merged with those which had suffered discrimination at the hands of 
Nazis. 
Thus, unlike the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals, human rights and non-discrimination do feature in the United Nations 
Charter. Despite the incorporation of a number of references to human rights in the 
Charter, it must not be overlooked that the issue of effective implementation of human 
rights and non-discriminatory norms provoked great anxiety and drew reservations 
from a majority of States which relied on the notion of State sovereignty and domestic 
jurisdiction. Hence in the end 
81 "The general coalescence of opinion at San Francisco in favour of the principle was not without 
elements of political compromise. The Atlantic Charter agreed by the United Kingdom and the 
United States of America, and the subsequent Declaration of the United Nations made only 
general statements and were not explicit on the Racial Discrimination issue. Following the 
promulgation of these documents, Britain made it clear that it had made no commitments in 
relation to racial policies in the colonies. There is evidence that the 'racial question' caused 
nervous responses in other states, including the United States of America-though wartime drafts 
of the charter of the new international organisation prepared in the United States emphasised the 
importance oCthe principle" (footnotes omitted) Thornberry, 310. 
82 According to chapter IX, Section A the organisation was to promote respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, UNCIO Doc, iv.13. Mckean, 53. 
83 cited in Lauren op.cit nole, 7, 10-11. 
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"all the proposals that the United Nations be actively required 
to 'safeguard' 'protect', 'guarantee' 'implement' 'ensure' 'assure' or 
'enforce' these provisions died a sudden death. Instead, the only verbs 
that could gain majority acceptance were relatively innocuous ones such 
as 'should facilitate' 'assist', 'encourage' and 'promote'. Even here 
delegates carefully explained that they did not want these words to 
assume any greater meaning than they already possessed". 84 
From these humble beginnings, and in an environment when "human rights and 
racial discrimination founded on the rock of national sovereignty" the rapid progress 
that was made on the issue of developing international norms on prohibition of racial 
discrimination is truly remarkable. Indeed, the crusade to adopt international measure 
for denouncing and prohibiting racial discrimination became a potent force. By the 
time it was decided by the Human Rights Commission that the proposed Bill of rights 
was to contain a Declaration, a Covenant and measures of implementation, the UN 
General Assembly, had already through a number of its resolutions manifested its 
interest in the issue of non-discrimination. 
As early as 1946 General Assembly Resolution 103 (1),85 declared that it is in 
the higher interests of humanity to put an immediate end to religious and so-called 
racial persecution and discrimination .... [calling] .... on the governments and responsible 
authorities to conform both to letter and spirit of the UN Charter. There are 
innumerable other General Assembly Resolutions testifying to this determination of the 
United Nations including for example, Resolution 44(1) concerning the treatment of 
persons of Indian Origin in South Africa,86 GA Resolution 56 (1) concerning the 
Political rights ofWomen87 and GA Res. 96 (1) relating to genocide.88 
A number of incidents, although taking place at the different parts of the 
World, further increased the momentum for generating norms on the prohibition of 
discrimination. The series of anti-Semitism movement "swastika epidemics" that 
84 Lauren, ibid., 18. 
:: GA Res 103 (I), adopted forty-eighth plenary meeting, 19 November, 1946. 
GA Res 44 (I), fifty-second plenary meeting, adopted 8 December, 1946. 
:: GA Res 56 (1) Political rights of women, fifth plenary meeting adopted 11 December, 1946 
GA Res, 96 (I) fifty-fifth plenary mccting adopted 11 December 1946. 
150 
spread around Western Europe during the late fifty's-early sixty's revived the bitter 
memories of Nazi philosophy of anti-Semites and its consequences. Perhaps more 
important for the cause of non-discrimination was the rapid increase of the new 
members of the United Nations and their philosophy of ending racial discrimination and 
colonisation. 
Notions of equality can be wide-ranging and can be reflected in myriad forms 
and as far as collectivities are concerned, may encompass ideals such as self-
government, autonomy, and self-determination. The impetus of the United Nations on 
self-government with its focus on independence for peoples under "colonial and alien 
domination" drew its inspiration from a movement against racial discrimination and 
domination, blending itself logically in the ideal of "equal rights and self-determination 
of all peoples, and of the universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion". 
Although, as we have seen earlier, self-determination as an ideal has eluded a 
number of minority groups, the United Nations has been able to use it as its most 
potent weapon in its arsenal to destroy colonialism, and more generally racial 
oppression and domination. The 1960 Colonial Declaration in this respect has attained 
a landmark status. The pronouncement of the General Assembly was so revolutionary 
so as to earn a comment that it is "almost an amendment of the Charter".89 It 
demanded that 
"immediate steps shall be taken, in trust and Non-Self 
Governing territories or all other territories which have not yet attained 
independence, to transfer all powers to peoples of those 
territories ... without any distinction as to race, creed or colour ..... "90 
When considering the issue of non-discrimination, it is surprising to note the 
voluminous nature of instruments that the UN has adopted. The Genocide Convention 
has, in essence, its primary motive, the prohibition and prevention of the worst form of 
89 R Emerson, "Colonialism, Political Development and the United Nations" 19 10 (1965), 484-
503,493. 
90 Article 5. 
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discrimination, i.e. physical destruction of groups due to reason of their belonging to a 
particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group.91 The United Nations has also 
shown great interest in the issues of Apartheid and Slavery which directly relate to the 
subject of discrimination. This perspective is reflected in the adoption of the 
convention on Discrimination in Education 1960. The two International Covenants, as 
we have noted, provide several references to the issue of equality and non-
discrimination. More significant in this regard is the Race Convention. Schwelb's view 
is appealing when he writes that the Race Convention "is to a large extent declaratory 
of the law of the Charter, or in other words, the basic principles of the Convention lay 
down the law which binds also States which are not parties to the Convention, but as 
members of the United Nations, are parties to the Charter".92 
The formulation and establishment of a right to racial equality owes a great 
deal to a range of sources, a number of them subsidiary in character. The Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights aspired to be the magna carta of aU mankind, remains as 
one of the most frequently cited Resolution of the General Assembly and in a number 
of instances it has been treated as an equivalent level as the United Nations Charter 
itself91 It is however debatable whether all the rights enumerated in the Declaration 
now form part of international custom, it would nonetheless be difficult to disagree 
with the view that those which relate themselves to equality and non-discrimination 
have attained the maximum status of whatever the Declaration has to provide to the 
universal human rights jurisprudence.94 
As far as judicial pronouncements on the matter are concerned, there are 
several occasions where the ICJ and its predecessor, the PCU, has considered the issue 
91 Sec supra chapter S. 
92 E Schwelb "International Court of Justice and the Human Rights Clauses of the United Nations 
Charter" 66 AJIL (1972), 337-353, 351. 
93 Mckean, 274. 
94 " •• .it must not be assumed without more that any and every right in the Universal Declaration is 
part of customary international law. However the prohibition of discrimination occupies a special 
place in the sense that it determines the field of application of the rights in the Declaration: it is a 
structural, architectural aspect of the Universal Declaration, and for other general international 
instruments of human rights, rather than merely another right. It is plausible to assert that the 
non-discrimination partakes of whatever maximum status of the Universal Declaration." P 
Thornberry, 322. 
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of equality and non-discrimination. Perhaps the most celebrated consideration and 
pronouncement on the concept of equality is the advisory opinion of Permanent Court 
in the Minority Schools in Albania Case. 9S In that case the Court elaborated on the 
meaning of equality when it stated 
"same treatment and security in law and fact implies a notion of 
equality which is ... peculiar to the relations between the majority and 
the minorities ... Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind, 
whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment 
in order to attain a result which establishes an eqUilibrium between 
different situations ... The equality between members of the majority and 
of the minority must be an effective genuine equality~ that is the 
meaning of this provision"96. 
The Court went on to say 
"far from creating a privilege in favour of the minority .. .it 
ensues from this stipulation that the minority shall not be given a 
privileged situation as compared with the majority .. .It seems difficult to 
maintain that the adjective' equal', which qualifies the word' right', has 
the effect of empowering the state to abolish the right, and thus to 
render the clause in question illusory~ for if so, the stipulation, which 
confers so important a right on the members of the minority ... but it 
would become a weapon by which the state could deprive the minority 
regime of a great value". 97 
The dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka in the South West Africa Case (2nd 
Phase)98 has been described as "probably the best exposition of the concept of equality 
in existing literature"99 and it has played a phenomenal role in elevating the status of 
racial non-discrimination. In the South West Africa Cases, the applicants, Liberia and 
Ethiopia charged South Africa with the breach of international legal obligations in 
relation to the territory of South West Africa as imposed under Article 2 of the 
Mandate and Article 22 of the League Covenant. In the second phase of the case, 
9S AlB 64. 1935, 17. 
96 AlB 64. 19. 
97 Ibid. 
98 IeJ Rep 1966,6. 
99 I Brownlie (ed.), Basic Documents on Human Rights, 1981, 2nd edn.(Oxford: OUP) 439. 
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though the Court declined to examine the merits of the claim on the grounds that "the 
applicants can not be considered to have established any legal right appertaining to 
them in the subject matter of the present claim", the judgment of the dissenting Judge, 
Judge Tanaka contains an excellent comment on the issue of prohibition of racial 
discrimination in general international law. After a detailed analysis drawing upon the 
various sources he concludes "the norm of non-discrimination or non-separation on the 
basis of race has become a rule of customary international law" .100 During his analysis 
of this concept of equality, Judge Tanaka says 
"the most fundamental point in the equality principle is that all human 
beings as persons have an equal value in themselves, that they the aim 
itself and not means for others, and that, therefore slavery is denied. 
The idea of equality of man as persons and equal treatment as such is of 
metaphysical nature. It underlies all modem law systems as a principle 
of naturallaw"l 01 
However, he goes on to elaborate that the principle of equality does not 
exclude the differentiation of treatment on the basis of such considerations as sex, 
language, age, religion, economic conditions and education. In his view, 
"to treat different matters equally in a mechanical ways would 
be as unjust as to treat equal matters differently" and that "the principle 
of equality before the law does not mean the absolutely equality, namely 
equal treatment of men without regard to individual concrete 
circumstances but it means relative equality, namely the principle to 
treat equally what are equal and unequally what are unequal" .102 
The respondents, in defending their policies, provided a number of cases of 
differential treatment such as the minorities treaties and different treatment based on 
gender drawing parallels with their policy of apartheid. Judge Tanaka intelligently and 
meticulously attempted to draw a distinction between permissible and impermissible 
forms of differentiation. 
100 293. 
101 305. 
102 Ibid. 305-6. 
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"Different treatment must not be given arbitrarily; it requires 
reasonableness, or must be in conformity with Justice, as in the 
treatment of minorities, different treatment of sexes regarding public 
conveniences, etc. In these cases, the differentiation is aimed at the 
protection of those concerned, and is not detrimental and therefore not 
against their will" .103 
The eloquence of Judge Tanaka's enunciation of the principle of non-
discrimination nonetheless, reflects complexities if it was considered from a standpoint 
of undertaking special measures to protect minorities. If, as the respondents claimed, 
Apartheid was simply an expression of separate and autonomous development for the 
ultimate well-being of racially, linguistically, culturally and economically different 
communities, then, in view of preserving group identities it could not be per se be 
deemed illegal. Eloquent, though the opinion is, a close reading nonetheless reflects 
certain difficulties which general international law presents for the protection of 
minorities. According to Dr Thornberry 
"while stating the fundamental norm in terms of the fundamental 
norm in term of non-discrimination and non-separation there is an 
implicit recognition that the justice of the minorities' case may require 
permanent measures of protection. The justification of the minorities 
case is not achieved without difficulty, and the opinion demonstrates the 
tension between a concept of equality, which is not coherent enough to 
recognise and embrace their case. The judge goes too far in his denial 
of the realities of group identity which is subject to increasing 
recognition in later international instruments" .104 
In any event, recognition of the basic principles expressed by Judge Tanaka 
came in the ICJ's advisory opinion in the Namibia case. lOS The advisory opinion was 
as a consequence of the unacceptable stance of South Africa in the face of opposition 
by the international community as reflected through numerous General Assembly and 
Security Council Resolutions. In its Resolution 284 the Security Council requested the 
Court to advise upon the following matter "What are the legal consequences for the 
103 Ibid. 313. 
104 Thornberry, 317. 
lOS Legal Consequences/or States of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970). leI Rep. 1971, 16. 
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states of the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970)1" The judgement of the Court is absolutely clear on 
the position of International law in relation to non-discrimination. 106 The Court is 
adamant and assertive in its view that the 
"official governmental policy pursued by South Africa in 
Namibia is to achieve a complete physical separation of races and ethnic 
groups in separate areas within the territory ... These measures 
established limitations, exclusions or restrictions for the members of 
indigenous population [and that] to establish instead and to enforce, 
distinction, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusively based on 
grounds of race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which 
constitute a denial of fundamental human rights is a flagrant violation of 
the purposes and principles of the Charter" .107 
As far as extrapolating wider norms relating to racial discrimination is 
concerned some caution may be called for; the opinion is directed towards the pariah 
State of South Africa and the focus is upon a "territory having an international 
status" ,108 On the other hand such an interpretation, it is submitted, is too narrow; it is 
so constrictive and limited that it betrays reality. Schwelb's view is more convincing 
"what is a flagrant violation for the purposes of and principles of the Charter when 
committed in Namibia, is also such a violation when committed in South Africa proper, 
or for that matter, in any other sovereign Member State, or a Non-Self-Governing or 
Trust territory" .109 There are a number of other cases where the court has shared the 
same sentiment. In the Barcelona Traction Case, for example, in its description of the 
basic human rights in "contemporary international law" the Court referred to 
"protection from racial discrimination". 
106 Schwelb op.cit note 92. 
107 paras 130 and 131; The views of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurics were much in the minority. His 
contention was that there was more in the South Mrican argument that practices of Apartheid per 
se are not detrimental to the welfare of the population; ibid. para 208; Schwelb op.cit note 92, 
349. 
108 Para 131. 
109 Schwclb, op.cit note 92, 349. 
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6.3.3 JUS COGENS 
If the stance of the United Nations is considered through the role it has played 
in adopting international instruments relating to the prohibition of discrimination based 
on race, and the consensus which has emerged from state practice and the various 
judgements of leJ, it is highly persuasive to argue that the prohibition of racial 
discrimination now forms part of the norm of jus cogens. 
As we have noticed earlier, a divergence of opinion exists as to the contents of 
jus cogens. IIO Taking a more liberal approach, as Judge Tanaka did in the South West 
Africa cases it would be possible to view the whole of human rights regime having in it 
a character of jus cogens. He says 
"If we can introduce in the international field a category of law, 
namely jus cogells, recently examined by the International Law 
Commission, a kind of imperative law which constitutes the contrast to 
jus depositivum, capable of being changed by way of agreement 
between States, surely the law concerning the protection of human 
rights may be considered to belong to jus cogells ". III 
On the other hand, an overtly generous view on jus cogens might stretch the 
concept to unacceptable limits so as to risk its indelibility. It is important to bear in 
mind Professor Brownlie's cautionary remarks when he says "that the major 
distinguishing feature of [the rules of jus cogens] is their relative indelibility" .112 
Nonetheless, quite regardless of the extent to which one is prepared to agree with 
Judge Tanaka, out of the general category of human rights, prohibition of racial 
discrimination stands out as a safe candidate for inclusion in the list of Jus Cogens. 
According to Schwelb "if there is a subject matter in the matter in the present-day 
110 See infra chapter 5, notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
III South West Africa cases, ICJreports 1966, 298. 
112 513. 
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international law which appears to be a successful candidate for regulation by 
peremptory norms, it is certainly the prohibition of racial discrimination" .113 
Mckean's point is persuasive when he suggests that even on a narrow view "the 
principle of equality and non-discrimination are prime candidates for inclusion in the 
list of jus cogeni'. He reiterates this view in a more assertive manner saying that there 
are good reasons "for accepting that the principles of equality and non-discrimination, 
in view of their nature as fundamental constituents of international law of human 
rights, are part of jus cogens".114 Dicta in both the Barcelona Traction Case llS and the 
Namibia casell6 reinforces this assertion. In a similar fashion Professor Brownlie 
includes prohibition of racial discrimination in his category of the list of non-
controversial cases of jus cogens. 117 
While there seems very little doubt as to the recognition of prohibition of racial 
discrimination and apartheid as categories of jus cogens, it is submitted that it would 
be unwise to include in the same bracket any and every form of discrimination 
regardless of its form and content. Religious discrimination, may be alluded to as an 
example of the latter instance and some uncertainty exists as to its place in the norm of 
non-discrimination. I 18 
113 E Schwelb "Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as formulated by the International Law 
Commission" 61 AJlL (1967) 946-975,956. 
114 283. 
m ICJ Rep, 1970, 3. 
116 ICJ Rep, 16. 
117 I Brownlie, 513 ~ c.f. the "projected list" of Whiteman which does not contain an explicit mention 
of discrimination.~ M Whitman "Jus Cogens in International Law with a Projected List" 7 
Ga.JCL (1977), 609-626. 
118 It is worth noting that while the main thrust of Brownlie's argument in placing the "principle of 
racial non-discrimination" as a primary example of the norm of Jus Cogens, the supporting 
statement as far as religious and sexual discrimination is concerned, finds only a place as a 
footnote where he rather tentatively S.1YS "The principle of religious non-discrimination must 
have the same status as also the principle of non-discrimination as to sex" Brownlie, 513~ also see 
Sullvian op.cit note 45. 
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6.4 WEAKNESSES IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RIGHT TO RACIAL 
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
In the preceding sections we have already noted that there exists a broad 
consensus on the issue of prohibition of racial discrimination. This consensus is 
evidenced through an analysis of international treaty law as well as customary law. As 
far as the Race Convention is concerned, its unique position is reflected by the degree 
of its ratification's and by the readiness of States to endorse its provisions by the 
necessary amendments to their domestic legislation. A closer analysis, even that of the 
issue of racial equality however, discloses a number of weaknesses in implementation. 
Discrimination based on race, colour, ethnicity, language, religion and culture 
are historical as well as contemporary phenomenon. The consequences of traditional 
practices of discrimination have produced complex problems in contemporary terms; it 
is largely recognised that legal prohibitions per se would not be completely effective in 
societies with ancient history of rivalries between communities or where there are vast 
economic, educational and cultural differences amongst various groups. 
The differences may well not be based on the sophistication or otherwise of a 
particular community but because of prejudice and past acts of discrimination. As 
Meron rightly points out 
"past acts of discrimination have created systematic patterns of 
discrimination in many societies. The present effects of past 
discrimination may be continued or even exacerbated by facially neutral 
policies or practices that, though not purposely discriminatory, 
perpetuate the consequences of prior often intentional discrimination. 
For example when unnecessarily rigorous educational qualifications are 
prescribed of racial groups who were denied access to education in the 
past may be denied employment"."9 
119 Meron, op.cit note 55, 289; for a succinct analysis of a number of moral justifications in favour of 
Affirmative Action see B Parekh "A case for Positive Discrimination" in B Hepple and E 
Szyazczak (eds.), Discrimination: The Limits of Law (London: Mansell Publishing Limited), 
1992. 
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In order to overcome past disabilities, a strong case can be made for affirmative 
action. However, if there is logic in the argument for overcoming past acts of 
discriminatory behaviour, there is also a strong lobby which would not be in favour of 
a prima facie discriminatory treatment in order to compensate for previous acts. In 
order to overcome past acts of discrimination going back to earlier generations, would 
it be fair and just to give priority to the contemporary less meritorious claims? 
The intensity and vigour of the debate has resurfaced in constitutional, legal, 
administrative and judicial pronouncements, creating bitter divisions. North American 
and Indo-Pakistan lawyers need not be reminded of the divisive nature of the issues 
involved.120 The Race Convention, as has been seen, provides for affirmative action 
policies. On the other hand, a closer analysis of the travaux preparatoires and the 
reservations that are entered against the articles relating to the provisions of affirmative 
action provide complexity to the issues. It hence remains unclear whether the broad 
consensus which is reflected in the general principles of the Convention is reflected in 
case of the provisions relating to affirmative action. 
It may well be that at present, in view of the lack of clarity as to State practice 
it may be difficult to accept the view unequivocally that the principles relating to 
affirmative action exist in customary international law. Another recurrent problem to 
which considerable attention needs to be paid is the nature of the political and 
administrative structures in various States. There are a number of patently 
undemocratic regimes, which perpetuate on the basis of the exploitation of conflicts 
within the society. One only has to consider the problems confronted by such States as 
Iraq, Iran, Burundi, Rwanda and a number of other Mrican and Asian States to 
appreciate the problems confronted. 
The problems of racial, ethnic and religious tensions are confronted by most 
States, regardless of the fact of the official admission. Whereas these tensions are 
120 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 1954; Regents of the University of California v Bakke, 
438 US 265, 1978; A Freeman "Anti Discrimination law A Critical Review" Politics of Law, 96· 
116; J Armour "Compensatory Discrimination: The Indian Constitution and Judicial Review" 16 
Melbourne ULR (1987) 126·138. 
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evident in advanced industrialised States of North America as well as Western Europe, 
extreme forms of racial and ethnic divisions have taken place in States which have 
recently gained their independence. Tribal, ethnic and racial antagonism has been 
witnessed in many of the States of Africa. Similarly, acute divisions have been evident 
in Asia with the prime examples of Malaysia, Sri Lanka, India and Pakistan. In 
Malaysia for instance, as Van Dyke explains in some detail the issue of religion, race 
and linguistic identities is intertwined and discrimination by the Malays "the 
Bumiputras" persists against the Chinese, Indians and others.121 Sri Lanka provides a 
stark example where, through a culmination of discriminatory legislation and 
governmental policies there has been a sustained effort to discriminate against the 
Tamils. The early restrictive and discriminatory laws relating to citizenship, and the 
linguistic and religious policies while all working against the Tamils reflect an 
unfortunate picture.122 In view of the socio-economic, political and historical 
difficulties it is not surprising to see that a complete end to all forms of racial 
discrimination is an enduring and painstaking task. The implementation mechanisms 
that exist in pursuance of States conventional obligations certainly provide a reflection 
of the difficulties inherent in combating racial discrimination. 
The key international implementation mechanism that has been devised as far as 
the elimination of racial discrimination is concerned is the procedure adopted under the 
Race Convention. The main vehicle for the performance of the Convention and for 
measures of implementation is the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) having 18 independent experts. They are elected from a 
list of persons nominated by the State parties from among their own nationals. The 
experts are of high moral standing, elected by State parties from their nationals but 
acting in their personal capacity.12l The committee is involved in all the procedures 
concerned with the implementation. These systems consist of (a) a reporting 
121 Van Dyke, 111-130. 
122 P Hyndman, "The 1951 Convention Definition of Refugee: An appraisal with particular reference 
to the case of Sri Lankan Tamil Applicants" 9l1RQ (1987), 49-73. 
123 Article 8 (1). 
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procedure (b) inter-State complaints procedure (c) an ad hoc conciliation commission 
to deal with the inter-State complaints (d) petitions by individuals or groups on an 
optional basis (e) petitions by inhabitants of colonial territories. The key mechanisms 
to date remains of State reporting to which we shall focus our attention. Article 9(1) 
provides 
State parties undertake to submit to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, for consideration by the committee, a report on the legislative, judicial, or 
other measures which they adopted and which they adopted and which give effect to 
the provisions of this convention; 
(a) within 1 year after the entry into force of the Convention for the state concerned; 
and 
(b) thereafter every two years and whenever the committee requests. The committee 
may request further information from the State parties. 
According to Article 9(2) 
The committee shall report annually, through the Secretary-General, to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions 
and general recommendations based on the examination of the reports and information 
received from State parties. Such suggestions and general recommendations shall be 
reported to the General Assembly together with comments, if any, from the state 
parties. 
Despite the often considerable delay in receiving State reports, with frequent 
and significant omissions or lack of information, the flexibility and ingenuity with 
which the committee has performed its task has made the reporting procedure a 
success. Its flexibility in receiving delayed reports, usage of a variety of sources of 
information alongside the content of the report, guidance as to the content of the state 
reports, and accommodating a system of examination of reports have all contributed 
towards a positive element. Despite that, a survey of the reports reveals the 
considerable problems with the activities, some genuine due to the enormity of the 
issues faced, some due to the obligations undertaken. 
The inter-State procedure under article 11-13 is supervised by CERD, with 
provisions for sub-ordinate ad hoc conciliation commission in the case of more 
intractable disputes.124 The provisions of the aforesaid article are similar in nature to 
that of the ICCPR, 125 although in the case of the ICCPR it applies only to States that 
124 Article 12 & 13. 
125 See Articles 41 and 42 ofICCPR 
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have specifically recognised the competence of the committee to receive reports. 126 It 
is rather surprising to note that this procedure has not been used frequently, although 
some States have made allegations against other States (non-parties) of having 
generated difficulties in their implementation obligations. 
Article 14(1) provides for a provision whereby a State party 
"may at any time declare that it recognises the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider communications from mdividuals or groups of individuals within 
its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by toat state party of any of the 
rights set forth in the convention. No communication shall De received by the 
committee if it concerns a state party which not made such a declaration"127 
The provisions contained in the article are provisional. The drafting history 
reveals that this article reflects a compromise "between the desire to grant victims of 
racial discrimination an adequate remedy, on the one hand, and the reluctance of many 
States jealous of their sovereignty to recognise such a right, on the other".128 By 
Article 14 (2) a State party agreeing to this procedure "may establish or indicate a 
body within its national legal order which shall be competent to receive and consider 
petitions or group of individuals within its jurisdiction who claim to be victims". 
Hence, there exists the probability "of a double safeguard against the embarrassments 
which may be caused to a State party by individual or group petitions" .129 The 
attenuated nature of the provisions of the article are reflected through a careful 
reading, and the usage of the term "petition" rather than "communication" has led 
cynics to point out that the provisions are meant only "to deliver the message", 130 
126 Article 41. 
127 Sce the Optional Protocol to ICCPR 1966, Article 25 ECHR, Article 44 oflACHR. 
128 Comment by the Ghanaian representative UN Doc NClJ/SR.1355, 10, Lerner op.cit note 24, 
61; Since 1984 Article 14 mechanism has been in operation although its significance has not 
matched that of the first Optional Protocol under ICCPR. For cases before CERn see Yilmoz-
Dogan v. Netherlands CERD Report, GAOR, 43rd Session, Supp 18,59, 1988; D.T.D. v. France 
CERD, GAOR., 44th session, Supp 18, 84, 1989. 
129 Thornberry, 270. 
130 V Bilker ''The International treaty against Racial Discrimination" 53 Afarquette Law Review 1 
(1970), 60-93, 79; "According to the Canadian representative Article 14 could not be more 
optional than it was" UN Doc NC.3/SR.13 57. 
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While the wording of the article indicates the provisional nature of the 
presence of such a body with the obvious hurdle of State sovereignty, the provisions 
relating to petitioning provides a considerable advance since at least the procedure 
allows racial or ethnic groups the right to petition before an international tribunal. 
Although, unlike the Optional Protocol, group petitions are acceptable, the scope is 
narrow both in comparison to article 25 of EClIR and article 44 of ACHR, which 
allow any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals to address 
petitions. 
Although the Convention deals with racial groups and not specifically with 
minorities, minorities remain the natural victims of racial discrimination in most States 
and their cases have inevitably come under primary consideration.13l The reporting 
procedures designed to obtain information regarding legislative and administrative 
practices also helps in the identification of the overall policies which affect the position 
of the States. 
The role of CERD is in some ways analogous to that of the Human Rights 
Committee working under the auspices of the ICCPR and the responses which the 
States make to both these committees are also similar. However, unlike the individual 
petitions before the Human Rights Committee, the individual and group petitions 
before CERD have not rigorously been invoked and hence it is only speculative as to 
what role these petitions might play in the enforcement procedures. 
The Convention operates in a broad framework affecting a considerable 
number of institutions within the State. State parties are required to ensure that not 
only public authorities are prohibited from acting in a discriminatory manner but also 
to ensure that private individuals and groups conform to the provisions of the 
Convention. The achievement of this task would necessarily entail the implementation 
machinery within both civil and criminal jurisdiction. 
Secondly governments are often constrained in their actions due to a number of 
conflicting interests within the society. There has to be a balance between the 
131 Thornberry. 272. 
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introduction of laws prohibiting racial discrimination and other rights including the 
freedom of opinion, conscience, expression and assembly. Thirdly, amongst the 
ordinances of the Convention lie a number of provisions which, despite being 
progressive in nature are onerous and financially demanding. Hence in order to be 
implemented thoroughly a number of provisions not only require time but can also put 
considerable strain on the position of economies of developing States. 
Quite apart from these issues, there are a number of difficulties and 
misconceptions which need to be overcome. The experience of CERD has revealed 
that a number of States regularly misconceive their obligations under the Convention. 
While some States have regarded that there is no obligation to report if they claim that 
racial discrimination does not exist within their States,132 others have felt under no 
obligation to report periodically if they have not instituted any further measures to 
combat discrimination. \33 Confusion has also been reported where a State declares that 
the ratification of treaty provisions are self-executory and the State party itself does 
not have to take any action to make changes in the constitutional or legal 
framework. 134 Another frequent occurrence noted by CERD has been the delay or the 
presentation of incomplete reports relating to legislative, judicial and administrative 
matters. 
A survey of the State reports on the whole, however, reveals an encouraging 
picture. Australia, for instance upon ratification of the Convention adopted the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975.13S A number of discriminatory acts were declared unlawful, 
and the Act's overall impact promised to be phenomenal. Similarly the amendment 
introduced by Belgium in its constitutional framework has been done with the object of 
ensuring complete compliance with the provisions of the Convention. 
\32 See generally N Lerner, The United Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Alphen aan den Rijn: SijthoJT and Noordhom 1980. 
133 Ibid. 116. 
134 Ibid. 
13S For Australia's initial report see (CERD/CIR.85/Add.3) see N32/18 par 161-176; see Gerhardy v 
Brown (1985) 57 ALR 472. 
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The political changes that have taken place in the States of Central and Eastern 
Europe may have significant impact in the de facto observance of the rights provided in 
the Convention. However, even prior to this political and ideological transformation, 
State reports from some eastern European parties showed that a considerable number 
of positive steps had been undertaken. Bulgaria, which was the first country to ratify 
the Convention produced such encouraging evidence that in the proceeding of CERD 
itself it was said that the report of Bulgaria has "demonstrated the influence of the 
Convention on the development of domestic legislation on a State party".136 
The comprehensive reports submitted by Poland,137 the former German 
Democratic Republic,138 the former Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republid 39 and the 
former Soviet Union140 similarly showed at least the de jure application of the 
provisions of the Convention. A similar encouraging response has been evinced from 
the State reports of developing countries. Niger in its fifth periodical report stated that 
it regards the norm of the prohibition of discrimination as one of jus cogens. 141 
Philippines in her periodic reports has stated, through the adoption of the 1973 
constitution and subsequent legislative changes it has prohibited all actions relating to 
discrimination.142 
Senegal'43 and Swaziland'44 have similarly showed the adjustment made to their 
laws to comply with the provisions of the Convention. Despite the fact that some 
uneasiness has been evidenced on the part of a number of Muslim States, in particular 
136 for a survey of the periodic reports submitted by Bulgaria see CERD/CIR.. 70, 
CERD/CIR.30/Add.12, Add.19. For their discussions see N9018, para 249. N31118 and 
CERDIClSR.413 & 414. 
137 CERD/CI20/Add.19 par 2~ CERD/CIR.3/Add.4 & Add 23~ CERDIR.30/Add.17~ 
CERDIR. 701 Add.28; CERDIR. 901 Add. 13 ; C/201 Add. 1 O. 
138 CERD/CIR.63/Add 3; CERD/CIR.87/Add 1; CERD/CI71Add 1; for a discussion of their reports 
see N9618, par 216-219; N31118 par 198-204; CERD/C/SR. 415-416. 
139 for reports presented by Ukraine CERD/CIR.3 Add 26 and Add 26 and Add 37; 
CERD/CIR.30/Add.20; CERDIR.70/Add 17; CERD/CIR.90/Add.15; For their discussion see 
N90I8, par 206-210; Al31118, par 192-196; CERD/C/SR.418; CERD/C/20/Add 23. 
140 CERD/CIR.3/Add 12; CERD/CIR.30/Add.19; CERD/CIR.70/Add.14; CERDICl120.lAdd.19; 
141 CERD/CIR.90/Add.20; CERD/C/20 Add.9 & Add.30 
142 See CERD/ClR.3/Add.13; CERD/CIR.30/Add 11 & Add 37 and CERD/CIR. 7 and Add 11. 
143 For Senegal's reports see CERD/CIR.50/Add.l4 and CERD/CIR.77/Add.10; CERD/C/R.SO/40 p 
15. 
144 CERD/CIR.3/Add.33 and 45; CERD/CIR.30/Add.40. 
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those from the Middle East,145 the overall impression in relation to the implementation 
is impressive. 
There remains however the fact that the incorporation of legislative provisions 
are not in themselves sufficient to create a non-discriminatory society. It takes time to 
overcome the age long prejudices of racial, ethnic and linguistic superiority. The 
sacred values of equity, justice and non-discrimination could only be achieved 
gradually and progressively. 
6.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Discrimination exists in myriad forms and its potentially evil manifestations are 
capable of affecting every member of society. As far as racial discrimination is 
concerned it is highly persuasive to argue that there is now an absolute prohibition of it 
in customary international law. Members of racial and ethnic minorities would 
therefore be entitled to protection from discrimination under general international law. 
Discrimination based on race or ethnic origin is however, only one facet of a wider 
phenomenon. Religious or Linguistic discrimination, although associated to 
discrimination in general and categorised in the same bracket alongside racial 
discrimination, are evils in their own right with far reaching implications. 
It may well be possible to argue that the general prohibition existing in 
international law against discrimination on grounds of inter alia sex, race, ethnicity, 
religion and language belongs to the category of peremptory norms of jus cogens. On 
the other hand, the consensus formed on the issue of prohibition of discrimination 
based on grounds of race and ethnicity cannot be said to match the relative lack of 
concern shown on grounds of religion. The issue of religion, in particular as 
Thornberry elaborates: 
145 See for instance Iran's 5th periodic report CERD/C1201 Add.l. For a consideration of the 
committee's discussion in relation to Iraq's reports see Al9618, par 105. 
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"takes international law to the limits of human rights. at least in 
so far as the law functions in a community of States. It is quite 
meaningless, for example, to the adherents of a religion to have their 
beliefs or practices declared to be contrary to 'Public morality'. To the 
believer, religion is morality itself and its transcendental foundation 
grounds it more firmly in terms of obligations than any secular rival, or 
the tenets of other religions. All religions are to a greater or lesser 
extent 'fundamentalist' in character in that they recognise that their is 
the just rule, the correct avenue to truth. When the States and the 
dominant religion are in harmony with each other, friction is minimized, 
but in States determined to carry the secular, and anti-religious 
approach to a position of dominance, or in the case of minority religions 
struggling to survive in a State dominated by adherents of a majority 
group, conflict is always possible and frequently occurs. No such 
considerations militate against the international proscriptions of racial 
discrimination".146 
Even in the case of racial discrimination, the apparent international consensus 
may have many elements of superficiality. We have already noted that while unanimity 
lies in the ideal of equality and a non-discriminatory society, considerable differences 
exist on the view of achieving genuine equality and overcoming previous 
discrimination. As in the Genocide Convention, it may well be argued that not every 
provision in the Convention bears the mark of customary law. 147 Despite the large 
number of ratifications of the Race Convention, the issue of affirmative action has 
remained divisive. State practice is equivocal without, it is submitted, giving any firm 
guidelines on the position as regards customary law.148 The Race Convention makes 
explicit provisions as to affirmative action and the issue is highly significant if progress 
is to be made in the direction of attaining genuine equality. 
A number of tensions precipitate when the matter of taking measures to 
prohibit racial discrimination is considered, more particularly that of obligations on the 
part of States to outlaw organisations that incite racial hatred. Article 4 of the Race 
Convention has already generated debate, controversies and reservations. There can 
often be a fine dividing line as to what would be racist expressions, or views of a 
146 Thornberry. 324. 
147 See Supra Chapter 5~ R Baxter "Multi-lateral treaties as evidence of Customary International 
Law" 41 BYIL (1965-66) • 275-300. 
148 Ibid., 326. 
168 
particular organisation which may be taken to work against a particular race, ethnic, 
religious or national groups as against merely sarcastic demeanours or a rightful 
expression of freedom of speech. The liberties which a tolerant society bestows would 
surely include as much a right to free expression of views and values as it would to 
prevent racial abuse and violence. 
SECTIONB 
EMERGING RIGHTS 
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7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters relating to the rights of minorities have attempted to analyse 
the vacillating approach of international law towards minorities. I As has been noted, 
since 1945 while international law has attempted to provide minorities with a basic right to 
physical existence, the scope of this right is not clear? The existence of minorities as 
distinct groups remains under jeopardy as the threat of their physical extermination seems 
to have provided an unfortunate backdrop to the possibility of their extinction as 
autonomous ethnic, linguistic and religious entities. 
International law, in its modern development, has placed greater emphasis on the 
issue of non-discrimination with the view that all individuals are to be treated equally. It 
has been argued that attempts at equality for all individuals and the protection of 
minorities overlap. This view has been re-affirmed by various authorities which have 
perceived minority rights and prevention of discrimination as two sides of the same coin.3 
However the formulation of human rights jurisprudence on the ideals of physical existence 
and non-discrimination for all individuals, it is submitted, is not in itself adequate for 
preserving distinct identities of minorities. Although the rights to physical existence and 
of non-discrimination are essential pre-requisites for a minority to survive as a separate 
and distinct entity, positive measures are called for. 
The key question that needs to be analysed is the extent to which contemporary 
international law has advanced towards furnishing minorities with what has been tenned "a 
2 
3 
See Supra Chapters 3-6. 
Supra chapter s. 
According to the Special Rapporteur Capotorti the prevention of discrimination and implementation 
of special measures to protect minorities "are merely two aspects of the same problem~ that of fully 
ensuring equal rights to all persons". Capotorti. 26. 
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right of autonomy". A survey of the international legal norms for the protection of 
minorities reveals the inadequacies in the system; the difficulties in conceiving international 
law as a medium to protect minorities are substantial. On the other hand, international law 
is not static, and as the present chapter attempts to examine, there are signs of more liberal 
tendencies in so far as the norms relating to minorities are concerned. 
The present discussion illustrates a progression in a more positive direction, 
although it is suggested that in view of the inherent difficulties of international law, these 
liberal tendencies have, as yet, to concretise into the fully established right of autonomy. 
The meaning of the term "autonomy" is of considerable importance which we shall 
consider in some detail. The third section of the present chapter considers the possible 
elements of the concept of autonomy in existing international instruments, whereas the 
penultimate section deals with the problem in recognition and implementation of the 
concept. 
7.2 ELABORATION OF THE CONCEPT OF "AUTONOMY" IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Autonomy is not a term of art and has no precise definition or meaning in 
international law.4 To the contrary, John Chipman Gray notes that "on no subject of 
international law has there been so much loose writing and nebulous speculation as on 
autonomy". S There are differences of opinion amongst international lawyers and publicists 
as to the precise content of autonomy; though there is a relative agreement that autonomy 
can be interpreted both in a broad and a narrow sense. Hannum and Lillich, while 
4 
5 
, 
"There are various models of . self-government' or . autonomy' but neither of these is a term of art". I 
Brownlie "Rights of Peoples in International law" (cd.) J Crawford, Rights of Peoples, (Oxford: 
OUP), 1988, 1-16, 6. H Hannum and R Lillich "Autonomy in international law" Y Dinstein Models 
of Autonomy, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books), 1981, 215-254~ also see R Lindley, 
Autonomy, 1986. 
Cited Hannum and Lillich (ed.) ibid., 215. 
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focusing primarily on what they regard as "general, political or governmental autonomy" 
and treating it to be consistent with "full autonomy" or the principle of "self-government" 
distinguish it from the more "restrictive types of autonomy e.g. cultural or religious 
autonomy".6 In their view: 
"Autonomy and self-government are determined primarily by the 
degree of actual as well as formal independence enjoyed by autonomous 
entity in its political decision-making process. Generally, it is understood 
to refer to independence of action on the internal or domestic level, as 
foreign affairs and defence normally are in the hands of the central or 
national government, but occasionally power to conclude international 
agreements concerning cultural or economic matters also may reside with 
autonomous entity".7 
With their primary attention focused on cases of "full autonomy", they proceed to 
consider its various ingredients and make a survey of governmental structures and a 
number of particular issues and power. They observe the governmental structures of 
autonomous entities with the distribution of the power, authority and responsibility of the 
executive, judiciary and legislature divided between the autonomous entity and the Central 
government. They then consider particular issues, such as international personality, 
policing arrangements and security, financial and economic arrangements. 
A consideration of cultural, religious and minority group autonomy only occupies 
a peripheral place in their study, though they do acknowledge and provide examples of 
such cases 
6 
7 
"There are, however, several entities which have been granted 
. autonomy' not as a response to desires for political self-government, but 
rather as a means of particular concern to these groups e.g. cultural 
autonomy or religious freedom. Examples of such limited autonomy 
include the Belgian linguistic communities, the Aaland Islands, the millets 
Ibid. 218. 
Ibid. 
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under the Ottoman Empire, ethnic minontles in Eritrea, and de facto 
cultural autonomy enjoyed by traditional societies in Tokelau atolls".8 
Professor Bernhardt endorses the aforementioned distinction made by Hannum and 
Lillich when he comments 
"The notion of' autonomy' has broader as well as narrow meaning. 
In the broader sense, autonomy means autonomous self-determination of 
an individual or an entity, the competence or power to handle one's own 
affairs without interference. In national public law one speaks of autonomy 
of universities, of cities, this is always done in relation to the state. In the 
broader sense autonomy describes the limits of state interference, on the 
one hand and the autonomous determination and regulation of certain 
affairs by specific institutions on the other ... 
In a more narrow sense, autonomy has to do with the protection 
and self-determination of minorities. And it is in this sense that the notion 
of autonomy is used in modern international law. 
The essential element of autonomy is the granting of certain rights 
to a specific part of the state population, in view of its characteristics 
which differ from the majority of the popuiation ... Linguistic, cultural and 
ethnic minorities are the proto-types of entities which need protection. In 
order to preserve their culture, the language or their religion. They are 
interested in having their own schools, other cultural institutions etc. in 
excluding state and majority interference as far as their specific 
background. Because a certain group is, and feels different from majority 
of the population, it longs for different rights. This seems to me to be the 
central element underlying autonomy .... ".9 
Professor Bernhardt then goes on to distinguish between what he terms "territorial 
autonomy" from "personal autonomy". "Territorial autonomy" is applied to a situation 
where autonomy is provided on a territorial basis. "Personal autonomy" denotes to 
situations where members of a minority are scattered in various parts of the country and 
autonomy is granted on the basis of their personality. The concept of "personal autonomy" 
seems significant in order to satisfy the myriad possibilities in which minorities can exist. 
Returning to our analysis of the concept of autonomy, Hannum in his more recent work 
has proposed that 
8 
9 
Ibid. 246. 
Italics added. R Bernhardt, "Federalism and Autonomy" ibid. 23-28, 26. 
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" ... a new principle of international law can be discerned in the 
interstices of contemporary definition of sovereignty, self-determination 
and the human rights of individuals and groups, which will support creative 
attempts to deal with conflicts over minority and majority rights before 
they escalate into civil war and demands of secession. This right to 
autonomy recognises the right of minority and indigenous communities to 
exercise meaningful internal self-determination and control over their own 
affairs in a manner that is not inconsistent with the ultimate sovereignty-as 
that term is properly understood-of the State" .10 
The present study, with its focus on the position on ethnic, linguistic and religious 
minorities concentrates on this issue of autonomy "in the narrow sense" as described by 
Professor Bernhardt. Attempts at defining concepts have often come up without success; 
an inability to define conceptions is particularly glaring in international law. II In the light 
of observations made earlier, it is difficult to conceive a possible consensus definition of 
autonomy. However for the purposes of the present study, Hannum's views as cited 
above are followed. Autonomy is therefore taken to mean as 
" ... recognising the right of minorities and indigenous communities 
to exercise meaningful internal self-determination and control over their 
own affairs in a manner that is not inconsistent with ... [State] 
sovereignty."12 
Autonomy as a concept, highly attractive though it may appear, provides a number 
of complexities. Not least amongst these is its natural affinity and overlap with that of self-
determination and all that that may entail. Bearing in mind the probable incendiary 
tendencies of self-determination, States may feel hesitant to recognise autonomy as a right 
of minorities under international law. In recent years, however there appears to be a move 
in the direction of recognition of some form of autonomy for the minority groups and a 
review of recent international and national would provide strength to this argument. On 
10 Hannum. 473-4. 
II Supra Chapters 2 and 3. 
12 Ibid. 
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the other hand, it probably is the case that most States are unwilling to be bound under 
international law to concepts which may ultimately be linked in one form or another to the 
right of self-determination to minorities. 
7.3 MINORITIES AND THE ISSUE OF AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
Cultural, linguistic and religious autonomy is not an alien concept in the 
vocabulary of minorities. Its history stretches to the time when minorities as distinct 
groups came to be recognised. Nascent reflections of autonomy are evident in the Millet 
system as practised in the Ottoman currency;'3 concern that was expressed at the end of 
the First World War for the position of minorities;'4 President Wilson's fourteen points 
programme, point twelve of which declared that non-Turkish minorities of the Empire 
should be "assured of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development";IS 
the mandate system with the application of the principle "that peoples form a sacred trust 
of civilisation"; 16 minorities treaties17 and the outcome of the Aaland Islands. ls 
The subsequent developments that took place after the Second World War more 
or less resulted in the erosion of any independent concern that previously existed for 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities and for their aspiration of autonomy and 
existence as distinct entities. The interest in the position of minorities that could be 
ascertained was largely of an indirect nature, namely the United Nations preoccupation 
with upholding individual human rights and concern with non-self-governing territories; 
\3 Supra chapter 4~ V Van Dyke, 1985, 74. 
14 Supra chapter 4. 
IS D McDowall, The Kurds, (London: MRG), 1991, 15-16. 
16 Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
17 Supra chapter 4. 
18 Ibid. 
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the territorial aspects of Chapter XI is of considerable significance. It concerns non-self-
governing territories and Article 73 applies to territories "whose peoples have not yet 
attained a measure of self-government". A focus of this nature upon territorial elements 
meant a lack of consideration for ethnic, linguistic and religious groups who were without 
a territorial base. 
While the Issue of self-government, as we have noted, has increasingly been 
dominated by the surge for independence of the former colonies,19 the progression in the 
Untied Nations with the emphasis on individual human rights and non-discrimination 
meant a neglect of the issue of collective identity and autonomy for minorities. 
The United Nations Charter makes no references to minorities and it would appear 
that the Charter had been framed with the view that while focus should be on the rights of 
individuals, minority rights could be adequately protected in a regime of non-
discrimination?O As Mckean says, "There was a sharp reaction against the protection 
since the interests of minority groups were generally believed to be adequately 
safeguarded by the faithful observance of the principle of non-discrimination" .21 The 
Commission on Human Rights that was set-up in 1946 as a subordinate body of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) worked with this ideology in mind and the 
history of the formation of the Sub-Commission presents an interesting analysis for 
ascertaining the then existing interest in the protection ofminorities.22 
Although the ECOSOC permitted the inclusion in the terms of reference of the 
Commission, the mandate to protect minorities, the interests of the Commission and its 
Sub-Commission in the area of minorities have only occasionally been impressive. This 
19 "From the very beginning of the United Nations, emphasis has been put on the development of non-
self-governing territories towards independence" L Sohn, "Models of autonomy within the United 
Nations framework" in Dinstein (cd.) op.cit note 4, 5-22, 9. 
20 I Claude Ir, National Minorities An International Problem (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press), 1955, 21l. 
21 Mckean, 59. 
22 P Alston "The Commission on Human Rights" (cd.) P Alston The UN and Human Rights A Critical 
Appraisal, (Oxford: OUP), 1992, 126-210. 
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could partly be explained by the Constitution of the said bodies. The Commission consists 
of representatives of States23 and although the Sub-Commission is a body of independent 
experts, the individuals therein are nominated by States themselves and sometimes act as 
official spokesmen.24 
The Commission was authorised to establish separate Sub-commissions on 
protection of minorities and prevention of discrimination?5 However in the end it decided 
to have just one Sub-commission.26 The Sub-commission has only engaged itself actively 
in the issue of the protection of minorities during 1947-54 and then 1971 onwards.27 
However, between 1955-1971 the Sub-commission concentrated on the issues relating to 
non-discrimination. 
Kunz's sarcasm bears a considerable measure of truth, at least in the early years of 
the United Nations- "At the end of the first World War international Protection of 
minorities was the great fashion: treaties in abundance, conferences, League of Nations 
activities, an enormous literature. Recently this fashion has become nearly obsolete. 
Today the well dressed international lawyer wears human rights".28 The change in trends 
and fashions was made evident through a decline in the international agreements focusing 
upon the position of minorities, with greater emphasis on individual human rights. The 
eclipse in concern for minorities was steady, though not complete, as Minorities did 
feature in the international agenda in certain agreements. These included the agreement 
signed between Austrian and Italian Governments in Paris guaranteeing the "German 
speaking inhabitants" of the Balzano Province and other neighbouring territories and 
23 Ibid. 
24 A Eide "The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities" (ed.) 
Alston Ibid., 211-264. 
25 J Kelly, "National Minorities in International Law" 3 JILP (1973),253-273,264-5. 
26 Ibid .. 
27 See Mckean 75-77 .. 
28 J Kunz ''The Present Status of International Law for the Protection of Minorities" 48 AJIL (1954) 
282-287, 282. 
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providing for a number of rights in particular linguistic and cultural rights.29 Similarly, the 
Peace treaties of the Allied Powers with Bulgaria,30 Hungary, 31 Finland, 32 Italt3 and 
Rumania34 (signed on 10 February 1947) and Japan35 (signed 8 September 1951) contain 
provisions requiring those States to protect the basic human rights without any distinction 
as to race, sex, language, religion. A special statute contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed between Italy, the UK, USA and Yugoslavia in relation to the 
Free territory of Trietise. Similar developments have taken place for the protection 
minorities in continents other than Europe. In 1950 the newly independent States of India 
and Pakistan entered into an agreement regarding the protection of their minorities,36 
which shall be a subject of our consideration in Part IV. 
7.3.1 The Universal Declaration ofIIuman Rights 
As noted above, the Sub-Commission was not heavily involved in drafting the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948,37 which 
although not mentioning the term "minority" effectively applies to minority groups.38 The 
protection from genocide in the Genocide Convention is accorded to "national, ethnical, 
racial or religious" groups, though the absence of the term "minority" possibly reflects 
29 Signed 5 September 1946. Capotorti, 30. Austrian State treaty 1947; Bilateral treaty containing 
minority protection provisions include treaty of Friendship and Mutual aid between Poland and 
Checkoslovakia 1947; Mckean, 50. 
30 UNTS 41,21 Art 2. 
31 UNTS 41,213 Art 6. 
32 UNTS 49, 3 Art 15. 
33 UNTS 42,3 Art 3(1). 
34 UNTS 42, 3 Art 3(1). The same provisions appeared in article 6 (1) of the State treaty with Austria 
1955 UNTS 217, 223. The treaty provides special measures of providing positive measure for 
minority protection. E Schwelb "The Austrian State treaty and Human Rights" 5 ICLQ (1956), 265-
272. 
35 See in particular the preamble which emphasises on the basic principles of human rights UNTS, 217, 
45. 
36 Agreement on Protection of Minorities April 8, 1950, Pakistan-India 131, UNTS, 3. 
37 UNTS 78, 277. 
38 Supra chapter 5. 
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anti-minority sentiments of that time. More significantly for the present debate the 
omission of any provisions relating to cultural genocide represents an unfortunate aspect 
of the Convention.39 Despite a number of efforts on the part of various organisations, 
States and members of the Sub-Commission to provide limited rights of autonomy to 
minority groups40 no specific references to the protection of minorities were included in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 41 According to a draft presented by the 
Division of Human Rights: 
In all countries inhabited by a substantial number of persons of a 
race, language or religion other than persons belonging to such ethnic, 
linguistic or religious minorities shall have the right to establish and 
maintain, out of equitable proportion of public funds available for the 
purpose, their schools and cultural institutions, and to use their language 
before the courts and other authorities and organs of the state and in the 
press and public assembly. 42 
A refined and revised draft of the aforesaid article as presented by the Sub· 
Commission stated 
In States inhabited by well defined ethnic, linguistic or religious 
groups which are clearly distinguished for the rest of the population and 
which want to be accorded differential treatment, persons belonging to 
such groups shall have the right as far as is compatible with public order 
and security to establish and maintain their schools and cultural or religious 
institutions and to use their own language and script in the press, in public 
assembly, and before the courts and other authorities of the state, if they so 
choose43 
39 Ibid. 
40 See article 31 of the drafting committee's article relating to minorities. The Commission however 
deleted these provisions and also Soviet proposals relating to (1) the provision that cultural groups 
should not be denied the right to free self-development and (2) to grant national minorities the right 
to have schools in their mother tongue. The successful argument against these proposals both in the 
commission and the third committee were that the new human rights regime would be adequate to 
protect minorities and in any event a single article would be inadequate to protect such a complex 
issue, UN Doc ElCN.4/SR. 73, 5-6, 10 and E/CN.4/SR. 74, 4-6~ Thornberry 133.~ Mckean 70-71. 
41 UN G.A Res. 217A (III) UN Doc. A 1810 (1948), 71. 
42 UN Doc FJCN.41 AC.l/3 Add. 1 , 409. 
43 UN Doc ElCN.4/SR.52, 9 
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Notwithstanding the absence of any specific articles in the Declaration, there is 
nonetheless a mention of a number of rights, which can parenthetically be associated to the 
rights of minorities. The Declaration specifically provides in article }44 and 2,4S the right of 
equality and non-discrimination.46 The right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion is stated in Article 18,47 the right to freedom of opinion and expression is provided 
in article }9,48 the right to peaceful assembly and association in article 20,49 the right to 
education in article 2650 and the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community to provide the necessary foundation for providing individual members a natural 
claim for autonomy as a group right.sl 
7.3.2 The International Covenants 
Despite the adoption of the individualistic and universalistic Declaration with the 
emphasis on the principle of non-discrimination, the General Assembly did show some 
interest in minorities by adopting Resolution 217 (III) which declared that the UN cannot 
remain insensitive to the fate of minorities. It was also assumed that since the Universal 
44 All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and 
conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood. 
4S Every one is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration without distinction of 
any kind such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status .... 
46 Infra Chapter 6. 
47 "Every one has the right to freedom of thought~ conscience and religion, this right includes freedom 
to change his religion or belief, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to 
manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance." 
48 "Every one has the right to freedom of opinion and expression~ this right includes freedom to hold 
opinions with out interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers." 
49 (1) "Every one has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association. (2) No one may be 
compelled to belong to an association." 
so Article 26 provides inter alia Education "shall be [directed} to promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activates of the Nations 
for the maintenance of peace. According to sub-section 3 Parents have a prior right to choose the 
kind of edueation that shall be given to their children". 
51 Article 27 (1) provides "Every one has the right to freely participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefit". 
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Declaration was to form the first part of International Bill of Human Rights a 
comprehensive set of rights would be introduced in subsequent documents. The 
Declaration, after a considerable period of gestation, was followed by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)S2 and the International Covenant of 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).53 The original plan had been to contain 
substantive rights in just one Covenant. However, there was considerable disagreement as 
to the inclusion of Civil and Political rights alongside the Economic, Social and Cultural 
rights and it was eventually decided to have to two Covenants, which now form the basis 
of international legal obligations in human rights. 
The ICCPR and ICESCR are of particular importance for the present discussion 
for a number of reasons. 54 Unlike General Assembly Resolutions which are not per se 
binding, the Covenants are binding on States which are parties to it. The identical Part 1 
of both the Covenants refers to the Rights of All Peoples of self-determination, which 
although not necessarily relevant to the minorities, may have a bearing on their position. 
Article 27 of the ICCPR is of special importance for minorities as it remains the main 
Provision in current international law which attempts to provide direct protection to 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities. 
The implementation of the ICCPR, like other human rights instruments, is required 
at national level in the first instance. By article 2(1) of ICCPR each State party 
"undertakes to respect and to ensure to aU individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the present 
Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, birth 
or other status". 
52 Annex to UN Gen. Ass Res. 2200 (XXI), GAOR, 21st Sess Sup 16 49· UKTS 6 (1977)· Cmnd 6702. 
53 ' " , 
Annex to UN Gen. Ass Res. 2200 (XXX), GAOR, 21st Sess, Sup 16, 49~ UKTS 6 (l977)~ Cmnd 
6702. 
S4 Robertson and Merrills, Human Rights in the World An Introduction to the Study of International 
Protection of Human Rights, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 1989. 
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The supervisory body in charge of the implementation of the Covenant is the 
Human Rights CommitteeS5 whose functions include the supervision and over seeing of 
State reports/6 to deal with the complaints made by State parties that one of the other 
State party is failing to perform its obligations in a proper manner. 51 Finally under the 
Optional Protocol, individuals who claim to become victims of violations of human right 
abuses could bring a communication before the Human Rights Committee. 58 
7.3 ARTICLE 27 AND THE ISSUE OF AUTONOMY FOR MINORITIES 
As far as the protection of persons belonging to minorities is concerned, article 27 
of the ICCPR stands out as the main article in international treaties, and hence the status 
which it has, necessitates a detailed analysis. S9 In an environment unfavourable for the 
preservation of special provisions for minorities, an analysis of the travaux preparatoires 
of article 27 reveal the tensions inherent in drafting such a provision. The final draft of 
article 27 provides 
"In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic 
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not he denied 
the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their 
own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language" . 
55 For measures of implementation sec Article 28-45 of the ICCPR. 
56 Ibid. Article 40 
51 Ibii Article 41. 
58 D McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee. (Oxford: OUP), 1991; J Rehman "The Role of the 
Human Rights Committee in dealing with Individual Petitions under the Optional Protocol" 11 JLS 
(1992), 13-22; A De Zayas, J Th. Moller, T Opsahal "Applicability of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights under the Optional Protocol of the Human Rights Committee" 28 GYIL 
(1985), 9-64; S Ghandhi "The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual 
Communications" 57 BYIL (1986),201-251. 
59 H Hannum, Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, (Dordrecht: M.Nijhofl), 1993, 27; M 
No~ak. United Nations Covenants on Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary (Kehl am 
Rhem: Strasbourg) 1993,482-3. 
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The article refers to terms provoking a number of questions and although an 
attempt has already been made to deal with some of those complicated issues,60 the 
particular context of article 27 requires certain explanations. The article is drafted in a 
rather awkward manner; it seems to be framed with a basic presumption that a majority of 
States comprise of homogenous groups, and the issue of minorities is confined to only a 
few of these. Indeed this was the precise stance adopted by the so-called "countries of 
immigration" and in particular a number of American States. The phrase <lIn those States 
in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist" was introduced by Chile at the 
ninth session of the Commission on Human Rights.61 The aim behind such wording 
appears to be to provide protection only to the long established minorities and to prevent 
or discourage the formation of new minority groupS.62 Hence, it appears that if the 
benefits are to be accorded to members of minority groups, official recognition of their 
existence is a necessary prerequisite. This phraseology invites States to deny the existence 
of minorities within their boundaries, and many have not hesitated to do SO.63 
The travaux preparatoires reveal that according to the approach adopted by most 
of the Latin American States issues relating to minority rights were not a problem for their 
continent but were confined to some European and Asian countries. The Chilean 
representative, for instance 
"agreed that this problem of minorities which arose in some 
European Countries did not arise in the American States, particularly those 
60 See infra chapter 2. 
61 9 U.N ESCOR. Commission on Human Rights, UN.Doc ElCN.4/SR. 368-71 (1951). 
62 According to Mr Diaz Casanueva "the term 'minority' as used in the article meant 'separate or 
distinct groups, well defined and long established on the territory of a State; hence the term must be 
understood in a sociological and historical sense' .. :he would not like to think that the article would 
be used to foster the formation of minorities anywhere' GAOR, 16th Session, 3rd Committee, l103rd 
meeting, paras 23,25; Mr Munguia Nova of Nicaragua "wished to make it clear that in its judgement 
the article would not foster the growth of minority groups in Latin America by referring explicitly to 
'existing minority groups"', ibid. para 36. 
63 Mr Kaliswali of India had warned that such phraseology "might encourage dictatorial States to refuse 
to recognise the rights of minorities living in their territory, simply by denying their existence" ibid. 
para 37. 
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of Latin America. They would not like the adoption of article [27] to 
encourage the formation of minorities, which was already bound to be 
promoted by the nationalist movements appearing everywhere in the 
world".64 
A number of them went so far as to declare that they had no minorities existing in 
their States. In this regard the position of the delegates from Brazil,65 Chile66 and 
Ecuador'7 needs to be noted. In addition to the stance adopted by the so-called "countries 
of immigration"68 representatives from a number of Asian and Mrican States presented a 
similar view.69 Although the Eastern European States adopted a more favourable 
approach towards the existence of minorities, they were reluctant to make concession if it 
threatened their socio-political ideologies.70 The recognition of the existence of religious 
minorities was, for instance, a difficult issue. The attitude of the former German 
Democratic Republic is typical in the sense that it asserted that since there was no State 
religion there were no religious minorities either. 71 However vacillation has not merely 
been an attribute of the formerly communist States, but can also be evidenced in 
assertions of western democracies. France, for example made a formal declaration in 
which it stated that "Article 27 is not applicable so far as the Republic is concerned".72 
The obligations in the article require States "not to deny the right [to persons 
belonging to minorities] to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own 
religion, or to use their own language". The wording of the provision, contrary to other 
64 GAOR, 16th Session, 3rd Committee, 1103rd meeting, para 19~ also note the view ofMr Cox (peru) 
in 1104th mtg., para 4. 
65 Ibid. 1103 mtg. para 12 
66 Ibid. para 23 
67 Jbid, para 44. 
68 Australian delegate ibid. para 25 
69 See the position adopted by the delegate from Guinea ibid. para 53. 
70 See e.g. the comments ofthe Soviet delegate Mr Sapozhnivikov l104th meeting. paras 10-12. 
71 GAOR, 33rd Session, Special Suppl. No 40, UN Doc N33/40 para 177. 
12 Human Rights, International Instruments, sign.:1tures, Ratification and Accessions etc. 
STIHRI4IREV.4 
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articles, is definitely negative in tone,73 and there is a clear difference in approach from 
other provisions where an express prohibition is involved.74 The distinction of individual 
or collective rights also does not provide a clear answer as the only provision containing 
collective rights in the Covenant has been put considerably forcefully; article 1, as we 
have already indicated, provides All Peoples with a Right to self-determination. 
The obligations that are to be imposed upon State parties have been a matter of 
considerable debate. As the discussions of the Commission indicate, it was the generally 
held view that the text that had been presented by the Sub-commission was not strong 
enough to place States and governments under the obligation of providing special facilities 
to members of minorities. The sole obligation that was placed on the States was not to 
deprive or deny members of the minority groups of the status they were already enjoying.7s 
The culmination of these factors have led a number of academics to suggest that State 
parties are only required to adopt a benevolent attitude towards their minorities, not to 
hinder in exercising the rights as stated in the article and to do nothing positive to protect 
their minorities from being assimilated by the dominant majority. Indeed, there is a 
considerable academic body which considers that article 27 does not provide collective 
rights at all. According to Modeen 
"The clause speaks of the rights of a (national) minority member in 
community with other members of his group to use his own language and 
enjoy his own cultur~. Such formulation cannot be interpreted as affording 
any collective rights. The clause in fact merely states the obvious, that a 
member of a national minority speaks his own language within his group 
and cultivate his own qualities. Thus article 27 reveals an individualistic 
73 In contrast see e.g. Article 18(1) "Every one shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion", Article 24(3) "Every child has the right to require a nationality". 
74 sec e.g. Article 7 "No one shall be subjected to torture, cruel, in human or degrading treatment" 
7S According to Capotorti during the discussions at the Commission "It was generally agreed that the 
text submitted by the Sub-Commission would not for example place States and governments under 
obligation of providing special schools for persons belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic 
minorities. Persons who comprised of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities could as such request 
that they should not be deprived of the rights recognised in the draft article. The sole obligation 
imposed upon them was not to deny that right". Capotorti. 36. 
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approach to the minority problem. According to its wording the clause 
does not concern minorities as such, but only single members of it. 
The minority States are not required to enter into any commitments 
to protect their minorities, beyond avoiding hindrances on the minority 
group employing their own language and developing their own culture. 
With this unclear formulation it is difficult to discover any express right for 
a national minority to establish its own schools, even at its own expense 
and even less are they entitled to receive instructions in their own tongue in 
schools mandated or supported by the State. Nor is there any sign that 
minority possesses the right to use its own language in relationships with 
public authorities". 76 
He then advances on the premise that 
"the international Bill of Human Rights is thus no real advance on 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, so far as the treatment of 
national minorities is concerned"." 
In Tomuschat's view, article 27 protects only individual persons and not minority 
groups as such, a formulation that "can not be viewed just as an accident of drafting".78 
Similarly, Sohn sees the structure of article 27 as "a deliberate decision to avoid giving to 
the group an international personality". 79 Dinstein, however, is not in favour of adopting a 
restrictive view. His approach is that if article 27 is not to be rendered meaningless, it 
must go beyond the ambit of article 18 because "the intention of the drafters of article 27 
is to grant collective human rights to members of a minority qua a group". 80 In an earlier 
work, which has carried substantial influence, he is firmly of the view that "international 
76 Italics added; T Modeen, The Protection of National Minorities in Europe, (Abo: Abo Akandmi) 
1969, 108. 
77 Ibid. 
7B C Tomuschat "Protection of Minorities under article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights" Volkerrecht als Rcchtsordnung Internationale Gerichtbarkeit Menscherrechte 
Festschrift Fur Herman Mosler (1983),949-979,954. 
79 Sohn "Protection of Minorities" Henkin, 270-289, 274. 
80 Y Dinstcin "Freedom of Religion and Protection of Religious Minorities" in Y Dinstein and M 
Tabory (eds.) The Protection of Minorities and Human Rights, (Dordrecht: M.Nljhoff), 1992, 145-
170. 
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law accords rights-on a collective basis-to ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities"8! and 
in fact goes on to treat the provisions of the article as declaratory in nature and reflecting 
minimum rights recognised by customary law,82 a matter which is of considerable debate 
and shall be addressed separately. 
Equally, it makes sense to argue that, in order for the article to have any meaning 
over and above the other provisions of the Covenant, it must carry some positive 
obligations.8] A necessary corollary of the preservation of cultural, religious, and linguistic 
autonomy is the imposition of positive obligations. The usage of the term "in Community 
with others" could also be used in favour of a more positive interpretation of the article as 
it is the community which is the source of the individual's religion, race and language.84 
This interpretation would be in line with the principles laid down in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of the treaties 1969. 8S Thornberry suggests that in order 
to add anything at all to the existing provisions relating to, for instance, the protection of 
religion and freedom of expression article 27 must be given a more forceful 
interpretation.86 To provide for the rights contained in article 27, it would appear that 
provisions similar in nature to article 18 and 19 must be read in conjunction with the rights 
provided in article 27. 
:: Y Dinstein "Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities" 25 ICLQ (1976) 102-120, Ill. 
Ibid., 118. 
8] F Capotorti "The Protection of Minorities under Multi-Lateral agreements on Human Rights" 2 IYIL 
(1976) 3, 22. 
84 F Ermacora, "The Protection of Minorities before the United Nations" 182 Rcc. des cours (1983), 
215, 366,322. 
8S UNTS No 58 (1980); Cmnd 7964. Article 31(1) provides "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith 
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of its object and purpose". 
86 Thornberry, 80. 
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Article 27 can be criticised in another important respect. It is not only emasculated 
in placing positive obligations on state parties, it is also limited in scope as far as the issue 
of locus standi is concerned. The provisions of the article are limited to persons and not 
to minorities hence, depriving the latter of any locus standi to bring action before the 
Human Rights Committee. In this regard the Committee has held that an organisation is 
ineligible to submit a communication.s7 Disappointing though it may seem, the constraints 
of international law prevented the adoption of a more revolutionary approach.88 
In the context of human rights, individuals as opposed to minority groups are 
generally given a locus standi before international tribunals. Though there has recently 
been some bias towards granting groups a certain limited standing,89 the overall 
framework discourages minorities as collectivities to challenge their States before 
international courts. Even in historical terms, when minorities were more a focus of 
international concern, the issue of international standing posed delicate questions. As 
Capotorti says: 
"In the system of protection of minorities established in 1919-1920, 
rights were accorded to individuals only. The theory of an international 
personality of minorities developed later, mainly owing to the fact that the 
right of petition was granted not only to members of minority groups but 
also to other groups themselves. But treaties and other international 
instruments relating to minorities concerned expressly with individual 
rights-the rights of persons belonging to minorities". 90 
The International Covenants, in line with other major international instruments 
discussed above generally accord the rights contained therein to individuals and it has been 
suggested that the position was followed for reasons of consistency.91 The political 
87 A Group of Associations for the Defence of the Rights of the Disabled and Handicapped persons in 
Italy etc., v Italy, GAOR, 39th session Supp No 40~ JRT and the WG Party of Canada v Canada, 
GAOR, 38th session, supp No 40, 263. 
88 Capotorti, 35. 
89 See e.g. article 14 oflhe Race Convention, article 25 of the ECHR and Art 44 of ACHR. 
90 Capotorti, 35. 
91 Ibid. 
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implications of providing minorities with an internationalioclis standi would create greater 
friction between minorities on the one hand and States on the other. In any event, if 
minorities were provided with locus standi, there would be a number of procedural 
problems, again involving the issue of what constitutes a minority and whether a certain 
section could in fact represent the group in question. However this lack of international 
standing need not be an unmitigating disaster. International law, despite efforts, has at 
best only partially succeeded in snatching away the limelight from minorities for even by 
the narrowest of interpretations which one is prepared to provide the "communal" element 
remains a key ingredient of the article. 
The Human Rights Committee IS the body in charge of implementing the 
Covenant. The jurisprudence of the committee under the Optional Protocol which permits 
individuals-from States who have become parties to both the Covenant and the Optional 
protocol-to submit communications to the committee, provides a helpful guide. Although 
a number of communications have involved a discussion of the provisions of article 27,92 
the case that has attracted most attention is that of Lovelace v Canada. 93 Mrs Lovelace 
had lost her status as a Maliseet Indian after her marriage to a non-Indian according to the 
Indian Act ofCanada.94 She claimed that an Indian man who married a non-Indian woman 
would not have lost his status and that the law was discriminatory. The essence of the 
original communication filed by her had been that this loss of status and deprivation of the 
right to return to her original reserve lands had been in breach of articles 2( 1), 3, 23 (1 ), 
23(4),26 and 27 of the Covenant. 
92 See e.g. ivan Kitok v Sweden lIRC, 33rd Session, UN Doc CCPRlC/331D11985 10 August 1988~ Chief 
Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake B and v Canada, Report of the Human Rights Committee, vol ii, 
GAOR 45 Session, Supp No 40, UN Doc N45/40, 1. No 167/1984) lIRC Selected Decisions. Note 
also the jurisprudence of Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) supra 
chapter 5 in particular A Yilmaz-Dogan v The Netherlands (No 111984) & Bemba Talibe Diop v 
France (No 211989) 
93 1981 1 HRC Selected Decisions, 83. 
94 S.12(l)(b)~ Can. Rev. Stat., C.l-6. 
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In relation to admissibility she had argued that she was not obliged to exhaust the 
domestic remedies that are provided in article 5(2)(a) of the Optional Protocol since the 
Canadian Supreme Court had already declared that regardless of any inconsistency with 
the Canadian Bill of rights and legislation prohibiting discrimination, the relevant 
provisions9s remained operative.96 The communication was declared admissible in August 
1979 and the Committee provided its interim decision in July 1980. In giving its decision 
the Committee took the view that the denial of opportunity to Sandra Lovelace to return 
to her reserves was essentially a breach of Article 27.97 The decision of the Committee is 
revealing for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Committee did not find it necessary to enter 
the maze of complications arising out of a probable definition of minority and assumed 
without much ado that Mrs Lovelace belonged to a minority. Secondly, the Committee 
while delivering its decision took into account the hybrid nature of the rights that arise 
from the provisions of the artic1e.98 It is hoped that this approach is continued when the 
Committee is faced with communications from States like those from Latin America which 
have persistently insisted on the non-existence of minorities within their jurisdictions.99 
9~ ibid. 
96 A-G of Canada v. Jeanette Lavelle. Richard isaac et al v Yvonne Bedard (1974). SCR 1349. 
97 "The rights under article 27 of the Covenant have to be secured to 'persons belonging' to the 
minority. At present Sandra Lovelace does not qualify as an Indian under Canadian 
Legislation ... Persons who are born and brought up on a reserve, who have kept ties with their 
community and wish to maintain these ties must normally be considered as belonging to that minority 
with in the meaning of the Covenant...The right to live on a reserve is not as such guaranteed by 
article 27 of the Covenant...However, in the opinion of the Committee the rights of Sandra Lovelace 
to access to her native culture and language' in community with the other members' of her group, has 
in fact been. and continues to be interfered with. because there is no place outside the Tobique 
Reserve where such a community exists. On the other hand, not every interference can be regarded as 
a denial of rights with in the meaning of article 27 .. The Committee recognises the need to define the 
category of persons entitled to live on a reserve, for such purposes as those explained by the 
government. .. Article 27 must be construed and applied in the light of other prOvisions mentioned 
above ... Whatever be the merits of the Indian Act in other respects it does not seem to the committee 
that to deny Sandra Lovelace the right to reside on the reserve is reasonable, or necessary to preserve 
the identity of the tribe". 
98 Sec para 15 ibid. 
99 See infra text accompanying note 64-71. 
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In Kitok v Sweden,l°O the petitioner alleged that he had inherited rights in reindeer 
breeding, land and water in Sorkaitum Sam village, but through the operation of a 
Swedish law, he was denied the power to exercise those rights resulting from the loss of 
his membership from the Sam village. The communication alleged violations of micle 1 
and 27 of the ICCPR. The Committee declared his claim inadmissible under article 1 
viewing that the "author, as an individual, could not claim to be the victim of a violation of 
the right to self-determination. Whereas the Optional Protocol provides recourse to 
individuals claiming that their rights have been violated, Article 1 deals with rights 
conferred upon people as such" .101 As far as the provisions of article 27 were concerned, 
the Committee decided to consider the communication on its merits. However, it 
observed that the overall provision of Swedish law was consistent with the spirit of article 
27. 
7.4 SUPPORT FOR AUTONOMY OUTSIDE THE PROVISIONS OF 
ARTICLE 27 
The ICCPR is a multilateral treaty and hence in pursuance of the rule of pacta 
tertiis nec nocent nec prosllnt, prima facie binds only parties to the treaty. The rule is 
now expressed in article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969)102 
according to which "A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State 
with out its consent". Although there was a general consensus among the delegates that 
the Covenants presented an aspirational standard for all States of the world, it was equally 
clear that the document as a whole was not to be considered as forming customary 
100 CCPRlCl33D/19711985, lO August 1988; Human Rights Committee, 33rd session; Prior decisions 
CCPRlCIWG/271D1197 1985; CCPRlC129D/197 1985 (admfssibility 25 March 1987). 
101 63 para .. 
102 UNTS No 58 (1980); Cmnd 7964. 
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international law~103 they were more in the nature of "standards of achievement",I04 "a 
guide"los or as elaboration and extenuation of the principle enunciated in the United 
Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration. I06 
Hence, despite the fact that the ICCPR was adopted overwhelmingly,107 it still 
remains doubtful that the States which actually voted in favour of its provisions 
collectively in the form of a document would have endorsed each of its provisions 
separately. This opinion was clearly echoed by the representative of Japan who said that 
while her country had voted for the Covenant as a whole, had she been asked to provide 
an affirmative response to every provision that was in the Covenant the answer would 
have been different. 108 Similarly the representative of the USA stated in clear terms "Our 
affirmative votes do not of course express our agreement with or approval of every part of 
the Covenant" .109 
A provision of a treaty may attract binding force in customary international law 
provided it fulfils the basic criterion of the establishment of custom. IIO A treaty would 
generate rules of customary law if its text or its travaux preparatoires is declaratory of 
pre-existing law or if the rule stated in the treaty has crystallised customary law in the 
process of formation. \11 There also exists the possibility of the generation of new 
customary laws, emanating from the treaty rule subsequent to its adoption.112 
103 According to the representative of Philippines the Covenant provided a "standard of achievement". 
The Representative of Czechoslovakia said that it provided an anchoring of an international standard, 
and according to the representative of Columbia it was guide for world leaders. 
104 The representative of Philippines GAOR. 21 session, Plenary meeting, 1496. 
lOS Representative of Columbia. ibid. 
106 See the views oHhe Chinese Representative GAOR 9th session, UN Doc AlC.3.SR 570. 
107 105-0-0. 
108 GAOR. 1495th meeting. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Article 38 of VCLT 1969 provides that "Nothing in article 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a 
treaty from becoming binding upon a third state as a customary rule of international law, recognised 
as such". 
III "{Discussing the} situation where rules contained in a treaty (or treaties) commend themselves to the 
international community in general, so that the rules originally formulated in the treaty may come to 
have the character of customary law and as such be binding on those States which are not parties to 
the treaty" Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Auther Watts state "Quite apart form the final treaty provision 
itself, the preparatory work leading up to the negotiations for the treaty, and in some cases the course 
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However, in order to affirm the existence of customary rule through any of the 
aforementioned conditions, the basic criterion needs to be satisfied-the criterion requiring 
adequate proof of State practice alongside the requisite opinio juris. It needs to be 
recalled that Article 38 l(b) mentions "international Custom as evidence of general 
practice accepted as law". 1 \3 According to Brierly 
"Custom in its legal sense means something more than mere habit 
or usage; it is a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one. 
There must be present a feeling that, if the usage is departed from, some 
form of sanction will probably, or at any rate ought to, fall on the 
transgressor. Evidence that custom ... exists... can be found only by 
examining the practice of States; that is to say, we must look at what States 
do in their relations with one another and attempt to understand why they 
do it, and in particular whether they recognise an obligation to adopt a 
certain course." 114 
There obviously remains an inextricable link between the requirement of State 
practice and opinio juris-exemplification of which could be gauged from dicta of the 
Court in North Sea Continental Shelf Cases when it stated that "State 
Practice .... should ... have occurred in such a way as to show a general recognition that a 
rule of law or legal obligation is involved". 1 15 
As we have noted, the disagreements and uncertainties that are apparent from the 
travaux prt}paratoires, make it difficult to sustain the view that article 27 at least initially 
possessed, customary force, and the argument that article 27 was intended to become part 
of general international law may also be open to debate. Although there are provisions in 
of the negotiations themselves, will also have made its own contribution to the development of 
customary law, particularly in the case of those treaties which have been, carefully prepared in the 
manner of those flowing from the work of the International Law Commission". R Jennings and A 
Watts, (ed.) Oppenheim's International Law, vol. i, Peace, 9th edn., (Longman: Harlow) 1992,33. 
112 See the North Sea Continental Shelf cases 1969 IeJ Rep 3; 0 Schaeter "Entangled Treaty and 
Custom" in Y Dinstein, International law at a time of perplexity, Essays in honour of Shahta; 
Rosenne, (Dordrecht: M.Nijhofl), 1989,717-738, 718. 
113 Article 38 1(b) ofthe Statute ofthe ICJ see supra chapter 1. 
114 J Brierly, The Law of Nations (ed.) H Waldock 6th edn. (Oxford: OUP), 1963,59-60. 
115 IeJ Reports 1969,3 at 43. 
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the Covenant the customary nature of which is beyond question, the controversial position 
of article 27 makes it unlikely to be included in that list. As observed earlier, a number of 
governments were sceptical as to the nature and effect of the article. The approach 
adopted by France typifies the stance of a number of governments. France, as we have 
already noted made a specific reservation to Article 27 stating that: 
"in the light of Article 2 of the Constitution of the French Republic 
the French Government declares that Article 27 is not applicable so far as 
the Republic is Concerned". 
On the other hand, there is a body of international lawyers which is firmly of the 
view that the substance of article 27 carries significant value in general international law. 
We have already observed Professor Dinstein's view as regards what he believes as its 
positive value and provisions of a collective nature as provided in article 27. He is also of 
the view that article 27 is "declaratory in nature and reflects a minimum of rights 
recognised by customary international law"116 though he concedes that "what we have here 
is minimum rather that maximum of rights. There is need of further concertisation of 
general and somewhat abstract principles". 117 
The assertion that the substance of article 27 is reflective of customary law has 
been made by a number of noted authorities, although the claim is substantiated only 
indirectly. Professor Dinstein himself, relies upon the UNESCO Convention against 
discrimination 1960 the advisory opinion of PCIJ in the Minority Schools in Albania 
case. 118 Professor Brownlie's assertion that the substantive elements of article 27 
constitute general international law119 and his primary bases for such an argument is the 
irreversible nature of damage to cultural and linguistic identity hence putting the matter at 
116 Op.cit note 81, 118. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid.; also see Thornberry, 220. 
119 Re the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline enquiry: Consideration of Public International Law concerning the 
rights of the Dene and Inuit as the indigenous peoples of the North West territories of Canada, 
Opinion, 1976, ibid., 220-21; Personal Communication~ Professor Brownlie's response to the initial 
enquiry is thankfully acknowledged. 
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a level of fundamental human rights. While principles of fundamental human rights carry 
the value of obligations erga omnes, a possibility of irreversible degradation of minority 
characteristics merits the consideration at the same level. He reinforces his argument with 
the inclusion of a whole host of international instruments. 
Reliance has also been placed upon other possible sources of international law-
Capotorti for instance hypothesis that 
"While this article is not a source of legal obligations for States 
which have not yet ratified the covenant, the approval of the Covenant by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations has conferred upon the articles 
the value of general principles no less significant than those set forth in 
solemn United Nations Declaration. From this point of view, the right 
granted by Article 27 to persons belonging to .... minorities can be 
considered as forming an integral part of the system of protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms instituted after the Second World War".I20 
Apart from an explicit admission of the absence of legal obligations for States 
which have not ratified the Covenant, Special Rapporteur seems to be referring to 
"general principles" as enunciated in Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICl121 Equally, 
he may well be indicating at the possibilities of recognition of the substance of the article 
through its approval by the General Assembly which would be more opportune as its 
comes within the ambit of "soft law". 122 
The value of the arguments of the aforementioned jurists is no doubt substantial 
and carries weight. The increasing number of ratification's to the Covenant may take some 
heat out of the present discussion. It also seems to be the case that in so far as the article 
provides a limited right of persons belonging to minorities, the substance of this right is 
contemporaneously reflected in customary law. The debate surrounding the position of 
article 27 has been intensive, though not without reason. For a considerable period of 
time it has remained the sole beacon house for aspirations of autonomy on the part of 
120 UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub.2/3841 Add.4, para 1. 
121 Thornberry, 219. 
122 Ibid. 
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minorities. The substance of the right to autonomy which the article may be taken to 
provide is extremely limited, and in practice the value of its provisions may not be as 
imposing as have been made out by the commentators discussed above. International1egal 
norms and values however are not static~ progression is being made in the direction of 
recognising, albeit in a limited form, of autonomous development of minorities. 
If article 27 was to be formerly regarded as a sole phoenix of hope and inspiration 
to all minorities globally, it has been reinforced by a number of recent initiatives. The 
United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992 adopted 
the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities. 123 The Declaration was finally adopted after a considerable period 
of gestation. The former Yugoslavia had submitted to the Human Rights Commission a 
draft declaration in 1978124 and it had been decided to create a working group to consider 
the provisions of the declaration. For more than a decade the working group struggled in 
the labyrinth of definitional and substantive complexities before presenting its final version 
at the Commission's 1992 session. 12s The Commission adopted the Declaration and 
recommended the same to the ECOSOC and the General Assembly. 
The Declaration cannot by any stretch of the imagination be deemed as a giant step 
in the direction of autonomy for minorities. Its limitations are manifest from its stature as 
a General Assembly Resolution~ its conservatism obvious from its focus upon individuals 
or persons belonging to minorities, rather than minorities themselves. Thornberry 
highlights the points when he writes 
"The rights are those of 'persons belonging to' minorities, not 
minorities as such. The' persons' reference occurs at 24 points in the text. 
123 UN Doc AlResl471135 (Appendix 1) 
124 UN Doc.ElCN.4IL.l367IRev.l 1978. 
125 See the Commission on Human Rights, Report of the forty-eighth session, ECOSOC Official Records, 
1992, Supp No 2, 54~ UN Doc.E/1992 22~ E/CN.4/1992/84. 
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This is in line with article 27 of the [ICCPR] which describes the rights of 
individuals rather than groups" .126 
There are other possible drawbacks. The title adds the term "National" to 
"Ethnic", "Religious" and "Linguistic" minorities. While the usage of "National or 
Ethnic" has contributed to some confusion, the addition of ''National'' in itself has 
provided certain States with an opportunity to claim a limitation on the sphere of 
protection to nationals of the State alone. 127 The Declaration also fails to provide a 
definition of a "minority" which is unfortunate. As we have noted in an earlier chapter, a 
number of States have been reluctant to recognise the existence of minorities; international 
legal mechanisms like other legal principles can not be expected to work effectively in a 
vacuum. 
The Declaration, nonetheless, is a wider and more expansIve expression of 
minority aspirations and may be taken as a concerted effort on the part of the international 
community to overcome some of the limitations surrounding international law relating to 
the minorities. l28 Article 1(1), of the Declaration, in itself seems to be an advance over the 
previous position in so far as there is an explicit and positive ordinance that States 
"shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, 
religious or linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories 
and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity". 
Article 2(1) confirms and elaborates upon the position of article 27 of ICCPR. 
This provisions of the article present a more positive stance compared with the previous 
tentativeness associated with article 27; from mere non-denials to positive rights. It 
provides 
126 P Thornberry "The UN Declaration on Minority Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities" (cds.) A Phillips and A Rosas, The UN Minority Rights 
Declaration, (TurkulAbo: London), 1993,27. 
127 See, for example the German Position as adopted in its statement to the Human Rights Commission, 
working group. UN Doc ElCN .. 4/1991153, para 17. 
128 B Dickson "The United Nations and Freedom of Religion" 44 ICLQ (1995)327-357, 354. 
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"Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities 
(hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to 
use their own language, in private and in public, freely and without 
interference or any form of discrimination." 
Article 2(2) provides for wide-ranging participatory rights to persons belonging to 
minorities in "cultural, religious, social, economic and public life". The provision is 
extremely significant for our present debate as the recognition and authorisation of such 
rights form an essential element of the concept of autonomy. Similarly, article 2(3) 
provides for effective participation at national and regional levels and on matters which 
necessarily affect the position of minorities. Article 2(4) authorises persons belonging to 
minorities to establish and maintain their own institutions, a matter indispensable to the 
autonomous existence of minorities. 
Hence, article 2 as a whole, could be taken to bear significant value for our present 
debate; there is the explicit recognition of a measure of autonomy, even though the right 
to autonomy itself failed to be incorporated in the Declaration. Article 3 of the 
Declaration also carries a similar message. It reinforces the collective dimension with 
encouragement of the communal enjoyment of rights without discrimination of any sort. 
Article 4, is of considerable significance and deserve to be stated in full 
(1) States shall take measure to ensure that persons belonging to 
minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and 
fundamental freedom without any discrimination and in full equality before 
the law. 
(2) States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to 
enable persons belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and 
to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs except 
where specific practices are in violation of national law and contrary to 
international standards. 
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(3) States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever 
possible persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to 
learn their mother tongue. 
(4) States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of 
education, in order to encourage the knowledge of the history, traditions, 
language and culture of the minorities existing with in their territory. 
Persons belonging to minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain 
knowledge of the society as a whole. 
(5) States should consider appropriate measures so that persons 
belonging to minorities may participate fully in the economic progress and 
development in their country. 
Articles 5, 6, and 7 also carry considerable value. According to article 5, 
"legitimate interests" of the persons belonging to minorities would be taken in account 
when formulating national policies or programmes of co-operation and assistance among 
States. The emphasis of articles 6 and 7 is upon international co-operation in 
understanding the minority question in a more tolerant and rational manner. The 
Declaration as a whole has many positive elements; there are manifestations of the matter 
of autonomy as we have been discussing, though as we have noted earlier, suggestions to 
include a specific right to autonomy for minorities failed to be accepted. The communal 
aspects of existence of minorities is more pronounced, the references relating to State 
sovereignty and territorial integrity although integral to the Declaration are framed in a 
more accommodating manner, less confrontational to aspirations of autonomy and distinct 
identity. 
Having said that, the impulse of realisation of an element of international standard-
setting for minorities should not in any way be allowed to overwhelm or exaggerate 
reality. As noted earlier, the Declaration remains a General Assembly Resolution and its 
impact on the development of international law as yet unclear. Many of the substantive 
provisions of the Declaration are themselves framed in a rather general manner providing a 
number of States with the undesirable discretion. 129 Even as a political and moral 
129 Hence the position adopted by the Poland in the Human Rights Commission may be unduly 
optimistic according to which "Even though the text, was not perfect, it did appear to fulfil two 
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expression there have been controversies as to the rights of minorities and concern for 
State sovereignty and territorial integrity resurfaced frequently. Right to autonomy was 
not acceptable and even the "lower level" right to "self-management" failed to be 
incorporated. Connotations of autonomous development and the term "self' reminisces 
ominously to the explosive subject of self-determination.130 Again the manner and 
circumstances of the adoption of the Declaration may, as its critics would argue was 
probably more in response to the inability of the United Nations to take appropriate action 
to protect the rights of minorities, even after the East-West detente and the ending of the 
Cold War. 
A number of other international, regional and national instrument may provide 
some strength to the view of an emerging right to autonomy as has been discussed in the 
present chapter. The adoption of the revised ILO Convention, as we have seen promises 
to be a considerable advance on the position of Indigenous peoples and possibilities exist 
for the passage of the General Assembly Resolution on indigenous peoples.131 It is worth 
noting the recent initiative taken at a more regional level. The steps undertaken principally 
by the Council of Europe and OSCE are to be commended. The setting-up of the 
institution of High Commissioner for National Minorities promises to be a fruitful 
exercise. 132 Similarly the adoption and coming into operation of the European Charter 
essential requirements: firstly, it constituted a comprehensive international instrument in the field of 
protection of minorities, all of whose rights were clearly specified, and secondly, it clearly set out the 
commitments by which States could universally agree to be bound in so sensitive a sphere. It was 
thus a sound document. in line with the general approach to the question of international standards 
for the protection of the rights of minorities, and which, while ensuring a satisfactory balance 
between the rights of the nation as a whole." UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/SR18, para. 20. 
130 P Thornberry "International and European Standards on Minority Rights" Mial114-21. 
131 Supra chapter 3. 
132 CSCE Helsinki Decisions, 35 ILM 1992, 1385~ A de Zayas, "The International Judicial Protection of 
Peoples and Minorities" in C Brolmann, R Lefeber and M Zieck, Peoples and Minorities in 
International Law (Dordrecht: M. NijhofI), 1993, 253-287, 282~ A Bloed, "The OSeE and the issue 
of National Minorities" in A Phillips and A Rosas (eds), Universal Minority Rights, ( Abo Akademil 
MRG: TurkulAbo and London), 1995, 113-122, 116-119. 
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for Regional or Minority languages 1992,133 and the Framework European Convention for 
the protection of National Minorities 1994,134 would provide valuable contributions. 
The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages-the culmination of a 
project under consideration ever since 1988, in actual fact, leaves much to be desired. The 
Charter is essentially more an "undertaking" on the part of States to recognise minority 
languages rather than according specific linguistic rights to minority groups.13S However, 
the drawbacks of the Charter ought not to be allowed to negate its overall positive value. 
The issue of linguistic rights, has been a sensitive one, and minorities both in historical as 
well as contemporary terms have suffered greatly on the basis of discrimination on 
grounds of language. 
The recognition in the preamble of the Charter that "the right to use a regional or 
minority language in private and in public life is an inalienable right" is in itself 
commendable and worthy of appreciation. According to article 2, State parties undertake 
to base their policies, legislation and practice on the objectives and principles contained in 
Part II of the Charter-the main aim of the exercise is to ensure the usage of regional and 
minority languages in such key areas as education, media, in judicial and legal relations, in 
administration, media, cultural activities, and economic and social life. 
Notwithstanding its potentially greater significance, the present study does not 
analyse in any great depth the recently adopted Framework European Convention for the 
Protection of Minorities. The Convention was opened for signature on 1st February, 
1995. According to article 28 of the Convention 
"shall enter into force on the first day of the month following the expiration 
of a period of three months after the date on which twelve member States of 
the Council of Europe have expressed their consent to be bound .... " 
133 Adopted by the Committee of Ministers, opened for signature 2 October 1992. 
134 Council of Europe, H (94) 10, Strasbourg, 1994. Text also available in A Phillips and A Rosas (eds), 
op.cit note 132. 
135 P Thornberry "The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: Background Analysis Observations and an Update" in 
A Phillips and A Rosas (cds), op.cit note 132, 13-36, 6l. ' , 
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The very recent coming into operation of the convention, and a regional focus 
makes it difficult, at least for the time being to analyse adequately the convention's overall 
impact on general international law. Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the convention is 
definitely a positive and significant step forward in the direction of protecting the rights of 
minorities, as well as granting autonomy in the form which we have considered earlier. 
to 
In the Convention there is a firm recognition and undertaking on the part of States 
"promote conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities 
and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their 
identity, their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage.,,136 
The convention goes on to elaborate the manner and form in which the 
aforementioned commitments would be satisfied. Perhaps more significantly the 
convention provides for effective participatory rights-an essential ingredient in the concept 
of autonomy. 
7.6 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH TIlE RECOGNITION AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF AUTONOMY IN STATE PRACTICE 
The recognition and any implementation of the emerging right to autonomy 
presents significant differences in State practice, depending upon, inter alia, the 
comparative historical, political, social and economic background. The relatively gradual 
evolution of the advanced States of the industrialised world contrasts radically to the 
abrupt and often bloody conception of many of the States of Mrica and Asia. These new 
136 Article 5(1). 
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States that have emerged from the rubble of de-colonisation have often indicated that 
building up of the nation-State is indispensable even at the cost of assimilative measures. 
Independence for a number of States bore a heavy price, both in terms of human 
lives as well as resources. The aftermath of "liberation" however has been in many ways 
disillusioning: the Colonisers left behind them an inchoate, political and constitutional 
structure, the administrative and bureaucratic set-up being tailored to the needs of a 
colonising elite proved ineffective. There were huge social, political, economic, cultural 
and educational gaps amongst nationals of these States. The cases of, for example Sri 
Lanka, Malaysia, Pakistan, India, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda, amongst many others can be 
read out in support of this argument. 
The urge to build nation-States, in the absence of a developed and a balanced 
political set-up, often resulted in forced assimilation of populations, sometimes bordering 
upon active persecution and genocide. Minorities, in this struggle have been a prime 
victim~ their often artificial union to the State, their ability to attract trans-national 
sympathisers, and their irredentist stance in failing to give into the majority demands have 
raised suspicions on the part of modern governments. Their is no shortage of examples; 
the case of the "Jaffna" as well as Indian Tamils of Sri Lanka,137 the Indian and Chinese 
communities of Malaysia,138 the Pathans, Baluchis and Sindhis of Pakistan,139 the various 
ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities ofIndia,140 the Biharis and the indigenous peoples 
137 W Schwarz, The Tamils of Sri Lanka, (London: Minority Rights Group)~ also see AI, Sri Lanka. The 
North East: Human Rights vio/alions in a context of Armed Conflict, 1991 AI Index ASA 37/14191; 
AI, Sri Lanka An Assessment of Human Rights Situation ASA 37/1193; P Hyndman "The 1951 
Convention Definition of a Refugee: An Appraisal with particular reference to the case of Sri Lankan 
Tamil Applicants" 9 HRQ (1987), 49-73~ R Oberst "Tamil Militancy and Youth insurgency in Sri 
Lanka" in Vajpeyi and Malik; "Teenage Tigresses" Independent on Sunday, 26 February 1995. 
138 Van Dyke 
139 see infra Part IV. 
140 A Engineer, (ed.) Ethnic Conflict in South ASia, (Dehli: Ajanta Press), 1987; D Vajpeyi and Y Malik 
(eds.) 
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in Chittagong Hill tracts ofBangladesh,141 the Tibetans ofChina,142 the Asian population of 
Kenya and Uganda143 and many others instantly come to mind. 
It is perhaps not an exaggeration to suggest that the issue of minority rights has 
become ever more significant since the start of the decolonization process. Sadly the burst 
of decolonization has had little if anything to further the cause of self-determination for a 
considerable number of groups now arbitrarily placed in the new sovereign States. These 
groups, newly liberated from centuries of colonial domination, have only found it replaced 
by a local and more ugly from of oppression.144 Indeed, it is not surprising that a number 
of states from Asia and Africa have in the immediate aftermath of attaining their 
independence become victims of bitter inter-ethnic conflict and have not recovered since. 
The principle of uti possidetis had generally been followed which resulted 
in the creation of multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual States with artificially 
drawn boundaries. The origins of principle of uti possidetis could be traced in the early 
nineteenth century whereby the newly independent successor States of the former Spanish 
Empire in South and Central America were considered to have inherited the administrative 
divisions of the colonial empire as their new territorial boundaries.14s. 
The elaboration of the principle, as well as its rationale, was provided by the 
arbitrator in Columbia-Venezuela Award of 1922 
"The [Uti Possidetis] principle laid down the rule that the boundaries of the newly 
established republics would be the frontiers of the Spanish provinces which they were 
141 Father R Timm et aI, Adivasis of Bangladesh, (London: MRG), Keesings Contemporary Archives 
"Bangladesh: Documents in Chitta gong hill tracts" July 1986. 
142 S Subedi, "The Right of self-determination and Tibetan People" in Kritsiotis, 1-16~ lCoJ, The 
Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, (Geneva) 1959~ C Mullin and P Wangyal, The Tibetans Two 
Perspectives on Tibet-Chinese Relations, (London: MRG), 1983; AI, Peoples Republic of China 
Repression of Tibet, 1987-1992, 1992; "Tibetan tells of Chinese torture" Independent on Sunday, 26-
2-95. 
143 A Ghosal and T Crowly "Refugees and Immigrants: A Human Rights Dilemma" 3 HRQ (1983) 327-
347, 331~ M Akehurst "The Uganda Asians" 8 Nov. NU (1973), 1021. 
144 Thornberry "Self-Determination" 867~ J Rehman. Minority Rights: Assimilation or segregation, 
Unpublished LL.M Dissertation. University of Hull, 1991. 
14S M Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge: Grotius Publication), 3rd edn, 1991,302. 
204 
succeeding. This general principle offered the advantage of establishing the absolute rule 
that in law no territory of old Spanish America was without an owner" .146 
The doctrine has come to be accepted as having universal significance and global 
application; in essence the application of the principle meant that the demarcations of 
boundaries under the Colonial regimes corresponded to the boundaries of the new States 
that emerged.147 This phenomenon, however, in many instances has resulted in minorities 
in these new States often finding themselves trapped in an intolerant and repressive 
environment and many of the leaders from the minority groups feel that they have been 
denied the very right of self-determination, upon which their nationalistic movements were 
based. The picture has been eloquently summed up by Professor Claire PaHey when she 
says: 
"Recent social engineering activities, which have contributed to 
current world minority problems, have been the attempts by the newly 
independent nation states in Asia and Africa to build a nation. In this task 
many of the political elites took to heart the theories of sociologists and 
consciously tried to engage in social control activities. They tried to induce 
and regulate social change by reconstructing their political and economic 
institutions and to embody and to promote innovation and to enhance their 
efficiency by centralisation. They engaged in conflict management. They 
tried to induce national integration by attempting to control individuals' 
subjective loyalties and to redirect these to a new nation state so as to 
146 1 UNRIAA 1922, 223, 228~ cited in D Kritsiotis "Uti Possidetis in the Sudan: An Mrican Crises in 
Perspective" Kritsiotis, 73-91, 79. 
147 see Article 3(3) of the OAU Charter~ Principle III of the Helsinki Final Act 1975, 1975 ILM 1292; 
Article 62 2(2)(a) VCLT 1969, 58 UKTS, 1980, Cmnd 7964; Article 2 of the Vienna Convention of 
State succession in respect of treaties 1978 17 ILM 1488, 72 AJIL 971. For judicial 
acknowledgement of the principles see Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v Mali) 1986 IC] Reports 
554; G Naldi "The Case concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Mali) Uti Possidetis in an 
Mrican Perspective" 1987 ICLQ 893; Temple of Peach Vihar case (Merits) (Cambodia v Thailand) 
1962 IC] Rep 6, 16, 29; Rann of Kutch Arbitration 1968, 50 ILR 2, 408; Guinea-Guinea Bissau 
Maritime Delimitation case 77 ILR 1985,635,637; Arbitration tribunal in Guinea-Bissau v Senegal, 
199083 ILR I, 35~ Land, Islands and Maritime Frontier case: EI Salvador v Honduras (Nicaragua 
intervening) 1992 ICJ Rep 351, 380~ also see Sovereignty over Certain Frontiers (Belgium v the 
Netherlands) ICJ Rep 1959, 209, in particular Judge Moeno Quitana's dissenting opinion, 252; Avis 
Nos. 2 and 3 of the Arbitration Commission of the Yugoslavia Conference, 31 ILM 1497, 1499; Taba 
Award (Egypt v Israel) 80 ILR 1989, 224 in particular arbitrator Lapidoth's dissenting opinion; also 
see] Klabbers and R Lefeber "Mrica: Lost between Self-Determination and Uti-Possidetis" in (eds.) 
C Brolmann, R Lefeber and M Zieck, Peoples and Minorities in International Law, (Dordrecht: M. 
Nijhofl), 1993,33-76. 
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downgrade local loyalties. They have tried to create a common consensus. 
They sought to create a new ideology. They sought to give the new nation 
state and their own rule legitimacy. They featured selected national 
symbols (flag, national dress, national traditions). They tried to use 
language to draw the nation together. They tried to direct the economy 
and national wealth for national objects. The approach was usually 
authoritarian: in many cases one-party systems were set up by their 
constitutions. The history of such attempts is relatively short, but even so 
it can confidently be said that as yet such activities have seldom had the 
intended effects on racial, tribal, linguistic, religious and regional group 
loyalties" .148 
While many of the minority groups within these countries have continued to feel 
aggrieved and often discriminated and persecuted, the reasons for such a state of affairs 
are contemporary as well as historical. Professor Palley comments relating to the urge of 
Nation-building and national integration of desperate ethnic, linguistic and religious 
groups synthesise reality. However, the political elite that took over from the colonial 
masters in a number of instances felt that there options were limited. 
In many ways, the considerable demographic changes over centuries, the impact of 
colonisation and the after effects of decolonisation were to have a profound impact on the 
new successor states. Many of the contemporary problems relating to Asians in East 
Mrica, in Tanzania, Kenya, and in Uganda and in Fiji Islands~ the Blacks in the Americas 
reminisce a colonial legacy. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, substantial 
European migration took place primarily to America and Australia, while the indigenous 
population was wiped out by disease or killing. Similarly the white Colonisers transported 
various racial and ethnic groups with the intended purpose of propping up their own 
empires. 
148 PaHey,4. 
• 
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The issue of autonomy, for minorities, has been perceived as a probable threat to 
the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the State. Though the intensity of the 
conflict between minorities and the State may vary depending on a number of factors, its 
existence transcends all political and regional frontiers. Indeed, the former Communist 
regimes have been notorious for their stance on issues such as religious, cultural and 
linguistic tolerance. The imposition of a politically repressive and intolerant system was 
aimed at stripping the individual of his cultural, linguistic and religious identity. 
The issue of ethnic, linguistic and religious autonomy has not confined itself to the 
formerly Communist or developing States of Africa and Asia. Governments in Latin and 
North America and Australia have faced severe confrontation from their minorities and 
more significantly their indigenous populations. Equally in Western Europe, a number of 
minorities exist, and their position within their constitutional framework, as we shall 
observe shortly, has also engendered difficulties. 
Bearing in mind the present limitations of this study, it would not be possible to 
discuss in any detail the issues that have arisen in relation to the position of minorities 
within the constitutional framework of every state. The discussion that follows aims, 
however, at highlighting the myriad complexities and difficulties which the subject of 
minority rights could and does generate. Ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities have 
often found themselves being affected by State policies. 149 The aforementioned 
characteristics are interlinked and cannot be looked at in isolation. The case of the Jews, 
and to some extent the Muslims, provides a good example of this scenario. Ethnic, 
cultural, racial and religious values particularly in Africa and Asia have a strong influence 
on the development of a group. The Muslim minorities which regard themselves as 
culturally (and perhaps ethnically) different, in various States have shown extreme 
149 Kuper GenOcide; Potter; H Fien, Genocide Watch, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press), 
1992 provide useful historical expositions of cases where religious minorities have been persecuted by 
States. 
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displeasure in attempts on the part of the State to be assimilated. fearing that they might 
lose their religious and cultural identity.150 Racial, religious and linguistic dissonance 
involving Muslims has led to a number of genocidal conflicts in several territories 
including Palestine,1SI Lebanonl52 and, more recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina.1S3 A similar 
problem is faced by the disciples of certain other religions. These religious minorities have 
often suffered in Asia,154 Mrical55 and Eastern Europe.156 The religious conflict, with its 
political and economic connotations however is not confined solely to the developing 
world as is signified in the cases of Spain and Northern Ireland. \S7 
Language is the vehicle for cultural and moral development of a group, and the 
strategic position which language enjoys has often been a source of friction between the 
State on the one hand and minorities on the other. There are a variety of ways in which 
linguistic persecution could be engineered. These modes include 
"denial of opportunity to acquire and employ the mother tongue, 
the language of the elite or world languages~ deprivation imposed upon 
individuals through group identifications effected by language for access to 
different value process (as for employment); the conduct of community 
process and enterprises, especially of enlightenment and power, in 
languages alien to members of the community and finally the coerced 
learning of specified languages other than the home language". 158 
150 See for instance the position of Muslims in the United Kingdom, in Thailand and India; T Wright Jr, 
"North Indian Muslims: The Mobilisation and Demobilisation of a Former Elite" in J Ross and A 
Cottrell (cds.), The Mobilisation of Collective Identity: Comparative Perspectives, (University Press 
of America), 1980,279-296. 
151 On the issue of Palestinian Refugees see F D'Souza and J Crisp et ai, The Refugee Dilemma, 
(London: MRG) 1985. 
152 D McDowall, Lebanon: A Conflict o/Minorities (London: MRG) Rev ed, 1986. 
\S3 J Rehman, "International Community Accomplice to massacre or Globo-cop of human rights The 
Case ofthe Bosnian Muslims" (eds.) H Cullen, D Kritsiotis, N Wheeler (cds.) Politics and the Law 0/ 
former Yugoslavia, (Hull: University Press), 1993. 
IS4 For the position of Chinese in India and Malaysia see Van Dyke, 64-66; R Cooper, Baha'is of Iran 
(London: MRG), 1991. 
155 See a variety of reports produced by MRG. 
IS6 Ibid. 
IS7 Palley, 14; 
IS8 M Mcdougal, H Lasswell and L Chen, Human Rights and World Public Order The Basic Policies of 
an International Law of Human Rights (New Haven and London: Yale University Press) 1980, 174 
footnotes omitted; Van Dyke, 17-51. 
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States have adopted a wide range of measures from legal equality of all regional 
languages to the designation of one language as the sole official language. ls9 The cases of 
Malaysia, Thailand, Iran, Sri Lanka and Burma typify situations where minority linguistic 
groups have felt being dominated by the policy of a single official language. The attempts 
to re-assert the hegemony of a single language has raised considerable political strife in 
countries like India, Canada and Belgium.16O 
A survey of a number of States shows that the issue of language has generated a 
series of conflicts. In some countries, the imposition of the language of one ethnic group 
as the official language has led other groups to feel that they are being discriminated and 
exploited. In many newly independent States of Asia and Africa, the adoption of national 
language has remained a thorny issue and ironically in the aftermath of independence the 
retention of the language of the former coloniser has proved less divisive than its 
replacement by a single indigenous language. 161 The case of Kurds in Iraq, Iran and 
Turkey, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, Muslims in India, and the various ethnic groups of 
Pakistan raise delicate questions as to the policy which, a developing state needs to adopt-
while accommodating the linguistic interests of the minority groups, also balances with the 
limited resources that are available for a developing country. 
Cultural values, though often an amalgamation of various distinct features, emerge 
from religious beliefs and linguistic orientations. A discussion of culture has frequently 
emerged where a State contains an indigenous population. While in the Americas162 and 
Australia the indigenous population has been persecuted, the issues of the treatment of 
such groups as the migrant workers, and immigrants from the former colonies has 
attracted major criticism of certain European States. The Asian and Black communities in 
the United Kingdom, the Blacks and Spanish-speaking groups in the United States of 
159 J Paradis "Language Rights in Multicultural States: A Comparative Study" 48 eBR, (1970) 651. 
160 Infra. 
161 For the case of Pakistan see Part IV infra. 
162 J Clincbcll and J Thomsom "Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans 
under International Law" 27 BufJ.LR (1978) 669-714. 
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America, the Gypsies, the Laps in Finland and Sweden have all had to confront particular 
difficulties. 
The feeling of mistrust and apprehension between minority groups on the one hand 
and the State on the other has led to a number of conflicts. The Civil War in Sudan from 
1956-1972,163 the Kurdish rebellion in the early 1970's,l64 the civil war in Nigeria and the 
civil strife in Northern Ireland are all a manifestation of this fact. It seems that a primary 
source of conflict arises because the minority groups feel that they could not participate in 
the political, economic and social life of their country. They feel discriminated and 
consider that the State is deliberately employing tactics to deprive them of their cultural, 
religious or linguistic identity. A number of socio-economic, political and historical 
factors may add to the divisions within the State. 
A vast array of constitutional devices provide considerable options and include 
pluralism, integration, assimilation, and segregation. Whereas examples of all these 
approaches could be discerned from the State practice of a number of States, it is also 
quite possible that the State may at anyone time be employing two or more methods for 
different groups at the same time. Assimilation as a constitutional device with its emphasis 
on individual equality and non-discrimination has been widely practised. Almost all 
constitutions reflect assimilationist tendencies of this nature, though it may manifest in, for 
example, in the incorporation of a Bill of Rights, Non-justifiable Directory principles of 
State Policy (India and Pakistan) and other non-discriminatory statutes and provisions. In 
a plural system, distinctly separate institutions for minorities are recognised and provided 
for, with the objective of realising their autonomous development. 
Federalism is sometimes seen as a proper mode of granting autonomy to regions 
on a territorial basis. Federal constitutions in general terms could be regarded as ones 
where the powers of government are divided between the Central and provincial 
163 See the discussion supra chapter 6 
164 D McDowell The Kurds, (London: MRG), 1991. 
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government. However, as Professor PaUey reminds us, and as we have seen from the case 
of former Yugoslavia and USSR, Federalism does not provide an absolute guarantee for 
minority autonomy. 
"The prognosis for successful Federalism depends upon the 
circumstances under which the Federal state has been created. If it is 
merely a legacy of imperialism and it is a vast territory with agglomerations 
of ethnic groups, then the state will face almost insuperable difficulties, 
which would have arisen irrespective of its principle of constitutional 
organisation. Federation will have been adopted as a last resort and as 
giving the best chance to the new state of surviving intact. Many new 
Federations failed, it is surprising that many more have not collapsed ... Only 
if a Federation has arisen out of Organic growth, support by a need for 
common defence and a desire to exploit economic opportunities, has it in 
the long run been successful e.g. Switzerland, United States and Australia. 
Mere artificial creations are unlikely to be held together by constitutional 
glue and in the long run to survive basic disunity" .165 
Professor Palley then goes on to provide the example of Canada with considerable 
demand on the part of French Quebecois of complete autonomy bordering on secession; 
there are many other examples. Lebanon and Cyprus, for instance, present two leading 
cases where attempts to accommodate minority aspirations and recognition as distinct 
collectivities through constitutional devices have failed. Lebanon's population, though 
divided equally between Muslims and Christians, branches out into various sects. The 
primordial recognition of the existence of various groups resulted in the adoption of a 
constitution which assigned seats on the basis of religious denominations. The 
Constitution, however, was abrogated in 1947 which was also against the spirit of the so 
called National pact which had provided sanctity to the recognition of communal 
existence. Despite the constitutional rearrangements and expansion of parliamentary 
representation in 1966, political stability was not forthcoming. While the presence of 
165 Palley, 8. 
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Palestinian resistance groups provided Israel the pretext to intervene intermittently, Syria's 
military intervention only helped to complicate the dynamics of the conflict. l66 
The 1960 Constitution of Cyprus, a most comprehensive (though complicated) 
attempt at satisfying both Greek and Turkish communities failed in a very short space of 
time. Although the constitutional provisions, in a determined fashion, tried to provide for 
proportional representation in political and administrative sections, the mutual mistrust 
between Greeks and Turks often lead to deadlocks, constitutional crises and ultimately 
provided a pretext for the Turkish invasion in 1974.167 
Certain other constitutional practices provide more cause for optimism. 
Switzerland for instance is an excellent example of a country where political 
decentralisation has kept different linguistic groups from confronting each other. The 
Italian practice of regionalism has defused pre-existing tensions and prejudices amongst 
the various ethno-nationalist groupS.I68 From a positive perspective of accommodating 
minorities the arrangement as regards Trentino-Alro Adiege Region and its provinces of 
Bolonzo are worthy of appreciation. Similarly, the constitutional and administrative 
changes that took place in Belgium over a period of time, in particular during 1970-1974 
set up the example of a case of the application of group rights on the basis of their 
linguistic-cultural distinctiveness by constitutional amendments, legislation and 
compromise.169 According to Dr Thornberry 
"The whole intention of the division of Belgium into Flemish, 
French and German language communities in the Belgian scheme is to 
maintain cultural distinctiveness even at the expense of individual choice. 
In Belgium the territorial principle is dominant-the principle that an 
individual's rights depend not altogether on preferences but upon their 
geographical location. The equilibrium between linguistic groups is 
maintained from the level of the Belgium cabinet down to local and 
166 J Sigler, Minority Rights A Comparative Analysis (London: Greenwood Press), 1983, 111-112; Van 
Dyke, 57-58. 
167 Ibid. 112-113; Van Dyke, 57-58. 
168 Palley, 14 
169 Ibid. 
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communal level, and effects commerce as much as education. The effect of 
this complicated bifurcation of rights and responsibilities is that each 
linguistic community is treated as corporate entity with its own or 
collective rights. The interests of individuals are mediated through the 
community to which they belong, and group rights exist to complement 
individual rights or to compete with them". 170 
It seems to be the case that in States where the existence of minority 
groups is recognised officially, the right of members of these groups to maintain and 
develop their own culture is generally recognised. However, in those States where the 
existence of minorities is denied a policy of assimilation would appear to be pursued. 
Capotorti provides the examples of a number of Latin American States where expression 
of minority aspiration is not encouraged.171 Use of Languages other than Spanish have not 
been not permitted in Argentina. Similarly Chile, and Brazil are reported to have been 
actively pursuing a policy of cultural and linguistic assimilation. 172 
7.6 CONCLUSIONS 
A debate on the emerging right of autonomy is complex~ the probable 
change in trends which we have already considered points, it can be contended, to a 
progression in the direction of recognition of some form of autonomy for minorities. Its 
advance is slow; its limit and scope uncertain. State practice in this politically tumultuous 
period can be very unpredictable. The issue of minority rights could, as it has in States of 
Eastern and Central Europe, so cataclysmically, engulf the international community. If 
170 P Thornberry, Minorities and Human Rights Law, (London: MRG), 1987, 11; also see the Case 
Relating to certain Aspects of the Laws on the use of Languages in Belgium, Judgement. 23 July, 
1968 European Court of Human Rights Ser A No 6; M McDougal, H Lasswell, L-C Chen, "Freedom 
from discrimination in choice of Language and International Human Rights" lSIULJ (1976), 151-
174, 167-170. 
171 Capotorti, 52-3. 
172 Ibid. 53. 
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this indeed were to happen, the existing State structure would be the first causality; 
governments chastened by recent experiences may not find it easy to reconcile notions of 
nation-building, as against autonomy and self-determination. The problems, though not 
exclusive to the developing world, are probably more acute there. The urgency to build 
nation-states from otherwise artificially united peoples, with repressive and totalitarian 
regimes has produced a backlash of considerable force sometimes threatening the very 
fabric of the State. 
The debate on the limits of minority rights may well be unending. International 
law, operates through the medium of States and minorities are confronted with the 
principles of State sovereignty and territorial integrity. Minorities, like those of the Kurds 
of Iraq, Iran and Turkey, non-Arab population of Southern Sudan, Tamils of Sri Lanka, 
the Tibetans of China would find bliss in securing genuine autonomy. Autonomous 
development can not be taken as an absolute panacea to the global pathologies, though its 
healing ability may be invoked in such wide and varied cases as the West Bank and Gaza 
strip, Northern Ireland, and even the Falklands (Malvinas) Islands.173 The link between 
minority rights and self-determination is not necessarily secession. Meaningful autonomy 
may provide satisfactory answers and yet the international community of States remains 
reluctant to endorse such a course of action. 1 74 
Some States even though practising liberal policies of autonomy in their domestic 
laws find it difficult to recognise and to be bound by principles of autonomy, self-
government or self-determination. Thornberry's comments may provide a useful point to 
conclude the discussion. 
"Although it is sometimes resorted to as a means of reconciling the 
minority and state, the right to autonomy is not a specific right of 
173 See W Reisman "The Struggle for the Falklands" 93 Yale LJ (1983) 28-58, where he draws an 
analogy of Falklands to Aaland Islands in suggesting the establishment of a similar form of 
autonomy, 57-58. 
174 See P Alston, "The Security Council and Human Rights: Lessons to be learned from the Iraq-Kuwait 
Crises and its aftermath" 14 AYBlL (1990-1) 107-175. 
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minontles in contemporary international law. An evolution may be 
underway in this respect towards greater recognition of autonomy by 
international law. For the time being we are faced with the paradoxical 
situation that states practising generous policies of autonomy in their 
internal law may be very reluctant to translate this into binding or even 
hortatory international norms". 115 
115 P Thornberry "International and European Standards on Minority Rights", Miall, 14-21,20. 
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INTRODUCTION TO PART IV 
Part III of the present work (chapters 5-7) while examining the existing legal 
norms relating to the rights of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities has highlighted 
both weaknesses in the substance of these rights and the problems associated with their 
effective implementation. As noted in Part III, State practice has varied considerably in 
relation to the recognition, promotion and protection of the rights of minorities. Some 
States have treated their minorities generously while others have dealt with them 
contemptuously and disdainfully, often exploiting the weaknesses in international legal 
norms to their greatest advantage. 
The differences in State practice, are matched by, and are consequent upon the 
social, political, cultural, religious and regional peculiarities of minorities.! Indeed a wide 
variety of historical, economic, cultural, sociological and political factors have an 
important bearing not only on the form and nature of claims that are made by the minority 
groups, but also on the reaction to these demands on the part of the State concerned? In 
view of these factors, it is submitted that a global overview of minority rights may be 
inadequate and merely vacuous. Hence, the present part while focusing on the case of 
Pakistan, with its own historical, political and constitutional complexities, highlights the 
problems and difficulties of international law in providing adequate rights to minorities and 
for effectively safeguarding those rights. 
As a matter of fact the case of Pakistan provides an intriguing example of 
multifarious issues that are confronted by international law in relation to the protection of 
the rights of minorities. The arbitrary incision of India along religious lines in August 
2 
J Robinson "International Protection of minorities A Global view" 1 IYBHR (1971), 61-91,61. 
R Wrising, (ed.) Protection of Ethnic Minorities Comparative Perspectives, (New York: Pergamon 
Press) 1981~ F Heinz Indigenous populations. Ethnic Minorities and Human Rights, (Berlin: Quorum 
Verlag) 1988; J Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative Analysis, (London: Greenwood Press) 1983; 
Hannum. 
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1947,3 resulted in the physical extermination of hundreds of thousands of men, women and 
children.4 The partition also created millions of refugees, conceiving the "largest inter-
country transfer of population in the twentieth century". S Accurate figures for those who 
were killed or forced to become refugees are not available. According to Ben Whitaker 
and his collaborators "in all nearly one million people were killed during the period of 
partition. A total of some eight million Muslim refugees moved from India into Pakistan, 
and a similar exodus of Hindus and Sikhs took place in the reverse direction".6 Despite 
the presence of evidence of imputability on the part of groups of individuals and to lesser 
extent the governments of India and Pakistan, in the persecution and genocide of their 
religious minorities, no legal action was undertaken either at the domestic or international 
level.' 
After 1947, Pakistan's association with discrimination, persecution and physical 
extermination of its minorities continued, though ethnic and linguistic communities became 
more a focus of attention. Emergence as an independent State was to signal the start of 
bitter inter-ethnic rivalries resulting in the rupture of the show of solidarity which was 
evident immediately preceding independence. Ethnic identifications which had, at least 
temporarily, lost their strength emerged with greater vigour, with until 1971 the country 
J 
4 
s 
6 
The Partition of India also resulted in the geographically anomalous State of Pakistan see infra; J 
Crawford, The Creation of States in International law, (Oxford: OUP) 1979 115-117. 
For useful discussions in English see L Collins and 0 Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, (London: 
Collins) 1975; P Moon, Divide and Quit, (London: Chatto and Windus) 1961: L Kuper Genocide, 
infra chapter 9. 
E Haque, The Dilemma of Nationhood and Religion: A "State of Art" Review of Research on 
Population Displacement Resulting from the Partition of the sub-continent, Paper presented at the 
fourth Research and Advisory Panel conference on Forced Migration (IRAP) University of Oxford, 
Oxford, England, 5-9 Jan, 1994, 3~ According to Wilcox "The creation of Pakistan implied not only 
the drawing of administrative lines but also the largest population transfer in modem history" W 
Wilcox, Pakistan The Consolidation of a Nation, (New York and London: Columbia University 
Press) 1963,53. 
B Whitaker et ai, The Biharis in Bangladesh, (London: MRG), 1978, 7; Haque considers the number 
of voluntary and involuntary migrants to be exceeding 13 million, Haque op.cit note 5, 3. 
See infra chapter 9. 
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serving as a battlefield for the anti-antithetical visions of Bengali and West Pakistani 
nationalism.8 
Forced assimilation of its ethnic and linguistic communities, in particular the 
Bengalis and patent discrimination against them resulted in the civil war of 1971.9 While 
the international community remained apathetic to the reasons that led to the civil war, 
generally treating this issue as a matter of domestic jurisdiction under article 2(7) of the 
United Nations Charter,IO the peremptory norms of international law relating to the 
prohibition of genocide conspicuously failed to provide any form of protection to the 
Bengalis. It is estimated that between 1-3 million Bengalis were massacred, \I many of 
them becoming victims of genocidel2 with the civil war creating nearly 10 million refugees. 
In the wake of the United Nations failure to act, the Indian military intervention 
and the modus operandi of the process of the birth of Bangladesh promised to lend 
support to the otherwise suspect doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Military 
intervention provided encouragement to those who advocated such actions as an 
exception to the general rule prohibiting the use of force. 13 According to Professor Lillich 
the military action by India 
8 C Kennedy, "Policies of ethnic preferences in Pakistan" 24 AS (19&4),6&&-703,6&&. 
9 Ibid.; R Jahan, Pakistan The Failure of National integration, (New York: Columbia University 
Press) 1972; G Chaudhury, "Bangladesh: Why it happened" JAjJs (1972) 242-249; 0 Nornan. 
Pakistan A Political and Economic History Since 1947, (London: Kegan Paul International) 1990. 
10 Article 2(7) provides "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require 
the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" . 
II "In East Bengal between I million and 3 million civilians were massacred in 1971 by Pakistan army 
in a vain attempt to halt Bangladesh's secession" T Gurr, 92; Kuper, Genocide, 79; L Kuper, 
Prevention o/Genocide. 1985,47-48. 
12 A Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh. (Deh1i: Vikas Publications) 1971; N Macdermot, "Crimes 
Against Humanity in Bangladesh" IL (1973), 476-4&&, 4&l. 
\3 Even critics of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention like Franck and Rodley were forced to 
concede that "International law is not static. The Bangladesh experience is an instance, by far the 
most important in our times, of the unilateral use of military force justified inter alia. on human 
rights grounds and India succeeded. International law as a branch of behavioural science, as well as 
normative philosophy, may treat this event as the harbinger of a new law that will hence forth, 
increasingly govern inter-State relations. Perhaps India's example, by its success, has already entered 
in to nation's conscious expectations". T Franck and N Rodley "After Bangladesh The Law of 
Humanitarian Intervention" 67 AJIL (1973), 275-305, 303. 
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"following months of inactivity by the United Nations and the world 
community generally in the face of obvious gross human rights deprivations 
in the area, manifestly calls for a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
protection of human rights by general international law. The doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention, whether unilateral or collective, surely deserves 
the most searching reassessment given the failure of the United Nations to 
take effective step to curb the genocidal conduct and alleviate the mass 
suffering which took place in ...... Bangladesh" .14 
Throughout the conflict, while the United Nations Security Council 
remained bitterly divided, unwilling and unable to take any form of action, the 
deliberations of the General Assembly and other United Nations organs reflected more a 
concern for the preservation of territorial integrity and State sovereignty than the 
persecution and genocide of Bengalis, with most States anxious to prevent their own 
recalcitrant minority groups from contemplating any similar action. IS While the 
international community failed to take any effective action in East Pakistan, India's 
unilateral action, arguably motivated more due to political concerns helped in the 
conception of the first and until recently perceived to be the only successful secessionist 
movement of the post-colonial era. As Gurr points out 
"Until the dissolution of the USSR in 1990, the only 
ethnonationalists since 1945 who had won independence from existing 
states were the Bangladeshes, whose independence was bought at the price 
of political mass murder and India's intervention" .16 
14 R Lillich "The Internatioll.:'tl Protection of Human Rights by General International Law. Second 
Interim Report of the Sub-committec" (R Lillich Rapporteur) in Report of the International 
Committee on Human Rights on the International Law ASSOciation, 1972, 38. 
IS ICol, The Events of East Pakistan, 1971 (Geneva. 1972) 85; Kuper Genocide, 58; V Nanda "A 
Critique of the United Nation's inaction in the Bangladesh Crises" 49 DenU (1972), 53-67; J 
Salzburg "United Nations Prevention of Human Rights Violations The Case of Bangladesh" 27 10 
(1973). 115-127; also see T Franck and Radley "The Law, the United Nations, and Bangladesh" 2 
IYIlR (1972), 142-175; infra chapter 9. 
16 T Gurr, 319; uThe only successful case of post-colonial secession is that of Bangladesh. The 
instrument oCthe right in that case was not international law, but the Indian army" P Thornberry "Is 
there a phocnix in the Ashes? International law and Minority Rights" 15 Tex.IV (1980), 421-458~ 
453~ also see Kuper, Prevention of Genocide. 44; R White, "Self-determination: Time for a Re-
assessment" 28 NILR (1981) 160; V Nanda. "Self-determination in International Law A Tragic tale 
oftwo Cities Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)" 66AJIL (1972), 321-336, 322. 
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More unfortunate was the fact that no trials could be held for those 
involved in committing war crimes and crimes against humanity including acts of 
genocide. 17 There were no significant problems relating to jurisdiction or custody of those 
accused of committing such crimes. However political considerations proved far too 
strong and overpowered any legal or humanitarian concerns with China and the US, both 
permanent members of Security Council putting pressure on the unconditional release of 
the Pakistani prisoners of War. Equally Bangladesh required the much needed economic 
and financial aid to develop its damaged infra-structure, and in the end aU prisoners of war 
were unconditionally repatriated without any trials being conducted. ls 
In the truncated Pakistan, despite the promulgation of the 1973 constitution 
guaranteeing provincial autonomy and religious freedom, there is considerable evidence of 
discrimination and attempts at forced assimilation of minorities. 19 As the present part 
would exemplify, while international laws have remained inadequate to protect the 
minorities of Pakistan with a number of serious gaps in the substantive norms themselves, 
the limited and attenuated laws that are designed to safeguard any of these rights have 
proved ineffective. 
Since the partition of India along communal lines came to playa crucial part in the 
subsequent development of minority issues, the next chapter aims to provide a historical 
overview of the factors leading to such a partition. Chapter nine considers the issues 
arising out of the right to physical existence of minorities. The international legal 
17 Kecsings Contemporary Archives 13-19 May, 1974, 26509~ J Paust and A Blaustein, "War Crimes 
Jurisdiction and Due Process The Bangladesh Experience" 11 Vanderbilt JTL. (1978), 1-37~ J Paust 
and A Blaustein, Human Rights and the Bangladesh Trials A Legal Memorandum to the People's 
Republic of Bangladesh on International Crime and Due Process (with supporting Documents), 
Unpublished,1974. 
18 Paust and Blaustein ibid., L LeBlanc The United States and the Genocide Convention, (Durham, 
N.C: Duke University) 1991~ " .. Bangladesh •... considered setting up a war crimes tribunal to prosecute 
Pakistan's military personnel, but then dropped the initiative for a variety of political and diplomatic 
considerations" C Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity in International Criminal law, {Dordrecht: M. 
Nijhofi) 1992, 232. 
19 See infra Chapter 9, 10 & 11. 
220 
obligations of Pakistan are analysed, and the applicability of these norms IS then 
considered within the constitutional framework ofPakistan20• 
Chapter ten of the study discusses the application of the right to equality 
and non-discrimination within the State practice of Pakistan. The international legal 
obligations that are placed on Pakistan are analysed through the various sources of 
international law. In considering the applicability of these norms the main focus relates to 
highlighting the gaps and the weaknesses in the substance of these rights and the particular 
problems that have been associated to their application in the cases of Bengalis, Baluchis 
and the Sindhis. 
In section two of the present part, following the pattern of Part III, 
consideration is given to the problems confronting Pakistan when faced with the emerging 
right of autonomy of minorities. A natural focus of analysis lies in the artificial nature of 
the creation of the State, and the historical distinctiveness of the communities that came to 
form the new State. A conflict of interest between the concepts of state-building as 
against allowing autonomy, and self-government has been particularly pronounced in the 
case of Pakistan and attracts our attention in that chapter. 
20 Sec infra Chapter 9. 
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EVOLUTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS 
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8.1 INTRODUCTION 
India's contribution to international law, significant though it is,' has raised a 
number of complex and intriguing issues.2 Not least amongst those has been the question 
of protection of minorities. The dilemma of minority rights in India had been confronted 
by the British ever since they gained effective control and incorporated India as a Colony3 
and the successive constitutional arrangements that were made came to recognise that 
serious minority problems existed.4 The Muslims of the Sub-Continent, although in a 
minority believed that they had a special rationale in having their rights recognised and 
protected in any constitutional arrangement. 5 Although they formed a majority in the 
western provinces of British India, Muslims were an overall minority being spread out in 
various states and provinces. The demands made by Muslims League and other Muslim 
leaders like Sir Mohammed Iqbal reflect the difficulties in satisfying any demands for the 
protection of minority rights or vindication of aspirations of "self-determination" . 
Indeed, even the famous Lahore Resolution of 23 March 1940 failed to address 
adequately whether India was to be partitioned along communal lines in order to create 
independent States and if so how many new States were to emerge. Hence there remained 
2 
3 
4 
5 
See N Singh "India and International Law" in Anand (ed.) Asian States and the Development of 
International law (New Delhi: Vikas) 1972, 25-43~ for a historical analysis of the entry and 
relationships of Asian and African States in the International Communities see C Alexandrowicz 
"The Afro-Asian World and the Law of Nations" 123 Rec. des COUTS (1968-1), 125-210; also see Abi-
Saab, "The Newly Independent States and Roles of International Law, An Outline" 8 HowL.! (1962), 
95-12l. 
On the anomalous nature of international personality see T Poulouse "India as an Anomalous 
International Person" 44 BYIL (1970) 20 1-212~ W Wilcox, Pakistan The Consolidation of a Nation, 
(New York and London: Columbia University Press), 1963~ J Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law, (Oxford: OUP) 1979, 131-132. 
For a historical analysis see K Aziz, The making of Pakistan (Lahore: Islamic Book Services) 1966~ 
L Ziring, Pakistan The Enigma of Political development (Dawson: Westview) 1980; L William, The 
State of Pakistan, (London: Faber) 1962. 
See The Government of India Act 1909, The Government of India Act J 9 J 9, The Government of India 
Act 1935. 
J Rehman "Self-Determination, State-building and the Mohajirs~ The Role of Indian Muslim 
Refugees in the Constitutional development of Pakistan" 3(2) CSA 1994, 111-129. 
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a profound ambiguity and hesitancy amongst Muslim politicians as to any plans of 
partition. Ultimately efforts by the British to provide independence to a United India 
proved unsuccessful in the wake of the inability or unwillingness on the part of Muslim 
and Hindu leaders to resolve their differences. Hence, after the failure of the Cabinet 
Mission Plan of 1946, it was decided that there was no other option save to partition 
India and to establish two independent States.6 
8.2 PARTITION OF INDIA AND THE DILEMMA OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 
In practical terms, however, the prospect of partitioning India into religious 
denominations provided immense complications, the precise implications of which were 
never fully appreciated.' Right until the eve of independence, there remained considerable 
uncertainty as to which territories would be included in Pakistan or India. There were a 
number of autonomous principalities, whose exact status in international law remains 
unclear and whose rulers showed a considerable lack of determination in deciding the 
future of their states.8 
The problems for the imperial power were compounded because British India 
comprised of 875,000 square miles and a heterogeneous population of nearly 
388,997,9959 having different cultures, myriad ethnic backgrounds and racial 
characteristics, practising different religions and speaking more languages than those 
6 
7 
8 
9 
ICoJ, The Events of East Pakistan, J 97 J, (Geneva) 1972, 15, Ziring, op.cit note 3, 67; A Gledhill, 
Pakistan, The Development of its Laws, (London: Stevens and Sons) 1957,60. 
Infra Chapter 9-11. 
"While a degree of autonomy or self-government enjoyed by a territory often has been utilised by 
international legal scholars to determine in which category of special sovereignty or dependency-
protectorates, vassal state, dependent state, colony, associated state, or other category- a territory 
should be placed, these categories are often overlapping and are frequently subject to scholarly 
disagreement" H Hannum and R Lillich, "The Concept of Autonomy in International Law" in Y 
Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books), 215-254, 
248-9; For a consideration of the position ofIndian States see Wilcox op.cit note 2. 
Census of 1941; According to the Census Muslim Population was 94, 389,428. 
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spoken in the whole of European Continent. In addition, independence per se had come 
to be unacceptable to a significant minority of the population of British India. Hence the 
problem that confronted Britain related to the redrawing of the new national boundaries 
and affording a "right" to self-determination. Ultimately Bengal and Punjab had to be 
partitioned. The lines drawn in each instance were clearly a recipe for future disasters. 
While the incision of Bengal meant condemnation of both sides to economic ruin, the 
decision to award Gurdaspur to India necessarily provided the incentive to the Hindu Raja 
to join Kashmir with the State of India, a decision which to this day has been a source of 
antagonism and three wars between India and Pakistan. lo 
As far as the issue of the realisation of a "right" to self-determination was 
concerned Franck's comments, in a recent paper, are both instructive and illuminating 
when he says 
"By far the majority of the intended colonial beneficiaries of the 
new self-determination were in Africa, but the first major test was in India. 
Here the British permitted a form of self-determination to be used to 
partition the sub-continent between predominantly Hindu and Muslim 
regions, a process during which hundreds of thousands were killed and 
millions left homeless. The Indian experience of undoing the boundaries 
created by the colonial empires-however benevolent the intent and arbitrary 
the colonial frontiers-caused most nationalists in the newly emerging 
African states to try for a better solution" .11 
After all the chaos, and consequent misery of the incision of India, the Pakistan 
that emerged was nonetheless not immunised form the virus of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious communalism. In fact, the creation of the new State was only to provide the 
beginning of concerns relating to the protection of minority rights. In the surge for 
independence from British rule, and amidst the euphoria generated by the prospect of the 
10 See A Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy 1846-1990, (Hertfordshire: Roxford Books), 1991~ A 
Azmi, Kashmir An Unparalleled Curfew, (Karachi: Panfwain Printing Press) 1990~ A Varsheny, 
"India, Pakistan and Kashmir: Anatomies of Nationalism" 31 AS (1991),997-1019,1000. 
11 T Franck "Post-modern Tribalism and the Right to Secession" (ed.) C Brotmann, R Lefeber, M Zieck, 
Peoples and Minorities in International law. (Dordrecht: M. Nijhoml993. 3-27, 7-8. 
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creation of an Islamic State, it had become difficult to appreciate the force of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious heterogeneity amongst the indigenous population. The new State 
contained a number of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities and their position has 
continued to provide new concerns for international law. 
8.3 GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC ANOMALIES OF 
PAKISTAN 
At the time of its creation, Pakistan was divided into two "wings" of 
unequal sizes. East Bengal (Subsequently renamed East Pakistan) comprised of a mere 
55,126 square miles whereas West Pakistan consisted of 310,403 square miles. Despite 
these sizes, it was in fact in the Eastern "wing" that nearly 54% of the total population 
resided, a figure which could be used to gauge the population density of East Bengal (See 
Table 1). The diversity in geographical locations and a segregation by 1,200 miles of 
hostile territory of India made any form of integration extremely difficult between the two 
wings. 
Although there were significant differences between various groups of the Western 
"wing", these differences seemed less prominent when matched with the historical, socio-
political and the linguistic features of the Eastern "wing". The Western "wing" was 
similar in nature to the Middle East in its history, geography, culture, and language, 
whereas the Eastern Wing was similar to South-East Asia. On the other hand whereas 
East Bengal was relatively homogenous linguistically, each of the provinces of West 
Pakistan had its own language, culture, history and traditions. Ironically, Urdu which was 
initially designated as the sole national language, was spoken by an extremely small 
minority. Bengali, the traditional language of Bengal was virtually unknown in West 
Pakistan. Similarly the majority of Bengalis had no understanding of any of the provincial 
languages spoken in the Western "wing". (Tables 2 & 3) 
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Despite the fact that Islam, as the religion of the majority of the people of Pakistan 
had influenced their cultures and traditions, it could not be stated categorically that it was 
the over-riding factor, concealing all other cultural and traditional traits. The indigenous 
traditions were deeply ingrained in all ethnic and linguistic groups, thereby making the task 
of integration into the nation-state of Pakistan cumbersome and difficult. 
8.4 MINORITIES OF PAKISTAN: FACTS AND FIGURES 
Although the official position in relation to the existence and numbers of religious, 
linguistic and ethnic minorities has often been shrouded in controversY,J2 Pakistan's 
minorities could generally be divided into two categories. There remains a considerable 
overlap between ethnic and linguistic minorities who could be bracketed under the same 
heading. At the time of independence, Pakistan comprised of 6 main ethnic and linguistic 
communities. The Baluchis (Baluchistan), The Sindhis (Sindh), the Muhajirs (North 
Indian Muslim refugees who settled in Sindh), the Pakthuns (North West Frontier 
Province), and the Punjabis (Punjab) formed the communities of Western Pakistan. The 
Eastern "wing" of Pakistan comprised mainly of the Bengalis, with a small proportion of 
Urdu-speaking migrants who have come to be known as Biharis. 
In the light of the discussion in chapter two relating to the definition of minorities, 
the Baluchis, the Sindhis and the Pakhtuns could be regarded as coming within the 
category of minorities. The case of Bengalis was however, more complicated since they 
constituted a numerical majority and hence would not fit automatically in the definition of 
a "minority" as provided by Professor Capotorti. \3 
It is submitted that while a basic weakness in international law relating to the 
protection of the rights of minorities is reflected in the absence of a definition of the term 
J 2 Sec infra chapter 9. 
J 3 Capotorti, 96. 
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"minority" in an intemationallegal instrument, the adoption of such definition must take in 
to account the position of ethnic groups like the Bengalis. East Bengal constituted of 
nearly 54% of the total population and in this sense the provincial population formed a 
numerical majority.14 On the other hand, as we shall see in due course, the Bengalis had 
very little share in the political and constitutional affairs of the State. They were heavily 
discriminated against, and suffered from the characteristic minority syndromes.ls It would 
seem more realistic to define "minorities" in terms of their control of the political, 
administrative and economic machinery of the State. Although it is true that in most 
circumstances a numerically superior group is also in a domineering position, this is not 
always the case; the debate conducted in an earlier chapter, along with the views of certain 
authorities, such as Professors Palley and Dinstein need to be recalled. 16 Bearing in mind 
the fact that Bengalis remained a minority in practical terms, the present work analyses 
their case alongside the Sindhis, Baluchis and the Pakhtuns. 
The case of Bengalis is also interesting from the viewpoint of analysing different 
though conflicting identities present in a single community. If the issue is perceived as one 
14 The discussion is open to debate, although the argument may seem persuasive that the Bengalis were 
"Peoples" in International Law, entitled to the "Right of self-determination". ICoJ list their criterion 
of what constitutes a "People" under international Law~ see ICoJ, op.cit note 6, 60~ also see Professor 
Nanda's special features which "legitimised" the Bengali struggle for self-determination V Nanda, 
"Self-Determination in International law: the tragie tale of two cities Islamabad (West Pakistan) and 
Dacca (East Pakistan)" 66 AJIL (1972), 321-336~ Indeed, the anomalous and rather artificial nature 
of Pakistan was to lead to not so unconvincing claim that, in 1971, East Pakistan was a non-self-
governing territory under Chapter XI of the Charter. According to Crawford [pakistan's] status [as a 
metropolitan State and outside the ambit of Chapter XI] at least in 1971, was not quite so clear, for 
several reasons. In the first place, East Bengal probably qualified as Chapter XI territory in 1971, if 
one applies the principle accepted by the General Assembly in 1960 as relevant in determining the 
matter. According to Principle IV of Resolution 1541 (XV) a territory is prima facie non-self-
governing if it is both geographically separate and ethnically distinct for the "country administering 
it". East Pakistan was both geographically separate and ethnically distinct from West Pakistan~ 
moreover the relation between West Pakistan and East Pakistan, both economically and 
administratively, could fairly be described as one which "arbitrarily ptace[d] the latter in a position of 
subordination. It is scarcely surprising then that the Indian representative described East Bengal as, 
in reality, a non-self-governing territory. In any case, and this point is perhaps as cognet, it is hard to 
conceive of any non-colonial situation more apt for the description "carence de souverainete" than 
East Bengal after 15 March 1971~ Crawford, op.cit note 2, 116 (footnotes omitted). 
IS Y Dinstein "The rights of minorities and peoples" 25 ICLQ (1976), 102-120, 1l2~ 
16 Ibid.; Palley, 3~ UNESCO cited in Capotorti, 9, para 43~ J Fawcett, International Protection of 
Minorities, (London: MRG), 1979, 4~ supra chapter 2. 
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of religious identity, East Bengal had a significant proportion of ten million, mainly Hindu 
minority. As an ethnic and linguistic group Bengalis showed greater homogeneity, though 
the influx of a significant proportion of Urdu-speaking "Biharis" may have affected this 
homogeneity. 
Since the secession of East Pakistan, and the elimination of Bengalis from the 
equation, the Sindhis, Baluchis and the Pakthuns can be regarded as the primary ethnic 
and linguistic minorities. Similarly, with the partial dismemberment of Pakistan, and the 
exclusion of Bengali Hindus, the proportion of religious minorities has correspondingly 
declined (Tables 4-6). The Post 1971 Pakistan comprises of four provinces, namely 
Baluchistan, NWFP, Sindh and Punjab. The State is surrounded in the North and North-
West by Afghanistan, in the West by Iran, in the south by the Arabian sea and in the East 
and South-East by India. 
Primarily due to the sensitivity of the minority issue, the official census since 1961 
has not contained any specific question about the mother tongue of the respondents. 
Indeed, while the language data from the 1972 census was not published at all", (see 
Table 7) the last census held in 1981 provides information relating to what is termed as a 
family question on "language commonly spoken in the household" .18 (Table 8). The 
official census which according to the constitutional provisions was due to take place in 
1991 was postponed for a variety of reasons. According to the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) 
the immigrant population settled in Sindh ... strongly contested the 
figures that emerged from preliminary enumeration's. Others disputed the 
1981 count too. Representative bodies of Christians, for instance, put the 
present size of their community in excess of 5 million; Ahmadis claimed 
their number to be in the region of 4 million. Their grievances tended to be 
17 See R Wrising "The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan" in (ed.) R Wrising, Comparative 
Perspectives Protection of Ethnic Minorities, ( New York: Pergamon Press) 1981,271-312,309. 
18 According to a United Nations Report this question was presented to random sample of 10% of the 
respondents. United Nations Pakistan: Report of a Mission on Needs Assessment for Population 
ASSistance, November 1979, Report No 23, 26. 
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frequently voiced because the number of seats for minorities in the national 
and provincial legislatures is fixed in proportion to their population, and 
there is a feeling among the minorities of their being grossly 
underrepresented. 19 
Some reliance, could however be placed on the unofficial figures (Table 8) which 
have been presented by HRCP. 
19 HRCP, State oJlfuman Rights in Pakistan 1991. (Lahore: Maktabi Jadeed) 1992, 119. 
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9.1 INTRODUCTION 
The right to physical existence of all individuals, whether seen singularly or 
collectively as groups, is of a fundamental and peremptory character.! Although it is clear 
that States remain bound by the international legal prohibition of genocide,2 it must also be 
borne in mind that the physical extermination of minorities is generally conducted by 
States themselves.3 
The case of Pakistan is exemplary in this regard as there remains substantial 
evidence to support the view that over its forty seven years of independent history, a 
number of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups have been persecuted, discriminated and 
have even been subjected to physical extermination. While the international community 
has remained apathetic largely due to political considerations and constraints, the current 
international legal norms, as we shall shortly consider, are in themselves inadequate in a 
number of ways to provide protection of this right to physical existence. 
9.2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
Pakistan showed a keen interest in the rapid adoption of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the crime of Genocide4 (hereafter the Genocide 
Convention), voting for it both in the Sixth Committee and in the plenary session of the 
General Assembly. It is a party to the Genocide Convention and the Convention on the 
non applicability of statutory limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against humanit~, thus 
2 
3 
" s 
See supra, Part III, chapter S. 
For a comparative survey see A Blaustein and G Flanz, Constitutions of the Countries of the World, 
(Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications) 1973-. 
See supra, chapter S. 
77 UNTS 277~ HMSO, Misc. No (1966), Cmnd. 2904; 10 Jan 1958. 
See supra chapter 5; ratified by Pakistan 10 January 1958. 
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explicitly recognising the provisions contained in these instruments.6 Although Pakistan 
has not enacted any specific legislation to give effect to the provisions of either of these 
conventions, it is clear that it still remains bound by their provisions under international 
law.' 
The rules relating to the prohibition of the physical extermination of minorities in 
contemporary international law, are reflected in the Genocide Convention.8 According to 
Thornberry, the treaty provisions of the Convention provide the minimum that 
international legal norms afford to minorities.9 In view of our earlier discussion, it would 
be difficult to lay assertive claims as regards the criminalization of cultural genocide in 
conventional as well as customary law. lo The travaux preparatoires of the Genocide 
Convention however reveal that Pakistan considered "cultural" genocide as a crime under 
international law. The force of authority for this assertion derives from the position 
adopted by the delegation of Pakistan in the UN General Assembly where the issue was 
being debated. II During the debates the representative of Pakistan in the Sixth Committee, 
spearheaded an emotional charge of "cultural" genocide conducted by India at the time of 
6 
7 
8 
9 
See The Reply of Pakistan in Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Persons who have 
committed Crimes against humanity, Report to the Secretary General 25 UN GAOR Annex I 
(Agenda Item 30), at 24, UN Doc. Al8038/Add 1, 1970 
J Paust and A Blaustein, "War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience" 11 
Vanderbilt JTL, (1978), 1-37, 20 n71; Referring to the events of 1971 the ICoJ state "At the time of 
hostilities in 1971 Pakistan had not yet complied with this obligation and genocide did not therefore 
constitute a crime under the domestic law of Pakistan. However, as Article I declared genocide to "a 
crime under international law, as soon as Pakistan ratified the Convention, genocide became an 
international crime applicable to all persons within the territory of Pakistan" ICoJ, The Events of East 
Pakistan, 1971, (Geneva) 1972,55. 
See supra chapter 5. 
Thornberry 105; supra Chapter 5. 
10 Ibid. 
II GAOR, 3rd Session, Sixth Committee, Part 1, (63 mtg.) 30 September 1948, 1O-1l~ (83 mtg.) 25 
October 1948, 193-205; 3 GAOR Plenary 178 meeting st 818-48. Indeed, it was the fear that 
Pakistan might take action against India before the International Court of Justice under article IX of 
the Convention that led to the reservation being put in place by India see LeBlance, The United States 
and the Genocide Convention (Durham, N.C: Duke University) 1991, 205-206; see also I Claude Jr, 
National Minorities, An International Problem (Cambridge: Mass Harvard University Press) 1955, 
ISS; H Hannum, "International Law and the Cambodian Genocide Sounds of Silence" 11 HRQ 
(1989) 83-138, 105. 
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partition.12 Pakistan made strenuous efforts to have cultural genocide specifically 
incorporated in the Convention, and its failure was taken as a serious blow to the cultural 
contribution of smaller groupS.13 In the plenary meeting Pakistan's representative Begum 
Ikramullah said 
" .. .it must be realised that very often a people did not differ from its 
neighbours by its racial characteristics but by its spiritual heritage. To 
deprive a human group of its separate culture could thus destroy its 
individuality as completely as physical annihilation. Moreover, those guilty 
of the crime of mass extermination committed that crime because the 
existence of a community endowed with a separate cultural life was 
intolerable to them. In other words physical genocide was only the means, 
the end was the destruction of a peoples' spiritual individuality" .14 
Pakistan's subsequent actions particularly in East Pakistan prior to December 
1971, and subsequently in Baluchistan and Sindh must be judged in the light of these 
considerations. 
12 According to LeBlanc "Through out the negotiations on the convention in the Sixth Committee, the 
Pakistani delegation lobbied aggressively in favour of an article on cultural genocide. A draft article 
on the subject covered such acts as 'forced and systematic exile of individuals representing the culture 
of a group'. Provisions such as this could arguably have made the convention applicable to the kinds 
of atrocities that occurred during the break-up of India and the creation of Pakistan" LeBlanc ibid. 
206; "Despite strong opposition by the United States and France, the Ad hoc Committee voted 
overwhelmingly to retain the concept of cultural genocide in the draft convention ... The debate 
continued and the decision reversed, when the General Assembly held its Third session in the fall of 
1948. The agenda item relating to the Genocide Convention was referred to the Sixth (Legal) 
Committee, where the battle to retain cultural genocide provision was waged by a group of states 
which included prominently the Soviet bloc and a number of Asian-Arab states against a determined 
opposition which was conspicuously representative of European and European-derived peoples. One 
interesting deviation from the pattern suggested above was the position of India, whose objection to 
the inclusion of cultural genocide was clearly related to the fact that Pakistan, an ardent supporter of 
the provision, proclaimed that it could hardly wait to haul its neighbor before a tribunal as a violator 
of the cultural rights of its Moslem minority". Claude, op.cit, note II, 155. 
13 According to S Ikramullah, Pakistan's rcpresent.1tive at the UN the deletion of the provisions relating 
to cultural genocide "destroyed the very letter and spirit of Resolution of December 1946 because it 
effectively deprived the contributions of small groups of people" S Ikramullah, Pakistan Horizon, 
December 1948,234. 
14 GAOR 3rd Session, Part 1, 178 meeting., 9 Dec. 1948,817. 
232 
9.3 APPLICABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORMS RELATING 
TO PHYSICAL EXTERMINATION OF MINORITIES 
9.3.1 Physical extermination of religious minorities committed after the 
partition of India 
The case of Pakistan provides a classic example of the usage of the defence of 
absence of intent in committing genocide. A distinct, albeit, closely inter-related argument 
has been to deny any allegations of genocide in situations where persecution and 
massacres of political opponents belonging to distinct ethnic, linguistic and religious 
groups has taken place. ls The following discussion attempts to highlight these issues in 
the context of the incidents which have occurred in the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan. 
The ancient history of India bears considerable scars of the traditional rivalry 
between Hindus and Muslims. 16 The failure of these communities to reach a constitutional 
settlementl7 and the prospect of partition flared up these traditional hostilities to the extent 
of an open conflict. As the independence of India approached, with the knowledge that a 
partition was to take place, communal violence broke out with an unprecedented ferocity 
in various parts of the country. The frenzy and madness that this partition brought about, 
took its toll on the religious minorities on either side of the frontier. Innocent Muslims, 
Hindus and Sikh civilians got involved in the bloody "holy" wars. While the Muslim 
minorities left behind in India became an easy prey for the Hindus, equally brutal 
massacres took place inside the frontier of Pakistan of Hindus and Sikhs. 
In a majority of instances angry and violent mobs, infuriated at the (often widely 
exaggerated) stories of the killings and torture of their co-religionists, and the rape, 
IS See supra chapter 5. 
16 See supra Chapter 8. 
17 Ibid. 
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assaults and other forms of degradation of their women produced such venom and fury 
that they lost all senses and in a determined mood of vengeance went ahead to kill in the 
most tortuous manner possible anyone, belonging to the opposing religion. Everywhere in 
India and Pakistan, religious minorities became victims of a campaign of physical 
extermination and their harrowing stories have filled volumes. 18 
The province of Punjab vivisected in an artificial manner, had left nearly 5 million 
Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan and over 5 million Muslims in India.19 Not surprisingly it 
became one of the worst affected areas, where nearly half a million people perished 
becoming victims of the genocidal conflict· Describing the incidents that took place in 
Punjab during August-September 1947, Collins and Lapierre state 
"It would be unique, a cataclysm without precedent, unforeseen in 
magnitude, unordered in pattern, unreasoned in savagery. For 6 terrible 
weeks, like the ravages of the medieval plague, a mania for murder would 
sweep across the face of northern India. There would be no sanctuary 
from its scourge, no comer free from the contagion of its virus. Half as 
many Indians would lose their lives in that swift splurge as Americans in 
four years of combat in World War 11".20 
Similarly Bengal witnessed particularly distressing incidents of mass torture and 
killings. Collins and Lapierre say 
"mobs howling in quasi-religious fervour came bursting from the 
slums, wavering clubs, iron bars, shovels, any instrument capable of 
smashing in a human quasi religious savagely beat to a pulp any Hindu in 
their path and left the bodies in cities gutters ... Later, the Hindu mobs came 
storming out of the neighbours, looking for differentials Muslims to 
slaughter. Never in all its violent history, had Calcutta known 24 hours as 
savage as packed with human viciousness like water-soaked logs, scores of 
bloated cadavers bobbed down the hooghley river towards the sea. Other 
18 For objective analysis in English see Collins and Lapierre, Freedom at Midnight, (London: Collins) 
1975; Kuper GenOcide; Moon Divide and Quit, (London: Chatto and Windus) 1961; G Khosla Stern 
Reckoning A Survey of the Events leading up to and the following Partition of India, (Dehli: OUP) 
1989. 
19 Collins and Lapierre ibid., 284; Kuper Genocide, 65. 
20 Ibid. 284. 
234 
corpses, savagely mutilated, littered the city's streets. Everywhere, the 
weak and helpless suffering most. .. " .21 
Admittedly, the forces of confusion that were unleashed by the unplanned and 
disorganised partition of India and the hostile environment of charges and counter-charges 
make it extremely difficult to gauge those who were responsible for such large scale 
genocide.22 Nonetheless, as we have discussed earlier, acts of genocide, regardless as to 
whether by public officials or private individuals, are punishable,23 
It is also submitted that there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the new 
governments of India and Pakistan were, to an extent, responsible for allowing the 
physical extermination of the minorities to take place. The views of a British officer 
stationed in West Pakistan are instructive when he says that "despite noble professions 
there was no real desire to punish those who robbed, raped and murdered the minority 
communities, rather there was a disposition to punish those who tried to protect them",24 
It may well be that in such frenzied conditions it is difficult to maintain law and order, but 
there remains substantial evidence that members of the police and army were themselves 
suffering from communal hatred?S In a number of cases the government officials through 
their actions encouraged unruly mobs to carry out and perpetuate massacres. According 
to Kuper "part of the difficulty was that the forces of law and order proved unreliable, 
having become infected by communal fears and hatreds. The police, the military, railway 
clerks and other officials, were often themselves involved in massacres or did not 
intervene".26 In Lahore, whole street of Hindu homes were ablaze, while Muslim police 
and troops stood by watching.27 Another example is that of Sheikhupra where 
21 Collins and Lapierre, ibid. 
22 Kuper Genocide, 66; R Emerson "The Fate of Human Rights in the World" 27 WP (1975),201-226, 
223. 
23 See supra Chapter 5; M Ford "Non-Governmental interference with Human Rights" 56 BYIL (1985), 
253-280,260,279. 
24 Moon, op.cit note 18,237. 
2S Kuper Genocide, 67. 
26 Ibid., 67. 
27 Collins and Lappierre, op.cit note 18,285. 
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"the entire Hindu and Sikh community was herded into an enormous 
'go-down', a huge warehouse used by the town bank to store the sacks of 
grain held as collateral for its loans. Once inside, the helpless Hindus were 
machine gunned by Moslem police and army deserters. There were no 
survivors" .28 
A number of sources corroborate the view of complicity on the part of law 
enforcing agencies during massacres which were carried out by unruly mobs. It is argued 
that the armed forces that were assigned the task to prevent any such occurrences, often 
failed to take action while some joined in the plundering and looting themselves. While 
millions of Hindus and Sikhs were forced to flee from their homes, in Punjab and Sindh, 
the urge to drive them out was due to a considerable extent to the greed of taking over 
land and property left by their fleeing victims.29 The Governments of India and Pakistan 
had promised to protect the lives and properties of their religious minorities, a view 
subsequently reaffirmed by the 1950 treaty between the two States.30 In actual practice, 
however the properties of these persecuted minorities was taken away permanently, never 
to be returned.3! In Pakistan, in a number of instances, the properties taken away from 
Hindus and Sikhs were arbitrarily distributed amongst political supporters. Besides that 
large settlements of refugees were established despite resentment on the part of the local 
population.32 
28 Ibid. 287. 
29 "A motive that had nothing to do with religious fervour was more often behind the Moslem attacks on 
Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan. It was the greed, a simple often carefully orchestrated effort to grab 
the lands, shops and wealth of their neighbours" ibid. 288 and "Inevitably a dingly thought swept the 
Moslem masses: if Pakistan is ours, so too are the shops, farms, houses and factories of Hindus and 
SHms" ibid. 284. 
30 UNTS 131,3 (8th April) 1950. 
3! Personal interview with Air Marshall (Retd) Zafar A Chaudhry-former chief of Pakistan Air force; 
Callard, Pakistan A Political Study, (London: Allen and Unwin) 17; also see A Ahmed, "Refugee 
voices, Memories of Partition 1947", 3(3) JRS, (1990), 262-264, 263. 
32 "The Muhajir (refugees) were allowed to occupy the properties and businesses left by the emigrating 
Hindus. Tens of thousands of Muhajirs benefited from real or bogus property claims. Several 
townships were constructed to provide housing to shelters Muhajirs. New housing development 
projects were approved to Muhajir middle and upper classes residential plots at prices below the 
developmental cost together with loans on easy terms". F Ahmad "The rise of Muhajir separatism" 1 
JAAS (1989), 97-129, 108; " .. as the administration of evacuee property was in the hands of a non-
Sindhi, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, in the government ofL A Khan, the lion's share of both urban and 
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The incision of India in such a manner had momentous consequences as far as the 
issue of physical protection of minorities was concerned. It resulted in the extermination 
of more than One million civilians and the creation of at least twelve million refugees, one 
of the biggest human migrations ofhistory.33 More importantly being the first major act of 
genocidal activity since the Nuremberg trials and adoption of the General Assembly 
Resolution 96(1), it was to reflect, on a practical plane the weaknesses that were inherent 
in the issue of physical protection of minority groups. It is submitted that while the 
Nuremberg trails set a clear precedent, the tone of the General Assembly, in Resolution 
96(1) was declaratory of the principles of international law and was binding on all States, 
including those that emerged subsequent to the adoption of the Resolution.34 
rural property went to succour the needy and not so needy refugees from India" T Wright Jr "Center-
Periphery Relations and Ethnic Conflict in Pakistan- Sindhis, Muhajirs and Punjabis" CP (1991), 
299-312, 303. 
33 F D'Souza and J Crisp, The Refugee Dilemma, (London: MRG) 1984,6; Kuper GenOCide; J Rehman 
"State-building, Self-Determination and Indian Muslim Refugees" 3 (2) CSA (1994), 111-129; B 
Whitaker et ai, Biharis of Bangladesh , (London: MRG) 1977, 7. 
34 "Such resolutions [passed by State representatives] are authority for the content of customary law only 
if they claim to be declaratory of existing law. A clear example is resolution 96(1) of 11 December 
1946, which says that 'the General Assembly .... affirms that genocide is a crime under international 
law'. But such declaratory language is surprisingly rare". (footnotes omitted) Akehurst "Custom as a 
source of international law" 47 BYIL (1974-5), 1-53,6. On the position of new states Akehurst says 
"According to traditional theory, new States are bound automatically by all rules of customary law in 
existence at the time when they become independent. The theory is not accepted by writers (especially 
writers from communist states) who believe that custom is an implied agreement between states and 
the new states are not bound without their consent. However such writers are prepared to infer 
consent from entry into relations with other States unless the new States make reservations expressly 
with holding its consent. The qualification reduces the element of consent to a fiction; but since such 
reservations are never made in real life, the practical results is the same as the result produced by the 
traditional theory. The attitude of new states of Asia and Africa is sometimes lacking in clarity and 
consistency. At times they deny that they are bound by certain rules which harm their interests; but 
they accept other rules with out question, as if those rules were binding on them automatically and not 
solely because the new states had consented to those rules ... The traditional theory is in keeping with 
what has been said above about dissenting states. A state can . opt out' of a rule of customary law by 
dissenting before the rule becomes well established, but not afterwards. Unfortunately for the new 
states, most rules of customary law were well established before the states concerned became 
independent~ independence carne too late for them to dissent effectively" ibid. 27-28; Y Dinstein 
"International Law as a Primitive Legal System" 19 NYUJILP (1986-7) 1-32, 9~ "No single state can 
say on its admittance into the community of nations that it desires to be subjected to such and such 
rules of international law, and not to others. The admittance includes the duty to submit to all the 
rules in force, with the sole exceptions of those which are binding upon such states only as are parties 
to a treaty creating the rules concerned" R Jennings and A Watts (eds.) Oppenheim's International 
Law. (Harlow: Longman) vol. i, 1992, 9th cdn Peace, 14-15; G Fitzmaurice "Some Problems 
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The debates of the United Nations clearly reflect the view that both India and 
Pakistan recognised the international legal obligations relating to the protection of 
minorities.35 On the other hand it was equally clear that as far as this issue of protection of 
minorities was concerned, the whole environment was one of charges and counter-charges 
of incompetence, indifference, of being accomplices or participants to genocide.36 Hence 
Pakistan's official declaration to the Security Council stated 
"It became clear that [the government of India] were determined to 
leave no Muslims in East Punjab. The Pakistan government appealed to 
the government of British Commonwealth to arrange a conference to find 
ways and means of removing the serious threat to the peace and security of 
the Sub-continent, but Indian government opposed this proposal". 37 
Although both the governments of Pakistan and India promised to undertake strict 
measures to ensure the protection of their minorities, subsequently reconfirmed by the 
1950 treaty,l8 it is submitted that their acts failed to put these intentions into practice. 
Both States have denied having any involvement into the genocidal conflict. There were 
no serious investigations, and no trials were held for involvement of individuals in acts of 
genocide.39 While millions were devastated, both the States of India and Pakistan were in 
a position to refute any imputability as well as deny any complicity with any acts of 
genocide. 
Regarding the Sources of International Law" Symbolae Verzijl, (La Haye: Nijhofl) 1958, 153-176, 
165-166. 
35 See LeBlance, op. cit note 11. 
36 3 SCOR, supp for Nov. 1948, 77. "The government of Pakistan reported to the Security Council that 
it had made repeated efforts to persuade the government of India to arrest the course of' genocide' in 
East Punjab and the neighbouring areas, but without success" K Hasan, Pakistan and the United 
Nations, (New York: Manhatten Publishing Co) 1960 38. 
37 ' , 
3 SCOR, Supp for Nov. 1948, 77-8 ; also see No 64 2891h-290th meeting 7 May. 21, 312 meeting, 3 
June supp for June 1948, 78. 
38 131 UNTS 3 (8 April 1950). 
39 Personal interviews. 
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9.3.2 Genocide in the former East Pakistan 
There is substantial evidence to suggest that Pakistan had been involved in 
committing large-scale violations of human rights including physical extermination of 
various minorities in the former East Pakistan.4o The reason that led to such an 
unfortunate scenario lie primarily in large scale discrimination and attempts at forced 
assimilation of the Bengalis of East Pakistan and treating it as a colony of West Pakistan.41 
The alleged atrocities, including large-scale genocide, was a consequence of the 
civil war which began following a decision of the military leaders to postpone the calling 
of the National Assembly which was also to frame a new, democratic constitution for 
Pakistan. The Assembly members had been elected through the general elections held in 
the country in December 1970, the first ever based on adult franchise. The Awami League 
(the main Bengali opposition party) scored a dramatic and overwhelming victory, 
obtaining 167 of 313 in the National Assembly. It had an overwhelming victory in East 
Pakistan having gained 160/162 seats (Table 10). The unequivocal and complete support 
which the Awami League had, is reflected from the fact that the party managed to win all 
but two seats in the National Assembly. The election results came as a shock to the West 
Pakistan military and politicians and their unwillingness to allow the Awami League to 
frame a new constitution (based on their 6 points manifesto seeking greater autonomy) 
and form the government led to the postponement of the calling of the session of the 
Assembly. 
This gesture of the West Pakistan army was, however, widely perceived in East 
Pakistan as another move to deny the Bengalis their legitimate democratic rights. Sheikh 
40 A Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh. (Deh1i: Vikas Publications) 1971~ ICoJ, op.cit note 7~ 
Kuper, GenOcide, 76-80~ R lahan "The Bengalis of East Pakistan" in Potter, 44-61. 
41 See infra chapter 10 and 11; V Nanda "Self-Determination in International law The tragic tale of two 
cities-Islamabad and Dacca" 66 AJ1L (1972), 321-336; Nanda "A Critique of the United Nations 
inaction in the Bangladesh crises" 49 DenU (1976) 53-67~ Suzuki "Self-Determination and World 
Public Order: Community response to territorial separation" 16 Va.JIL (1978) 779-862; 
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Mujib-ur-Rehman, the Awami League leaders' call for a general strike led to large-scale 
civil disobedience movement with a refusal to pay taxes and a total strike in government 
businesses and offices. The West Pakistan rulers, instead of ameliorating the political 
grievances of the Bengalis, attempted to resolve the problems through use of military 
force. On the 25th of March 1971, the Pakistan military struck with devastating brutality, 
with the intention of "weeding-out" all opposition, and the country of all anti-Islamic 
elements, in particular the Hindus. 
However, the official contention remains that the military actions taken after 25 
March 1971 were purely to bring the civil war to an end. According to the White Paper 
that was produced by Pakistan government 
"the action of Federal government on 25 March 1971, was designed 
to restore Law and Order, which had broken down completely during the 
Awami League's non-violent non-co-operation movement".42 
The real picture, however was completely different. It was in fact the denial of the 
legitimate demands of the rights of Bengalis with the postponement of the calling of the 
newly elected National assembly to draft a constitution for Pakistan which prompted the 
non-co-operation movement and the decision instead to coerce the Bengalis through 
brutal use of force that created a law and order situation. According to ICoJ 
"the charge that there had been a complete breakdown of Law and 
order is not justified, at least up to 24 March. The breakdown of Law and 
order which then occurred was a consequence of the breakdown in talks, of 
the decision to re-assert the authority of the army, and of armed resistance 
to that decision". 43 
42 Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Crises in East Pakistan, Introduction, S August 1971 
(Islamabad: Government of Pakistan press) 1971. 
43 lCoJ, op.cit note 7, 23. 
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4.3.2.1 The Scale and extent of genocide 
The scale of the atrocities committed by the West Pakistan forces were horrendous 
and difficult to find parallels with. According to J Salzburg the atrocities committed in 
East Pakistan included 
"Killing and torture; mistreatment of women and children; 
mistreatment of civilians in armed conflict, religious discrimination, 
arbitrary deprivation of property, suppression of the freedom of speech, the 
press and assembly, suppression of the right ofmigration".44 
Exact figures are not available although it is estimated that between 1-3 million4s 
people died and roughly 10 million were forced to become refugees. 46 The events 
subsequent to March 1971 make it quite obvious that the army was determined to 
physically exterminate at least certain sections of the population. It has been contended by 
the West Pakistan military and political leaders that while the military action against 
Mukhti Bhani, students and other opposition groups was conducted in order to bring the 
civil war to an end the action, against political opponents does not come within the 
existing definition of genocide. As we have already discussed, unfortunately, the 
definition as provided in Genocide Convention has a major gap in which "political 
genocide" could be condoned. On the other hand, the physical extermination of Hindus, it 
can be said with certainty, comes within the ambit of the definition of genocide as 
44 Cited in Nanda "Self-Determination in International law" op.cit note 41,331-332. 
4S Figures have varied considerably according to the political inclination of the authority. Jaban op.cit 
note 40, puts the figure at between 1-3 million 257~ Kuper Genocide, 79~ Kuper Prevention of 
GenOCide, 48. According to Whitaker "Three million has become established as the number of 
people who were killed in all during the period of terror between March and December 1971"~ 
Whitaker et ai, op.cit note 33, 8. 
46 "In the early 1970's ten million people left what is now Bangladesh and fled to India" P Hyndman 
"Developing Refugee law in Asia Pacific Region: Some issues and prognosis" 1 AsYIL, (1990), 19-44, 
23. 
241 
provided by the Convention and there was clearly an intent to wipe them out. Affirming 
our point ICoJ report states 
"as far as the three groups are concerned, namely members of the 
Awami League, students and Hindus, only Hindus would seem to fall 
within the definition of 'a national, ethnical, racial or religious group'. 
There is overwhelming evidence that Hindus were slaughtered and their 
houses and villages were destroyed simply because they were Hindus. The 
oft repeated phrase 'Hindus are enemies of the state' as a justification for 
the Killing does not gainsay the intent to commit genocide~ rather does it 
confirm the intention. The Nazis regarded the Jews as enemies of the state 
and Killed them as such. In our view there was a strong prima{acie case 
that the crime of genocide was committed against the group compromising 
the Hindu population of East Bengal".47 
According to Professor Nanda 
"On 2S March, 1971, the Pakistani military struck Dacca without 
warning and initiated a reign of terror throughout East Pakistan which 
continued with increasing intensity until December 1971. Villages were 
burned~ Civilians were indiscriminately killed~ Hindus were sorted out and 
massacred as were university teachers and students, lawyers, doctors, 
Awami League leaders and Bengali military and police officials. The 
horrors of these events prompted observers to accuse the Pakistan armed 
forces and razakars, the local volunteer militia who were collaborators of 
Pakistani armed forces in East Bengal, of committing selective genocide, 
particularly to deprive East Pakistan of Bengali leadership" .48 
The sheer brutality with which the campaign was conducted to exterminate the 
Bengalis, and in particular the Hindus, provides one of unfortunate examples of human 
history. ICoJ opine 
"The principle features of this ruthless operation were 
indiscriminate killing of civilians, including women and children and the 
poorest and weakest members of the community, the attempt to 
exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the Hindu 
population~ the arrest, torture and killing of Awami League activists, 
47 ICol, op.cit note 7,57. (emphasis added). 
48 Nanda "A Critique" op.cit 41 (footnotes omitted) 55. 
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students, professional and business men and other potential leaders among 
the Bengalis, the raping of women, the destruction of villages and towns; 
and the looting of property. All this was done on a scale difficult to 
comprehend".49 
4.3.2.2 The Role of the United Nations Organs 
In the face of this clear evidence of massive violations of individual and collective 
rights including large scale genocide, the organs of the United Nations remained unwilling 
or unable to take any action. so Under the United Nations Charter the key guardian of 
international peace and security is the Security Council. Although the extent to which the 
Security Council could act in situations where there are gross violations of human rights 
but may not have any international dimensions is not crystal clear, it nonetheless has the 
discretion to determine under the provisions of Chapter VII whether there exists a threat 
to international peace and security.51 
According to article 39, the Security Council "shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security". It is arguable that since 
the start of the conflict in March 1971, on numerous occasions, action was called for on 
49 ICoJ op.cit note 7, 26-27. 
so Throughout this so-called reign of terror "the United Nations failed to use its available machinery to 
deal with the situation either with a view to terminating the gross violations of human rights which 
were occurring or to deal with the threat to international peace which they constituted" ibid. 98. 
SI See P Malanczuk, Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use of Force, (Amsterdam: 
Het Spinhuis) Inaugural Lecture at the University of Amsterdam 22 January, 1993, l6-23~ also see I 
Brownlie "Humanitarian Intervention" in J Moore (ed.) Law and Civil War in the Modern World, 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press), 1974, 26~ '{A} finding ofa 'threat to the peace' is, to a 
large degree, a political decision on the part of the Council and so such a finding as regards a wholly 
internal situation is not precluded. Generally, however, the permanent members are not going to 
exercise this discretion unless the situation has potential international repression which could affect 
their interests or even involve them in an escalating conflict" N White, The United Nations and the 
Maintenance of International Peace and Security, (Manchester: Manchester University Press), 1990, 
36~ R Higgins, The United Nations: Appearance and Reality, Josephine Onoh Memorial Lecture, 
(Hull: University Press), 1993, 10~ J Morris "Haiti: State Sovereignty, Self-interest and the New 
World Order" in Kritsiotis 40-70,55. 
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the part of the Security Council. Indeed, the memorandum of the Secretary-General in 
July 1971 makes the point very clear when he says 
" .. .1 have reluctantly come to the conclusion that the time is past 
when the international community can continue to stand by, watching the 
situation deteriorate and hoping that relief programmes, humanitarian 
efforts and good intentions will be enough to tum the tide of human misery 
and potential disaster. I am deeply concerned about the possible 
consequences of the present situation, not only in the humanitarian sense, 
but also as a potential threat to peace and security and for its bearing on 
the future of the United Nations as an effective instnlment for 
international co-operation and action ". S2 
There were serious political differences on the issue of East Pakistan in the 
Security Council and it was "seized" of the matter only after active hostilities broke out 
between India and Pakistan in December 1971, nine months after the civil war had started 
with its consequent violations of human rights and mass exodus of refugees. Ultimately 
when it did begin its deliberations on 4th December, the political and ideological 
differences immediately came to surface. 
The Indian and Pakistan governments charged and counter-charged each other. 
While the Indian representative accused Pakistan of denying the legitimate aspirations of 
autonomy to the Bengalis and of committing genocide, S3 the Pakistan delegate refuting all 
these allegations counter-charged India of provoking and encouraging a secessionist 
movement. 54 The issue became a pawn in the hands of the major powers, with the US and 
China supporting Pakistan and asking for an immediate cease-fire and military withdrawal, 
and the Soviets siding with India and insisting on the immediacy of a political settlement in 
East Pakistan. Ultimately these political and ideological differences prevented any form of 
action with the Soviet Vetoing a draft Resolution. 
S2 UN Document S/I0410 pi (italics added). Dec. 3. 1971; UN Press Release SG/SM 1516 2 August. 
1971. 
S3 SIPVl1608. 8. 18. 32. 
S4 SIPVl1608.7. 
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Given this impasse in the Security Council, the matter was then referred to the 
General Assembly, who could take action under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.55 There 
was a sense of urgency in the General Assembly and a strong consensus on the ways 
things should operate. It must, however, be noted that this consensus suggests that the 
prime concern of the members was upon the insistence of the territorial integrity, State 
sovereignty and the retention of status quo. Kuper accurately describes the situation 
"The basis of this consensus [in the General Assembly] was the 
commitment to two general principles of international relations between 
independent states, namely, respect for their sovereignty and their 
territorial integrity, and non-interference in their internal affairs. To this 
must be added the fear of fragmentation as a result of the exercise of the 
right to self-determination". 56 
The Indian invasion of East Pakistan in December 1971 was unacceptable to the 
majority and the action was deplored in the General Assembly.57 Indeed, the vote on the 
issue overwhelmingly 
"reflected the disapproving attitude by most states to the secession 
of Bangladesh from Pakistan and India's armed intervention. Many of them 
were no doubt anxious to discourage dissident minorities in their own 
states from taking the same course .... The US on December 12 requested 
that the Security Council be re-convened due to 'India's defiance of world 
opinion' in respecting the General Assembly'S call for cease fire and 
withdrawal of troops". 58 
The actions taken in other UN organs, including those specifically related to 
Human Rights had shown a similar unease. The issue was brought before Sub-
55 GA Res. 377 (V). 
56 Kuper, Prevention o/Genocide, 58. 
57 The General Assembly vote was 104-11 (10 abstentions) calling for an immediate cease-fire and 
58 instant withdrawal. oflndian troops GA Resolution 2793 XXVI, 7 December 1971. 
lCol, 85~ Accordmg to the then United States Ambassador to the UN, George Bush, the Pakistani 
~ilitary action in March "docs not.. justify the actions ofIndia in intervening militarily and places in 
Jeopardy the territorial integrity and political independence of its neighbour Pakistan". SNP. 1611, 
December 12, 1971, 11. 
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Commission largely as a result of the initiatives of those international Non-Governmental 
Organisations, which have a consultative status with the ECOSOC. J Salzburg, a 
representative of the International Commission of Jurists, added his voice to the plea that 
the Sub-Commission take action under the mandate ofECOSOC Resolution 1235 (XLII). 
However, the stance adopted by members of the sub-commission was far from being 
satisfactory and conspicuously failed to show any real concern for the violations of the 
rights of the Bengalis. 
Mr Janis, the Indian observer pointed to the human rights situation and in 
particular, the influx of millions of refugees into India.59 The representative of Pakistan, 
Mr Khan challenged these assertions, arguing that the present matter was beyond the 
scope of the consideration of United Nations bodies since it affected the territorial 
integrity of States.6O As to other members of the Sub-Commission, the participation 
remained minimal, and only three members actually participated in the debates,61 and 
indeed one of them remained opposed to any discussion in the belief that these matters fell 
within the domestic jurisdiction as provided by article 2(7) of the UN Charter.62 
Although there was some consideration of the conflict, the concern that was 
shown, at most related to humanitarian issues. Only one member, Branimic Jankovic from 
the former Yugoslavia deplored the apathetic approach urging the members of the Sub-
Commission not to remain silent as a matter of individual conscience argued "that when 
faced with a situation affecting tens of thousands of persons, members were inclined to 
suppress their feelings and conscience. But in such a situation, the sub-commission should 
not remain silent...".63 
The Sub-Commission unfortunately remained silent, and failed to take any action 
under Res. 1235 (XLII). The sounds of silence, however were not only characterised in 
59 For his comments see UN Doc ElCN.4/Sub SR.625-35, 1971, 139-144. 
60 For his comments ibid. 145-6. 
61 Ibid. 74-75, 146-147. 
62 Ibid. 74 
63 Ibid. 74-75. 
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the Sub-Commission, but transcended through the entire fabric of the UN organisation. 
The Commission on Human Rights did not meet at all during the East Pakistan crisis. 
Although, the treaty based body of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of 
Racial Discrimination did meet twice during 1971, it failed to show any real concern for 
violations of human rights. 
The crisis of East Pakistan had its roots in the racially discriminatory and 
undemocratic political and constitutional stance of the West Pakistan politicians and army, 
and Pakistan being a party to the said convention, the committee had the mandate to 
inquire into greater detail the constitutional and political shortcomings of Pakistan. Having 
decided that Pakistan's report was not adequate, the committee in its April session asked 
Pakistan, alongside 16 other States to provide supplementary information at the 
committee next session due in September. No subsequent action was undertaken in its 
September session nor did Pakistan comply with the committee's earlier requests. 
Admittedly there was some consideration of the matter in the Economic and Social 
Council in July 197164, and in the third committee of the General Assembly,6S though the 
focus of the concern related largely to humanitarian aspects. 
While the UN remained deadlocked over the issue, the fate of East-Pakistan was 
sealed by the final Indian invasion and surrender of the Pakistani troops in December 
1971. The failure of the United Nations to take any positive action, and its inability to 
make any constructive use of the array of its human rights instruments were echoed in the 
comments of the Indian Ambassador when he exclaimed "what, indeed, has happened to 
our convention on genocide, human rights, self-determination and so on".66 Reflecting on 
the general disillusionment Salzburg writes 
"The United Nations never deliberately considered the massacres of 
at least several hundred thousand persons and the perpetration of forms of 
: 8 UN Monthly chronicle (No 8) 1972 August-September, 1971. 
Ibid. (No 11) 124-126, December 1971. 
66 SIPVl606, 32. 
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gross violations of human rights in Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, 
from March to December 1971. The United Nations non-response to these 
tragic events represents a serious omission in the exercise of its 
responsibility to promote human rights. Prompt United Nations 
consideration of the human rights violations when they were first reported 
might have prevented further violations as well as the secession of 
Bangladesh from Pakistan and the hostilities between India and Pakistan. 
The Bangladesh experience vividly illustrates the inextricable relationship 
between the United Nations Charter principles of promoting human rights 
and maintaining peace and security. It also illustrates unfortunately, that 
member states consider that the charter's principles of non-interference in 
matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a member state may 
prohibit UN intervention until a situation reaches a level of international 
conflict incapable of a non-violent solution. Scholars of UN affairs should 
consider the implications of Bangladesh experience in terms of UN 
capability to prevent human right violations" .67 
9.3.2.3 Role of India 
It remains clear that ever since active civil war started on 25 March 1971, Indian 
actions, in providing active military support to MlIkhti Bhani (the insurgent group) and its 
subsequent engagement in the military operations towards the end of November 1971, 
with the invasion and occupation of some of Pakistan's territory and capture of its military 
armament were in breach of the customary and treaty norms of non-intervention into the 
affairs of another State. 
It seems doubtful that even after the pre-emptive strikes on the part of the Pakistan 
military on Indian territory, the full scale invasion of India could be sufficiently justified 
simply on the orthodox and traditional grounds of self-defence.68 It has to be conceded 
that India was forced to accept nearly 10 million refugees and their maintenance was 
67 J Salzburg, "United Nations Prevention of Human Rights violations The Case of Bangladesh" 2710 
(1973), 115-127, 115. 
68 Fonteyne treats India's stance on the issue of self-defence as "some vague and controversial 
allegations of self-defence by Indian spokesmen" J Fonteyne "The Customary International Law 
doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current validity under the United Nations Charter" 4 
Cal. WIU (1974), 203-270, 204~ also see J-P Fonteyne "Burden-Sharing: An Analysis of the Nature 
and Function ofInternational Solidarity in cases of Mass influx of Refugees" 8 AYBlL (1978-80) 162-
184. 
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having serious consequences for the Indian economy. Equally it needs to be noted that the 
treatment of the Hindu population by Pakistan, particularly with reference to the 1950 
treaty did provide India with a more immediate concern than the rest of the international 
community. On the other hand, Indian political motives remain extremely important and 
could not be overlooked. 
It is clearly arguable that while Indian politicians occasionally and rather 
inconsistently relied upon the doctrine of humanitarian intervention,69 India had strong 
political interests in the breaking-up of the State of Pakistan, and that the invasion and 
subsequent defeat of Pakistan army was not so much prompted by humanitarian concerns 
or a desire to uphold the principles of human rights and self-determination but by a desire 
to break up it arch enemy, whose existence it had with grave reluctance and only 
grudgingly accepted. After all as Franck and Rodley correctly point out 
" ... no one was more icily indifferent to the Hungarian freedom fighters dying 
on the streets of Budapest than India's foreign minister Krishna Menon, who 
contemptuously declared '[W]e can not say that a sovereign member of this 
Assembly ... can be called upon to submit its elections and everything else to the 
United Nations'. India could scarcely have invaded Hungary as it did Bangladesh. 
But Delhi could have expended some moral prestige it enjoyed in the international 
community on taking the Soviets to task, thereby raising some of the' invisible' costs 
of that draconian operation. Instead Mr Menon dismissed the Hungarian struggle for 
independence and self-determination as no more than an electoral dispute and so 
beyond the legitimate concern of his country or international community. Yet when 
India saw a chance to partition Pakistan, its representative went into some detail to 
enlighten the Security Council as to the failure of East Bengali elections, equating 
humanitarian and political rights and calling for their international and eventually 
unilateral enforcement; and Soviet Ambassador Malik even, in part sought to justify 
the Indian invasion on grounds of Pakistan's political irregularity. 'In view of that 
expression of will' he said to Pakistani Ambassador ' as represented by the 
convincing figures of 167 seats in Parliament of East Pakistan out of total of330 in 
the Parliament, why have you decided to deprive these members of the parliament of 
the right that is theirs to exercise the confidence placed in them by the peoples as 
69 Ibid .• 204; "We are glad that we have on this particular occasion absolutely nothing but the purest of 
motives and the purest of intention; to rescue the people of East Bengal from what they are suffering" 
per Indian Ambassador SIPV/606, 18. 
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expressed through their will? Why is it desired to deny them the right to work freely 
in the legislative body'''. 70 
Equally instructive is Nanda's argument when he says "As to India's motives, it 
unquestionably must have welcomed the opportunity to split Pakistan into two countries 
and weaken it, thereby minimising the perceived threat to India from a stronger 
Neighbour".71 India itself has been involved in a number of instances notably in Kashmir, 
Nagaland and Punjab where it has prima facie denied the minorities aspirations of 
autonomous development or self-determination.72 
9.3.2.4 Issue of Punishment of individuals involved in genocide 
If the East Pakistan saga was to exemplify the view that in an environment where 
political concerns predominate any humanitarian values, making the prevention of the 
physical extermination and genocide of minorities difficult and cumbersome, the 
punishment of those involved in such crimes was to prove impossible. Despite the coming 
into effect of the Genocide Convention, article IX of which provides the International 
Court with the compulsory jurisdiction to settle dispute amongst contracting parties in 
relation to "interpretation, application and fulfilment of the Convention", States have 
remained reluctant to bring any such disputes before the International Court. The tragedy 
of East Pakistan was also, at long last, to break the silence of this provision of the 
70 Frank and Rodley, "After Bangladesh The Law of Humanitarian Intervention" 67 AJIL (1973),275-
305, 293-294. 
71 V Nanda, "Tragedies in Northern Ireland, Liberia, Yugoslavia and Haiti, Revisiting the validity of 
Humanitarian Intervention" Part 1 20 DenJJL (1992), 305-334. 319. 
72 "The Kashmir and Naga repression's by India have scarcely raised an international eyebrow and the 
Indians, with impunity, have been able to scorn the international presence-the UN military observers 
who are supposed to supervise the old truce lime. The repression of political freedom in Kashmir and 
elsewhere in India scarcely make more convincing New Delhi's role as a disinterested champion of 
principles of freedom and Self-Determination beyond its boundaries". (footnotes omitted) Frank and 
Rodley op.cit note 70, 296. On Kashmir see A Lamb Kashmir A Disputed Legacy, 1846-1990, 
(Hertfordshire: Roxford Books) 1991. 
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Convention, with the proceedings instituted being the first ones in the 20 year history of 
the Convention.73 
Ironically it was neither Bangladesh, India or any other State sympathetic to the 
cause of the Bengalis that initiated the action but the Pakistan government itself which 
brought interim proceeding against India as a tactical move.74 India, which had the 
custody of Pakistan's prisoners of war, had agreed with Bangladesh that it would hand 
over to Bangladesh several thousand individuals who would then be charged with a 
number of war crimes including genocide. On 11 May 1973 Pakistan, in an attempt to 
prevent the trials and to secure their repatriation to Pakistan, filed an application with the 
IC] instituting proceedings against India seeking interim measures ofprotection.7s 
Pakistan had been of the view that India was acting in violation of the third and 
fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 by detaining 92,000 Pakistani prisoners of war whom 
India had a duty to repatriate. Similarly in Pakistan's view were any trials to be conducted, 
Bangladesh would neither have the jurisdiction nor provide an appropriate forum. It 
claimed jurisdiction to try the persons accused of genocide in its own tribunals contending 
that Bangladesh could not provide a "competent tribunals" as was envisaged by article VI 
of the Genocide Convention since the atmosphere prevailing in those trials would be 
highly emotional and extremely prejudicial to the accused.76 Pakistan in its application 
sought the following interim measures 
"(1) That the process of repatriation of prisoners of war and 
civilian internees in accordance with international law, which has already 
begun, should not be interrupted by virtue of charges of genocide against a 
certain number of individuals detained in India. 
73 In relation to Article IX which provides for the jurisdiction of the IC], the imprint of Pakistan 
remains significant. Pakistan's allegations in relation to cultural genocide as conducted by India led 
the Indian delegate to fear a clause providing for the courts jurisdiction "would make it possible for 
an unfriendly state to charge, on vague and insubstantial allegations that another state was 
responsible for genocide within its territory" UN GAOR. Sixth Committee (103 mtg) 437 (1948). 
74 Trial o/Pakistan Prisoners o/War, IC] Reports 1973, 347~ H Levie, "Legal aspects of the continued 
detention of the Pakistani Prisoners of War by India" 67 AJIL (1973), 512-516. 
7S I Hussain, Issues in Pakistan's Foreign policy. (Lahore: Progressive Publishers), 1988,214. 
76 See The case concerning the Trial 0/ Prisoners 0/ War (pakistan v India). IC] pleadings, 3-7. 
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(2) That such individuals, as are in the custody of India and are 
charged with alleged acts of genocide, should not be transferred to 
'Bangladesh' for trial till such time as Pakistan's claim to exclusive 
jurisdiction and the lack of any other Government or authority in this 
respect has been adjudged by the Court". 
However, already in April 1973, Bangladesh had announced that it would proceed 
to try 195 Pakistani nationals "for serious crimes, which include genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, breaches of article 3 of the genocide convention, murder rape 
and arson".77 It also legislated an International Crimes (Tribunals) Act in July 1973 
providing for the trials of those accused 195 prisoners, and had requested a number of 
experts to come and observe as trial observers. 
The case before the international Court was to prove short-lived never proceeding 
to a discussion of the merits, being settled by agreement between India and Pakistan in 
August 1973, and leading to Pakistan's Declaration of 14 December to drop the suit 
against India.78 Through the aforementioned accord India and Pakistan reached an 
agreement for the repatriation of 91,000 prisoners of War and civil internees that were 
held by India, save for the 195 soldiers that were alleged to have been primarily involved 
in committing war crimes and genocide.79 Sufficient evidence, it is submitted, would have 
been available at that time to try those involved in war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide. As far as trials for genocide were concerned Bangladesh had already 
accepted that it was obliged to act in accordance with the provisions of the Genocide 
convention. 
It would be appropriate here to counter the two objections raised subsequently by 
the Pakistan government. The first one relates to the territorial jurisdiction of Bangladesh, 
that Bangladesh could not be an appropriate forum to try persons accused of committing 
77 Press release, April 17 1973 reprinted in Paust and Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due 
Process A Case Study of Bangladesh, (Unpublished Documents) 1974, 54. 
78 India-Pakistan Agreement on Repatriation of Prisoners of War 12 ILM (1973) 1080-84. 
79 Ibid~ also see India-Pakistan: Agreement on Bilateral Relations and statements on its implementation, 
3 July 1972, 11 ILM (1972), 954-957~ India-Pakistan: Joint statement on the implementation of the 
Simla Agreement, ibid. 958-962. 
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genocide. However a closer analysis of article VI exposes the fallacy of this argument. 
Article VI requires such trials to take place "by a competent tribunal of the State in the 
territory of which the act was committed, or by such penal tribunal as may have 
jurisdiction". Since there is no restriction as to the timing of the coming to existence of a 
new State, it would have seemed perfectly compatible with the intentions of the article, 
firstly to treat Bangladesh as "the State in the territory of which the act was committed" 
and secondly to regard the newly formed government as having jurisdictional competence 
to try the alleged offenders.80 It is clear that Bangladesh as a successor State to Pakistan 
could appropriately and legitimately claim jurisdiction, to try war crimes and crimes 
against humanity and genocide.81 
The other objection relates to the absence of implementing legislation criminalizing 
acts of genocide and putting in effect the provision V of the Convention in either Pakistan 
or Bangladesh. As we have noted already, at all material times Pakistan was a party to the 
Genocide Convention, although it had not adopted any domestic legislation to give effect 
to its provisions. It nonetheless remains clear, it was bound under international law by the 
provisions of the Convention as article 1 of the Convention on the Non-applicability of 
Statutory Limitation to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity states "even if such acts 
do not constitute a violation of domestic law of the country in which they were 
committed". Hence it could be stated with a degree of certainty that it was not an issue of 
jurisdiction, evidence or even the custody of the accused but one of the politics of 
international law. 
Despite the fact that Bangladesh had emerged as an independent sovereign State 
and was prima facie in a position to try war criminals, it needed recognition and political 
and economic support from the international community. Pressure was introduced by 
80 Paust and Blaustien, op.cil note 7, 21. 
81 Ibid. 
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Pakistan with the refusal to release nearly 400,000 Bengalis which included both civilians 
and former members of armed forces. 82 According to Paust and Blaustein 
"Pakistan, contrary to the letter and spirit of the 1949 convention 
placed even more pressure on Bangladesh by refusing to release some 
400,000 Bengalis (civilians and former members of Pakistan Armed forces) 
who were being held in Pakistan and utilised as pawns in complicated 
power game."83 
Pakistan, alongside China put further pressure on Bangladesh by refusing to 
recognise it as an independent State84 and indeed the urge to pressurise was so strong that 
it led to China's casting of the first veto as a permanent member of the Security Council 
barring membership of Bangladesh.8s The first application of Bangladesh (for United 
Nations membership) was vetoed by China, the grounds given were the alleged refusal of 
Bangladesh to comply with General Assembly Resolutions concerning repatriation of 
prisoners and withdrawal offoreign troopS.86 The grounds on which this veto was casted, 
related to the claim that Bangladesh, in refusing to repatriate Pakistani prisoners of war, 
had acted in violation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,87 which as Paust and Blaustein 
comment 
"was a curious twist of the Geneva Conventions, especially in view 
of the obligations of Bangladesh and India to prosecute those accused of 
grave breaches of the Conventions. China and Pakistan clearly had no 
intentions to fulfil their obligations to prosecute violations of international 
law. Political considerations were far more important than fulfilment of 
international legal responsibility". 88 
82 Washington Post, August 26, 1972 .. 
83 Op.cit note 7. 35. 
84 Keesings 25-31 March, 1974, 26423~ Washington Post, August 30 at 18 
8S See SCOR, 27th Year, Supp for July, August and September. S/10759~ SC 1660th meeting, 25 
August 1972, GAOR, 27th Session, Annex Agenda Item 23, Doc N8776~ UN Monthly Chronicle 
August-September 1972. 24. 
86 Jbid. 1659 meeting, August 1972 (11-1 China, 3 Guinea, Somalia, and Sudan). 
87 Ibid. 
88 Op.cit note 7, 36. cf. H Levie "Legal aspects of the continued detention of the Pakistani Prisoners of 
War by India" 67 AJIL. (1973), 512-516~ H Levie "The Indo-Pakistani agreement of August 28, 
1973" 68AJIL (1974), 95-95. 
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The accountability for genocide and physical extermination of minority groups was 
unfortunately compromised by political ideals. In an agreement signed in Delhi on 9th 
April 1974, it was agreed to repatriate the 195 alleged perpetrators of genocide and other 
crimes of international law, implicitly recognising that none of these men involved would 
ever be tried or held accountable for the genocide committed in the former East Pakistan. 
As far as the issues of human rights were concerned the only act that emerged was an 
apology by the government of Pakistan stating that it condemned and deeply regretted any 
crimes that may have been committed.89 
9.4 CONCLUSIONS 
The present study has attempted to exemplify that in the absence of States 
upholding and protecting the rights of minorities and punishing those involved in violating 
these rights, it is difficult to promote or protect the rights of minorities. There are a 
number of substantive weaknesses in the whole prohibition of genocide; States like 
Pakistan have not hesitated to capitalise on these. The case of East Pakistan provides one 
of the most unfortunate incidents of State authorities engaging and perpetuating acts of 
genocide. However, despite the presence of substantial evidence of physical extermination 
and genocide of minorities, the international community generally failed to take any 
concerted action. Indian actions, it is contended, were prompted by political 
consideration, though they nonetheless helped Bengalis in ridding themselves of an ugly 
form of oppression and persecution. 
89 Bangladesh-India-Pakistan: Agreement on the Repatriation of Prisoners of War and Civilian 
internees, 13 ILM 1974,501-505 para 13~ New York times April, 1974, at 3 col. l. 
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A sadder and perhaps more unfortunate element of the whole saga, is the fact that 
no trials could be held for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide~ international 
community failed once again to hold responsible and punish those individuals who had 
conducted such activities. Accountability for genocide was compromised by political 
interests. Professor Cherif Bassiouni's comments could provide a befitting conclusion to 
our present debate 
"Notwithstanding the enormous victirnzation and the apparent 
effort of Bangladesh, abetted by India, to prosecute such violation, political 
considerations prevailed and Bangladesh did not carry out its intentions. It 
did so in exchange for political recognition by Pakistan and once this 
recognition was given, India returned the Pakistani detainees and accused 
war criminals who thus escaped individual criminal responsibility".90 
90 C Bassiouni, Crimes against Humanity and International Criminal Law, (Netherlands: Sijthofl) 1992, 
230. 
CHAPTER TEN 
MINORITIES AND THE RIGHT TO 
EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
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10.1 INTRODUCTION 
Earlier discussion has attempted to establish that the contemporary regime 
relating to individual human rights is based on the principles of equality of treatment 
and non-discrimination. I Although the general prohibition in relation to non-
discrimination is widely entrenched into the legal and constitutional framework of 
almost every State, it is submitted that in many ways international law lacks in 
providing any detailed measures necessary to uphold this right, or in defining 
adequately its parameters. 2 
The case of Pakistan vividly reflects the problems which the issue of 
discrimination and inequality could generate. It is worth re-calling that the State itself 
was formed primarily due to the fact that the Muslim minority of British India feared 
submission and discrimination by an overwhelming Hindu majority and the treatment 
as second-class citizens in a United India3• The hostile attitude of the two communities 
towards each other and a general unacceptability to reconcile their differences, forced 
the British colonial masters to acknowledge the separate existence of the Muslim 
minority and to introduce separate electorates and separate representation. 
Immediately prior to independence and partition of British India despite their linguistic, 
ethnic and cultural differences Muslims came to regard themselves as constituting a 
single homogenous group, and conceived themselves to be intrinsically different from 
other communities living in the Sub-Continent. 
Although the fear of being discriminated in a Hindu majority State became the 
driving force leading to the ultimate creation of Pakistan, the carving out of a State on 
2 
3 
See supra chapter 6 and 7. 
Ibid. 
See C Kennedy "Policies of Redistribution Preference in Pakistan" in N Nevitte and C Kennedy. 
(eds.) Ethnic Preference and Public policy in developing states, (Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc.) 
1986, 63-107, 64~ C Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press) 
1967,6. 
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religious lines, nonetheless resulted in the presence of a considerable number of 
religious minorities principally Hindus, Christians and Sikhs. After the emergence of 
Pakistan with Muslims as an overwhelming majority the issue of equality and 
discrimination adopted ethnic and regional connotations. Ethnic and linguistic 
minorities, in particular the Bengalis and Baluchis led the charge of discrimination, and 
of forced assimilation.4 
While endorsing the view that the principles, at least of racial non-
discrimination and equality are firmly entrenched in international law and reflected 
through custom and treaty law, the present chapter critically analyses these principles 
in relation to their substance and effective implementation. On the substantive front, 
the main focus of criticism lies in the apparent generality or vagueness of these 
principles, providing States like Pakistan the opportunity to adopt de facto 
discriminatory policies. As far as the issue of the possible implementation mechanisms 
is concerned, it is contended that they remain woefully inadequate in particular where 
the government in power itself is unrepresentative and has established its authority 
through unconstitutional means. 
10.2 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
Pakistan's international legal obligations in relation to the prohibition of 
discrimination based on race, religion, sex and language, like an overwhelming majority 
of other States, flow from its admission in the United Nations and ratification of the 
UN Charter.s Ever since its independence in August 1947, Pakistan has manifested 
4 
5 
R Wrising "The Baluch Frontier Tribes of Pakistan" (cd.) R Wrising, Protection of Minorities, 
Comparative Perspectives, (New York: Perganom Press) 1981,277-312. 
On 30 September, 1947, the General Assembly decided to admit Pakistan as a member of the 
United Nations see GAOR, Second Session, 92nd Plenary meeting, 311; UN Doc. AlCN.41l49, 7; 
On Pakistan's International Status see D O'Connell, State Succession in Municipal and 
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strong support for the principle of equality and non-discrimination for all individuals 
regardless of race, colour religion and sex. It actively participated in the preparation 
and adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, despite resistance from 
certain religious elements protesting that some provisions of the Declaration were 
contrary to the spirit oflslam.6 This active participation was prompted by a belief, in 
the words of its representative Begum Ikramullah, in the dignity and worth of man. 
She stated 
" ... .It was imperative that the peoples of the World should 
recognise the existence of a code of civilized behaviour which would 
apply not only in international relations but also in domestic affairs".7 
Pakistan's policies have at least in terms of constitutional manifestations 
affirmed the principles of the Universal Declaration.8 The first constitutional 
document, i.e. the Objective Resolution that was adopted in March 1949 is clearly 
based on these principles, and indeed the fundamental rights provided in the first 
constitution of 1956 resemble conspicuously with the provisions of the Declaration. 
Subsequent constitutions of 1962 and 1973 have also based themselves on the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. Part II of the present Constitution, the 
1973 Constitution (as amended), following closely the line of Universal Declaration 
provides inter alia for a number of fundamental rights including Freedom of 
6 
8 
International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) vol. ii, 184-187; A Gledhill, 
Pakistan, The Development of its Laws (London: Stevens and Sons Ltd) 1957,65. 
It needs to be noted that Saudi Arabia, a conservative Muslim State, abstained from voting in 
favour of the Declaration on grounds that it provided for certain provisions unacceptable to Islam; 
A Robertson and Merrills, Human Rights in the World, An Introduction to the Study of 
international Protection of Human Rights 3rd edn. (Manchester: Manchester University Press) 
1989, 70. 
GAOR, 3rd Session, Part I, third Committee, 90th meeting., 1st Oct. 1948,37. 
"The Pakistan Constitution has the distinctive privilege of incorporating in its chapter I, about 
two thirds of the thirty fundamental human rights enumerated in the United Nations Declaration 
of Human Rights" CJ M Haleem, "The Domestic Application of International Human Rights 
Norms" in Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence, The Domestic Application of International 
Human Rights Norms, (London: Human Rights Unit) 1988, 91-108, 106. 
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Association (Article 17), Freedom of speech (Article 19), Freedom to profess religion 
and to manage religious institutions (Article 20), safeguard against taxation for 
purposes of any particular religion (Article 21), safeguard as to educational institutions 
in respect of religion (Article 22), equality of all citizens before law (Article 25), non-
discrimination on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, residence etc. in access to 
public places and services (Article 26) and preservation of language script and culture 
(Article 28). 
In the international forum Pakistan has demonstrated not only its commitment 
towards establishing a regime of non-discrimination and equality of treatment for all 
individuals regardless of race, religion and sex but initiated moves to protect its 
religious minorities. In 1950, it entered into treaty obligations with India in relation to 
the protection of its minorities and established a ministry to ensure the observation of 
these international obligations.9 
Pakistan was also actively involved in the adoption of a number of international 
instruments including the International Covenants. Indeed, in so far as the issue of 
protection of groups is concerned Pakistan has taken an extremely firm and positive 
stance. The views of Pakistani delegates on the subject of "cultural" genocide have 
already been noted.!O Similarly, during the debates on Article 27 of ICCPR the 
Pakistani representative treated it as the most significant Article in the entire 
Covenant.!! Pakistan also played a key role in the preparation of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, and was in fact the third State to 
9 131 UNTS (1950). 
10 Supra Chapter 9. 
II Begum Aziz Ahmed "considered [article 27) to be the most important in the whole Covenant. 
The existing text was satisfactory, and she was prepared to vote for it as it stood ..... There were 
several religious minorities in Pakistan whose sentiments had always been respected and 
protected by law. In Pakistan, freedom of religion, language and culture was not only advocated 
but practised with pride".NC.3/SR.1104, 14 November, 1961, paras 15-17. 
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have ratified it,12 an apparent reflection on the part of the State towards establishing a 
regime of racial non-discrimination. 
10.3 APPLICABILITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL NORMS 
RELATING TO EQUALITY AND NON-DISCRIMINATION 
10.3.1 Political Self-Interests and the Exploitation of the Gaps in Existing 
Norms 
10.3.1.1 Non-Recognition of Ethnic and linguistic Groups on which 
Non-Discriminatory Norms could be Applied 
In the face of its international legal commitments, the constitutional practices of 
Pakistan, however seem equivocal. Undoubtedly it has been the historic factors and 
the urge to build a nation-State which forced successive governments to adopt 
assimilative policies even at the expense of discrimination against a number of ethnic, 
linguistic and religious groups. One strand of this discriminatory stance is reflected in 
the official position that no ethnic, racial and linguistic minorities existed in Pakistan 
with the implication that racial and ethnic discrimination could not possibly exist within 
the State. 1] 
12 "Pakistan was among the very first states to sign the Convention and the third to ratify it" 6th 
periodic report of Pakistan before the Committee, CERD/C/66/Add.10 para 8. 
13 The term minority has been used in the present 1973 Constitution on a number of occasions (see 
for example the Preamble, article 2(a) and 36). However there is no definition of what constitutes 
a minority. The meaning of minority that was taken by the drafters of the constitution and has 
been subsequently adopted is that minorities necessarily means religious minorities (personal 
interviews). For a confirmation of these views see the proceedings of CERD discussed infra; 
According to the ICoJ "It is only the non-Muslim religions that are formally recognised by the 
government and the constituting minorities and for whom special, albeit not entirely favourable, 
arrangements are considered appropriate. The only way in which the interests of various 
linguistic and cultural groupings in the provinces can be protected, therefore is through the 
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Considering the ethnic, racial and linguistic composition particularly prior to 
the secession of East Pakistan this view seems patently inaccurate. However this 
assumption reflects the realisation of the sensitive nature of the issues involved. 
Combined with the non-recognition of racial or linguistic minorities, there has been a 
conspicuous move towards assimilation of different groups into a Pakistani nation 
with one language, culture and ideology. Since religion was the only bond which 
brought the otherwise desperate groups under the umbrella of Pakistan, it has featured 
prominently in Pakistan's constitutional developments. However, while it appears that 
Islam has been used excessively to inculcate a sense of unity, in the process religious 
minorities have been singled out and discriminated heavily. 
A close analysis of Pakistan's successive constitutions affirm the view that 
explicit recognition has only been accorded to the existence of religious minorities. 
Similarly with the knowledge at hand that international protection could depend on the 
official recognition of the existence of minorities,14 despite criticisms Pakistan showed 
great reluctance to admit the presence of minorities other than religious minorities, 
which incredible though it may seem, remained the official stance even in the context 
of the former East Pakistan. 
State reports submitted by Pakistan to CERD, which operates under the 
auspices of the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination 
are particularly revealing in this respect. IS While, as noted earlier, although the 
convention does not deal specifically with minorities, the situation of racial groups 
necessarily overlaps with those of minorities. Hence, quite frequently State parties are 
confronted with the discussion relating to discrimination issues faced by minorities. I6 
constitutional provisions establishing provincial government and assemblies" ICoJ, Pakistan 
Human Rights After Martial Law Report of a Miss ion (Geneva) 1987, 115; R Wrising, op.cit note 
4,277-312,294. 
14 "What must be emphasised .. .is the fact that international protection of minorities does depend on 
official recognition of their existence" Capotorti, 12, para,61. 
IS Supra chapter 6. 
16 Ibid. 
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Combined with this view of the absence of ethnic and linguistic minorities, 
there also has been the assumption that there does not exist any form of racial 
discrimination. Indeed, Pakistan, while referring to the events which led to the 
secession of East Pakistan, asserted "at no time was the imputation of racial 
discrimination or differentiation a component of [the] grievances or a cause of friction 
between the regions of Pakistan". 17 
In the truncated Pakistan this policy of non-recognition of ethnic and linguistic 
minorities has become even more pronounced. During the consideration of the fourth 
periodic report before the committee the representative of Pakistan stated that the 
reason behind non-inclusion of information relating to ethnic composition had been due 
to the reason that 
"his country had no data about it's people based on their race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin. If the committee wished to 
obtain information about the languages spoken in Pakistan, however, 
they could easily be supplied with it in the from of tables taken form the 
report in 1972 population census. His government had supplied 
information about religious minorities, because it had viewed the 
question of discrimination against the background of the country's 
history. In Pakistan, there were no racial or ethnic minorities but only 
religious minorities which represent less than 5% of the population" .18 
Understandably this stance has often come under criticism from the members of 
the Committee. Several members were extremely surprised by this statement and 
doubted its accuracy leading to a considerable debate. One member of the committee 
Mr Nabavi put two basic question to the representative of Pakistan 
"The first concerned the composition of the population of 
Pakistan. When the third report had been considered, it had been 
suggested that in its fourth report, Pakistan should furnish information 
about its ethnic minorities. According to the reply which had just been 
given Pakistan did not have any ethnic minorities, but only religious 
17 Al9018, para 164. 
18 (Italics added) CERDIClSR.322 para 3. 
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minorities. Despite that answer, it ought still to be asked whether the 
population of Pakistan was made up of a single race and really 
consisted of a single ethnic group" .19 
Another member of the committee, Mr NeUel, referring to Pakistan's second 
report which had contained information relating to the population of backward areas 
with inhabitants complying with tribal customs and laws wondered as to the extent 
which these customs and traditions reflected differences of ethnic origin. In his earlier 
comments, Mr Nettel had stated that he 
"found it difficult to understand that in a country of the size of 
Pakistan there were no groups of people differing by race or ethnic 
origin. Moreover to state that 'minorities in Pakistan are essentially 
religious minorities' seemed to him to imply that there were other 
minorities, unless a religious minority and an ethnic minority were held 
to be the same thing. In any case, even if there were no ethnic 
minorities or racial discrimination, there was no reason why provisions 
concerning the protection of ethnic and racial minorities should not be 
included in the Constitution of Pakistan, as provided in the 
Convention" . 
These queries produced a swift response from Mr Sattar, Pakistan's 
representative. While not inclined to perceive religious minorities identical or the same 
as ethnic minorities, he was firmly of the view that racial distinctions "had no part in 
the tradition or history of the country"?O In reply to Mr Nettel's earlier question, he 
had this to say 
"The sentence at the beginning of page 2 stating that minorities 
in Pakistan were' essentially' religious minorities might be clearer if the 
word 'essentially' were deleted. He could nevertheless assure Mr 
Nettel that the minorities in Pakistan were religious in origin"?1 
This same approach is exhibited again in the fifth periodic report which claims 
19 Ibid. para 5. 
20 Ibid. para 42. 
21 Ibid. para 43. 
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"The people of Pakistan being of a relatively homogenous racial 
group and following the precepts of Islam, which is a universal religion 
advocating tolerance for people belonging to every race have not faced 
the problem of racial discrimination. It has, therefore not been 
necessary to enact any new laws or administrative measures to deal 
specifically with racial discrimination other than already existing in the 
country".22 
This view was once more criticised by several members and one member 
commenting on it viewed that 
"if all states parties to the Convention adopted the same criteria 
to decide whether it was necessary to enact new laws or measures 
designed to prevent racial discrimination, they would be practically, 
exempt from discharging this obligation under the Convention, since 
almost all the religions of the World preached equality and tolerance".23 
The line of representation on the part of Pakistan, however is continued in 
subsequent reports and in their discussions. In its eighth report it is asserted that 
"Racial discrimination is therefore not only unknown in the c;:ountry but is anathema to 
the people of Pakistan when practised elsewhere in the World".24 
The report continues to state 
"The government, regrets, however, that it is unable to provide 
any further information of this nature as data on ethnic origin are not 
collected in the country's decennial census or otherwise. This is in itself 
a striking illustration of the non-existence of racial prejudice and 
testifies to the absence of any feeling of racial discrimination or 
exclusiveness in Pakistani society. This is not to deny the prevalence of 
a number of different languages in the various parts of the country or 
the existence of religious minorities". 25 
22 Fifth periodic report CERD/C/20/Add.l5, para 1. 
:: GAOR 33rd session supplement No 18 N33118, para 253~ CERD/c/SR391. 
CERD/C/118/Add.15 para I, Eighth periodic report. 
25 Ibid. para 3. 
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During the consideration of the Eighth periodic report, Pakistan's 
representative Mr Hussain said 
"The report provided ample information on the steps taken to 
protect the rights of minorities, who in Pakistan were religious, not 
ethnic minorities. The constitution granted all rights to minorities and, 
where necessary, they had been given special treatment" .26 
A closer analysis of Pakistan's approach on the issue of racial discrimination or 
on the recognition of the existence of racial and religious minorities, is itself however 
self-defeating in many ways. In a number of its reports, particularly before the CERD, 
detailed lists of legislative and administrative provisions are provided which are meant 
to counter racism and racial discrimination. This at least, implicit recognition, is also 
reflected in the replies of Pakistan to Human Rights Commission in relation to the 
"Rights of persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic minorities". 
Similarly in its "Declaration on Minorities" the Government of Pakistan undertook that 
"minorities shall be integrated and accepted in the general stream of national life 
without affecting their religious and cultural identities and that special measures shall 
be adopted to help and support the underprivileged sections of the society, irrespective 
of their creed, caste or colour"27 and that in, order to protect and promote the interests 
of the minorities a cultural council had been set Up.28 
As we have already noted, successive constitutional documents have also 
recognised the possibility of the existence of linguistic and ethnic minorities with a 
wide number of provisions prohibiting discriminatory practices. A numbers of Laws 
have also been in force to prevent and punish acts which are against racial harmony or 
promote racial and ethnic discord29 • 
26 CERDICISR. 713 (Consideration of the Eighth report by Pakistan). 
27 UN Doc E/CN.41l298/Add.3 para 3. 
28 Ibid. para 4. 
29 See e.g. section 505 ofthe Pakistan Penal Code~ section 153-A of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860~ 
section 99-A of the Code of Criminal procedure 1898; The Security of Pakistan Act 1952 and 
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On the other hand, it is worth reiterating the point that the mere presence in 
constitutional and legislative provisions forbidding discrimination based on race, 
nationality, ethnic origin, language or religion per se can not be interpreted as 
constituting recognition of the existence of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. 
This sentiment is also echoed by Special Rapporteur when he observes that "as far as 
the question of implicit recognition, it should be pointed out that general constitutional 
provisions forbidding discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, religion or 
language can not be interpreted as constituting a recognition of ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities". 30 
10.3.1.2 POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONCERNS AND 
THE ISSUE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION 
(i) Religious Discrimination 
The point was made earlier that political and ideological concerns have a 
greater tendency to conflict with issues relating to religious equality. Although racial 
problems have been extremely disruptive, there seems to be a greater consensus 
amongst the international community in relation to the prohibition of racial 
discrimination.31 Religious discrimination is unfortunately evidenced in a number of 
States,32 particularly where Islam is the official religion.33 In this respect the case of 
Pakistan is quite revealing for the State was, in fact, created in the name of Islam, as a 
section 3 of the Political Parties Act 1962. These provisions are provided in the fifth periodic 
report of Pakistan. 
30 Capotorti, 13, para 65. 
31 Supra chapter 6. 
32 Van Dyke; E Benito; A Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the matter of Religious Rights 
and Practices, E 60. XlV. 2, 1960. 
33 Benito ibid.; Krishnaswami ibid. 
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safe-haven for the Muslims of the Indian Sub-continent. Hence as far as the probable 
influence of religion on other constitutional and political issues is concerned, Pakistan 
perhaps represents an extreme example, although the treatment that has been accorded 
to religious minorities is no worse than a number of other States. Religious identity 
formed the genesis of the struggle of self-determination for an independent State for 
the Muslims of British India. Although the precise implications of such a policy were 
not considered in any great depth, it was obvious that the partition on account of 
religious denominations would necessarily mean that substantial religious minorities 
would become part of the two new States?4 The initial official position of Pakistan 
clearly reflected a secular note. On 11 August Pakistan's founder and first governor-
general said in his speech to the Constituent Assembly 
"Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and 
you will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be 
Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious 
sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the 
political sense as citizens of the State".35 
The successive constitutional provisions, as we have already mentioned briefly, 
following this secular line have generally tended to establish a tolerant environment. 
Indeed one of the first steps which the first Constituent Assembly undertook was the 
passing of the Objective Resolution in March 1949. The Resolution relies heavily on 
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. It pledged (inter alia) that Pakistan's first 
constitution should make adequate provisions for the non-Muslims to freely profess 
and practice their religion and this tolerant spirit is also reflected in the provisions of 
the 1956, 1962 and 1973 Constitutions?6 
34 K Sipe, The Political, Economic and Social Consequences of Partition, Related Migration, 
Karachi's Refugee Crises, (Ann Arbor: Microfilms) 1984,9. 
3S M A Jinnah, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, vol. I, 20, August 11, 1947. 
36 For a detailed analysis see infra Chapter 11. 
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Although according to Article 2 of the present constitution, Islam is to the 
State Religion of Pakistan, article 20 provides-Subject to law, public order and 
morality 
(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and 
propagate his religion; and 
(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall 
have the right to establish, maintain its religious institutions. 
Article 27(1) states 
No citizen otherwise qualified for appointment in the service of 
Pakistan shall be discriminated against in respect of any such 
appointment on the ground only of race, religion, caste, sex, residence 
or place of birth 
Despite the presence of these and as we noted a number of other provisions, on 
a practical plane, it has become equally clear that the presence of constitutional 
provisions in themselves have not guaranteed a regime of equality and non-
discrimination. In its initial years of independence the Hindus and Sikhs who were left 
behind in Pakistan not only became an object of persecution and discrimination, their 
mere presence was regarded as a threat to the integrity of Pakistan. The fortunes of 
the treatment that has been accorded to religious minorities has fluctuated with the 
political environment. Despite the constitutional guarantees their position has ranged 
from being regarded as anti-State and disloyal citizens at one end of the spectrum to 
those who may well be accepted into the community provided they were content to 
acknowledge their subservient position. 
Indeed, the inherent tensions between principles of religious orthodoxy as 
against building up a secular non-discriminatory State are reflected throughout the 
history of Pakistan. In particular prior to the secession of East Pakistan, the Hindu 
minority of East Pakistan often felt discriminated and was frequently persecuted. As 
Callard points out 
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"Those Hindus who did remain, principally in East Bengal, 
showed their willingness to accept the new state of Pakistan. But it 
would be impossible to pretend that they welcomed the events of 1947. 
They found themselves separated from friends and relatives and cut off 
from major centres of commerce and education. Those in West 
Pakistan witnessed and suffered several months of killing and looting 
and endured total uncertainty as to the safety of their persons and 
possessions. In East Bengal, where with rare exceptions communal 
violence since partition has been avoided, the Hindus could not help but 
wonder whether it was their turn next. And every where they have had 
to bear a constant burden of suspicion and obloquy. All the sins, real or 
imagined, of the Indian government have been levelled at the Hindus of 
Pakistan"37 
Unfortunately, the Hindu community both prior to and even after 1971, has 
been a continuous target of suspicion and often treated as fifth column. Political 
expediencies, have often allowed the Hindus to be treated as scapegoats for the general 
incompetence of the governments in power. As we have already noted, while Islam 
has been used as a rallying force for political ends, conversely and for the same 
political purposes Hindus have been treated as anti-State and anti-Islamic elements, 
persecuted and even becoming victims of genocide. 
Since 1971 the change in the political dynamics has also affected not only the 
treatment accorded to religious minorities, but also the constitution of the minorities 
themselves. The focus of attention after the secession of East Pakistan has turned 
towards sects which, despite considerable tensions previously had been allowed to 
claim themselves as Muslims. In the truncated Pakistan, the position of religious 
minorities unfortunately does not provide a promising reflection. Although the 
constitution of Pakistan has granted fundamental rights including freedom of religion, 
and the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religious beliefs, there has been 
evidenced considerable amount of resentment and discrimination against such religious 
37 K Callard Pakistan A Political Study, (London: Allen and Unwin) 1957,237 
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communities as Christians, Hindus, Parsis, as well as other sects like Zikris,38 Shais,39 
and Ismailis. 
The group that has faced the worst forms of discrimination is the Ahmadis. 
Ahmadis are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad who claimed to be the promised Imam 
Mehdi as had been prophesied in various gospels. The main conflict between the 
orthodox section of the Muslims and the Ahmadis is that the latter claim that Mirza 
was the last prophet, a claim incompatible to the belief of the majority of Muslims.40 
The doctrinal debate relating to the basic tenants of Ahmadi philosophy in particular 
their beliefs as to Khatam-i-Nabuwat (the finality of the Holy Prophet Mohammed) is 
shrouded in controversy.41 
Whatever may be the exact position, it remainS clear that contemporary 
Ahmadi doctrine produces an interpretation which does not attempt to antagonise the 
orthodox Muslims.42 Despite these concessions, and a firm belief in belonging to the 
Muslim Ummah, Ahmadis have been a constant target of discrimination and 
persecution. The anti-Ahmadi sentiments which had been simmering ever since the 
Ahmadis left their traditional homeland of Qadian in India to move to Rabwah in 
Pakistan after partition, boiled over in early 1950's and were evident in the severe anti-
Ahmadi movement of 1953.43 Although several of the demands of the campaigners of 
38 S Harrison "Ethnicity and Political Stalemate in Pakistan" in A Banuazizi and M Weiner (eds.) 
The State. Religion and Ethnic Politics, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard) 
1987,276-298,276. 
39 S Querishi "The Politics of the Shia Minority in Pakistan: Context and Development" in D 
Vajpeyi and Y Malik, (eds.) 109-138. 
40 See F Daud, Violations of Human Rights in Pakistan: The Case of Ahmadiyya community. 
Unpublished LL.M Dissertation, University of London, 1992,6-8. 
41 C Kennedy "Towards the Definition of a Muslim in an Islamic State The Case of Ahmadyya in 
Pakistan" in D Vajpeyi and Y Malik, (eds.) 71-108. 
42 Kennedy ibid. 89; ICoJ, Pakistan: Violations of Human Rights After Martial Law, (Geneva) 1987, 
103-4. 
43 Government of Punjab, Report of the Court of Inquiry constituted under the Punjab Act 11 of 
1954 to inquire in to the Punjab disturbances of 1953, (Lahore: Superintendent of Government 
Printing Press), 1954; also see M Munir, From Jinnah to Zia. (Lahore: Vanguard) 1982; M 
Rashidi, Islamic Jammuhira Pakistan Mee Quadianiat 1947-1983. (Lahore: Muktabai Bisath) 
1983 (Urdu). 
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the 1953 anti-Ahmadi movement Were given consideration, or at least an impression 
was given that they were being considered seriously, it was not until 1974 that through 
an amendment to the Constitution Ahmadis were declared non-Muslims.44 The 
amendment added Ahmadis to the list of non-Muslims and defined them as 
"A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified 
finality of prohpethood of Muhammed (peace be upon him) the last of 
the prophets, in any sense of the word or of any description 
whatsoever, after Muhammed (peace be upon him), or recognises such 
a claimant as a prophet or a religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the 
purposes of the Constitution or law" .45 
Despite the fact the Ahmadis were declared non-Muslim it did not have an 
immediate adverse impact on their position, alongside other religious communities 
within the society46 and it was only during the Islamization period of President Zia that 
patent discrimination against religious minorities particularly the Ahmadis was 
evidenced.47 Equally the restraints and enlightened judiciousness which the courts 
had shown prior to the beginning of Nizam-MlistaJa (Islamic Order) were missing 
during Zia's period. In 1981, the Lahore High Court applying the 1974 constitutional 
amendment retroactively ruled that Ahmadis (being non-Muslims) could not inherit 
land from Muslims.48 
Under pressure from fundamentalist Ulema, President Zia on 26 April 1984, 
issued an anti-Ahmadi Ordinance which added two Clauses to Pakistan Penal Code. 
According to s298B 
44 Constitutional (2nd amendment) Act 1974 Act XLIX 1974. 
45 Article 260(3) Constitution of Pakistan (as amended), 1973. 
46 See Abdar Rahman Mab ash ir vAmirAli Shah (1978) PLD 113. 
47 It has been contended that as far as the overall Islamization process as initiated by General Zia 
which ostensibly aimed to bring the whole society within the fold of Islam, it was more in the 
nature of "political noise" and mere rhetoric rather than anything concrete; see C Kennedy 
"Islamization and Legal Reform in Pakistan 1979-1989" 63 PAJJs (1990), 62-77; C Kennedy 
"Repugnancy to Islam-Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in Pakistan" 41 ICLQ (1992), 769-
787. 
48 MohammedAshraq v. Mst Niameut Bibi PLD (1981) Lahore 520. 
272 
(1) Any person of the Qadiani group or the Lahori group (who 
call themselves "Ahmadis" or any other name) who by words, either 
spoken or written, or by visible representation-
(a) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or 
companion of the Holy Prophet Mohammed (peace be upon him), as 
"Ameer-ul-Mumineen", "Khalifat-ul-Mumineen", "Khalifat-ul-
Mumineen", "Khalifat-ul-Muslimeen", "Sahaabi" or "Razi Allah 
Anaho"; 
(b) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a wife of the 
Holy Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon him), as Ummul-Mumineen; 
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of 
the family (Ahle-bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammed (peace be upon 
him), as Ahle-bait; or 
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as Masjid; 
shall be punished with imprisonment or description for a term 
which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
(2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call 
themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name) who by words, either 
spoken or written, or by visible representation, refers to the mode or 
form of call to prayers followed by his faith as "Azan" or recites Azan 
as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment or either 
description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be 
liable to fine. 
According to s 298C 
Any person of the Qadiani group or Lahori group (who call 
themselves "Ahmadis" or by any other name), who directly or 
indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls or refers to, his faith as 
Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his 
faith, by words either spoken or written, or by visible representation in 
any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims, shall 
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which 
may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. 
In 1986, through Criminal Law Amendment Act, a new clause was introduced 
in the Pakistan Penal Code. The new Article 295C provides 
Wh~ever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible 
representation, or by any imputation, innuendo or insinuation, directly 
or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet (peace be 
upon him) sh.all be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and 
shall also be hable to fine. 
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A subsequent amendment to section 295C made death penalty mandatory for 
anyone defiling the name of Prophet Mohammed,49 which apart from reversing an 
emerging trend in the international community for the abolition of death sentence, 
allows for the application of a vague provision against the probable political and 
personal opponents of the complainants. Through the Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, 
1992, the maximum punishment for breaching section 29SA has been increased from 
two to ten years. so 
In an environment charged with religious intolerance, which clouds the 
judicious and equitable instincts of a judge, it has not been surprising to note that the 
various challenges against these ordinances have failed. 51 In a lengthy judgement the 
Federal Shariat Court, in MUjibur Rahman v. Government of Pakistan52 the Court had 
upheld the validity of these anti-Ahmadi ordinances. Apart from a commentary which 
is full of biased and derogatory remarks against the Ahmadi values and belief, Fakhre 
Alam CJ, it is submitted, misconstrued the spirit of Article 18 (wrongly stated by him 
as Article 28) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 when he said 
"There in nothing in this charter to give to the citizens of a country the right to 
propagate or preach his religion". S3 While the attempts before the Supreme Court to 
declare Ordinance XX of 1984 have failed, the Lahore Session Court recently 
49 See Muhammed lsamail Qureshi v. Pakistan PLD 1991 FSC 10 where the FSC held that 
alternative punishment of life imprisonment as provided in S29SC as repugnant to Islam and 
ordered that this alternative punishment be deleted; HRCP, Pakistan State of Human Rights 1991, 
(Lahore: Maktaba Jadecd Press) 1992, 121~ AI, Pakistan, Open letter to Political Parties, Index; 
ASA 33/04/93 September 1993, 5; Times, "Boy escapes hanging in Pakistan" 24-2-95; 
Independent "Boy 14 escapes death sentence" Independent 24-2-95. 
50 See PPC 295-A (as amended), The Major Acts 1994, Punjab Law Publications, 85. 
51 See Zaheerudin V State 1993 SC MR 1718; also see Mirza Khurshid Ahmad v. Government of 
Punjab PLD 1992 Lah 1. 
52 PLD 1985 FSC 8. 
S3 Ibid. 117; This attitude can be contrasted with the views of AI, which in its 1991 report on 
Ahmadis states "Legislation which provides for imprisonment and even death on grounds of 
religious conscience violates the right to freedom of religion contained in Article 18 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is contrary to the 1981 UN Declaration on 
Elimination of All forms of intolerance and of Discrimination based on Religion and Belief' AI, 
Violations ofhuman Rights of Ahmadis, ASA 33/015/91 September 1991, 1. 
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sentenced two Christians Salamat Masih and Rehmat Masih to death under S295. The 
case provoked considerable international concern over the obvious injustice that was 
being dispensed. The High Court subsequently quashed the convictions on the basis of 
insubstantial evidence, although Bhatti J delivering the Judgement of the Court was 
careful not to criticise or challenge the patently vague provisions in question. While 
the two accused fled the country and their families were forced to leave their homes 
for fear of reprisals, religious zealots have pledged to go before the Supreme Court 
and have the High Court verdict overruled. 54 
Some concern has been shown, albeit inadequate, by the international 
community over the passage of the aforementioned laws. In August 1985, the United 
Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of discrimination and protection of 
minorities expressing "grave concern" at the promulgation of these ordinances of 1984 
which "violate the right to liberty and security of persons, the right to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest or detention, the right to freedom of thought, expression, conscience 
and religion, the rights of religious minorities to profess and practice their own religion 
and the right to effective safeguard".55 Similarly, despite the recent media attention 
over Pakistan's blasphemy laws it is unlikely that the present government would be in 
any position to change the said laws. 
The present section has attempted to show that governments are often 
pressurised by militant elements. States like Pakistan, where religion plays a 
fundamental role these pressures could have a phenomenal impact on the fortunes of 
the governments--something which national politicians cannot afford to ignore. 
Similarly, while "attempts to resolve conflicts between religious law and human rights 
norms may be fruitless where religious doctrine insists upon the unavailability of the 
54 7 April Daily Jang, 1995. 
55 United Nations Sub-Commission Resolution, 1985/21, UN Doc EleNA/1986/5 (1985), 102,; 
Hannum, 68~ AI, op.cit note 53, 10. 
275 
sacred law or its supremacy over human rights norms"56 it remains extremely difficult 
for international law to impose any sanctions for the failure to respect any of the 
human rights obligations. 
(ii) Discrimination Based on Language and Ethnic Origin 
Discrimination based on language and ethnic origin is interrelated phenomenon 
in the case of Pakistan and have had serious repercussion on the perceptions of 
minority groups. The issue of ethnicity is discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter, the aim of the present discussion merely being to identify how Pakistan's 
policy makers in a desperate bid to build a nation-State have adopted strategies which 
have proved to be patently discriminatory. 
Linguistic dissonance, like that of religion has had a fundamental role in 
establishing the fortunes of the peoples of the sub-continent. Indeed, the Hindi-Urdu 
conflict was one of the main causes of hostility between the Muslim minority and the 
Hindu majorit~7. After the creation of Pakistan, Urdu was adopted as the sole State 
language despite the fact that less than 10% of the total population had any 
understanding of it58 • The Bengalis bitterly resented this linguistic policy. There were 
considerable riots and bloodshed before Bengali was provided with a national status. 
While the 1956 Constitution did provide an equal status to Bengali and Urdu, in actual 
fact, Bengali like other regional languages continued to remain subservient. Linguistic 
discrimination was one of the key issues which led the Bengalis to civil war and 
ultimate secession. 
56 D Sullvian "Advancing the Freedom of Religion through the UN Declaration on Elimination of 
Religious intolerance" 82 AJIL (1988), 487-520, 515. 
57 F Fatehpur, Pakistan Movement and Hindi-Urdu Conflict. (Lahore: Sangeemeel Publications), 
1987~ P Brass "Muslim Separatism in the United Provinces" E&PW (1970) 167-187. ~ , , 
A Mascarenhas, The Rape of Bangladesh (Dehli: Vikas Publication) 1971, 16 
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Subsequent to the secession of East Pakistan, Urdu has remained the official 
language despite the fact that this policy is bitterly resented by Sindhis, Pukhtuns and 
Baluchi minorities. As the 1981 census shows Urdu is "commonly spoken" by only 7.6 
% of households in Pakistan, a very small proportion of the total population. In 
international circles Pakistan has continued its policy of not only denying that the issue 
of linguistic dissonance has been evidenced in Pakistan, but also that there are no 
linguistic minorities within Pakistan. 
Pakistan's ninth periodic report before CERD explicitly states "There are no 
linguistic minorities in Pakistan". S9 Not unnaturally, this view has been doubted by 
observers and by members of the committee itself. During the consideration of the 
seventh report one of the committee members expressing his concern at the position 
adopted by the Pakistan government in relation to linguistic policies said 
"the 7th report stated that the national language was Urdu; 
however reports on the 1961 census indicated that Urdu was the native 
language of at most 8% of the population, where as there were other, 
much more widespread languages, such as Punjabi, which was the 
mother tongue of forty seven million people out of a total of 84 million 
inhabitants, that is to say 56% of the population. He wondered, how it 
was possible that a language with so little currency as Urdu was 
established as Pakistan's national language. It was regrettable that the 
report gave no detailed data on the ethnic composition of the 
country".6O 
Members of the linguistic minorities are antagonistic at the continuation of this 
linguistic policy for not only do they remain at a natural disadvantage in competing in a 
foreign language while attempting to seek employment in the Public sector and 
receiving higher education, but also there are substantial claims that even if they do 
qualify their prospects of promotion are jeopardised due to their linguistic background. 
S9 CERD/c/1l49 (ninth periodic report). 
60 CERDIClSRl630 para 59. 
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The position of language is of prime importance to all States regardless of their 
level of development and it can be cogently argued that internationallaw provides only 
a tenuous protection of linguistic rights. Hannum accurately reflects this sentiment 
when he says 
"Linguistic rights are not specifically protected under 
international human rights law, except in a relatively restricted. The 
two Covenants do prohibit discrimination on the basis of language, and 
it is clear that no one can be, for example, imprisoned, denied the right 
to enter or leave, or forbidden from participating in Public affairs on the 
grounds that he/she speaks a particular language. On the other hand is 
there a right for every citizen to have an election ballot in a language in 
which that education may be offered? Does the prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of language mean that there can be no 
'official' language". 61 
The newly independent States of Africa and Asia have, in particular, found it 
difficult to adopt satisfactory linguistic policies. Ironically, in a number of instances 
the usage of colonial language has been seen as less divisive than a single indigenous 
language. In the case of Pakistan, while English remained the official language of the 
elite, Urdu has gradually been overtaking as the medium of higher education. A 
resurgence of English as the official medium, and its recognition as the medium of 
education may take away some of the bitterness that is generated by the continued use 
of Urdu, although according to critics the lesser developed linguistic minorities would 
still remain at a grave disadvantage. 
61 Hannum, 1l. 
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10.4 AMBIGUITY IN THE MEANS OF ACQUIRING DE FACTO 
EQUALITY 
As we have noted in an earlier chapter international instruments as well as State 
policies reflect tensions when the matter of ensuring genuine equality for various 
ethnic, linguistic and religious groups is debated. In pursuance of Article 1(4) and 2(2) 
of the Race Convention, adopting policies of affirmative action indicates a positive 
move. 62 However, as we shall see from the case of Pakistan, policies of preference 
cause a variety of other problems, and international legal instruments do not provide 
any satisfactory answer. Pakistan reflects vividly the problems faced by a number of 
States, which despite having adopted rigorous policies of affirmative action have found 
it difficult to overcome perceptions of inequality. 
In the case of Pakistan, two interrelated features have been crucial in providing 
the impetus to introduce, continue and to expand these policies of preferences. The 
first primary factor was that of ethnic diversity amongst the various regions of the 
countrt3• At the time of the creation of Pakistan, there was a striking ethnic 
diversification amongst the indigenous population, with various ethnic communities at 
different level of economic, political and sociological development. Over the years, 
this diversity has increased in the sense that a significant number of Pakhtuns, Baluchis 
and Punjabis currently reside outside their provinces. Not only have the Pakthuns 
come to be predominant in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, but also since 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the consequent civil war millions of Afghan 
refugees, a majority of whom are ethnic Pakhtuns, have been dispersed into various 
parts of Punjab and Sindh. Over the years there has also been what has described as 
62 Supra Chapter 8. 
63 S Zaidi "Regional Imbalance and National Question in Pakistan-Some Indications" 11 E&PW 
(1989) 300-314. 
279 
the "trickling" of a significant amount of people primarily from India, and 
Bangladesh,64 and successive governments have been under-tremendous political 
pressure to allow a number of ethnic groups to enter the country, in particular the 
Biharis.65 
A second, albeit significantly related factor which provided the initial impetus 
to the introduction of the policies of preferences was a realisation of wide differences 
in the levels of development between various regions of the country. East Bengal, as 
we shall shortly consider, was historically less developed and severed artificially from 
West Bengal. Equally, in West Pakistan, there were underdeveloped regions, including 
the Baluch territory and areas of what are currently known as FAT A and Azad 
Kashmir. 
Amidst these complications the quota system was first introduced, initially, only 
for the Central Superior Services.66 The disparity between the two wings was the main 
reason given for initial introduction and it was at that time confined to candidates 
seeking entry to officer level ranks in federal bureaucracy. According to the provisions 
20% of the vacancies in the Central Superior Services were to be filled on merit. The 
remaining 80% to be filled under the following regulations: East Pakistan 40%, Punjab 
and Bahwalpur 23%, Karachi 2%, and Sindh, Khairpur, NWFP, Frontier States, Tribal 
areas, Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir and Kashmir refugees 15%.67 
The quota system was soon expanded much further and was given the status of 
having a statutory exception in the 195668 and 196269 constitutions. The rationale 
64 C Kennedy and N Nevitte (eds.), Ethnic Preference and Public Policy in Developing States, 
(Lynne Reinner Publishers Inc.) 1986,64. 
65 B Whitaker et ai, The Biharis of Bangladesh, (London: MRG) 1978; Feature film. Prisoners of 
ConSCience, released by Mohajir Quami Movement on 5 November 1994; Daily Jang, Major 
asked to pressurise Pakistan for repatriation of Bihar is , Friday 18 November, 1994. • 
66 R Braibanti "The Higher Bureaucracy of Pakistan" in Braibanti et al. (eds.) Asian Bureaucratic 
systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition, (Durham: Duke University Press) 1966, 
265. 
67 Ibid, 149. 
68 Article 17 (1), Government of Pakistan, Constitution of Pakistan 1956, (Karachi: Government of 
Pakistan Printing Press). 1956. 
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behind the initial implementation of the quota was to ameliorate the inequalities 
between East and West Pakistan. A number of other constitutional provisions70 also 
enunciated the genuine recognition of the problems facing economic disparities. 
Despite these efforts the picture remained gloomy and discriminatory practices 
continued to exist and were clearly visible where they mattered most. Although it 
would appear that the introduction of the quota system did have some success, it is 
also clear that the ethnic and linguistic groups in particular the Bengali majority did not 
have a proportional share at the higher levels of decision-making. The Bengalis despite 
being in a majority were rarely involved in making decisions crucial to their 
independent existence. The military which contained an overwhelming majority from 
West Pakistan remained directly or indirectly in control of the government ensuring 
that Bengalis were excluded from political decision-making. 
Even after the secession of East Pakistan, and with it the elimination of the 
most vehement argument of institutional imbalance and inequity, the quota system has 
thrived in the otherwise infertile soil of regional animosity. In fact during the period of 
Prime Minister Bhutto, immediately after the secession of East Pakistan, the quota 
system became more comprehensive at federal level and was as follows: 10% merit; 
50% Punjab (including Islamabad); 7.6% Urban Sindh (Karachi, Hyderabad and 
Sukkar); 11.4% rural Sindh (areas not included in the urban quota); 11.5% NWFP; 
3.5% Baluchistan; 4% Northern areas and centrally administered Tribal Areas; and 2% 
Azad Kashmir.71 The quota system was also established in the provincial bureaucracy 
and most institutions of higher education. Indeed, the expansion of the quota system is 
reflected now in all aspects of public and private life. 
69 Article 240, Government of Pakistan, Constitution of Pakistan, 1962, (Karachi: Government of 
Pakistan Printing Press), 1962. 
70 See for instance Article 145(4) of the 1962 Constitution. 
71 GOP, Establishment Division, memo no. F8/9/72 TRY, August 31, 1973. 
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In the last decade the quota system has been further expanded. There are 
currently special reserved seats available for former militia officers in competitive entry 
exams at Federal and Provinciallevels.72 There are also a wide range of quotas for 
specialist interests in institutions of higher education; there are special reserved seats 
for children of medical doctors, military officers, central government and provincial 
government officers. There are also quotas for hockey and cricket players and 
foreigners. 73 In a number of institutions, there are special seats to be filled by the 
discretion of the provincial governor. A number of affirmative action provisions exist 
for the benefit of religious minorities mainly operating in the sphere of relaxation of 
age limit for the Federal Service examinations. Although, these provisions are 
welcomed by religious minorities the overall impact seems negligible for these 
minorities as it is rare for members of Scheduled caste or others to in fact have 
obtained such a high level of education to aspire for governmental offices. 
A number of studies do indicate that overall the quota system has had some 
success in making the bureaucracy more representative, nonetheless there are fixed 
costs of the system. It can also be argued that policies of preferences have failed to 
achieve any long term benefits, perhaps most conspicuously reflected in the failure to 
erase perception of inequality and discrimination amongst the Bengalis, subsequently 
leading to a successful sessionist movement. 
Many of the in-built "flaws" in affirmative action are exacerbated by the system 
in which it is operated in Pakistan. As typical of any affirmative action programme, 
often the people with less merit and ability are given preference over others more able. 
72 Federal Public Service Commission Act 1980 
73 For an instance of the Courts upholding the validity of the quota for Children of sportsmen and 
doctors see Naseem Mohmood v. KEMC, PLD, Lah 272~ The high stakes that admissions to 
some institutions of higher education has resulted in protracted judicial challenges, see 
Mohammed Jqbal Kahn Naizi v. Vice Chancellor University of Punjab PLD 1979 SCI; 
Rahmatullah Khan v University of Punjab PLD 1979 SC 33, Shahida Khatoon v. Government of 
Sind and 2 Others PLD 1982 Kar 454; Mohammed Anwar v. Government of NWFP, PLD, 1980 
Pesh 83. 
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Pakistan is rife with regional favouritism and clan patronage and very often there is a 
major tussle between the selectors and regional representation is a more dominant 
criterion than the merit. Furthermore the implementation of the system is usually 
cumbersome and time-consuming making potential candidates weary, and to seek 
employment in the private sector. Increased regional representation has also served to 
reinforce invidious distinctions between various regions of Pakistan 
"The systems reliance on small merit reservation, its use of 
widely publicised, regional based distinctions of performance in scoring 
examinations, and its variability in determining relevant qualifications or 
levels of skill lead many to believe that job seekers from the more 
favoured regions bear the burnt of government's attempts to equalise 
access to bureaucracy or to the professions".74 
The perceptions of inequity and unfairness are increased due to the presence of 
an imbalanced institutional and constitutional framework~ extensive periods of military 
dictatorships have exacerbated perceptions of inequalities. The struggle of ethnic and 
linguistic minorities, prominently the Bengalis but also on the part of the Baluchis, the 
Sindhis and the Pakthuns reflects the strength of the nexus between the establishment 
of representative institutions on the one hand and a regime of non-discrimination and 
equality of treatment on the other. 
The unfortunate picture of Pakistan's relationship with democracy is reflected 
from the fact that no general elections based on universal franchise were held until 
December 1970, by which time the frustrations of ethnic communities had concretised 
into rather radical demands. When the elections were ultimately held, the 
determination on the part of the West Pakistan army and politicians not to allow the 
establishment of representative Constituent Assembly to draft a new Constitution led 
to the civil war and ultimate secession of East Pakistan. 
74 Kennedy and Nevitte (eds.) op.cit note 64. 85. 
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In the truncated Pakistan, absence of representative institutions has been an 
issue which has featured prominently. Indeed, the 1977 General elections, the first 
ones held under the 1973 Constitution having been rigged7S led to eleven years military 
dictatorship of President Zia. The patently unrepresentative and dictatorial 
government of President Zia was, in many ways, repressive and intolerant to allow any 
freedom of expression; his eleven year rule came particularly hard upon religious as 
well as ethnic and linguistic minorities of Pakistan. Indeed, after coming into power in 
1977, General Zia suspended the 1973 constitution, alongside its provisions on 
fundamental rights. In the international arena, Pakistan, however, maintained that 
changes in Pakistan, had mainly been of a political nature and in no way affected the 
extent or availability of constitutional grantees of constitutional guarantees of the 
fundamental rights of citizens. According to the ninth periodic report before the 
Committee, 
[in Pakistan] " ... Political and Civil rights were freely exercised, 
perhaps more than in several other states. The judicial system was 
functioning in a fully normal fashion. All institutions were intact; 
political changes had not effect on them. However, those political 
changes were normal in every country which had the right to choose a 
political system that suited its people and did not have to import 
political systems from abroad".76 
In a political environment where the constitutional framework has remained 
unsettled and open to abuse by successive governments to advance their personal 
interests with the jUdiciary often submitting to the will of the government, the position 
of minorities remains precarious. In the absence of democracy and representative 
institutions, all individuals of the State suffer from inequality and discrimination; 
75 See the Supreme Court Judgement in Begum Nusrat Bhutto v. the Government of Pakistan PLO 
(1977) SC. 639. 
76 Consideration ofthe Seventh periodic report CERD/C/SR.484 para 47. 
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though, the plight of members of minority groups is particularly precarious and open to 
victimisation. 
10.5 CONCLUSIONS 
The case of Pakistan, in so far as issues relating to equality and non-
discrimination are concerned presents complexities. Ever since its existence the State 
has been a battlefield of antithetical visions of various ethnic, linguistic and religious 
communities and is still recovering from the trauma of 1971. Despite the presence of a 
number of ethnic and linguistic minorities, Pakistan has shown reluctance to recognise 
their existence; non-recognition of minorities may not be absolutely fatal to attempts 
on the part of international law to accord protection to those groups, though it would 
strain immensely the already fragile protection that international law provides to those 
groups. Religious minorities of Pakistan, the Ahmadis and more recently the Christian 
community have continued to be discriminated and persecuted. The legislation 
regarding blasphemy, it is contended, is highly discriminatory and has opened the way 
for large scale persecution. 
It is also contended that in a generally repressive, intolerant and undemocratic 
environment all individuals, majorities as well as minorities would suffer, though the 
problems of minorities would be particularly acute and pronounced. Minorities in a 
State like Pakistan, which has had a history of long and stressful periods of military 
dictatorships and arbitrary rule could expect little in the way of genuine equality and 
non-discrimination; in such instances international law can not dispense whatever little 
it promises. 
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11.1 INTRODUCTION 
The present chapter, through studying the case of Pakistan makes the claim 
that autonomy for minorities, is at best an emerging right in international law. It argues 
that a general consensus amongst the international community on this issue is difficult 
to be found. A primary difficulty with the issue involving a right to autonomy, as we 
have already considered, is the considerable ambiguity surrounding the concept itself.l 
Generalities may not be appealing to pragmatism; taxonomies of the State structures 
are too complex for the dispensation of a global antidote to every aftliction generating 
from minority-majority conflicts? In exacerbating these conflicts, minorities, as well as 
the interests of their trans-national sympathisers may also have a role to play; States 
fear that the ambiguities in the concept of autonomy and minority rights may be 
exploited. The experience of Pakistan directs towards the point that the lacuna 
between autonomy and the rather explosive concept of self-determination or self-
government may not in fact be very wide. 
On the other hand, the present discussion attempts to highlight a significant 
point; meaningful autonomy can in many instances, provide a satisfactory alternative to 
radical demands of secession in the name of self-determination. In the present context 
our earlier discussion needs to be recalled.3 State policies in relation to the granting of 
autonomy, it is submitted, is often heavily influenced by historical and geopolitical 
factors and the following section, while analysing the difficulties in the recognition of 
2 
3 
See the discussion infra chapter 7. 
Sec R Wrising, (ed.), Protection of Ethnic Minorities Comparative perspectives (New York: 
Pergamon Press) 1981~ J Sigler, Minority Rights: A Comparative analysis (London: Greenwood 
press) 1983; Hannum; H Hannum, (ed.) Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights, 
(Dordrecht: M. Nijhofl), 1993. 
Ibid. 
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the right to autonomy concentrates on a number of these historical and geo-political 
and constitutional factors. 
11.2 DILEMMAS OF RECOGNITION OF A mGHT TO 
AUTONOMY AND THE ARTIFICIAL NATURE OF PAKISTAN 
11.2.1 Issues of distinct identity and the minorities of Pakistan 
The territorial boundaries of Pakistan reflect the existence of a number of 
civi1isations~ ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious groups having their own distinct 
identities.4 These distinctions were equally manifest at the time of the establishment of 
Pakistan. Although the euphoria generated by the prospect of an Islamic State of 
Pakistan temporarily overwhelmed these differences, it did not take long for these 
multifarious cultural, linguistic and sociological diversities to re-emerge. 
Although Islam as the religion of a majority of the people of Pakistan had 
influenced their cultures and traditions, it could not be stated categorically that it was 
the aU important over-riding factor, concealing all other cultural and traditional traits.s 
The indigenous traditions were deeply ingrained in all the ethnic and linguistic groups. 
Whereas East Pakistan was a largely homogenous community, this was not the case for 
West Pakistan. Although each of the major ethnic groups was predominant in their 
own provinces with their own language and cultural heritage, their associations and 
4 See generally K Ali, A New History of India and Pakistan (Karachi: Pakistan Book Centre) 1992~ 
C Ali, The Emergence of Pakistan, (New York: Columbia University Press), 1967; L Williams, 
Pakistan Under Challenge (London: Stacey International) 1975. 
L Buchhiet, Secession The Legitimacy of Self Determination (yale: Yale University Press) 1978, 
198; L Ziring Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, (Dawson: Westview) 1980, 136; J 
Rehman "Ethnicity, Islam and the Constitutional Developments of Pakistan" paper presented at 
the Centre for Indian Studies, University of Hull, 22 February, 1995; C Kennedy, "Policies of 
ethnic preferences in Pakistan" 24 AS (1984), 688-703. 
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affiliations were different. The various regions of the Western "wing" were separate 
cultural entities in their own right. 
" It could be said the regions of Pakistan were separate cultural 
entities up to the time Pakistan became independent. In speech, diet, 
dress, social customs and values and interests, the regional folk shared 
little in common except their devotion to Islam. Each was proud of 
their peculiar cultural heritage and generally speaking reluctant to adopt 
to what they considered to be alien ways".6 
The position was complicated by the fact that the provinces, could not be called 
potential nations, as some units contained more than one ethnic or linguistic group 
within their provincial boundaries. 
11.2.2 Bengalis 
The story of the Bengali struggle against West Pakistan domination, is in fact a 
struggle for the realisation of demands for autonomy and self-government.' It was the 
failure to allow a measure of this autonomous development that subsequently 
concretised in demands for session in the name of self-determination.8 Historically the 
pre-independent Bengal, had remained a focal point, as far as the struggle of autonomy 
for the Muslims was concerned. Although Bengali culture, convictions and language 
bore considerable influence of the dominant Hindus, Islamic tradition carried as strong 
a value as any other Muslim region of British India. 
6 
, 
8 
Ziring op.cit note 5. 136. 
R Jaban, Pakistan The Failure of National Integration (New York: Columbia University Press) 
1972~ G Chaudhury, "Bangladesh: Why it happened" 1 Affs (1972). 242-249~ A Mascarenhas. 
The Rape of Bangladesh (Dehli: Vikas Publications) 1971~ V Nanda "Self-Determination in 
International Law: the Tragic Tale of Two Cities Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East 
Pakistan)" 66 AJIL (1972). 305-334; V Nanda "Self-determination Outside the Colonial Context: 
The Birth of Bangladesh in Retrospect" in Y Alexander and R Friedlander, Self-Determination 
National, Regional and Global Dimensions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press) 1978, 193-220. 
Supra Chapter 9. 
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Prior to the creation of Pakistan, despite strong religious fervour the position 
of Bengal in a future constitutional framework, and in particular its association to an 
independent Islamic State remained a subject of debate and controversy. When 
Pakistan was subsequently established, the Bengalis immediately began to have second 
thoughts about their new union with the Western Pakistan. Indeed, despite the heavy 
reliance on the values of autonomy, self-government and regionalism, unfortunately 
after the creation of Pakistan, these ideals were realised more through their 
infringement than through practice.9 
Soon after the creation of Pakistan, the political elite started introducing 
policies which Professor Claire Palley has termed as "domination devices"lo 
Integration into a nation State was to be achieved at whatever cost including the 
imposition of elite ethnic groups' political, economic, cultural and linguistic standardsll . 
Moreover many of Pakistan's National leaders, in its early days, were not indigenous, 
but had their origins in the provinces of British India where Muslims had been in a 
minority and were in fact refugees in the new State of Pakistan.12 They have been 
described as "national elite" by Jahan. \3 Although having spearheaded the Pakistan 
movement, this national elite failed to produce any constructive policies and 
consequentially found themselves at odds with the indigenous communities 
The Bengalis, in particular, felt as if under some form of "alien or colonial 
domination". In 1952 Language riots broke out in East Bengal, when central 
9 See the various amendments to the Independence Act 1947; and the Government of India Act 
1935. 
10 Palley,4. 
\I laban op.cit note 7~ Chaudhury op.cit note 7~ A Kamal, Political and Constitutional Dilemmas, 
(Karachi: Pakistan Law House), 1987. 
12 J Rehman "Self-determination, State-building and the Muhajirs The Role of Indian Muslim 
Refugees in the Constitutional Development of Pakistan" 3(2) CSA 1994, 111-129~ T Wright Jr 
"Indian Muslims Refugees in the Politics of Pakistan" Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics (1974), 199-205; T Wright Jr "Center-Periphery Relations and Ethnic 
Conflict in Pakistan Sindhis, Muhajirs and Punjabis" CP (1991), 299-312; F Ahmad "The Rise of 
Muhajir Separatism" JAAFFs (1989),97-129. 
\3 lahan op.cit note 7, 24. 
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government insisted on Urdu being the sole official language. The growing rise of 
ethnicity was reflected through the formation of Awami-Ieague (the first Muslim 
opposition party to the ruling Muslim League in 1949) anti-basic principles committee 
report movement followed by a draft constitution, birth of United Front which 
ultimately routed the Muslim League in the provincial elections of March 1954. 
The platform for this victory was the twenty one point manifesto, exclusively 
based upon greater provincial autonomy, representations based upon population and 
Bengali being given equal status to Urdu. They felt discriminated in every aspect of 
life, and even some of the legitimate historical factors resulting in East Bengal overall 
underdevelopment (which had been inherited from the colonial rule) were often swept 
aside as a mere propaganda on the part of West Pakistan to perpetuate their rule and to 
exploit the Bengalis. Bengali representation in the politics had remained limited, just 
as it had been in military and bureaucracy-they represented less than 5% in military and 
about 30% in bureaucracy (Table 11). The vernacular elite felt highly frustrated at 
their exclusion from political decision making and detested the highly political-
administrative centralised stance of the federal government. Similarly the economic 
policies followed by the Federal government were attacked by the Bengalis as highly 
discriminatory. There is also evidence to confirm the discriminatory and inequitable 
position adopted by the Federal government in relation to the allocation of resources. 
According to J ahan 
"During the first decade the Central government allocated 2/3 of 
its developmental and non-developmental funds to West Pakistan. 
There was a similar disparity in the allocation of foreign aid. The 
central government did much to develop the private sector through its 
economic and fiscal policies and its control of foreign exchange, import 
licensing, and capital issues. Here again there was interwing disparity in 
allocations ... the disparity, whatever its economic rationale, led to the 
charge of discrimination against the Bengalis towards the central 
government. The Bengalis were particularly dissatisfied with the 'one 
economy' policy of the government, which failed to take into 
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consideration the essential differences in economic patterns and the 
geographical separation between the two wings .... what irked the 
Bengalis most and gave special impetus to their demands for autonomy 
was the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan. Through a 
surplus in international trade and a deficit in interring trade, a sizeable 
amount of East Pakistan's foreign exchange earning was diverted to 
western wing" .14 
In our present discussion, an essential element of autonomy would be to allow 
the provincial governments a right to operate. In East Bengal, however, the elected 
provincial government was dismissed by the central government in May 1954-the 
essential spirit of autonomous development was negated.1s The frustrations were 
exacerbated by the failure of the first Constituent Assembly to produce a 
constitution. 16 
One of the stumbling blocks in the forming of the Constitution had been the 
representation of Bengalis in a future legislative assembly and the degree of their 
autonomy in future constitutional arrangements~ "domination devices" in the political 
sphere were introduced to curb the voting power of Bengalis. Despite considerable 
opposition from the minority ethnic groups of West Pakistan it was decided to 
amalgamate the four provinces of the western wing into a single province of "one-
Unit". Bengalis being the majority of the population it was aimed that parity be 
established with the two provinces having equal voting rights. 
A constitution that was ultimately formulated, Pakistan's first "indigenous" 
constitution17 provided for two provinces West Pakistan and East Pakistan (formerly 
14 Jaban op.cit note 7, 34-35. 
IS Ibid. 29. 
16 See Moluvi Tamizuddin Khan v The Federation of Pakistan PLD 155 Sind 96; The Federation of 
Pakistan v Moulvi Tamizuddin Khan PLD (Federal Court of Session 155; Akbar v The Crown 
PLD (Federal Court 1955) 387~ Usif Patel v The Crown PLD; Special Reference to the Federal 
Court PLD (Supreme Court) 1955, 435; for a thorough consideration of the constitutional issues 
see I Jennings, Constitutional Problems in Pakistan, (Cambridge University Press). 1957. 
17 Entered into force 23 March 1956~ See the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
(Karachi: Government of Pakistan Printing Press), 1956~ text also available in S Mahmood. 
Constitutional Foundations of Pakistan, (Lahore: Jang Publishers) 1989, 247. 
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East Bengal).I! Fundamental rights defined in part II were guaranteed to everyone and 
any laws inconsistent to these were to be null and void. However in so far as a 
promise for autonomy was concerned Pakistan's first constitution dispensed very little. 
While Bengali was accepted as an official language, Bengalis, despite their overall 
majority were denied a majority in the central legislature. Similarly the demands of the 
Bengali autonomists that only defence, foreign affairs and currency should be under the 
jurisdiction of the Federal government proved unacceptable. As far as the ethnic and 
religious minorities of Western Pakistan were concerned, their aspirations for ideals of 
autonomy were completely negated. The constitution confirmed the merger of 195519 
and endorsed the "One-Unit system" by which all provinces of West Pakistan and 
former princely States were combined into one province. 
In view to these deficiencies it was not surprising that the constitutional system, 
collapsed succumbing to a military coup. Military dictatorships are not congenial to 
representative democracy or accept easily ideals of regional autonomy or 
decentralisation. President Ayub's 11 year tenure did not provide any exceptions to 
this general rule. His 1962 constitution was devoid of any broader vision for 
autonomy or minority rights;20 more damaging perhaps were his contemptuous views 
about the Bengalis 
"East Bengalis, who constitute the bulk of the population, 
probably belong to very original Indian races .... Until the creation of 
Pakistan they had not known any real freedom or sovereignty ... .In 
addition they have been and still are, under considerable Hindu culture 
and linguistic influence ..... As such they have all the inhibitions of a 
downtrodden race and have not yet found it possible to adjust 
psychologically to the requirements of the new born freedom". 21 
18 Article 1(2) ibid. 
19 In compliance with the West Pakistan Act 1955. 
20 See the Constitution of the Republic of Pakistan (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Printing 
21 Press), 1956~ text also available in S Mahmood, op.cit note 17,628. 
M Khan, Friends not Masters, (London. Oxford: University Press) 1967, 187. 
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Ayub's regime has been legitimately criticised on knowingly exacerbating the 
"explosive schisms with in Pakistan"?2 In his 1954 memorandum General Ayub 
had called for treating "Bengalis as equal partners" by providing them "as much 
autonomy as possible and that means that in addition to the subjects already in their 
hands, communications, except inter-provincial industries, commerce, health 
should be handed over to the provinces, leaving defence, foreign affairs, currency 
in the hands of the Centre"23-suggestions which in fact had been the basis for the 21 
point manifesto of United Front. However subsequent to attaining power, Ayub 
followed a highly centralised bureaucratic system, failing to recognise the 
possibilities of regional autonomy. 
It is also of interest that the six point manifesto of Awami League that emerged 
in 1966, upon which it achieved an overwhelming success in Pakistan's first general 
elections in 1970, were nothing more than a synthesis of claims of meaningful 
autonomy. These were as follows;24 
(1) The character of the government should be Federal and 
Parliamentary . 
(2) The Federal government shall be responsible for only 
defence and foreign affairs. 
(3) There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely 
convertible in each wing. 
(4) Fiscal policy shall be the responsibility of the Federating 
units. 
(5) Separate accounts shall be maintained of the foreign 
exchange earnings of each of the federating units. 
22 0 Noman, Pakistan A Political and Economic History since 1947 (London: Kegan Paul 
International) 1990, 27. 
23 General M Ayub Khan, Memorandum on the Political situation of Pakistan, (Government of 
Pakistan, National Printing Press: Karachi), 1954. 
24 Bangladesh Documents 22-33; also available, H Rizvi, The Military and Politics of Pakistan, 
(Lahore: Progressive Publishers) 1986, 174-5. 
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(6) Federating units shall be empowered to maintain a militia or 
parliamentary force. 
As we have noted in an earlier chapter, there remams the possibility of 
considerable variation in models of Autonomy.25 Considering the aforementioned 
demands of Awami League, it can be argued that in fact what was being asked for was 
meaningful "internal self-determination" and "self-government in a manner not 
inconsistent with State sovereignty". The focus of the present work has not been upon 
the constitutional issues of Pakistan, though it needs to be noted that the in case of 
Pakistan effort to formulate a constitution has unfortunately proved to be nothing but 
lamentable; successive "Constituent Assemblies" being traumatised over such issues as 
the position of Islam and Sharia (Islamic Law), role of the army, Federalism and 
autonomy.26 For international lawyers, a significant lesson that emerges in so far as the 
conflict between West and East Pakistan was concerned, was that the inability to 
formulate an acceptable constitutional framework based upon regional autonomy, and 
the failure to grant genuine internal self-determination ultimately led to the painful and 
tragic events of 1971.27 Pakistan came into existence as a State in 1947, though its 
first general elections based on universal adult franchise could not be held until 
December 1970. Such a delay may stilt not have proved to be an unmitigating disaster 
had Pakistan's military ruler General Yayha Khan, honouring his word, allowed the 
Constituent Assembly in which the Awami League had a majority to come into session 
and draft a democratic constitution. The consequences, for this postponement were 
tragic, resulting in a civil war and the ultimate secession of East Pakistan. The concern 
of the international community unfortunately has not been so pronounced on the 
25 Supra Chapter 7. 
26 J Rehman, "Constitutional Dilemmas and Ethnic Minorities of Pakistan" JLS forthcoming, 1995; 
Noman, op.cit note 22. 
27 V Nanda, "Self-determination in International Law: the Tragic Tale of Two Cities Islamabad 
(West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan)" 66 AJIL (1972), 321-336; ICoJ, The Events of East 
Pakistan 1971, (Geneva, 1959). 
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subject of representative democracy and internal self-determination; a subject so 
essential to the rights of majorities and minorities alike.28 
11.2.3 Baluchis 
The subject of autonomy has also been at the forefront of the political and 
constitutional aspirations of other ethnic and linguistic minorities of Pakistan. The 
Baluch in this respect deserve particular attention and concern; their historical position 
reminisces of the Kurds29; both were kindred branches of the same tribe that migrated 
from what is now Syria several centuries ag030 and both were forcibly incorporated 
into the new nation-States of Asia despite promises of independent Statehood.31 
The Baluch nationalists, in particular, have had serious reasons to complain; 
they point to their largely independent history, prior to and during the British rule of 
India, and to the agreement reached between British Government, the Government of 
Kalat and the Government of Pakistan on 4th August 1947, article 1 of the agreement 
provided 
"The Government of Pakistan recognises the status ofKalat as a 
free and independent state which has bilateral relations with the British 
Government, and whose rank and position is different from that of 
other Indian states". 32 
28 V Nanda, "A Critique of the United Nations Inaction in Bangladesh" 49 Den LJ (1975) 53-67; J 
Salzburg ,"United Nation's Prevention of Human Rights Violations The Case of Bangladesh" 27 
10 (1973) 115·127. 
29 S Harrison, In Afghanistan's Shadow Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations, (New York: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1981) 1981, lO. 
30 S Harrison "Ethnicity and the Political stalemate in Pakistan" in A. Banuazizi and M. Weiner 
(eds.) The State, Religion and Ethnic Politics Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan, (Lahore: Vanguard 
Press) 1987,271. 
31 On Kurds see Chapter 7 Supra. 
32 Cited in I Baloch "The Baluch Question in Pakistan and the Right to Self·Determination" in W·P 
Zingel et ai, (ed.) Pakistan in itsfourth decade (Deutshes Orient·Institut) 1983, 188-209, 197. 
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In view of the agreement it was not surprising to note that, on 15 August 1947, 
the Khan ofKalat declared the independence ofKalat, a decision endorsed by the Kalat 
assembly.33 Amalgamation with Pakistan or the dismemberment of Kalat was 
unacceptable to the Khan; while absorption into Pakistan meant a loss of identity, the 
dismemberment of Kalat State was "tantamount to the political castration of the 
Baluch".34 One of the prominent leaders of the Baluch ideal of autonomous 
development, Ghaus Bux Bezenjo stated before the Assembly 
"We have a distinct culture like Afghanistan and Iran, and if the 
mere fact that we are Muslims requires us to amalgamate with Pakistan, 
then Afghanistan and Iran should also be amalgamated with Pakistan. 
They say we Baluch cannot defend ourselves in the atomic age. Well, 
are Afghanistan, Iran and even Pakistan capable of defending 
themselves against the superpowers? If we cannot defend ourselves, a 
lot of others can not do so either. They say we must join Pakistan for 
economic reasons. Yet we have minerals, we have petroleum and we 
have ports. The question is, what would Pakistan be without US?"3S 
Ignoring these political aspiration the Pakistan authorities relied heavily on the 
decision of the Baluch leaders in Quetta on June 29, 1947 to merge with Pakistan, 
deliberately concealing the fact that these leaders had been appointed by the British, 
and their Assembly's decision related to the small tract of land know as British 
Baluchistan.36 
Not unnaturally Baluch rulers remained unhappy and often rebellious with 
Pakistan's continual interference in what they regarded as their domestic affairs and 
despite constant threats of coercion, and actual usage of force it was not until 1955 
that the rulers of these independent territories formally agreed to cede their states. The 
element of a probable claim of secession on the part of Khan of Kalat was used as a 
33 Harrison op.cit note 30, 24-25. 
34 Cited in Harrison ibid. 25. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid 24. 
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major issue which led to the abrogation of Pakistan's first constitution in October 1958, 
the arrest of the Khan, and the promulgation ofMartiallaw.37 
Of all the provinces of the present Pakistan, Baluchistan remains the largest but 
most desolate and least developed and with the terrain covering 42% of the total area, 
the tiny indigenous population of around 4% is undoubtedly the poorest of all the 
regions. Comparisons are hard to draw with Punjab, the most developed and 
politically influential province. A mere 0.7% of the total industry is situated in 
Baluchistan province and representation of Baluchis in the Federal government is next 
to negligible. A majority of the Baluch grievances have stemmed from this economic 
and political deprivation. Baluchistan has economic resources which the successive 
Federal governments have explored and exploited~ natural gas deposits were found in 
the Sui area and have been used to fuel the needs of most provinces. Baluchistan coast 
also provided with new port possibilities and the harbour of Gwader was developed in 
the 1960's.38 The benefits of these projects to Baluchistan have proved to be negligible 
and as the Baluchi consciousness expanded, the people have begun to acutely sense the 
exploitation they had been forced to undergo.39 
After the secession of East Pakistan in 1971, the Baluch and Pakhtun minority 
representatives had formed strong pressure groups, ultimately forcing the then 
President Bhutto to make fundamental concession on the subject of regional autonomy 
in the new constitution. This was reflected through a number of the provisions of the 
1973 constitution. Article 28, for instance, provided for "any section of citizens having 
a distinct language, script or culture shall have the right to preserve and promote the 
same and subject to law, establish institutions for that purpose" .40 According to article 
37 L Ziring op.cit note 5, 163. 
38 S A Zaidi "Regional imbalance and the national question in Pakistan-some indications" E&PW 
(1989),300-314,310-314; H Alavi, "Nationhood and Nationalities of Pakistan" E&PW 1989. 
39 R Wrising, The Baluchis and Pathans (London: MRG) 1987,8. 
40 The Government of Pakistan, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, 
(Karachi: Government of Pakistan Printing Press), 1973. 
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33, State shall discourage parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial prejudices 
amongst the citizens. Article 37 committed the State to eradicate economic and social 
inequality among various regions, with Article 39 requiring all sections of the state to 
participate in the employment of armed forces. While Article 247 reaffirmed the 
separate legal status of tribal areas under Frontier crimes regulations, Article 251 (3) 
provided the right of Provincial Assemblies to adopt measures for the teaching, 
promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to Urdu, the National language. 
The constitution also gave more powers to smaller provinces in several ways. 
The upper house of the Assembly i.e. the Senate was to consist of the same number of 
representatives from each province.41 A Council of Common Interest (CCI) was set up 
in which provincial chief ministers were represented to formulate policies regarding 
part II of the Federal legislative list.42 CCI consisted of Chief Ministers of provinces 
and an equal number of ministers of the federal government which were nominated by 
the Prime Minister. The CCI would look into matters such as complaints of 
interference in water supply.43 The proceeds offederal excise duties on natural gas and 
hydro-electric power were to be paid to the provinces in which these sources of power 
were situated.44 
A National Finance Commission was established consisting of Federal and 
provincial ministers and other members to advise on matters of revenues between 
Federation and the provinces.45 As in the 1956 and 1962 constitution, fundamental 
rights were guaranteed and principles of State policy were provided. According to 
Chapter II Part III Parliament was to comprise of the National Assembly and the 
Senate. The National Assembly was a chamber consisting of 200 representatives 
directly elected and generally considered to serve for a term of 5 years. The aim of the 
41 Jbid. Article 59. 
42 Jbid. Articles 153-4. 
43 Ibid. Article iSS. 
44 Ibid. Article lS5. 
45 Ibid. Article 160. 
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senate was to provide equal representation to all the provinces.46 Each province 
elected 14 members, 5 nominees were elected from FATA, two from the Federal 
Capital elected by the National Assembly in Members of the executive administration 
of the province.47 
Part V of the constitution described the relationship between the Federation 
and the Provinces. Whilst the Parliament had the sole authority to legislate on matters 
on the Federal list, both Centre and Provincial Assemblies could make laws on matters 
on the concurrent list. In spite of all these measures, the 1973 constitution left 
sufficient room for an authoritarian rule. Part X allowed the President to declare a 
proclamation of emergency with power to suspend fundamental rights during an 
emergency. Indeed once the Constitution had come into force an emergency was 
declared, accompanied by the suspension of fundamental rights articles, a state of 
affairs which was to continue well over a decade until after the 1985 elections. 
Indeed, if the Baluchis were to anticipate that their minority aspirations would 
be realised, this was not to be the case. The year 1973 saw the beginning of a long 
hard drawn battle on the part of Baluchis against the central government with military 
operations against the Baluchis being authorised only one month after the Constitution 
came into operation. This was to lead to a major confrontation when 80,000 (mainly 
Punjabi) troops were engaged in an armed confrontation with as many as 55,000 
Baluchis.48 The casualties were not insignificant although again no precise figures are 
available. According to Baloch 
"The Pakistan armed forces suffered about 8000-10,000 
casualties. The number of guerrillas and their casualties is not reliably 
known. Thousands of civilian Baluch were killed in the military action 
46 Ibid. Article 51(1). 
47 Ibid. Article 59(1) 
48 Wrising op.cit note 39, 11. 
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and in the bombardments by Pakistan Air force and thousands migrated 
to Afghanistan or took refuge in Sind .. ". 49 
Baluchis, like the Kurds, can be regarded as a "people", though such a 
recognition would of course open the Pandora's box of what is the definition of a 
"people" in international lawo. If the Baluch in fact are a "people", then does their 
expression of self-determination include a right to secede?51 Divided between 
Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan whims of historical misfortunes have prevented the 
Baluchis from independent Statehood. Indeed, Baluch nationalists argue that had it 
not been for the British strategic interests to maintain the buffer State of Afghanistan 
against possible Russian aggression, and equally to carve up the Baluch territory, the 
contemporary status of Baluchistan would now be different.52 
In the years prior to 1971, despite forcible incorporation into Pakistan, Baluch 
political leaders would have been content with a federal system of government and 
regional, linguistic and cultural autonomy. Instead the "One-Unit" system was thrust 
upon them; a highly centralised bureaucratic system, abolishing provincial boundaries 
with the failure to provide any recognition to the Baluch language or culture. The 
system of "One-Unit" ultimately collapsed under the pressure of the Bengali civil war 
and secessionist movement, though as we have noticed the failure to implement and 
follow the spirit of the 1973 constitution has revived past grievances and memories of 
a secessionist civil war. 
Significantly for our purposes, a majority of the Baluch grievances have 
stemmed from denial of political and economic autonomy. The demand is for a re-
adjustment of power with the Federal government only in charge of foreign affairs and 
currency. Baluchis detest the Punjabi and Muhajir domination in the Civil bureaucracy 
49 Baloch op.cit note 32. 205. 
so Supra Chapter 2. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Personal interviews during 1993-4. 
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and the Punjabi constitution of the army is seen as a symbol of brutality. They seek 
Baluchistan for the Baluch people a province having unfettered local authority over 
almost everything provincial ranging from decision-making as regards the curriculum 
for secondary education to the exploitation of natural resources and the allocation of 
development funds. 
11.2.4 The Pakhtuns 
In 1893 the British drew the Durand line separating India from the mountain 
State of Mghanistan. However, the Mghans never really accepted this boundary and 
nationalists point out that it divides a "people" with common tradition and history and 
continues to deprive Mghanistan from acquiring a much desired outlet to open sea. 53 
Although, it is clear that by 1946, immediately prior to the partition of India, M A 
Jinnah had had a stranglehold on the affairs of NWFP, controversy is still generated 
when some Pakthun nationalists highlight the fact that the referendum that had been 
organised by the British, which led to 99% vote in favour of joining Pakistan could not 
be regarded as conclusive. They firstly point out that in the referendum the Pakhtuns 
were not given the option of union with Mghanistan (being only limited to union with 
either India or Pakistan) and secondly that a not so insignificant proportion (largely 
supporters of Khudai K~idmat gars commonly known as the Red Shirts) in fact 
boycotted the referendum. S4 
On the other hand it is equally clear that the creation of the Pakistan State was 
opposed by the Mghans who consorted with the Indian National Congress before 
53 Z·· 5 mng op.cit note • 236. 
S4 Wrising op.cit note 39, 5~ also see A Mohabbat "Pakthun National Self-Determination: The 
Partition of India and Relations with Pakistan" Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Saint Louis 
University, 1979. 
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Partition and were led to believe they would gain the port of Karachi if the Pakistan 
movement failed.55 Such anti-Pakistan groups like Ghaffar Khan's Khudai Khidmat 
gars wanted a home land for the Pakhtuns and having it renamed as "Pakhtunistan". 
The Mghan leaders appealed to the ethnic sensitivities of the Mghans and urged upon 
the inhabitants of NWFP to join Mghanistan when it became clear that the British 
departure was imminent. 
Indeed Mghanistan was the only State to cast a vote of opposition to Pakistan's 
membership of the United Nations. Its territorial dispute with Pakistan has been a 
long-standing and enduring one. Mghanistan, has since 1947 claimed either a 
substantial portion of the territory of Pakistan to be incorporated within Pakistan or the 
creation of an independent "Paktunistan". 56 Equally, Mghanistan has continued to 
provide overt support to the Pakhtun nationalistic sentiments across the border. A 
former President of Mghanistan Mohammed Daud remained a strong critic of the 
policies of Pakistan, which, in his view, reflected forced assimilation of the Pakhtun 
Nation into Punjabi nation-State. Successive Mghan governments in fact are 
suspected of strongly supporting the Pakhtunistan movement and the "Pakhtunistan" 
issue has heavily burdened Mghan-Pakistan relations ever since 1947 and has even led 
to outbreaks of armed violence especially in the early 1950's and 1960's. 
During the period of Soviet occupation there remained a threat of direct 
invasion in Pakistan. Currently however, with the influx of millions of Mghan 
refugees, although the threat of a secessionist movement seems to have subsided, the 
issue of integration and autonomy of Pakhtuns has remained a matter of considerable 
debate. 
55 Ibid. also see J Verzijl, International law in llistorical Perspective, (Leydon: Sijthoff) 1968, Part 
II,424. 
S6 See the views of M Shafiq, Minster for foreign AiTairs, General Assembly, 27th session, 10th 
October, 1972, cited in United Nations Monthly Chronicle, November 1972, 104; In 1969, the 
postage stamps of Mghanistan incorporated most of the NWFP and Baluchistan in the Mghan 
state, Ziring op.cit note 5, 236. 
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From the socio-economic position it is clearly evident that the Pakhtuns have 
far less reason to feel aggrieved than their compatriot Baluchis and Sindhis. In 
contrast to the contemptuous view that the dominant Punjabis are reputed to hold for 
the Baluchis and Sindhis, Pakhtuns enjoy much more respect. More importantly unlike 
others, Pakhtuns are not totally excluded from the economic and political power 
structure of the country. Pakhtuns have traditionally held important civil and military 
posts and even nowadays there is still significant Pakhtun controlling influence and the 
expansion in the military and bureaucracy over the last two decades has not been at the 
expense of the Pakhtun members of the establishment. 
The position of relative power and prestige amongst other minorities does not 
mean that the "Pakhtunistan" issue is completely dead. Pakhtuns have also a proud 
history and the bitter resentment of their forced entry into Pakistan is a constant 
reminder of their nationalist ideology. Currently Pakhtuns nationalism evinces in the 
alleged discrimination against NWFP in the allocation of development expenditures in 
agriculture and industry. Allegations have been levelled against Islamabad for holding 
back electrification of the province, so as to discourage industrial development, for 
local raw produce being transferred to factories of other provinces, funds for 
agricultural development being arbitrarily channelled to other Punjabi dominated areas. 
Some of the grievances are very typical and in line with complaints brought forth by 
embittered Sindhis, Baluchis and Muhajirs. Punjabi civil servants have continued to 
playa dominating role in provincial administration and in the same account Islamabad 
continues to resist Pakhtun nationalist efforts to upgrade Pashtu language in higher 
education. 51 
S1 "Battle of languages in Northern Areas" The News International 17 December. 1994. 
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11.2.5 Sindhis and Muhajirs 
The conflict between the Sindhis and the so-called Muhajirs has relatively 
recent origins; a consequence of the large-scale exchange of population at the time of 
the partition of India. S8 The contemporary conflict in many ways reminisces all those 
where an indigenous people which, being the target of persecution and forced 
assimilation, is attempting to preserve its identity and independent existence. Sindhi is 
the term used to denote the indigenous peoples of the region of Sindh. Sindhi history 
is an ancient one and goes back 5000 years; the region, historically having enjoyed a 
considerable measure of autonomy, allowed it to establish its own culture and 
tradition. It had also developed, over generations, written literature around which 
provincial identity could form.s9 However, after the partition of India in August 1947, 
a vast majority of the Sindhi Hindus and Sikhs were forced to flee; they were replaced 
by several millions Muslims from provinces which now form part of India. Although 
there is a certain amount of slipperiness in the term Muhajirs, the term is generally used 
for Muslim refugees primarily from Bombay and west the coast of India who came to 
settle in the urban areas of Sindh province.60 
For the Muhajirs who migrated to Sindh the experience was subsequently to be 
agonising. Their new homelands were to prove breeding grounds for the antithetical 
visions of cultural, linguistic and religious autonomy. However, and as we have 
indicated earlier, for many years Pakistan's political arena was dominated by Muhajirs. 
According to Callard, from 1947-52, Pakistan's political system was controlled by 
S8 A Salim, Sulagta Howa Sind (Lahore: Jang Publishers) 1990; A J Siddique, Muhajir Quamiat, 
(Karachi: Shibal Publishers) 1987 MAli, Sindh Khamoshi Ki Awaz (Urdu) (Lahore: Fiction 
House), 1994; K Athar, MQM Ki Khani, Altaj Hussain Ki Zubani Safar-i-Zindgani, (Lahore: 
Jang Publishers) 1988. 
S9 On the historical aspects of Sindb see Dr Khuro's excellent works~ H Khuro, Sindh Through 
Centuries (Karachi: OUP); H Khuro, The Afaking of Modern Sind (Karachi: Indus Publishers) 
1978; also see M Rahman, Land and Life in Sindh. Pakistan (Lahore: Ferozsons Pvt Ltd) 1993. 
60 B Ali "Sind and Struggle for Liberation" E&PW 7 March 1987, 402-405, 402~ "Economic 
Reasons for Ethnic Clashes", October-Nov. 1986, Muslim India, January 1987,41-42.41. 
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about 20 individuals, the majority of whom were Muhajirs.61 In 1947, Jinnah himself a 
cutchi-speaking Khoja Ismali from Bombay assumed the role of Governor General. 
The cabinet with L A Khan, a Muhajir from United Provinces (though originally from 
Kamal district in East Punjab) as the prime minister, comprised mostly of Muhajir 
politicians62. By creating 6 new seats in the newly established Constituent Assembly 
through co-option of its own members, the Muhajir representation was increased. 
Several of its members who were residents of West Pakistan were provided with East 
Bengal seats. At the provincial level Muhajir strength was manifested even more 
strongly. In Punjab and Sindh Provincial Assemblies seats, were provided for the new 
arrivals. 
Similarly 10 the prestigious Civil Service the Muhajirs established a 
predominant hold. Being of urban orientation, a considerable number moved to the big 
metropolis of Karachi and Hyderabad, subsequently complicating Pakistan's laws of 
ethnic preferences with a rural urban distinction. The modern and urbanised Muhajirs, 
with official patronage alongside their entrepreneurial skills, quickly established 
themselves. More divisive was the constant Federal intervention into provincial affairs. 
As early as August 1947, Jinnah Dismissed Khan Sahib's provincial ministry in North 
West Frontier Province (NWFP). In April 1948 Jinnah backed the ouster of M A 
Khuhro, an indigenous Sindhi, Sindh's first Chief minister, although at that time he 
enjoyed the support of a majority in the provincial assembly which had been 
occasioned by his opposition to the removal of Karachi from the Federal provincial 
control. Muslim Sindhis were left at a disadvantage~ no comparisons could be drawn 
between the "refugees" and there Sindhi hosts. Language, culture, politics, and society 
was all very different. Sindh was quickly swamped by an alien culture which 
immediately began to dominate not only Sindh but also the entire country. In Sindh 
61 K Callard, Pakistan A Political Study, (London: Allen and Unwin) 1957,25-26. 
62 L Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan, (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1961,205. 
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the Sindhis dropped to a bare majority or less in seven principle cities. Their case has 
been accurately described, thus as one of a region 
" in which a peripheral people feel in danger or actually have 
been swamped : numerically economically, and culturally, within their 
own land by newcomers or invaders. In this context, Sind is 
comparable to the state of Assam in India (inundated by Bengalis) and 
now to the Sikhs in Punjab (a bare majority over Hindus). For analogies 
outside of South Asia one might look at the reaction of the Malays to 
their Chinese minority until Singapore seceded, to the Palestinian and 
Lebanese • numbers game', to the swamping of Tibet by Hans Chinese 
settlers and of Kazakistan by Russians in the • second world' of 
communism, to the Basques (except that they are more prosperous than 
the average Spaniard), and in general to all cases of ethnic numbers 
reversal" .63 
Sindhi economy had traditionally been agricultural with very little industry and 
very few market towns; the Muhajirs represented a more advanced and urban capitalist 
culture which they had brought from the towns and cities ofIndia.64 Not only did they 
have a large entrepreneurial class along with an administrative and educated petty 
bourgeoisie service they also had a large and well trained working class. Immediately 
after partition, Karachi was detached from Sindh and made into a Federal district. The 
Consequences were enormous, resulting in the abolition of Sindhi within Karachi's 
Federal offices and replacement of Urdu speaking office workers, closing down of 
Sindhi department at the University of Karachi and ban of Sindhi in University 
examinations in Karachi. The Muhajir identity was quickly established within the new 
State and they emerged as the ruling ethnic group. They were educationally far 
superior,6S considered themselves culturally superior, their new home city was 
consolidated as the country's capital and above all they had taken a leading role in its 
63 T. WrightJr. op.cit note 12, 303. 
64 S A Zaidi, "Sindhi vs. Muhajir in Pakistan-Contradiction, Conflict, Compromise" E& PW 18 
May 1991, 1295-1302, 1295-1296~ P Brass "Muslim Separatism in UP Social context and 
Political strategy before partition" 167-186 Annual Number, E&PW (1970) 
65 In the early years they had a literacy rate of 70%. 
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creation. The continued bias in favour of Urdu, retention of One-Unit, heavy reliance 
on bureaucracy (with considerable Muhajir elements), encouragement of private 
enterprise and settlement ofMuhajir property claims were some of the benefits derived 
from the Ayub era. 
With the passage of time however, the main Muhajir party, the Muslim League 
was discredited with its failure to sustain any popularity. Absence of constructive 
policies and strong leadership, "cashing-in on the popular patriotism and the gratitude 
on the part of electors for having achieved Pakistan"66 and the rise of indigenous 
political parties, all contributed to the downfall of the League. There was also 
considerable increase in the Punjabi-Pakthun military influence over national affairs 
leaving Muhajirs in a relatively subordinate position. 
As far as the Sindhis were concerned their cause was championed by Z A 
Bhutto, an indigenous Sindhi and Pakistan's first elected Prime Minister. Acutely 
aware of the Sindhi grievances he tried to reduce the provincial alienation. A serious 
complaint on the part of the Sindhis had been their lack of representation at the 
Provincial and Federal level, in institutions of higher education. To improve the Sindhi 
proportion in the civil service, lateral entry programme was introduced. To help 
increase the number of indigenous Sindhis 11.4% seats were reserved for them in the 
Federal bureaucracy.67 To curb bogus domiciles the Provincial Assembly passed an 
ordinance laying down strict rules for the Definition of a "rural Sindhi". 68 The Sindh 
Permanent Residence Certificates Rules, which came into operation in 1971 provide 
for the most thorough scrutiny of individual's credentials. Direct District Magistrates 
were asked to follow a rigorous procedure, a comprehensive exercise of which, despite 
Provincial courts consolatory intervention, was bound to benefit the indigenous Sindhis 
66 K Azfar, "Constitutional Dilemmas in Pakistan" S Burki and C Baxter (eds.), Pakistan under 
Martial Law 11 years of Zia-ul-Haq, (Lahore: West view Press Pakistan Book Co-operation) 
1991, 58. 
67 C Kennedy, "The Politics of Ethnicity in Sindh" 31 AS (1991),994-5. 
68 C Kennedy, Bureaucracy in Pakistan, 1987, (Karachi: OUP) 109-152. 
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at the expense of Urban Muhajirs. More importantly many Sindhis were appointed to 
national and provincial offices. Indeed, the "nationalistic" agenda of Bhutto was 
targeted at the Muhajir entrepreneurs of Karachi and aimed at redressing the balance in 
favour of the Sindhis. 
Many in the Muhajir camps bitterly detested these moves on the part of Prime 
Minister, perceiving them as attempts to promote the interests of Sindhis, at the 
expense ofMuhajirs. There was a strong contingent of Muhajirs which took an active 
part in the civil unrest during 1977, culminating in the successful military coup of 
General Zia-ul-haq. While the General's 11 year military rule can generally be 
regarded as favourable to the Muhjairs, they could never reoccupy their initial 
authoritative position. It is interesting to note the Muhajir Charter of Demands 
Karadad-i-Maquasid which can be treated as their expression of autonomy. These 
included inter alia 
(1) Adequate representation in provincial as well as federal 
government departments on the basis of population 
(2) only those person should be treated as domiciled (in Sindh) 
who have been living (there) for the last twenty years and who spent 
their earnings in the province 
(3) only the real Sindhis, including Muhajirs, should be given the 
right of voting 
(4) seat reservation for Muhajir students in colleges should be 
on the basis of their population 
(5) Pakistanis from Bangladesh should be allowed to settle in 
Pakistan 
(6) outsiders should not be allowed to buy any property in 
Sindh; allotments already made should be cancelled 
(7) Local bus services (mainly owned by Pathans and Mghans) 
should be nationalised; Police officers, and mostly Punjabis and others 
accused of persecution ofMuhajirs should be arrested.69 
A number of demands presented by both the Sindhis and the Muhajirs 
coincide.70 These include a ban on any further settlements of Punjabis and Pakhtuns 
69 J Das Akhtar "Civil Pols Results Sharpen Ethnic Clashes in Pakistan" Organiser December 20, 
1987, 16. 
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into Sindh and restriction on the sale of properties and allotment of businesses to those 
not domiciled in Sindh. More importantly the demand is for greater provincial 
autonomy and less interference from Islamabad. Equally, Sindhis and Muhajirs 
demand that those who are involved in the administration of the province should be 
those who are domiciled in the province. 
On the other hand there are serious disagreements between Muhajirs and 
Sindhis themselves.'1 A fertile source of conflict is the provincial language. Muhajirs, 
want to maintain Urdu (their mother language) as the official language, something 
unacceptable to Sindhis. Another difficult area is the repatriation of Biharis from 
Bangladesh.72 Muhjairs claim that the Biharis of Bangladesh must be repatriated to 
Pakistan. This, however is unacceptable to Sindhis who fear an influx of Biharis in 
Sindh resulting in their complete loss of cultural and linguistic identity. Indeed, the 
issue of Biharis has been a sore spot in efforts to reach any agreement between the 
political parties of Pakistan, and contributed to the downfall of Benazir Bhutto's 
government and subsequently that of Main Nawaz Sharif. 
11. 3 CONCLUSIONS 
Pakistan in reality, using Rupert Emerson's terminology, has failed to emerge as 
a nation, but merely resembles a "nation in hope".73 It was a union of otherwise 
disparate people; Kashmiris, Punjabis and Bengalis divided between India and Pakistan, 
Pakthuns split between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Baluchis between Iran, 
Mghanistan and Pakistan. Each community having a different language, culture and 
tradition found the others at different levels of social, political and economic 
70 "A Plea for Peace and Amity in Sindh" Dawn 13 March, 1993. 
71 "Pakistan-Language riots in Sind" Keesings Contemporary Archives 25518 October 14-21, 1972~ 
"Tackling the Sindh Situation" Frontier Post 11-5-94. 
72 B Whitaker et ai, The Biharis of Bangladesh (London: MRG), 1978; Keesings Contemporary 
Archives 25833. 
73 R Emerson, From Empire to Nation, (Cambridge: Mass: Harvard University Press) 1960,94. 
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development. Equally, as we have noted, there has remained considerable interest on 
the part of the former USSR, India and Afghanistan in sharing the spoils of a 
fragmented Pakistan. 
Pakistan, is certainly not the only State to have confronted such problems; new 
States that emerged from the rubble of decolonization have had to face the tremendous 
task of building up a State comprising peoples of different ethnic, linguistic, cultural, 
religious and tribal affiliations. Indeed, it would be an oversight to neglect the 
difficulties that some States have had to face in the nation-building process. 
Dissension amongst the political elite as to finding the right balance between notions of 
autonomy as against this nation-building project often led to breakdown of any 
constitutional mechanisms. 
For these new States in particular, it would appear that a right of autonomy is a 
difficult right to concede. The inherent ambiguities in the concept, makes States 
reluctant to allow any concessions to minorities. For States like Pakistan, notions of 
autonomy portend ominously on their own existence; the lacuna, it is feared, between 
the concept of autonomy and self-determination is not very wide. Conversely, the 
lesson which international lawyers and statesmen ought to learn is that autonomy could 
provide a viable and satisfactory alternative to demands of secession. It can be, and it 
has been, argued that had the political elite of West Pakistan allowed democratic 
institutions to work, and had allowed the Bengalis an essential linguistic and cultural 
autonomy, a full expression of self-determination could have taken place within the 
original frontiers of Pakistan. 
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12.1 RIGHTS AND SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Earlier in the century, Oppenheim, the leading international lawyer, wrote 
"Several writers maintain that the Law of Nations guarantees to 
every individual at home and abroad the so-called rights of mankind 
without regarding whether he be a subject of a member State of the 
Family of Nations, or not. Such rights are said to comprise the right of 
existence, the right to protection of honour, life, health, liberty and 
property, the right of practising any religion one likes, the right of 
emigration, and the like. But such rights do not in fact enjoy any 
guarantee whatever from the Law of Nations, and they cannot enjoy 
such a guarantee, since the Law of Nations is a law between States, and 
since individuals cannot be subjects of this Law". 1 
Since 1945, however, a number of international and national instruments 
have related themselves closely to the promotion and protection of individual 
human rights, leading to a general belief that Oppenheim's views could no longer 
be endorsed. Indeed according to the latest edition of the work 
"International law is no longer...concerned solely with 
States ..... .It is no longer possible, as a matter of positive international 
law, to regard States the only subjects of internationallaw, and there is 
an increasing deposition to treat individuals within a limited sphere, as 
subjects of international law" . 2 
The progression of human rights law has generally been in the direction of 
according protection to the individuals against their States with the "anti-State" 
stance flowing "from the assumption that individual persons must be protected 
L Oppenheim. International Law A Treatise .. vol. i, Peace, (London: Longman) lst edn, 1905, 
346. 
R Jennings and A Watts (eds.) Oppenheim's International law, (Harlow: Longman) 9th edn, vol. 
ii, Peace 1992, 846, 848-9~ E Daes, Status of the Individual and Contemporary International 
Law: Promotion, Protection and Restoration of Human Rights at National, Regional and 
International levels (New York: United Nations) 1992. 
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from the abuse of power of parliaments, governments and public authorities". 3 
Despite the considerable advance in the cause of human rights, in reality, States 
continue to remain the main creators and bearers of rights and duties; the limited 
intrusion which international human rights law may make in the domestic 
jurisdiction of States is only acceptable to the extent that it does not in any way 
challenge their territorial integrity or the authority of the governments in power.4 
Article 34 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice declares "Only States 
may be parties in cases before the Court":s at the international level, the limited 
procedural capacity which individuals may have before certain treaty-based bodies, 
such as the Human Rights Committee, is granted at the behest of the States 
themselves. 
Whereas the path and progress of international law is determined by 
sovereign and independent States, some minorities have proved extremely capable 
of indulging in lasting conflicts, thereby threatening both the territorial integrity of 
the existing States and those who hold the reigns of power.6 This resilience, on the 
part of minorities, is sometimes matched with demands and declarations fashioned 
in their vision of the world order, but foretelling an ominous future for the existing 
State system.7 States are not keen to espouse the cause of minorities, especially if 
this propagation could lead to the support of an alternative and challenging 
constituency. 
If the existence of a procedural capacity is the primary measure of 
assessing whether an entity has rights under international law, then minorities may 
F von Prondzynski, Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations A Comparative Study. 
(London: Mansell Publishing Limited) 1987, 1. 
See supra chapters 5-7. 
1945 UKTS 67; 1946 Cmnd 7015. 
See supra chapter 1. 
See e.g. The Universal Declaration of the Rights of Peoples, Algiers 4 July 1976 in particular 
Articles 19-21, quoted in full in I Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, (London: 
Codes ria Book Series) 1991. 
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well be excluded from any such contention. On the other hand there is dicta to 
support of the view that procedural capacity need not be an essential prerequisite 
for having recognised rights and duties. In the Peter Pazmany case the PCIJ 
stated "it is scarcely necessary to point out that capacity to posses civil rights does 
not necessarily imply the capacity to exercise those rights oneself'.8 Similarly, the 
Permanent Court's successor, the ICJ, in the Reparations case stated "subjects of 
law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent 
of their rights".9 
12.2 INTERNATIONAL LA W AND THE LIMITS OF MINORITY 
RIGHTS 
There may be some disagreement as to the adequacy of the rights granted 
to minorities under international law, although the research into the subject has 
taken the view that international law is in itself an extremely difficult medium for 
effectively safeguarding whatever rights that are granted to minorities. Having 
said that, a theme that has emerged from the present study tends to suggest that 
international laws relating to the protection of minorities cannot be regarded as 
immutable. Professor Kunz once remarked that "he who dedicates his life to the 
study of international law is sometimes struck by the appearance as if there were 
fashions in international law just as neckties". 10 After the Second World War, with 
the establishment of the United Nations, any independent concern for the rights of 
minorities more or less absorbed into the wider aspiration of protection of 
individual human rights. The issue of minority rights remained peripheral to human 
8 The Peter Pazmany University v. the State oJCzechoslovakia, 1933 PCIJ Ser AlB No 61,231. 
9 Reparations Jor injuries in the service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, IC] Reports 
1949, 174. 
10 J Kunz, "The Present Status of International Law for the Protection of Minorities" 48 AJIL 
(1954) 282-287, 282 
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rights law; the existence of minorities, although in many ways real and palpable 
only occasionally becoming the focus of human rights law. Unlike the League of 
Nations which had a limited, yet discernible vision on minorities, both an inability 
and an unwillingness to consider the position of minorities characterised the 
approach of the United Nations. Kunz's remarks relating to the changing fashions 
in international law were ironic, though crudely reflective of this mood. He wrote 
"At the end of the first World War 'international protection of minorities' was the 
great fashion: treaties in abundance, conferences, league of Nations activities, an 
enormous literature. Recently this fashion has become obsolete. Today the well 
dressed international lawyer wears human rights". 11 
To some extent fashions and trends of international society have changed 
in the last fifty years when concern for the plight of minorities may not be so much 
of a minority fashion. A number of international and regional instruments, 
pioneered by the recently adopted United Nations General Assembly Declaration 
on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities, 1992, point towards a progression in a more positive direction. It is 
also the case that the apparent end to the "Cold-war" and the emergence of the 
"New World Order" appears to have removed some of the inherent tensions which 
for so long engulfed international law and politics, although, in so far as the 
protection of the rights of minorities is concerned, as the contemporary events 
indicate, there is not much cause for optimism. 
In this tumultuous period it seems difficult to come to any firm 
conclusions. It may well be that, at least, in theoretical terms, international 
instruments are coming to acquaint themselves more intimately and directly with 
minorities; for many international lawyers the forlorn hope remains "that 
international law is beginning to understand the minorities question better. The 
II Jbid. 282. 
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architecture of any eventual regime for minorities may be glimpsed as a distant 
building, even if the details and intricacies are not yet clear".12 
In contemporary terms the political geography of the post-colonial World 
poses a difficult set of questions. Many States, particularly those which have 
emerged from the rubble of decolonisation, have found various ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic and religious groups at different levels of social, economic and political 
development. It probably is the case that the hazards of nation-building have 
consequentially blinded the political elite of an awareness of these sociological, 
cultural and economic distinctions. It may have numbed their sensitivities for 
noble values such as tolerance and charity, negating their self-proclaimed ideals of 
preserving distinct identities, autonomy, self-government and self-determination, 
though it may well be a product of the unwillingness to accept ideological or 
political differences. 
On the other hand, practical realities must not be overlooked. The legacy 
of the colonial era, although encouraged and established by the colonisers to prop-
up their empires, has made integration of desperate groups into elements of nation-
State a considerably hazardous job.13 Modern developments in international law 
must acknowledge the complexities that are generated with these taxonomies, and 
not imprudently encourage the fragmentation of existing States. If the right to 
self-determination is not to exhaust itself or degenerate into perpetual anarchy, it 
must be regarded as a continuum of rights~ forming a natural lineage between 
individual human rights at one end of the spectrum to meaningful "internal" self-
12 P Thornberry. "International and Europe.'\n Standards on Minority Rights" Miall. 14-21.21. 
\3 "It was always understood by States emerging from colonialism that there would be problems 
associated with the fact that their boundaries had been settled by the Colonial powers on the basis 
of political interests that did not necessarily coincide with their own. In the case of the emerging 
Mrican States the problem of inherited boundaries has been particularly acute, and the tribes 
have often straddled the new frontiers yet have continued to feel themselves a unit". R Higgins, 
"General Course on Public International Law". Ree. des Cours, (1991) 167. 
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determination at the other, catering adequately for all peoples to pursue their 
political, economic, social and cultural development. 
12.3 MINORITY RIGHTS AND DE LEGE FERENDA 
The existence of present norms of international law could, at least in 
theory, be contrasted with a policy of De Lege Ferenda. 14 The absence of a 
consensus definition in international law has provided States with an opportunity 
to deny the existence of minorities within their boundaries. It is accepted that the 
absence of this definition may not in itself render the whole ideal of minority 
protection redundant, and that any subsequent definition that would be established 
could not radically differ from that provided by the Special Rapporteur. ls On the 
other hand a fuller exposition of the concept of a minority in an international legal 
instrument nonetheless seems a crucial task if further progress towards minority 
protection is to be made. 
Some changes, it is contended, need to be made to the Capotorti definition 
In order to provide a more comprehensive and fuller protection of certain 
minorities. Capotorti's definition limits itself to the numerical inferiority of the 
group in question. Following the line adopted by Dinstein, and Palley, it is 
submitted that other factors such as the socio-political, and economic strength of a 
particular community should also be considered in determining the status of a 
minority. I 6 Issues of nationality clearly fall within the jurisdictional domain of 
States, and States jealously guard their prerogatives to determine nationality of 
14 Thornberry, 396. 
15 Ibid .. 
16 Supra chapter 2. 
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individuals.17 The stringent exercise of rules relating to naturalisation beg the 
questions of the rights of groups who despite their long-standing and almost 
permanent character of residence are deemed in municipal laws as non-nationals. 
Indeed, the enduring nature both in terms of the duration of their residence and the 
suffering that certain groups of migrant workers, refugees and stateless persons are 
subjected to, requires a reconsideration of the rights that are provided to them by 
contemporary internationallaw.18 
The procedures set up by Economic and Social Council including that of 
Resolution 1503 have proved to be of limited value for minorities. 19 The lack of 
effectiveness which surrounds Resolution 1503 procedure results from its 
confidential and highly time-consuming nature and fear of intervention in the 
domestic affairs of the State. The procedure also reflects that States with a strong 
political clout could avoid investigation and political recrimination whereas those 
politically isolated or "disfavoured" could become targets of pressure and 
intimidation, a practice which would probably feature more extensively after the 
demise of the Soviet Union. We are reminded of the cynical comments of Ian 
Guest when he says that Resolution 1503 procedure "has become truly dangerous 
to human rights-and that it offers a useful refuge to repressive regimes" .10 
In the present State-centred international order it may well be unrealistic to 
suggest an ambitious and interventionist approach. Instead of adopting a 
confrontational stance it might be worthwhile to attempt to establish a constructive 
dialogue with the governments concerned; what cannot be achieved through 
17 P Weis, Nationality and Statelessness in International Law, (Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff and 
Noordhofi) 1979, 2nd edn. 240-241. 
18 R Lillich, Rights of Aliens under Contemporary International Law, (Manchester: University 
Press). 1984. 
19 P Alston, 11le Commission on Human Rights" (cd.) P Alston, The United Nations and Human 
Rights, A Critical Appraisal (Oxford: OUP) 1992. 126-210.148-155; J Donnelly, International 
Human Rights (Oxford: Westview Press) 1993, 12; Thornberry, 397. 
20 Cited in Alston ibid. IS3. 
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coercion and intimidation might just be available through persuasion and dialogue. 
The development of innovatory institutions as the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities set up in July 1992, could aim to bring pressure on States to improve 
their individual human rights and collective group rights record.21 The setting up 
of a High Commissioner for human rights in December 1993 is also a welcome 
sign.22 In so far as the protection of collective rights is concerned, as noted earlier, 
it is encouraging to observe an increasing number of regional and international 
instruments dealing directly with the position of minorities, though the need for 
adopting an international convention dealing specifically with minorities remains a 
real and urgent one. 
The solemn phoenix of hope that arose out of the frustrating experiences of 
Bangladesh and indeed continues to flourish is the fruition of the work of non-
governmental organisations. Like innumerable situations, it was the non-
governmental organisations who drew the initial attention to the atrocities being 
committed in East Pakistan; the meagre consideration which the Sub-Commission 
gave to the violations of human rights in East Pakistan was largely due to the 
intervention of non-governmental organisations. Indeed, at each stage of the 
conflict, starting from the civil war to the return of prisoners of war, a number of 
organisations including the Amnesty International (AI), the International 
Commission of Jurists (lCoJ) and the International Committee of Red Cross 
(JCRC) provided invaluable support. 
21 CSCE Helsinki Decisions, 35 ILM 1992, 1385~ A de Zayas, "The International Judicial 
Protection of Peoples and Minorities" in C Brolmann, R Lefeber and M Zieck, Peoples and 
Minorities in International Law (Dordrecht: M. Nijhofl), 1993, 253-287, 282; A Bloed, "The 
OSCE and the issue of National Minorities" in A Phillips and A Rosas (eds), Universal 
Minority Rights, (Abo Akademil MRG: TurkuJAbo and London), 1995, 113-122, 116-119. 
22 See the UN Chronicle, March 1994~ A Clapham, "Creating the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights: The Outside story" 5 ElIL (1994), 556-568~ G Alfredsson, "Minority Right: A Summary 
of existing practice" in A Phillips and A Rosas (eds), op.cit note 21, 77-86. 
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The role of the non-governmental organisations is to be applauded for their 
contribution towards protection of human rights in our analysis of the case of 
Pakistan, which is also of importance to minorities and indigenous peoples in 
general. Unhindered by restrictions and restraints which prevent States to act, a 
number of non-governmental organisations with consultative status in accordance 
with Article 71 of the United Nations Charter have often brought to light the 
glaring violations of individual and collective rights. Information on violation of 
these rights is often scarce or unavailable and non-governmental organisations do a 
commendable job in highlighting these violations, a living testimony of which is 
reflected in the completion of the present work. 
The focus of attention of many of the non-governmental organisations, it 
would appear, has traditionally been on the implementation issues relating to the 
civil and political rights. These steps need to be coupled with action relating to 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights which are of direct relevance to 
groups or minorities. The standard-setting activity of the United Nations for the 
elaboration of instruments relating to the rights of minorities, despite the adoption 
of the recent General Assembly Declaration, remains unimpressive. The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child bears the marks of the phenomenal role of a 
number of non-governmental organisations not only in the drafting of the 
Convention but also in initially raising the issue.23 A similar impetus has been 
provided by non-governmental organisations in presenting the concerns of the 
indigenous peoples and religious minorities on the international agenda.24 The 
C Cohen, "The role of NGO's in the drafting of the Convention on the Rights of the Child" 12 
HRQ (1990) 137-147; A Cassese, "How could Non-Governmental Organisations use United 
Nations bodies more effectively" 1 UIIR (1979), 73-80; D Tolbert, "Global Climate Change and 
the Role of International Non-Governmental Organisations" Unpublished paper, University of 
Hull, 1991. D Freestone, "The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child" in 0 
Freestone (ed.) Children and the Law: Essays in honour of Professor H. K. Bevan, (Hull: 
University Press) 1990,288-323. 
24 See I Brownlie, Treaties and Indigenous Peoples, (cd.) F Brookfield., The Robb Lectures 
(Oxford: OUP) 1991,58; N Lerner, "The 1989 ILO Convention on Indigenous populations: New 
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draft convention on minorities prepared by Professor Felix Ermacora and his 
colleagues at Vienna while acting for the Minority Rights Group (MRG)2S could 
provide a useful guide for the drafting of a binding international instrument.26 
The present work has concentrated on the position of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious minorities, although in actual practice the concept of a "minority" is much 
wider - it includes all those who are vulnerable and inarticulate, suffering from 
discrimination and dispossession. If this wider and all-embracing concept is 
acceptable, then the spectrum of specific concerns magnifies itself into the larger 
whole of individual human rights; vindication of these human rights becomes 
axiomatic to the promotion and protection of the rights of minorities. 
Ideals of human rights are sacrosanct and worthy of appreciation~ they are 
designed for every individual, though their observance and respect blends into 
more specific minority aspirations and it can be readily accepted that without 
respect to individual human rights, rights of minorities cannot be salvaged. 
Individual and collective rights are not monolithic, they imbibe claims of a rational 
and tolerant environment and rest on a platform of representative institutions. 
standards?" (eds.) Y Dinstein and Mala Tabory, The Protection of Minorities and Human 
Rights, (Dordrecht: M. Nijhofl) 1992,213-232; Benito. 
2S UN Doc ElCN.4INGO/231 (1979), text could also be found in J Fawcett, The International 
Protection of Minorities, (London: MRG) 1979; produced in its Appendix C. 
26 See also S Roth, "Towards a Minority Convention: Its need and content" in Dinstein and Tabory 
(eds.), op.cit note 23, 83-116. 
TABLE 1: Demographic differences between East and West Pakistan 
East 
Pakistan 
West 
Pakistan 
TOTAL 
POPULATION 
(MILLIONS) 
1951 1961 
41.9 50.8 
33.7 42.9 
POPULATION 
DENSITY 
(PERSONSI URBANIZATION LITERACY 
SQ ML) (PERCENTAGE) (pERCENTAGE) 
1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961 
701 922 4.3 5.2 21.1 21.5 
109 138 17.8 22.5 16.4 16.3 
Source: Adapted" from Pakistan, Ministry of home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs 
Division, Population Census of Pakistan, 1961, Vol 1, pt. ii, statements 2.3, 2.11, 
2.14~ pt iv, statements 4.l, 4.4. 
TABLE 2: Frequency 0/ languages contmonly spoken as mother tongue in Pakistan 
(percentage o/population) 
EAST PAKISTAN 'VEST PAKISTAN PAKISTAN 
LANGUAGE 1951 1961 1951 1961 1951 1961 
Bengali 98.16 98.42 0.02 0.11 56.40 55.48 
Punjabi 0.02 0.02 67.08 66.39 28.55 29.02 
Pushtu - 0.01 8.16 8.47 3.48 3.70· 
Sindhi 0.01 0.01 12.85 12.59 5.47 5.51 
Urdu 0.64 0.61 7.05 7.57 3.37 3.65 
English 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 
Baluchi - - 3.04 2.49 1.29 1.09 
Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Rome and kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs Division, Population Census of 
Pakistan, 1961, Vol 1, pt iv, statement 5.3. 
Bengali 
Punjab; 
Pushtu 
Sind"i 
Urdu 
English 
TABLE 3: Frequency of major languages spoken as additional 
tongues (percentage of population) 
EASTPAKISTAN WESTPAKISTAN PAKISTAN 
0.29 0.55 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.32 
0.01 l.98 l.18 0.84 0.52 
0.96 0.47 0.41 0.21 
0.01 0.01 1.16 1.57 0.50 0.69 
0.46 0.72 8.85 7.28 4.03 3.59 
1.31 0.83 2.63 2.07 l.87 l.38 
Source: Adapted from Pakistan, Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs 
Division, Population of Paki 'Iall, 1961, Vol 1, pt iv, statement 5.3. 
Moslem 
Hindu 
Christian 
Other 
TABLE 4: Religious distribution in Pakistan 
(percentage of total population) 
EAST PAKISTAN WEST PAKISTAN 
1951 1961 . , 1951 1961 :", 
76.8 80.4 97.1 97.2 
22.0 18.4 1.6 1.5 
OJ 0.3 1J 1.3 
0.9 0.9 0.0 0.0 
PAKISTAN 
1951 
.::, . 1961 
85.9 88.1 
12.9 10.7 
0.7 0.8 
0.5 0.4 
Source: Adapted from Paki tan, Mini try of Home and Kashmir Affairs, Home Affairs 
Division, Population enslI ' of Paki 'tan, 1961 , vol 1, pt 1, statement 2.18, Table 5, 
TABLE 5: Population distribution by religion, 1972 Census 
Pakistan 62461883 60434659 296837 603369 907861 4318 9589 1 205250 
Islamabad 234813 231609 75 37 2955 58 79 
N.W.F.P. 8032324 7998232 2162 2852 12828 77 39 16134 
Punjab 37610159 36610508 6569 54836 786494 1386 375 149991 
Sindh 14155909 13212500 271530 543922 95777 2736 8923 20521 
Balochistan 2428678 2381810 16501 1722 9807 61 173 18604 
Source: Population Census Organization 
Note: The table excludes the population of Federally Administered Tribual Areas, Kohistan Area of Hazasra District and 
Provincially Tribal area ajoining hazara District where specials Census schedules were used, which did not pennit 
tabulation as given in this table. 
TABLE 6: POPUlatiOIl distributioll by religioll, 1981 Cellsus 
Pakistan 84253644 81450057 104244 1310426 1276116 7007 2146 2639 101009 
Islamabad 340286 331167 1183 7846 36 35 3 5 11 
N.W.F.P. 11061328 11003937 11360 38583 4428 459 324 58 2179 
ab 47297441 46110205 63694 1061037 29268 1766 832 756 24883 
Sindh 19028666 17556712 21210 176898 1221961 4305 393 1714 45473 
Baluchistan 4332376 4257628 5824 20131 19598 439 189 106 28461 
F.A.T.A 2198547 2190408 973 5931 825 3 405 -- 2 
Source: Population Census Organization. 
TABLE 7: Population by sex, urban/rural areas, 
1972 Census 
Population (in thousands) 
Regionl Total Urban Rural 
Province Both Male Female Both Male Female Both Male Female 
sexes sexes sexes 
PAKISTAN 65309 34833 30476 16594 9027 7567 48715 25806 22909 
ISLAMABAD 
FEDERAL 235 130 105 77 46 31 158 84 74 
AREA 
PUNJAB 37610 20211 17399 9183 4977 4206 28427 15234 13193 
SINDH 14156 7574 6582 5726 3131 2595 8430 4443 3987 
N.W.F.P. 8389 4363 4026 1196 647 549 7193 3716 3477 
FATA 2491 1266 1225 13 8 5 2478 1258 1220 
BALOCHIST AN 2428 1289 1139 399 218 181 2029 1071 958 
Source: Population Census Organization 
,', 
Provillce 
Pakistan 
N.W.F.P 
F.A.T.A 
PUNJAB 
SIND 
I BALUCHISTAN 
lISLAMABAD 
TABLE 8: Language commonly spoken in households by Province 
(1981 Population Census) 
L 
-£7 
Total Urdu Punjabi Pusltto Sindhi Baluclti Brolti Hindko 
100 7.60 48.17 13.14 1l.77 3.01 l.20 2.43 
100 0.83 l.10 68.30 0.05 0.04 0.01 18.13 
100 0.01 0.10 99.70 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.02 
100 4.27 78.68 0.76 0.08 0.57 0.01 0.04 
100 22.64 7.69 3.06 52.40 4.51 l.09 0.36 
100 1.37 2.24 25.07 8.29 36.31 20.68 0.13 
100 11.23 8l.72 4.16 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.60 
Source: Pakistan's Eighth Periodic Report to CERD, CERD/C/118/Add 15, Annex I 
Siraiki Others 
9.83 2.81 
3.95 7.59 
0.00 0.09 
14.90 0.69 
2.29 5.97 
3.08 2.82 
0.10 1.83 
(In per cent) 
Christians 
TABLE 9: Religious Millorities 1991 
(Unofficialflgures as presented by HRCP) 
1,800,000 
Hindus and Schduled castes 1,800,000 
Ahmadis 140,000 
Parsis 9,597 
Buddhists 3,615 
Sikhs 2,940 
Others 1,383,700 
Source: HRCP, State of Human Rights in Pakistan 1991, (Lahore: Makataba 
Jadeed Press) 1992, p 119. 
Party 
AL 
PPP 
NAP 
PML(Q) 
PML(C) 
CML 
PDP 
JUP 
JUI 
11 
IND 
Total 
TABLE 10: Pakistan National Assembly Elections, 1970-1 
Punjab 
seats 
-
62 
-
1 
2 
7 
-
-
4 
1 
5 
82 
Sind 
seats 
-
18 
-
1 
-
-
-
-
3 
2 
3 
27 
NWFP Baluchistan 
seats seats 
- -
1 
-
3 3 
7 
-
- -
- -
- -
6 1 
- -
1 
-
7 
-
25 4 
W Pakistan EPakistan 
seats % seats % 
- -
160 98.8 
81 58.7 
- -
6 41.3 
- -
9 6.5 - -
2 1.4 
- -
7 5.1 
- -
- -
1 0.6 
7 5.1 
- -
7 5.1 
- -
4 2.9 
- -
15 10.9 1 0.6 
138 100-0 162 100-0 
Total 
seats % 
160 55.3 
81 27.0 
6 2.0 
9 3.0 
2 0.7 
7 2.3 
1 0.3 
7 2.3 
7 2.3 
4 1.3 
16 S.3 
300 100-0 
Note: These figures only represent the general seats. There were 13 addtional seats reserved for women of 
which AL won 7. 
Source: Craig Baxter, 'Pakistan Votes, 1970',Asian Survey, XI, March 1971, p. 21l. 
TABLE 11: East Pakistani representation in tile »Ii/itary establishment, 
1963 (percentage of total) 
Commissioned Junior Warrant Other 
Officers Commissioned Officers Ranks 
Officers 
Army 5% 7.4% 7.4% 
Air Force 170/0 13.2% 28.00/0 
Branch Chief Petty Petty Officers Leading 
Officers Officers Seamen and 
Below 
Navy 50/0 10.4% 17.3% 28.80/0 
Source: Pakistan, National Assembly, Debates, March 8, 1963, pp. 30-31. 
APPENDIX A: 
1. DECURATION ON niE RIGHI'S OF PERSONS BELONGING TO 
NATIONAL OR ETIiNlC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLunON 47/135 
[Adopted 18 December 1992. UN Doc. A/RFS/47/135} 
The General Assembly, 
Reaffirming that one of the main purposes of the United Nations, as pro-
claimed in the Charter of the United Nations, is to achieve intemational 
cooperation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion, 
Noting the importance of the even more effective implementation of in-
ternational human rights instruments with regard to the rights of persons 
belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
Welcoming the increased attention given by human rights treaty bodies 
to the non-disaimination and protection of minorities, 
Aware of the provisions of article 'Zl of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights concerning the rights of persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, 
Considering that the United Nations has an increasingly important role 
to play regarding the protection of minorities, 
Bearing in mind the work done so far within the United Nations system, 
in particular through the relevant mechanisms of the Commission on Human 
Rights and the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities, in promoting and protecting the rights of persons 
belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
Recognizing the important achievements in this regard in regional, 
subregional and bilateral frameworks, which can provide a useful source of 
inspiration for future United Nations activities, 
Stressing the need to ensure for all, without discrimination of any kind, 
full enjoyment and exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and 
emphasizing the importance of the draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in that 
regard, 
Recalling its resolution 46/115 of 17 December 1991, Commission on 
Human Rights resolution 1992/16 of 21 February 1992, by which the 
Commission approved the te.~t of the draft"'declaration on the rights of 
persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
and Economic and Social Council resolution 1992/4 of 20 July 1992, by which 
the Council recommended it to the General Assembly for adoption and 
further action, 
Having considered the note by the Secretary-General (A/47/501), 
1. Adopts the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or 
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, the text of which is annexed to 
the present resolution; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the distribution of the 
Declaration as widely as possible and to include the text of the Declaration 
in the next edition of Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments; 
3. Invites United Nations agencies and organizations and intergovern-
mental and non-governmental organizations to intensify their efforts with a 
view to disseminating information on the Declaration and to promoting 
understanding thereof; 
4. Invites the relevant organs and bodies of the United Nations, inter alia, 
treaty bodies and representatives of the Commission on Human Rights and 
the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities, to give due regard to the Declaration within their mandates; 
5. Requests the Secretary-General to consider appropriate ways for the 
effective promotion of the Declaration and to make proposals thereon; 
6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its 
forty-eighth session on the implementation of the present resolution under 
the item entitled 'Human rights questions'. 
ANNEX 
Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities 
The General Assembly, 
Reaffirming that one of the basic aims of the United Nations, as proclaimed 
in its Charter, is to promote and encourage respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion, 
Reaffirming faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth 
of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations 
large and small, 
Desiring to promote the realization of the principles contained in the 
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the 
Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief, and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, as well as other relevant international instruments that have been 
adopted at the universal or regional level and those concluded between 
individual States Members of the United Nations, 
Inspired by the provisions of article 27 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights concerning the rights of persons belonging to 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, 
Considering that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons 
belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute 
to the political and social stability of States in which they live, 
E.mphasizing that the constant promotion and realization of the rights of 
persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, as 
an integral part of the development of society as a whole and within a 
democratic framework based on the rule of law, would contribute to the 
strengthening of friendship and cooperation among peoples and States, 
Considering that the United Nations has an important role to play 
regarding the protection of minorities, 
Bearing in mind the work done so far within the United Nations system, 
in particular the Commission on Human Rights, the Subcommission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the bodies 
established pursuant to the International Covenants on Human Rights and 
other relevant international human rights instruments on promoting and 
protecting the rights of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and 
linguistic minorities, 
Taking into account the important work which is carried out by inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations in protecting minorities 
and in promoting and protecting the rights of persons belonging to national 
or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
Recognizing the need to ensure even more effective implementation of 
international instruments with regard to the rights of persons belonging to 
national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, 
Proclaims this Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities: 
Article 1 
1. States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, 
religiOUS and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective 
territories, and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. 
2. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve 
those ends. 
Article 2 
1. Persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities 
(hereinafter referred to as persons belonging to minorities) have the right to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, and to use 
their own language, in private and in public, frccly and without interference 
or any form of discrimination. 
2. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in 
cultural, religious, social, economic and public life. 
3. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate effectively in 
decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning 
the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a 
manner not incompatible with national legislation. 
4. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain 
their own associations. 
5. Persons belonging to minorities have the right to establish and maintain 
without any discrimination, free and peaceful contacts with other members 
of their group and with persons belonging to other minorities, as well as 
contacts across frontiers with citizens of other States to whom they are 
related by national or ethnic, religious or linguistic ties. 
Article 3 
1. Persons belonging to minorities may exercise their rights, including those 
sct forth in this Declaration, individually as well as in community with other 
members of their group, without any discrimination. 
2. No disadvantage shall result for any person belonging to a minority as the 
consequence of the exercise or non-exercise of the rights set forth in this 
Declaration. 
Article 4 
1. States shall take measures where required to ensure that persons belonging 
to minorities may exercise fully and effectively all their human rights and 
fundamental freedoms without any discrimination and in full equality before 
the law. 
2. States shall take measures to create favourable conditions to enable persons 
belonging to minorities to express their characteristics and to develop their 
culture, language, religion, traditions and customs, except where specific 
practices are in violation of national law and contrary to international 
standards. 
3. States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, 
persons belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to learn their 
mother tongue or to have instruction in their mother tongue. 
4. States should, where appropriate, take measures in the field of education, 
in order to encourage knowledge of the history, traditions, language and 
culture of the minorities existing within their territory. Persons belonging to 
minorities should have adequate opportunities to gain knowledge of the 
society as a whole. 
S. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons belonging to 
minorities may participate fully in the economic progress and development 
in their country. 
Article 5 
1. National policies and programmes shall be planned and implemented with 
due regard for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities. 
2. Programmes of cooperation and assistance among States should be planned 
and implemented with due regard for the legitimate interests of persons 
belonging to minorities. 
Article 6 
States should cooperate on questions relating to persons belonging to 
minorities, including exchange of information and experiences, in order to 
promote mutual understanding and confidence. 
Article 7 
States should cooperate in order to promote respect for the rights set forth 
in this Declaration. 
Article 8 
1. Nothing in this Declaration shall prevent the fulfilment of international 
obligations of States in relation to persons belonging to minorities. In 
particular, States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations and commitments 
they have assumed under international treaties and agreements to which they 
are parties. 
2. The exercise of the rights set forth in this Declaration shall not prejudice 
the enjoyment by all persons of universally recognized human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. 
3. Measures taken.by States to ensure the effective enjoyment of the rights set 
forth in this Declaration shall not prima facie be considered contrary to the 
principle of equality contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
4. Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as permitting any activity 
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, incluc:liIlg 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity and political independence of States. 
Article 9 
The specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations 
system shall contribute to the full realization of the rights and principles set 
forth in this Declaration, within their respective fields of competence. 
APPENDIX B: 
Agreement betWeen India and Pakistan 1950 conccming Minorities (Extract) 
A. The Governments of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure to 
the Minorities throughout its tenitory complete equality of citizenship, irrespective 
of religion, a full sense of security in respea of life, culture, propeny and personal 
honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, 
speech and worship, subjea to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall 
have equal opportUnity with members of the majority community to participate in 
the public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their 
country's civil and armed forces. Both Governments declare these rights to be 
fundamental and undertake to enforce them effectively. It is the policy of both 
Governments that the enjoyment of these democratic rights shall be assured to all 
their nationals without distinaion. 
Both Governments wish to emphasize that the allegiance and loyalty of the minor-
ities is to the State of which they are citizens, and that it is to the Government of their 
own State that they should look for the redress of their grievances. 
APPENDIX c: 
The Proclamation. of Independence 
Mujibnagar, Bangladesh 
Dated 10th day of April, 1971·. 
Whereas free e)e~tions were held in Bangladesb from 7th 
December, 1970 to 17th January, 1971, to elect representatives 
Cor the purpose of framing a Constitution. 
AND 
Whereas at these elections the people of Bangladesh elected 
167 out of 169 representatives belonging to the Awami League, 
AND 
. Whereas General Yahya. Khan summoned the elected 
representatives of the people to meet on the 3rd March, 1971, 
for the purpose of framing a Constitution, 
AND 
Whereas the Assembly so summoned was arbitrarily and 
Ulegally postponed for an indefinite period, 
- AND 
Whereas instead of fulfiIling their promise and while still 
conferring with the representatives of the people of Bangladesh, 
Pakistan authorities declared' an unjust and treacherous war, 
AND 
Whereas in the facts and circumstances of such treacherous 
conduct Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the un-
disputed leader of 7S miilion of people of Bangladesh, in due 
fulfilment of the legitimate right of self-determination 'of the 
people of Bangladesh, duly made a declaration of independence 
at Dacca on March 26. 1971, and urged the people of Bangla-
desh to defend the honour and integrity of Bangladesh. 
AND 
Whereas in the conduct of a ruthless and savage war the 
Pakistani authorities committed and are still continuously 
committing numerous acts of genocide and uDprecedented 
tortures, amongst others on the civilian and unarmed peop)e 
of Bangladesh, 
AND 
Whereas the Pakistan Government by levying an unjust war 
and committing genocide and by oth'er repres~ive measures 
made it imposl'ible fot the elected representatives of the people 
of Bangladesh to meet and frame a ConstitutioD, and give to 
themselves a Government, 
AND 
Whereas the people of Bangladesh by their heroism. bravery 
and revolutionary fervour have established effective control 
over th.e territories of Bangladesh, 
--We the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh, 
as honour bound by the mandate given to u~ by the people of 
Bangladesh whose will is supreme duly constituted ourselves 
into a Constituent Assembly, and 
. having held mutual consultations, and 
. in order to ensure for the people of Bangladesh equality, 
human dignity and social justice, 
declare and con,titute Bangladesh to be a sovereign People's 
Republic and thereby confirm the declaration of indepen-
dence already made by Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujlbur Rahman 
add 
do hereby affirm and resolv_e that till such time as' a 
Constitution is framed. Banga Bandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
shall be the Pr.:sident of the RepUblic a.nd that Syed Nazrul 
Islam shall be the Vice Pre~ident of the Republic, and 
that the President ~hall be the Supreme Commander of all 
the Armed Forces of the RepUblic. 
shall exercise allihe Executive and Legis1ative powers of the 
RepUblIC incl\Iding the power to grant pardon, 
shall have the power to a'ppoint a Prime Minister and such 
other Ministers 'as he considers necessary. 
shall bave the power to levy taxes and expend monies, 
shall have the power to summon and adjourn the 
Constituent Assembly, and 
do all other things that may be necessary to give to the people 
of Bangladesh an orderly and just Government. 
W~ the elected representatives of the people of Bangladesh 
do further resolve that in the event of there being no President 
or the President being unable to enter upon his office or being 
unable to exercise his powers due to any reason whatsoever, 
the Vice-President shaH have and exercise ali the powers, 
duti~s and rt:sponsibilities herein conferred on the President, 
We further resolve that we undertake to observe and give 
effect to all duties and obligations that devolve upon us as a 
member of the family of nations and to abide by the Charter 
of the United Nations. 
We further resolve that this proclamation of independence 
shall be dee~cd· to have come into effect from 26lh day of 
March, 1971. 
We further resolve that in order to give effect to this instru-
ment we appoint Prof. Yusuf Ali our duly Constituted poten-
tiary and to give to the President and the Vice-President oaths 
of office. 
.... - ... 
Sd/. PROP. YUSUF ALI 
Duly Constituted Potentiary. 
By and under the authority 
of the Constituent Assembly 
of Bangladesh. 
RE'PfJ:\lDIX D: 
Aeglscered No. DA.; 
the 
Bangladesh Gazette' 
/ 
Extraordinary 
Published by' Authority 
FRIDAY, JULY 20, 1973 
PiUt:r ill-Act of the Bnugl:ldcsh Parlianlent 
BAJ.'lGLADESIl p ARU~~IENT 
Dacca, the 20th July, 1973 
, 
The following Act of Parliament received the assent of the Ptesidant 
on tha l~th July, 1973, and is hel'eby pl\1Jllshed for ~ner-~ 
information :-
A~ .No. XIX OF 1973 
An. Act to pTovide jor the detention, prosecutiOJl and punishment ot 
persons for genocid~, crimes against humanity, war crimes and : 
. other crimes under in.ternational law. ~ I 
. ., 
. WHEREAS it is expedient to provide- for the detention, prosecution and 
punishment of persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war cmnes 
and other crimes under international lavl, and for matters conneoted 
therewith ; 
it is h~eby enacted as follows :-
1. Short title, extent and conunence1l1cnt.-(1) This Act may be called 
the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973. .. 
(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh. 
(3) It shall come into force' at once. 
2. DciinHions.-In this Act, unles"s the:e is anything repugna~t in the 
subject or context,- . 
. 
Ca) "auxiliary forces" includes forces placed under the control of 
the Armed Forces for operational, administrative, static and 
other purposes i " 
'. -, . 
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(b) "Govarnmentlt means the Government of the People's Republic 
. of Bangladesh ; . '. 
(c) "Republic!' means the People's Republic of Bangladesh; 
(d) "service law" means the Army Act, 195~ (XXXIX of 1952), the 
. Air Force Act, 1953 (VI of 1953), or the Navy Ordinance, 1961 
(XXXV of 1961), and includes the rules ond regulations made 
. under any of them; 
., (e) "territory of Bangladesh!! means the territory of the Republic as 
. defined in article 2 of the Constitution of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh; . 
(f) "Tribunal" means a 'tribunal set up under this Act. 
3. Jurisdiction of Tribw131 antI crilllcs.-(1) A Tribunal shall have 
the power to try and punish any person irrespective of his nationality who, 
being a member of any m-med, defence or auxiliary forces commits or has 
committed, in the territory of Bangladesh, whether before or after the 
commencement of this Act, any of the following crimes . 
. (2) The {ollowjng acts 01' any of them are crimes within the jurisdic-
1.lon of a Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility, 
namely ~- . .. 
(a) Crimes against HWl;lanity: namely, murder, extenninatioll, 
enslavement, deportation, i~prisonmcnt,· abdUction, confine-
ment, torture, rape or other inhumane acts committed against 
. any civilian population or persecution~ on political, racial, ethnic 
or religious grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic 
law of the country wh~re perpetrated; ... 
, . _ . (b) Crimes againSt Peace : namely, planning, pl'eparation, initiation 
. or waging of .a war of aggression or a war in violation of int~r­
national treahes, agreements or assurances; 
-I 
(c) Genocide: meaning and including any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy. in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial, religious or political group, such as : . _I 
(i) killing members of the group; ! "\ 
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the 
group; . 
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life cal-
culated to bring about its physica1 destruction in whole or 
in part;.. .. .. 
(iv) imposing l"l1easures intended to prevent births within the 
group; 
(v) forcibly transferring children of the group to a~other group; 
• 
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. '
(d) War \ Crimes: namely, violation of laws or .customs of war 
'which include but are not limited to murder, iU-treatmF:'nt or 
deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian 
population in the tenitory of Bangladesh; murder or ill-treat-
ment of. prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages and detenues, plunder of public or private, property, 
wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation 
not justified by military necessity; 
(e) violation of any humanitarian rules npplicable in armed con· 
. filcts laid down in. the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ; 
(f) any' <?ther crimes under international Jaw; 
(g) attempt, abetment .or conspiracy to commit any such crimes; . 
. '" (h) complicity in or failure to prevent commission of any' such 
crimes. 
. , -
· 4. Liability for Crimcs.-(l) When any crime as specified in section 
. 3 is. committed by several persons, each of such person is liable for that 
crime in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. . 
(2) 'Any commande~ or superior, officer who orderS, pennits, acquiesces 
or participa.tes in the commission of any of the crimes specified in section 
3 or is connected with any plans and acthrities involving the commission 
of such crimes or who. fails or omits to discharge his duty to maintain 
discipline, or ·to control or supervise the actions of the persons under his 
command or his .subordinates, whereby such persons or subordinates or 
any of them conunit any such crimes, or who fails to take necessary mea-
sures to prevent the commission of such crimes, is guilty of such crimes. 
. 5. Official position, etc. not to .free an accused fro1l1 responsibility for 
any crime.-(l) The official position, at any time, of an accused shall not 
be considered f!eeing him from responsibility or mitigati~g punishment. 
. (2) The fact that the accused acted pursuant to his domestic law or' 
to order of his Government ot' of· a superior shall not free him from res· 
· ponsibility, but may be consider.ed in mitigation of punishment if the 
Trib\mal deems that j~stice so requires. . 
6. Tribunal.-(l) For the purpose of section 3, the Government 
may, by notification in the- official Ga.zette, set up one or more Tribunals, 
each consisting of a Chairman and not less·than·two and not. more than 
four other members. . 
, (2) Any pel·son. who is 01' is qualified to be a Judge of the Supreme 
.Court of Bangladesh or has been a Judge of any High Court or Supreme 
Court which at any time was in existence in the territory of Bangladesh 
or who is qualified to be a member. of General Court M~tial under any 
service law of Bangladesh may be appointed as a Chairman or member . 
of a.Tribunal. . 
(3) The permanent sea.t ~f a Tribunal shall be in Dacca: . .' 
Provided that a Tribunal may hold its sittings at such gther place or 
places as it deems fit. .' '. .' .. ; # 
. .' 
.' 
5990 THE BANGLADESH GAZE'ITE, EXTRA., JULY 20, 1973 . [PART III 
(4). If any member of a TrilJunal dies or is, due to illness or any other 
reason, unable -to continue to perform his functions, the Government 
may, by notification in the official Gaz2tte, declare the office of such mem-
ber to be vacant and appoint thereto another person qualified. to-hold the 
office. 
(5) If, in the course of a trial, anyone of the members of a Tribunal 
is, tor any reason. unable to attend any sitting thereof, the trial may 
continue before the other members. . 
(6) A Tribunal shall not, merely by reason of any change in its mem-
bership or the absence of any member thereof from any sitting, be bound 
to recall and re-hear any witness who has already given any evidence 
and may act on the evidence already given Or produced before it .. 
. . .. :-
(7) If, upon any matter requiring the decision of a Tribunal, there . 
is a difference of o-pinion among its members, the opinion of the majority 
shan prevail and the decisioll of the Tribunal shall be expressed in terms 
of the views of the majority.' . 
(B) Neither the constitution of a Tribunal nor· the appointment of its 
Chnlrman or members shall be challenged by the prosecution or by the 
accused persons or their counsel. 
7.' Prosecutors.-(l) The Government may appoint one or more 
personS to conduct the prosecution before a Tribunal on such terms and 
conditions as mav be determined by the Government; and every such 
person shall be d'eemed to bE' a Prosecutor for the purposes of this 'Act. 
(2) The Go\'ernment may deSignate one of such persons as the Chief 
Prosecutor. . 
. . 
8. Investigation.-(l) The Government may establish an Agency 
!or the purposes of investigation into crimes specified in sectioll 3; and 
my' officer belonging to the Agency shall have the right to assist the pro-
se~ut1on during the tria~. - . . 
(2) Any' person appointed as a Prosecutor is competent to act as an 
Investlgntion Officer and the provisions relating to investigation shall 
,apply to such Prosecutor. " 
''(3) Any Investigation Officer makin~ ~m investi£!~tion under this Act 
may, by order in writing, require the attendance before himself of any 
person who appears to be :lcquainted with the circumstances ·of the case; 
and such person shall attend as so required. 
(4) Any Investigation Officer makin~ an investigation under this ~ct. 
may examine orally any person who appears to be acqt13inted with the 
facts and circumstances of the case.· 
(5) Such person shu.11 be bound to answer nIl Questions put to him 
by an !n\'estit!~tion Officer and ~hall not be excused· from answerln~ any 
question on the groUlld that the answer to sllch question will criminate, 
or may tend directly or indirectly to· criminate, such ,person.: . 
Pro'Yided that no such answer, which a person shall be comneUed to 
f!i've, sh:lll subicct him to anv arrest or prosecution, or be proved against 
him in any criminal proceedine. . 
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,(6) The Investigation Officer may reduce into, writin~ any statement 
made to him in the course o~ examination under this section. 
, , 
(7) Any person' who fails to ap'pear before an Investigation Officer 
:for tile purpose of examination or refuses to answer the questions put to 
, h1m by such Investigation Officer shall be punished with simple imprison-
ment which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to 
Taka two thousand, or with both. " ' 
, (8) Any Magistrate of the first class may take cognizance of an off-
ence punishable under sub-section (7) upon a complaint in writing by an 
Investigation Officer. 
(9) Any investigation done into the crimes specified in section 3 shall 
be deemed to" have been done under the provisions of this Act. 
-
, 9. Commcnccment of the "Proceedillgs.-{l) The proceedings before 
a Tribunal shall commence upon the submission by the Chief Prosecutor, 
or a Prosecutor authorised by the Chief Prosecutor in this behalf, of 
iannal char~es of crimes alleged to have been committed by each of the 
...accused persons. 
(2) The Trib~mal shall thereaft~r fL~ a d~te for the trial of such 
accused person. 
(3) The Chief Prosecutor shall, at least three weeks before' the 
commencement of the trial, furnish to the Tribunal a list of witnesses 
intended to be produced along with the recorded stat~ment of such 
witnesses or copies thereof and copies of documents which the prosecu-
tion intends to rely upon in support of such charges. 
'(4) The submissi~n of a list of witnesses and documents under suc-
section (3) shall not preclude" the prosecution from calling, with the 
pennission of the Tribunal, additional witnesses or tenderin~ any fur-
ther evidence at any stage of the trial : 
Provided that notice shall be given to the defence of the additional 
: witnesses intended to be called or additional evidence sought to be 
"tendered by the prosecution. -
(5) A list of witnesses for the defence, if any, along with the docu-
ments or copies thereof. which the defence intends to rely upon shall 
, , be furnished to the Tribunal and the prosecution at the time ~f the 
commencement of the trial 
10. Procedure of trial.-{l) The following procedure shall be followed 
at a trial before a Tribuna,I, namely :- ' 
.. 
(a) the charge shall be read out; 
(b) the Tribunal shall ask each accused person whether he 
,pleads guilty or not-gu1lty ; 
(c) if the accused. person pleads guilty, the Tribunal 'shall record 
the plea, and m~y, in its discretion, convict him thereon; 
. . . 
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.. 
. 
. (d) the prosecution sball make an opening statement; 
(e) the witnesses for the prosecution shall be examined, the 
. defence may cross-examine such witnesses and the prosecu-
tion may re-examine them; 
,". \. 
. 
(£) the witnesses ·for the defence, if any, shall be examined; the 
prosecution may cross-examine such witnesses and the 
defence may re--examine them; 
(g) the Tribunal may, in its discretion, permit the party which 
calls a witness to put any question to him which might be 
put in cross-examination by th.e adverse party; 
(h) the Tribunal may, in order to discover or obtain proof of 
relevant facts, ask any witness any question it pleases, in any 
fonn and at any time about any fact; and ~ay order produc-
tion of any document or thing or summon any witness, and 
neither the prosecution nor the defence shall be entitled. 
either to make any objection to· any such question or order 
or, without the leave of the T;ribunal, to cross-examine any 
. witness upon any answer' given in reply to any such question; 
(i) the prosecution shall f1ISt sum up its case, and thereafter 
the defence shall sum up its case: . 
-
. Provided that if any witness ~ examined by the defence, 
the prosecution shall have the right to sum up its case after 
the defence has done so; 
(j) the Tribunal shall deliver", its judgment and pronounce its 
verdict • 
. . ·(2)· All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be in English. 
. . 
(3) Any accused person or witness .who is unable to express him-
self in, or does not understand! English may be provide~ the assistance 
of an interpretor. . 
(4) The proceedings of the Tribunal shall· be in pUblic: 
Provided that the Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, take proceedings in 
camera. .. . '. '.-;"t;. 
.. '(5) No oath shall.. be administered. to any accused person .. 
11. Po,vers of Tribunal-{l) A Tribunal shall have power-
(a) to summon witnesses to the trial and to require their atten-
. dance and testimony and to put· questionS to· them; , 
(b) to administer oaths to witnesses; 
(c) to require the production of document and other evidentiary 
material ; 
, . 
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(d)·to appoint persons for carrying out any task designated by 
the Tribunal. . . 
. '. '(2) For the purpose of enabling any accused person' to explain any 
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, a Tribumu may, . 
at 'any stage of the trial without previously warning the aCQUsed person, 
put such questions to him as the Tn.bunal considers necessary : 
Provided that. the accused person shall not render himself liable to 
punishment by refusing to answer such questions or by giving !alse 
answers to them; but the Tribunal may dray; such inference from such 
. refusal or answers as it thinks just; . 
. I 
(3) A Tribunal shaU- ,. .:.:. j ,:I ,. j .. " 
. (a) confine the trial to an expeditious hearing of tlle issues raised 
, . by the charges ; ..... 
'{b} take measures to prevent any action whicli may cause un • 
. reasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements. 
. '(4) A Tribunal may punish any person, who obstructs or abuses its 
process or disobeys any of its orders or directions, or does anything which 
tends to prejudice the case of a party before it, or tends to bring it or 
any of its members into batred or contempt, or does anything which 
constitutes contempt of the Tribunal, with simple imprisonment which 
may e",-tend to one year, or tvith fine which may extend to Taka five 
. thousand, or \Vi~h both. • , .' 
. '(5) Any nlember of a Tribunal shal,lliave p'ower to direct, or issue a 
. warrant for, the arrest of, and to comnllt to custody, and to authorise the 
. continued detention in custody of, any person charged with any crime 
specified in section 3, . 
"(6) The· Chairnian of a Tribunal may make such administrative 
urrangements as he considers necessary for the perfonnance of the func-
tions of the Tribunal under this Act. 
I . 
12. Provision for defence counsel.-Wliere an accused person is not 
represented br counsel, the Tribunal may, at any stage of the case, direct 
that a counse shall be engaged at the expens~ of the Government to 
defend ·the accused person and may also determine the fees to be paid to 
. such counsel. 
, . : . 
. ' . 13. Restriction Ot adjeuxnmcnt.-No trial before a Tribunal sliall 
, be adjourned for any purpose unless the Tribunal is of the opinion that 
the adjournment is in the interest of justice. 
14. Statew<mt or confesSioll of accused PC1'SOUS.-'(l)" Any Magistra.te 
of the first class may record any statenlent or coniession made to him 
• by an accused. person at any time in the course of inyestigation or at any 
:.... time before the commencement of the trial . 
. 
. (2) The Magistrate shall, before refordillg any such confesSion, ex-
plain to the accused person making it that he is not bound to make a 
,'. coniession and that if he' does so it may be used as evidence against him 
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~nd no Magistrate sh!lll ~ecord any such confession unless, upon question. 
mg the ~ccused making It. he has reason to believe that it was made 
voluntanly. 
# 15.' Pardon of an approvcr.-(l) At any ~tage of the trial a Tribu. 
hal may wi~ a view, to .ob~aining the evidenc~ of any person sUpposed to 
hav~ been dIrectly or mdlrectly concerned In, or privy to any of the 
crim:es spe~ified in section 3, te!lder a pardon tp such person ~n condition 
of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances 
within his knowledge relative to the crime and to every ,other person 
concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof. , 
(2) Every person accepting the tender under this section shall be 
ex~ned as a witness in the trial. 
\3) Such persoll shall be detained in custody until the termination 
of ~he trial 
16. Charge, etc.-(l) Every charge against an accused person shall 
state-,' . 
, I 
·.(a) tIle name and particulars of tlie accused person; '.: ~ 
, . 
(b) the crime of which the accused person is charged;, . 
. (c) such particulars of the alleged crime as are reasonably, sum.. 
cient to give the accused person notice of the matter'with 
. which he is charged. 
, . . 
'(2) A copy of the formal charge and a copy of ea~h of the documents 
lodged with the formal charge shall be furnished to the accused per~n 
at a reasona')le time before the trial; and in case of any difficulty in 
furnishing copies of the documents, reasonable opportunity for inspec· 
tion shall be given to the accused person in such manner as the. Tribunal 
may decide. 
. 17. Right of accused persoll duriug tri;l.-(l) During trial' of an 
accused person he shall have. the right to give any explanation relevant 
to the charge made against hIm. 
(2) An accused person shall have the right to' conduct his own 
defence before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel . 
.-' 
(3) An accused person shall have the right to present evidence at 
the trial in support of .his defence, and to cross-examine any witness 
called by the .prosecutlon. '. \ 
. 18. No ex~use from answering allY question.-A witness sliall 
not be excused. from answering any question put to him on the ground 
that the, answer to such question will criminate or may tend directly or 
indirectly to cr.iminate such witness, or that it will expose or tend directly 
or indirectly t.o expose such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any 
kind: 
Provided that no such answer wrjch a witness shall be ~ompelled to 
give shall subject him to any arrest or prosecutiol1 or be proved against' 
him in any criminal proceedinr;, except a prosecution for giving false 
e\l'iaence. 
• .. 6"~ 
... _. "':'''-
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. 19. Rules· of evidence.-(l). A Tribunal shall not be bound by. techni-
cal rules of evidence; and it shill adopt and apply to the greatest 
possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and may admit 
any evidence, including reports and photographs publislied in news-
papers, periodicals and magazines, films and tape-recordings and other 
materials as may be tendered before it, which it deems to have probative 
. value. . . 
(2) A Tribunal may receive in evidence any statement recorded by 
a Magistrate or an Investigation Officer being a statement made by any 
person who, at the time of the trial, is dead or whose attendance cannot 
be procured without an amount of delay or expense which the Tribunal 
considers unreasonable. . 
.,(3) A Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge 
but shall take judicial notice thereof. 
. (4) A Tribunal shall take judicial notice of official governmental 
documents and reports of the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies 
or' other international bodies including non-governmental organisations. 
20. Judgement and sentence.-(l) The Judgement of a Tribunal. as 
to the guilt or the innocence of any accused person shall give the reasons 
on which it is based : 
Provided that eaCh member of the Tribunal shall be competent to 
deliver a judgement of his own. 
, (2) Upon ·conviction of an accused person, the Tribunal shall award 
, sentence of death or such. other punishment proportionate to the gravity 
of the crime as appears to the Tribunal to be just and proper. 
(3) The sentence awarded under ~s Act shall be aarried out in 
accordance with the orders of the Government. ' 
- ' 
'21. Right of appeal.-A person convicted of any crime s-gecified in 
section 3 and sentenced by a Tribunal shall have the right of appeal to 
. the Appellate DiviSion of the Supreme "Court of Bangladesh against 
such conviction and sentence: 
. Provided that su~ a:ppeal may be preferred within sixty days of the 
date. of order of conv:ction and sentence. . 
22. R~ of proeedure.-Subjcct to the provision of this Act, a Tri-
bunal may regulate its own procedure.. '. 
23 .. Certain laws not to apply.-The provisions of the Criminal 
Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 1898), and the Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 
1872), shall not apply in any proceedings under this Act. 
24. Bar of Jurisdidion.-No order, judgment or sentence of a, Tri-
bunal shall be called in question in any manner whatsoever in or before 
any Court or other authority in any legal proceedings whatsoe"'er ex-
cept in the manner provided in section 21. 
\ 
• 
5996 THE BANGLADESH GAZE'ITE, EXTRA., JULy 20,.1973 [PART III 
25. Indcmnity.-No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall 
lie against the Government or any person for anything, in good. faith, 
done or purporting to have been done under this Act. 
26. Provisions of the Act over-riding all other laws.-The provisions 
of this ·Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconSistent there. 
with contained in any other law for the time being in force • 
. ' 
.' 
, . 
. ' 
S. M.. RAHMAN; 
Secreta.ry. 
. '. :--
- :. 
PRmn:D. BY THE MANAGER, GoVERNMENT PRIN'l'INC PREss, TE.rCAoN, DACCA. 
PuBLIS.HED· BY THE AsSISTANT CONTIlOLLER-lN-CHAllGE, BANCLADISH FORMS 
AND PtmLICATIONS OFFICE, DACCA. 
APPENDIX E: 
BANGLADESH-INO IA-PAKIS TAN: AGREEMENT ON THE REPATRIATION OF 
PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIV:IL:IAN INTERNEES* 
[Done at New Delhi, April 9, 1974] 
On July 2, 1972, the ~resid~n~ of Pakist:~ and tho 
pri:e }oliniatar iJf Indja signed a..~ bisto:t'~.c s.graemcnt a": Si:lla. 
under ,.,h1ch they resolved that "the 't\'lO countries put all t!nQ. 
~ the oonflict end conf.r!Jntation. th~t have hither-:o marrerl 
tbc"ir :elati~ns and work for the pro~~ti~n of a friendly Q~~ 
: harI:~ni:lus J:t!la '~i~nship and the establish!nen t of dur~\ble pf1~ce 
· in t~a eub-oontinentlt. The Agreemen.t also pr':)v1ded for the 
· :sett~eUlent of "their di!,ferunccs by peace!t.tl "I:?ans tr':~\lgh 
· bilateral neg~tiationG ~: bY' any ~the:r- peace!nl means Ir'.ltually· 
· ao~ead up'!)nCl " 
2. !angYadesH walc~med th~ Stmla ~grcement. Tha·~~imQ 
lliniste:r: '':,If :B:llli;1.adesll stronsly 3llpp~rted .tts objective of 
~ rec~nciliationf go~d neighb~urlineas and estnblish::en"t o£ 
."du:able p~nce in the sub-c!)ntinent. 
~, 'J!he hummli ~uian p.r~hlem.s ursing L""1 ·the w~ke IJ! ·t~9 
tt2gic.6vantg at 1971 c~nst1tuted a major ~bst~cle·1~ the" wcy 
~ ~t reconc11i~t1on and n~rcalisation am~ng t~e c~untriaa of tha 
8Ub-~onti~ent. 'In ·the absence ~f rQc~gnLtion, it wao n~t 
P03flibla ~:l h&'VQ trip:o.rtl.te talks to settle the llUI!au1t:lri?lt:. 
problems as 13allglad9sh c~ui~ not pa:·tici"fla toe in such a ::ectir;,g 
except on the baaic 0"'£ s:lve:::eign oquali ty .. 
......... 
~--:[aeproduc:ed from the text provided by the Embassy of Pakistan at 
~. hinqtOD, D.C. 
"t [The Agreement: between India and Pakistan on the release and repatria-~ton of detained persons, signed on April 9, 1974, appears at I.L.M. page 
:~ _3-;- The Aqreement between India and Pakistan on the repatriation of 
::msoners of war, signed on August 28, 1973, appears at ~ I.L.M. 1080 
,:tt 73). '!'he Simla Agreement and the statement c:onc:erninq its implementa-
(. on appear at 11 I.L.M. 954 (1972).] 
4, . On Apri~ 17, 1973, India and Bangladesh t~ok a major 
step for\"/ard to. break the deadJ.ock on the humanitarian issues 
by cetting aside the political problem of rec~gnition. In a 
Decl~\l!at1on issued ~n that date they said that they "are 
resol·V'~d t:> continue their efforts to reduce tension, pr~l!1O te 
friendly and h~rm~nious reIati~nsnip. in the sub-continent and 
'A~rk together towards the establishment 'J.f a durable peace". 
Inspired by this vision and "in the 2arger .interests ':If. 
rec~nciliation, peace and stability i:n the sub-continent" tller 
j~intly proposed that tna problem of the detained a~d stranded 
persons. should be resolved 'In hum~nitari:ln c~nsiderations thrcugt 
simultane~U9 repatriation of all. such pers~ns except those 
Pakistani pris~ners ot '·/ar who might be required by the 
Governmeqt of Bangladesh f~r trial ~n certain char~es. 
5. Foll~wing the Decla·ra tion. there ''1ere a series ~f talks 
between In.!ia and Bangladash and Indl.a. and Pakio·tan. ·These talks 
rcnulted in an ag::oeement- at Del:li on Augusi; 28, 1~'73 between 
India and Pakistan with the C~l1C\.ll·!'ence of Ean£~lcdeoh \"h:L~h. 
provined for a s~lution of the ~ut3tanding humani tarl.an pr"'hle~5·. 
6. In pursuance 'J:C this Agreement.. th~ pr.~CE:3'S ot: -:hree-· 
"lay r~pa trj,;l"':i';)n commenced ';)n September 19, 19'13. Sf) ia::- r!e:l:.c-l~' 
300,000 pcrcono have been repatriated which haG genernted an 
~t:!loGphere of rec~n~iliation and paved the t.'i~y f~:r n~rt:lali!JC'lti'jn 
'J! rcln. tio!!s in t~e sub-continent. 
7. In F..ebruary 1974·,.. rcc~glli tiljl~ t~ok place thus 
facil!. tatir~ the participati~n 'Jf J3anglarlesh in the tripar·i:'i te 
mee·cine; envisa8ed in the ~elhi A.greec~nt J on tee ba'sis of 
G~vereign equality. Accordingly, His Excellency Dr. X~al 
H03cain, Foreign Minister of the Government ')f B~.ngladeenr --~.; 
Ilia F.lCcallcncY'· Sardar Swa.ran Singh, nin~.ste~: of Externa~ Affa.irs! 
G~"'ernI:lr:!nt ~f India. and His E~<;ellency !tfr. Aziz Ahmed, M5.nister 
.-
ot State !~r De!ence and F~reign Affairs of the Govern~~nt cf ~' 
Pakistan, met in- Uew Delhi :f.r~m l1.pril 5 ~o J\.prl1 9, 1974 :l:l.d .:'~ 
discuse9d the vari~ l1.S issues men ti or4cd in, the ])31hi Agrce!llent ~ .:~ 
in partioular the ques'tion ~f the 1''15 priscnel-s of war and tb~ I 
~ letion of the three-way pr~ce5s o~ repatristi~n inv~lving r::?-'~ea in Pakistan, Pakistanis in Bangladaah and PakistC\n1 
p~e;u.t; 
~1s~ners ~£ war in Ind13. 
~< 
~~ The Iw!inisterS. Tevi~'..zed the pl:':)greso of the thrce-
~1 ~patriat1on under the 'Delhi Agreement ,f August 28, 1973. 
~he1 we:ce gratified thR~ 3uch a large number ot per:;,!)lls dotaiflC-1d 
~ .. stranded in the three c'!)untricR had since r~ached theiJ: 
,0. 
~c1estlna ti~no,_ 
'. 
~ The M1niS""ter~ als", considered st6PS that needed t:) be 
~ . 
. faken in ~rder expeditiously t~ ·bring the pr,ccss ~f the three-
'way repatriation to ·a satisfac-:~ry concJ.usion. 
10. ~he Indian side stated that tee remaining Pakistani 
prieoners ~f war and civilian internees in India to be 
repatria.ted und'er the DeJ.bi Agreement, numbering approximately 
6,500. w~uld be repatriated at th~ usual pace ~f a .t~ain on 
alternate days and t~e likely short-fall due t~ the suspanDi~n 
of trains fr~m April 10 to April 19, 1974 on account or Kumbh 
Mela, would be madc",-\up by running addi t1~nal tl:ft.ins ai"tllr 
April 19. It was thus hoped ·that the r e!latriatlon ~:f prisoners 
of war wo\ad be comvleted by the end ~f April, 1974. 
11. ~he Pakistan side stated that the·rerat.::1ation ,,£ 
Bangl~desh nati.~nals fr,m Pa\:1stan 1.-las· a.pp::~achi.ng .c'lmpleti~n. 
The remaining 'Dangladesh na tL')nals in Pali.istan "/~uld also be 
t&patrt~ted without let ~r hindrance. 
12. In respect of n'Jn-Bangalees ill Eangladeoh, tho 
~a\(1atan Ride eta ted that the Oo~·e.rntl~nt <Jf Paki3tan. ha.d already 
ltaueo. c'!.oaranC'3B f'Jr m~ve!il~nt t~ Pak'ls tan in :t"av~".lr 'J! those 
. . 
n~n-Bangalees wh~ were either d'Jmtci1.ed in !'Jr1t~r ~vest P3ki~tan, 
vera employees ~f the Central G')venlruant and thc~' families or 
\leX'e memberc :)f the d1 vidod. ££l!l'!il ies, irrdSp!!cti · ... e of tb~ir . 
I\: ~~tgin~l d~mic1le. The iSS\lflnC~ .~r clenrnnccD t") 25,000 ners:..no 
\/il~ c'Jnst1 ~te hardship cases was elsfj in p:t"'fl'f.;S8. Tb.~ 
Pakistan sida rei tr:ratcd th~t a.ll th.,~~e- "lh~ f~ll ll.'lder the 
first three ca tegorif::s would be received by Pakistan vIi thout 
anv limit as t~ numbers. In respect ~f per.s~ns whose application . 
.. 
hed been ~ejectedt the Government of Pakistan \'Tould, UpOll 
requ.est, pr~vide reas~ns why any particular case was rejected, 
Any aggrieved applicant could. at any time, seek a revic·,! 'J! 
his application pr~vided he was able t~ supply new facts or 
~urther information to th~ G~vernment of Pakistan in'supp~tt of 
hie c:ln~ention that he qualified ill'olie or other of the three 
categories. The claims of such persons would n~t be time-barred. 
In. the event of the decision of review of a case be1ng.advcr~e 
the Governments of.Pakistan and Bangladesh might seek to 
resolve it by mutual consultation. 
1~. The question ')f 195 Pal,~gtani prisoners of' war ''las 
discussed by the three Ministers, in the conte~t or the earnest 
desire of the G~vernments f~r rec'Jnciliation, peace and 
friendship in the sub-.. pontinent. The Ji'orelgn Minister of 
~angladesh stated that the excesses and mani!~ld crimes 
o~mmitted by these pri30ners ~f war c~nstituted, nccording 
t~. the relevant pr~v1s1ons of the U,N. General As~embly 
ReG~lut1ons and Intern~,ti~nal Lav!, war crimes: cr1mes against 
humanity and genocide" and that there was universal consensus 
that pers~ns charged with such crimes as the 195 Pakistani 
pris~n·ers 'Ji war sh:)uld be held to account :a.nd subjected to 
the due pr~cees of l~w. The Minister ~f State !~r Defance and 
Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan said that his 
Government condemned and deeplY, . regretted any crimes tbt'.t 
may have been committed, 
14. In thi~ connection the three Ministers n~ted that 
the matter should be vie''1ed in the context of the determination 
of the three c~untries to c~ntinue reaolutely t~ ~ork f.or 
rec,)llcilia tion. Tha ~Iinisters furth&r n'Jted that !'Jll'Jwing 
recognition, the Prime Minister of P~kistan had 4e:lared,that 
he \>/~uld visit B?nglade:3h in response J!i:) the 1nvi t~. )iion of the 
Prime Minister ~f Bangladesh ane appealed t~ the pe~p~e ot 
Ba."lglad esh t'J f'J :cgi. ve an '1 .f'~r;,re t the C 1.S t::.ltes .,! th~ pas t: 
• 
L1. ~rtoz to pJ:~c~ te l.."ec'jnc ilia ti~n. S imil<1.~ .. ly, tb.{;: P:r.~i,ne Hln).s ter 
')i Ee.nbllldp.~it had 'declared ~it,h ratIarrl to the atroci ti~a ·n:.d 
deri'truction c!Jro:nittcd in Ban,gladesh j~n 1971 th~t he war..ted 
the pc~ple t~ forget thc,pnst and to make a tresh start, 
at3.ttng.tha~ tha people of Bangladesn knew how to forgive. 
151 In the l1Jht of tne f~rog~ing and, :i.n particular, 
having regard to the appeal ~f tQe Prime Minister of Pakistan 
to the poople of :B~Agladesh t~ forgive and forget the miat~kes' 
J ~f the past, the F')reign Ministe~ ~! Bangladesh stated that 
tr.e G~vcrnment of Eangladeoh had deciden not to proceed with 
the tri~.13 as an act 'Jf, clemency." It, we.s agreed. "ciha.l~ the '195 
"pri:e~ntir9 of wa~ rImy be re!,atr1ated t~ 'Paki.s·t.an Q1.ong wi tlJ. the 
~tner pr1a~nero of war n')w in the process ~!'repatri~tion 
unde~ the Delhi Agreement. 
16. il:ne i.finistero' exprasaed tltei:r. c~llv-icti~n, that -I;he 
ab~ve ag~name!1"ta provide a firm baai:s for th.e res'jlution of tnF! 
h'.lt~eni tn.::1e!I 'P.r~,b19~ a:-iein.g ~ut 'Jf th.e clJn~l.ic"; of 1911. 
·Tha:r reaftuiJ1ed' the vital ~taka the seven hundred Ltil110n 
people of' the tllree c~u."l.tries have in peace and 'Progress 
and 1"01 tera·elld 'th.e rcs-ol v·o. of '~h eir Govarnmen ts to ".:)~~k :!~r 
tb.e "Qr~mc tio:l ~f Jl~rmalisa tion. of r<!!la tiona al\C ~he 
establishment, *Jf 'dur3.bl~. ,peac~ in i;he sub-continent" 
~igned in How Dalhi on April 9, 1971 in three originals, 
each of which is eq':ta1ly authen.tic. 
Sil/-. 
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amnesty international 
COUNTRY 
DOSSIER 3 PAKISTAN 
·Use and abuse of the blasphemy 
laws 
JULY 1994 SUMMARY AI INDEX: ASA 33/08/94 
DISTR: CO/SC 
Several dozen people have been charged with blasphemy in Pakistan over the last .few 
years; in all the cases known to Amnesty International, the charges of blasphemy appear 
to have been arbitrarily brought, founded solely on the individuals' minority religious 
beliefs or on malicious accusations against individuals from the Muslim majority 
community who advocate novel ideas. The available evidence in all these cases suggests 
that charges were brought as a measure to intimidate and punish members of minority 
religious communities or non-confonning members of the majority community; hostility 
towards religious minority groups appeared in many cases to be compounded by personal 
enmity, professional or economic rivalry or a desire to gain political advantage. 
As a consequence, Amnesty International has concluded that most of the 
individuals now facing charges of blasphemy, or convicted on such charges, are 
prisoners of conscience, detained solely for their real or imputed religious. beliefs in 
violation of their right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. . 
The majority of those charged with blasphemy belong to the Ahmadiyya 
community, but Christians have increasingly been accused of blasphemy. Among them 
is a 13 year..old boy who is alleged to have written blasphemous words on the walls of 
a mosque, despite being totally illiterate. 
A common feature of accusations of blasphemy in Pakistan is the manner in which 
they are uncritically accepted by prosecuting authorities, who themselves may face 
intimidation and threats should they fail to accept them. Ill-treatment in custody is 
frequently reported, and may be exacerbated by the emotional manner in which charges 
of blasphemy are brought and publicized and the accused vilified by their accusers. 
Amnesty International is therefore concerned that trial procedures, including pre-trial 
procedures, in cases involving blasphemy charges do not meet international standards· 
for fairness. 
Following legal changes in 1991, the death penalty is the mandatory punishment 
for the offence of blasphemy under section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code. So far, 
two men have been sentenced to death; their appeals are pending. While nobody has so 
far been judicially executed after having been found guilty of blasphemy, at least four 
Christians charged with blasphemy have died, one in suspicious circumstances in jail and 
three at the hands of armed attackers. The changes in legislation relating to religious 
offences have contributed to an atmosphere of religious intolerance in which fanatics 
sometimes consider themselves entitled to take the law into their own hands. On 5 April 
1994, Manzoor Masih, a Christian man charged with blasphemy, was shot dead in 
Lahore; his two co-accused and an escort'were injured. A few days later, a Muslim 
practitioner of indigenous medicine, was stoned to death by a mob which believed him 
to be a Christian and to have burned pages of the Koran. They tried to set his body on 
flfe while he was probably still alive and dragged his dead body through the streets of 
Gujranwala. . 
Amnesty International is gravely concerned that after several recent instances of 
violence against members of the religious minorities or on religiously motivated grounds, 
neither the government nor any Qf the opposition parties have publicly condemned such 
acts and that the government does not appear to have taken all possible measures to 
ensure the safety of members of the religious minorities. 
Amnesty International welcomes the government's recent announcement that steps . 
would be taken to ameqd the p~ code and the code of criminal procedure to curb the 
abuse of the blasphemy laws but is not aware so far of any concrete legislative measures 
having been taken to that end. The organization reiterates its call to the Government of 
Pakistan: 
• to ensure that the laws against blasphemy are not abused to imprison prisoners of 
conscience; 
- to Immediately and unconditionally release such persons who are being held solely 
for the exercise of their right to freedom of religion; 
• to drop the charges of blasphemy against such persons; . 
• to ensure that while the blasphemy laws, espedally section 295-C, remain on the 
statute book, everyone charged with blasphemy receives a fair trial; 
• to ensure the safety of anyone charged with blasphemy and that no such person 
be subjected to any fonn of ill-treatment; . 
• to dedare a moratorium on carrying out the ~eath penalty and to take steps to 
abolish the death penalty for this offence; . 
• and to adopt international standards for the protection of the rights of 
religious minorities and to accede to the relevant international human rights 
Instruments. 
This report summarizes a 30-pagc: document, Pakistan: Us~ and abuse of the blarphemy 
laws .(AI Index: ASA 33/08/94), ISSUed by Amnesty International in July 1994. Anyone 
wanttng further details or to take action on this issue should consult the full document. 
